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ORDEAL BY BATTLE 



MACMILLAN AND CO., Limited 

LONDON . BOMBAY . CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

NEW YORK . BOSTON . CHICAGO 
DALLAS • SAN FBANCISCO 

THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Ltd. 

TORONTO 



ORDEAL BY BATTLE 



BY 

FREDERICK SCOTT OLIVER 



With that they looked upon him, and began to reply 
in this sort: Simple said, / see no danger; Sloth said. 
Yet a little more sleep; and Presumption said, Every Vat 
must stand upon his own bottom. And so they lay down 
to sleep again, and Christian went on his way. 

The Pilgrim's Progress. 



NEW YORK 

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

1916 

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 






COPYRIGHT 

First Edition June 1915 

Reprinted twice June 1015, July 1915 

Second Edition July 1915 

Reprinted twice August 1915, October 1915 






TO 

THE MEMORY OP 

HUGH DAWNAY 

COMMANDING THE 2nd LIFE GUARDS 
WHO WAS KILLED AT ZWARTELEEN ON THE 6th OF NOVEMBER 1914 

AND OF 

JOHN GOUGH, V.C. 

CHIEF OF THE STAFF OF THE FIRST ARMY 
WHO FELL NEAR ESTAIRES ON THE 20th OF FEBRUARY 1915 

THEY WERE BROTHER-OFFICERS OF THE RIFLE BRIGADE 

AND THOSE WHO KNEW THEM BOTH 

WILL OFTEN THINK OF THEM TOGETHER 



PEEFACE 

It is hardly necessary to plead, in extenuation of Preface. 
those many faults which any impartial reader will The 

purpose of 

discover in the following pages, the impossibility of this book, 
discussing events which are unfolding themselves 
around us, in the same detached spirit as if we were 
dealing with past history. The greater part of this 
volume has been written in haste, and no one is more 
alive to its shortcomings than the author himself. 

Faults of style are a small matter, and will be 
easily forgiven. It has not been the aim to produce 
a work of literary merit, but solely to present a 
certain view of public affairs. It is to be hoped 
that actual errors of fact are rare. Inconsistencies 
however — or apparent inconsistencies — cannot be 
altogether avoided, even by careful revision. But 
the greatest difficulty of all is to keep a true sense 
of proportion. 

In Part I. — The Causes of War — an attempt has 
been made to state, very briefly, why it has hitherto 
proved impossible to eliminate the appeal to arms 
from human affairs; to set out the main incidents 
which occurred at the opening of the present Euro- 
pean struggle ; to explain the immediate occasions, as 



x ORDEAL BY BATTLE 

Ordeal well as the more permanent and deep-seated causes, 
Battle, of this conflict ; to consider some of the most glaring 
miscalculations which have arisen out of misunder- 
standing between nations. 

In Part II. — The Spirit of German Policy — an 
attempt has been made to understand the ambitions 
of our chief antagonist, and to trace the manner in 
which these ambitions have been fostered, forced, 
and corrupted by a priesthood of learned men. The 
relations which exist between this Pedantocracy and 
the Bureaucracy, the Army, the Rulers, and the 
People of Germany have been examined. It would 
appear that under an academic stimulus, healthy 
national ambitions have become morbid, have re- 
sulted in the discovery of imaginary grievances, and 
have led the Governing Classes of Germany to adopt 
a new code of morals which, if universally adhered 
to, would make an end of human society. On the 
other hand, it would also appear that the German 
People have accepted the policy of their rulers, with- 
out in any way accepting, or even understanding, 
the morality upon which this policy is founded. It 
is also important for us to realise the nature of the 
judgment — not altogether unjustified — which our 
enemies have passed upon the British character, and 
upon our policy and institutions. 

In Part III. — The Spirit of British Policy — our 
own political course since the beginning of the cen- 
tury has been considered — the difficulties arising out 
of the competition for priority between aims which 



PREFACE xi 

are not in themselves antagonistic: between Social Preface. 
Reform, Constitutional Reform, and Imperial De- The 
fence — the confusion which has resulted from the in- tua book, 
adequacy of one small parliament, elected upon a 
large variety of cross issues, for dealing with these 
diverse needs — the lowering of the tone of public 
life, the depreciation in the character of public men, 
which have come about owing to these two causes, 
and also to a third — the steadily increasing tyranny 
and corruption of the party machines. 

The aim of British Foreign Policy has been simply 
— Security. Yet we have failed to achieve Security, 
owing to our blindness, indolence, and lack of leader- 
ship. We have refused to realise that we were not 
living in the Golden Age; that Policy at the last 
resort depends on Armaments ; that Armaments, to 
be effective for their purpose, must correspond with 
Policy. Political leaders of all parties up to the out- 
break of the present war ignored these essentials ; or 
if they were aware of them, in the recesses of their 
own consciousness, they failed to trust the People 
with a full knowledge of the dangers which threat- 
ened their Security, and of the means by which alone 
these dangers could be withstood. 

The titles of Parts II. and III. are similar — The 
Spirit of German Policy and The Spirit of British 
Policy; but although the titles are similar the treat- 
ment is not the same. Confession of a certain failure 
in proportion must be made frankly. The two pieces 
do not balance. German Policy is viewed from 



xii OBDEAL BY BATTLE 

Ordeal without, at a remote distance, and by an enemy. 

BY 

Battle. It is easier in this case to present a picture which is 
The - " clear, than one which is true. British Policy, on the 
th^book. other hand, is viewed from within. If likewise it 
is tinged with prejudice, the prejudice is of a differ- 
ent character. Both Parts, I fear, diverge to a 
greater or less extent from the main purpose of the 
book. Mere excision is easy; but compression is a 
difficult and lengthy process, and I have not been able 
to carry it so far as I could have wished. 

In Part IV. — Democracy and National Service — 
an attempt has been made to deal with a problem 
which faces us at the moment. Democracy is not 
unlike other human institutions: it will not stand 
merely by its own virtue. If it lacks the loyalty, 
courage, and strength to defend itself when attacked, 
it must perish as certainly as if it possessed no virtue 
whatsoever. Manhood suffrage implies manhood 
service. Without the acceptance of this principle 
Democracy is merely an imposture. 

I prefer 'National Service ' to ' Conscription, ' not 
because I shrink from the word * Conscription, ' but 
because 'National Service' has a wider sweep. The 
greater includes the less. It is not only military 
duties which the State is entitled to command its 
citizens to perform unquestioningly in times of dan- 
ger ; but also civil duties. It is not only men between 
the ages of twenty and thirty-eight to whom the 
State should have the right to give orders ; but men 
and women of all ages. Under conditions of modern 



PREFACE xiii 

warfare it is not only armies which need to be dis- Preface. 
ciplined; but whole nations. The undisciplined na- The 
tion, engaged in anything like an equal contest with t hia book. 
a disciplined nation, will be defeated. 



This volume was in type before the Coalition t** . . 

" *■ Coalition 

Government was formed; but there is nothing in it Govern- 
ment. 

which I wish to change in view of that event. This 
book was not undertaken with the object of helping 
the Unionists back into power, or of getting the 
Liberals out of power. 

The new Cabinet contains those members of the 
late one in whom the country has most confidence. 
Lord Kitchener, Sir Edward Grey, Mr. Lloyd 
George, and Mr. Churchill have all made mistakes. 
In a great crisis it is the bigger characters who are 
most liable to make mistakes. Their superiority im- 
pels them to take risks which the smaller men, play- 
ing always for safety, are concerned to avoid. 

The present Ministry also contains representa- 
tives of that class of politicians which, according to 
the view set forth in the following pages, is primarily 
responsible for our present troubles. Lawyer-states- 
manship, which failed to foresee the war, to prepare 
against it, and to conduct it with energy and thor- 
oughness when it occurred, still occupies a large 
share of authority. Possibly ministers of this school 



The 

Coalition 
Govern- 
ment. 



xiv OEDEAL BY BATTLE 

ordeal will now walk in new ways. In any case, they are 
Battle, no longer in a position of dangerous predominance. 
The Coalition Government, having wisely refused 
to part with any of those men who rose to the 
emergency, and having received an infusion of new 
blood (which may be expected to bring an accession 
of vigour) starts upon its career with the goodwill 
and confidence of the People. 

What has happened, however, is a revolution 
upon an unprecedented scale — one which is likely to 
have vast consequences in the future. The country 
realises this fact, and accepts it as a matter of course 
— accepts it indeed with a sigh of relief. But in 
other quarters, what has just happened is hardly 
realised at all — still less what it is likely to lead to 
in the future. 

During the ' Cabinet Crisis ' one read a good deal 
of stuff in the newspapers, and heard still more by 
word of mouth, which showed how far, during the 
past nine months, public opinion has moved away 
from the professionals of politics ; how little account 
it takes of them; also how much these gentlemen 
themselves mistake the meaning of the present 
situation. 

In political circles one has heard, and read, very 
frequently of late, expressions of regret — on the one 
hand that Unionists should have come to the assist- 
ance of a discredited and bankrupt administration — 
on the other hand that a government, secure in the 
confidence of the country, should, through a mistaken 



PEEFACE xv 

sense of generosity, have admitted its opponents to Preface. 
a share in the glory and prestige of office. One has The 
read, and heard, cavillings at the idea of appointing GoJera- n 
this or that public character to this or that office, as 
a thing beyond what this or that party ' could fairly 
be expected to stand.' Eeports have appeared of 
meetings of 'a hundred' perturbed Liberals; and 
very possibly meetings, though unreported, of 
equally perturbed Unionists have also been held. 
An idea seems still to be prevalent in certain quar- 
ters, that what has just occurred is nothing more 
important than an awkward and temporary disar- 
rangement of the party game; and that this game 
will be resumed, with all the old patriotism and good 
feeling, so soon as war is ended. 

But this appears to be a mistaken view. You 
cannot make a great mix-up of this sort without 
calling new parties into existence. When men are 
thrown into the crucible of a war such as this, the 
true ore will tend to run together, the dross to cake 
upon the surface. No matter to what parties they 
may have originally owed allegiance, the men who 
are in earnest, and who see realities, cannot help but 
come together. May be for several generations the 
annual festivals of the National Liberal Federation 
and the Union of Conservative Associations will 
continue to be held, like other picturesque survivals 
of ancient customs. When Henry VII. was crowned 
at Westminster, the Wars of the Eoses ended; the 
old factions of York and Lancaster were dissolved, 



Govern' 

nieut. 



xvi ORDEAL BY BATTLE 

Ordeal and made way for new associations. Something of 
Battle, the same sort has surely happened during the past 
The - " month — Liberal and Conservative, Radical and Tory 
have ceased for the present to be real divisions. They 
had recently become highly artificial and confusing ; 
now they are gone — it is to be hoped for ever. 

Will the generation which is fighting this war — > 
such of them as may survive — be content to go back 
to the old barren wrangle when it is done? Will 
those others who have lost husbands, sons, brothers, 
friends — all that was dearest to them except the 
honour and safety of their country — will they be 
found willing to tolerate the idea of trusting their 
destinies ever again to the same machines, to be 
driven once more to disaster by the same automa- 
tons ? To all except the automatons themselves — who 
share with the German Supermen the credit of hav- 
ing made this war — any such resumption of business 
on old-established lines appears incredible. There is 
something pathetic in the sight of these huckstering 
sentimentalists still crying their stale wares and 
ancient make-believes at the street corners, while 
their country is fighting for its life. They remind 
one, not a little, of those Pardoners of the fourteenth 
century who, as we read in history books, continued 
to hawk their Indulgences with unabated industry 
during the days of the Black Death. 



PREFACE xvii 

It is necessary to offer a few words of explanation Preface. 
as to how this book came to be written. During The origins 
the months of November and December 1912 and book. 
January 1913, various meetings and discussions took 
place under Lord Roberts's roof and elsewhere, be- 
tween a small number of persons, who held widely 
different views, and whose previous experience and 
training had been as different as were their opinions. 

Our efforts were concerned with endeavouring 
to find answers to several questions which had never 
been dealt with candidly, clearly, and comprehen- 
sively in the public statements of political leaders. 
It was clear that there was no 'national' policy, 
which the British people had grasped, accepted, and 
countersigned, as was the case in France. But some 
kind of British policy there must surely be, notwith- 
standing the fact it had never been disclosed. What 
were the aims of this policy? With what nation or 
nations were these aims likely to bring us into 
collision! What armaments were necessary in order 
to enable us to uphold this policy and achieve these 
aims ? How, and when, and where would our arma- 
ments be required in the event of war? Assum- 
ing (as we did in our discussions) that our naval 
forces were adequate, was the same statement true 
of our military forces? And if it were not true, 
by what means could the necessary increases be 
obtained 1 

The final conclusion at which we arrived was that 
National Service was essential to security. Under 



xviii ORDEAL BY BATTLE 

Ordeal whatever aspect we regarded the problem we always 
battle, returned — even those of us who were most unwilling 
The origins to travel in that direction — to the same result. So 
book! 3 long as Britain relied solely upon the voluntary prin- 
ciple, we should never possess either the Expedi- 
tionary Force or the Army for Home Defence which 
were requisite for safety. 

It fell to me during the winter 1912-1913 to draft 
the summary of our conclusions. It was afterwards 
decided — in the spring of 1913 — that this private 
Memorandum should be recast in a popular form 
suitable for publication. I was asked to undertake 
this, and agreed to do so. But I underestimated 
both the difficulties of the task and the time which 
would be necessary for overcoming them. 

When we met again, in the autumn, of that year, 
the work was still far from complete, and by that 
time, not only public attention, but our own, had 
become engrossed in other matters. The Irish con- 
troversy had entered upon a most acute and danger- 
ous stage. Lord Roberts put off the meetings which 
he had arranged to address during the ensuing 
months upon National Service, and threw his whole 
energies into the endeavour to avert the schism 
which threatened the nation, and to find a way to 
a peaceful settlement. Next to the security and 
integrity of the British Empire I verily believe that 
the thing which lay nearest his heart was the happi- 
ness and unity of Ireland. 

It is needless to recall how, during the ensuing 



PREFACE xix 

months, affairs in Ireland continued to march from Preface. 
bad to worse — up to the very day when the menace The origins 
of the present war suddenly arose before the eyes of book! 8 
Europe. 

During August 1914 I went through the old drafts 
and memoranda which had now been laid aside for 
nearly a year. Although that very thing had hap- 
pened which it had been the object of our efforts 
to avert, it seemed to me that there might be ad- 
vantages in publishing some portion of our conclu- 
sions. The form, of course, would have to be entirely 
different; for the recital of prophecies which had 
come true, though it might have possessed a certain 
interest for the prophets themselves, could have but 
little for the public. 

Early in September I consulted Lord Roberts, 
and also such of my friends, who had originally 
worked with me, as were still within reach. Finding 
that their opinion agreed with my own upon the de- 
sirability of publication, I laid out a fresh scheme, 
and set to for a third time at the old task. But as the 
work grew, it became clear that it would contain but 
little of the former Memorandum, and much which 
the former Memorandum had never contemplated. 
So many of our original conclusions, laboriously 
hammered out to convince the public in the spring 
of the year 1913, had become by the autumn of 1914, 
the most trite of commonplaces. And as for the 
practical scheme which we had evolved — endeavour- 
ing to keep our demands at the most modest mini- 



of this 
book. 



xx ORDEAL BY BATTLE 

Ordeal nrnm — it was interesting chiefly by reason of its 
Battle, triviality when contrasted with the scale of warlike 
The origins preparations upon which the Government was now 
engaged. Practically, therefore, the whole of the 
present volume is new — not merely redrafted, but 
for the most part new in substance. 



The I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to the 

author's , . 

acknow- friends with whom I have studied the problems ot 
policy and defence for some years past. The re- 
sponsibility for the contents and publication of the 
present volume is mine alone ; but I have used their 
ideas without hesitation, and have drawn largely 
upon the notes and memoranda which they drafted 
for my assistance. I wish also to thank several 
others — one in chief — for the kindness with which, 
upon the present occasion, they have given me help 
and criticism as these pages were passing through 
the press. 

There is also another source to which I wish here 
gratefully to confess my obligations. During the 
past five years there have appeared in The Round 
Table certain articles upon the relations of England 
with Germany 1 which have been characterised by 

1 The Bound Table (quarterly Review). Macmillan & Co., Ltd. Of 
the articles referred to the chief are: 'Anglo-German Rivalry' (Novem- 
ber 1910); 'Britain, France, and Germany' (December 1911); 'The 
Balkan War and the Balance of Power' (June 1913) ; 'Germany and 
the Prussian Spirit' (September 1914); 'The Schism of Europe' 
(March 1915). It is to be hoped that these and some others may be 
republished before long in a more permanent form. 



PEEFACE xxi 

a remarkable degree of prescience and sanity. At Preface. 
a certain point, however, there is a difference be- The 
tween the views expressed in The Round Table and ac know- 
those expressed in the following pages — a difference e gm ' 
of stress and emphasis perhaps, rather than of fun- 
damental opinion, but still a difference of some im- 
portance. I have dealt with this in the concluding 
chapter. 

I should like to make one other acknowledgment 
of a different kind. I have known the editor of The 
National Review from a date long before he assumed 
his onerous office — from days when we were fresh- 
men together by the banks of the Cam. During a 
period of upwards of thirty years, I cannot remem- 
ber that I have ever had the good fortune to see abso- 
lutely eye to eye with Mr. Maxse upon any public 
question. Even now I do not see eye to eye with him. 
In all probability I never shall. At times his views 
have been in sharp opposition to my own. But for 
these very reasons — if he will not resent it as an im- 
pertinence — I should like to say here how greatly I 
respect him for three qualities, which have been none 
too common among public men in recent times — 
first, for the clearness with which he grasps and 
states his beliefs ; secondly, for the courageous con- 
stancy with which he holds to them through good and 
evil report ; thirdly, for the undeviating integrity of 
his public career. Next to Lord Roberts, he did 
more perhaps than any other — though unavailingly 
— to arouse public opinion to the dangers which 



xxii ORDEAL BY BATTLE 

Ordeal menaced it from German aggression, to call attention 
Battle, to the national nnpreparedness, and to denounce 
the blindness and indolence which treated all warn- 
ings with derision. 



The 

author's 
acknow- 
ledgments 



Lord 
Roberts. 



Lord Roberts's responsibility for the contents 
of this volume, as for its publication at the present 
time, is nil. And yet it would never have been 
undertaken in the first instance except at his wish, 
nor re-undertaken in September last without his 
encouragement. There are probably a good many 
besides myself who owe it to his inspiration, that 
they first made a serious attempt to study policy 
and defence as two aspects of a single problem. I 
also owe to him many things besides this. 

The circumstances of Lord Roberts's death were 
befitting his character and career. The first great 
battle of Ypres was ended. The British line had held 
its own against tremendous odds of men and guns. 
He had no doubt of the ultimate result of the war, 
and during his visit to France and Flanders inspired 
all who saw him by the quiet confidence of his words 
and manner. After the funeral service at Headquar- 
ters a friend of his and mine wrote to me describing 
the scene. The religious ceremony had taken place 
in the entrance hall of the Mairie at St. Omer. It was 
a day of storms ; but as the coffin was borne out "the 



PREFACE xxiii 

' sun appeared, and made a magnificent rainbow on a Preface. 
'great black block of cloud across the square; and Lord 
'an airman flew across from the rainbow into the 
1 sunlight. ' ' 

If I were asked to name Lord Roberts's highest 
intellectual quality I should say unhesitatingly that 
it was his instinct. And if I were asked to name his 
highest moral quality I should say, also unhesi- 
tatingly, that it was the unshakeable confidence with 
which he trusted his instinct. But the firmness of 
his trust was not due in the least to self-conceit, or 
arrogance, or obstinacy. He obeyed his instinct 
as he obeyed his conscience — humbly and devoutly. 
The dictates of both proceeded from the same source. 
It was not his own cleverness which led him to his 
conclusions, but the hand of Providence which drew 
aside a veil, and enabled him to see the truth. What 
gave him his great strength in counsel, as in the 
field, was the simple modesty of his confi- 
dence. 

He was a poor arguer; I think argument was 
painful to him; also that he regarded it as a sad 
waste of the short span of human life. It was not 
difficult to out-argue him. Plausible and perspica- 
cious persons often left him, after an interview, 
under the firm impression that they had convinced 
him. But as a rule, he returned on the morrow to 
his old opinion, unless his would-be converters had 
brought to his notice new facts as well as new argu- 
ments. 



Lord 
Roberta. 



xxiv ORDEAL BY BATTLE 

Ordeal He arrived at an opinion neither hastily nor slow- 
Battle. ly> but at a moderate pace. He had the gift of stat- 
ing his conclusion with admirable lucidity ; and if he 
thought it desirable, he gave the reasons for his view 
of the matter with an equal clearness. But his rea- 
sons, like his conclusion, were in the nature of state- 
ments ; they were not stages in an argument. There 
are as many unanswerable reasons to be given for 
as against most human decisions. Ingenuity and 
eloquence are a curse at councils of war, and state, 
and business. Indeed, wherever action of any kind 
has to be determined upon they are a curse. It was 
Lord Roberts 's special gift that, out of the medley of 
unanswerable reasons, he had an instinct for select- 
ing those which really mattered, and keeping his 
mind close shut against the rest. 

It is superfluous to speak of his courtesy of man- 
ner and kindness of heart, or of his unflagging devo- 
tion — up till the very day of his death — to what he 
regarded as his duty. There is a passage in Urqu- 
hart's translation of Rabelais which always recalls 
him to my mind: — He was the best little great good 
man that ever girded a sword on his side; he took 
all things in good part, and interpreted every action 
in the best sense. In a leading German newspaper 
there appeared, a few days after his death, the fol- 
lowing reference to that event : — ' ' It was not given 
'to Lord Roberts to see the realisation of his dreams 
'of National Service; but the blows struck on the 
'Aisne were hammer-strokes which might after a 



PREFACE xxv 

' long time and bitter need produce it. Lord Roberts Preface. 
1 was an honourable and, through his renown, a dan- Lord 

Roberts. 

'gerous enemy . . . personally an extraordinarily 
'brave enemy. Before such a man we lower our 
'swords, to raise them again for new blows dealt 
'with the joy of conflict." 

Nor was this the only allusion of the kind which 
figured in German newspapers 'to the journey of 
'an old warrior to Walhalla,' with his final mission 
yet unaccomplished, but destined to be sooner or 
later accomplished, if his country was to survive. 
In none of these references, so far as I have been 
able to discover, was there the least trace of malice 
against the man who had warned his fellow-country- 
men, more clearly than any other, against the pre- 
meditated aggression of Germany. This seems very 
strange when we recollect how, for nearly two years 
previously, a large section of the British nation 
had been engaged in denouncing Lord Roberts for 
the outrageous provocations which he was alleged 
to have offered to Germany — in apologising to Ger- 
many for his utterances — in suggesting the propriety 
of depriving him of his pension in the interests of 
Anglo-German amity. What this section has 
itself earned in the matter of German grati- 
tude we know from many hymns and other effusions 
of hate. 



Ordeal 

by 
Battle. 

Hugh 
Dawnay 
and Johm 
Gough. 



xxvi ORDEAL BY BATTLE 

I have dedicated this volume to the memory of 
John Gough and Hugh Dawnay, not solely on 
grounds of friendship, but also because from both I 
received, at different times, much help, advice, and 
criticism — from the latter when the original Mem- 
orandum was in course of being drafted — from both 
when it was being reconsidered with a view to publi- 
cation. Whether either of them would have agreed 
with the statement in its present form is more than 
I can venture to say, and I have no intention of claim- 
ing their authority for conclusions which were never 
seen by them in final shape. 

In the first instance (November 1912-March 1913) 
Dawnay x and I worked together. His original notes 
and memoranda are to a large extent incorporated 
in Parts III. and IV. — so closely, however, that 
I cannot now disentangle his from my owm. The 
calculations as to numbers and probable distribution 
of the opposing forces, were almost entirely his. I 
have merely endeavoured here — not so successfully 
as I could wish — to bring them up to the date of the 
outbreak of war. 

Dawnay took out his squadron of the 2nd Life 
Guards to France early in August. Already, how- 
ever, he had been appointed to the Headquarters 
General Staff, on which he served with distinction, 
until early in October, when he succeeded to the 

1 Major the Hon. Hugh Dawnay, D.S.O., 6. 1875; educated Eton 
and Sandhurst; Eifle Brigade, 1895; Nile Campaign and Omdurman, 
1898; South Africa, 1899-1900; Somaliland, 1908-1910; 2nd Life 
Guards, 1912; France, August-November 1914. 



Gough. 



PREFACE xxvii 

command of his regiment. He fell at Zwarteleen near Preface. 
Ypres on the 6th of November 1914 — one of the most Hugh 
anxious days during the four weeks ' battle. and John 

His friends have mourned his death, but none 
of them have grudged it; for he died, not merely 
as a brave man should — in the performance of his 
duty — but after having achieved, with consummate 
skill and daring, his part in an action of great im- 
portance. On the afternoon of this day General 
Kavanagh's Brigade of Household Cavalry 1 — sum- 
moned in haste — dismounted, and threw back a Ger- 
man attack which had partially succeeded in pierc- 
ing the allied line at the point of junction between 
the French and English forces. This successful 
counter-attack saved the right flank of Lord Cavan's 
Guards' Brigade from a position of extreme danger, 
which must otherwise, almost certainly, have result- 
ed in a perilous retreat. The whole of this Homeric 
story is well worth telling, and some day it may be 
told ; but this is not the place. 

Dawnay was fortunate inasmuch as he lost his 
life, not as so many brave men have done in this war 
— and in all others — by a random bullet, or as the 
result of somebody's blunder, or in an attempt which 
failed. On the contrary he played a distinguished, 
and possibly a determining part, in an action which 
succeeded, and the results of which were fruitful. 

He was not merely a brave and skilful soldier 

1 This Brigade was known during the battle of Ypres as ' the Fire 
Brigade,' for the reason that it was constantly being called up on a 
sudden to extinguish unforeseen conflagrations. 



Dawnay 
and John 
Gough. 



xxviii ORDEAL BY BATTLE 

Ordeal when it came to push of pike, but a devoted student 
Battle, of his profession in times of peace. The mixture 
Hugh of eagerness and patience with which he went about 
his work reminded one, not a little, of that same 
combination of qualities as is met with sometimes 
among men of science. 

Hunting accidents, the privations of Ladysmith 
followed by enteric, divers fevers contracted in hot 
climates, and the severity of a campaign in Somali- 
land, had severely tried his constitution — which al- 
though vigorous and athletic was never robust — and 
had increased a tendency to headaches and neuralgia 
to which he had been subject ever since boyhood. 
Yet he treated pain always as a despicable enemy, 
and went about his daily business as indefatigably 
when he was in suffering, as when he was entirely 
free from it, which in later years was but rarely. 

Dawnay had a very quick brain, and held his views 
most positively. It was sometimes said of him that 
he did not suffer fools gladly, and this was true up 
to a point. He was singularly intolerant of pre- 
sumptuous fools, who laid down the law about mat- 
ters of which they were wholly ignorant, or who — 
having acquired a smattering of second-hand know- 
ledge — proceeded to put their ingenious and sophisti- 
cal theories into practice. But for people of much 
slower wits than himself — if they were trying hon- 
estly to arrive at the truth — he was usually full of 
sympathy. His tact and patience upon great occa- 
sions were two of his noblest qualities. 



PEEFACE xxix 

In some ways lie used to remind me, not a little, Preface. 
of Colonel Henry Esmond of Castlewood, Virginia. Hugh 
In both there was the same hard core of resistance an< i j0 hn 
against anything, which appeared to challenge cer- Goug ' 
tain adamantine principles concerning conduct befit- 
ting a gentleman. On such matters he was exceed- 
ingly stiff and unyielding. And he resembled the 
friend of Lord Bolingbroke, and General Webb, and 
Dick Steele also in this, that he was addicted to the 
figure of irony when crossed in discussion. One im- 
agines, however, that Colonel Esmond must have 
kept his countenance better, and remained imper- 
turbably grave until his shafts had all gone home. In 
Dawnay's case the sight of his opponent's lengthen- 
ing face was, as a rule, too much for his sense of hu- 
mour, and the attack was apt to lose some of its force 
— certainly all its fierceness — in a smile which remind- 
ed one of Carlyle 's description — ' sunlight on the sea. ' 

The following extract from a letter written by 
one of his friends who had attended the War Service 
at St. Paul's gives a true picture : "A sudden vision 
'arose in my imagination of Hugh Dawnay striding 
'down the choir, in full armour, like St. Michael — 
'with his head thrown back, and that extraordinary 
'expression of resolution which he always seemed to 
'me to possess more than any one I have ever seen. 
'His wide-apart eyes had more of the spirit of truth 
'in them than almost any — also an intolerance of 
'falsehood — or rather perhaps a disbelief in its ex- 
istence. . . ." This is true. He was one of that 



Ordeal 

by 
Battle. 

Hugh 
Dawnay 
and John 
Gough. 



xxx OBDEAL BY BATTLE 

race of men whose recumbent figures are seen in 
our old churches and cathedrals, with hands clasp- 
ing crusaders' swords against their breasts, their 
hounds couching at their feet. 

In physique and temperament Hugh Dawnay and 
John Gough 1 were in most respects as unlike a pair 
of friends as ever walked this earth; but we might 
have searched far before we could have found two 
minds which, on most matters connected with their 
profession, were in more perfect accord. Dawnay, 
younger by four years, had served under Gough in 
trying times, and regarded him (an opinion which 
is very widely shared by seniors as well as juniors) 
as one of the finest soldiers of his age. Though 
Dawnay was slender and of great height, while 
Gough was rather below the middle stature, broad 
and firmly knit, there was one striking point of 
physical resemblance between them, in the way their 
heads were set upon their shoulders. There was 
something in the carriage of both which seemed to 
take it for granted that they would be followed 
wherever they might choose to lead. In Lord Eoberts, 
and also in a strikingly different character — Mr. 
Chamberlain — there was the same poise, the same 
stable equilibrium, without a trace in it of self- 
consciousness or constraint. It may be that the 

Brigadier-General John Edmund Gough, V.C., C.M.G., C.B., A.D.C. 
to the King; b. 1871; educated Eton and Sandhurst; Eifle Brigade, 
1892; British Central Africa, 1896-1897; Nile Campaign and Omdur- 
man, 1898; South Africa, 1899-1902; Somaliland, 1902-1903 and 1908- 
1909; France, August 1914-February 1915. 



PREFACE xxxi 

habit of command induces this bearing in a man; Preface. 
or it may be that there is something in the nature of Hugh 

. Dawnay 

the man who bears himself thus which forces him and John 

Gough. 

to become a leader. 

Gough took no part in the preparation of the 
original Memorandum; but in March 1913 he dis- 
cussed it with me 1 and made various criticisms 
and suggestions, most of which have been incorporat- 
ed here. His chief concern with regard to all pro- 
posals for a National Army was, that the period of 
training should be sufficient to allow time for turning 
the average man into a soldier who had full confi- 
dence in himself. "When war breaks out" — I can 
hear his words — "it's not recruits we want: it's sol- 
'diers we want: that is, if our object is to win the 
'war as speedily as possible, and to lose as few lives 
'as possible." Under normal peace conditions he put 
this period at a minimum of two years for infantry ; 
but of course he would have admitted — and did, 
in fact, admit when I saw him last December — that 
under the stress and excitement of war the term 
might be considerably shortened. 

His chief concern in 1913 was with regard to short- 
age of officers. He criticised with great severity the 
various recent attempts at reforming our military 

1 At St. Jean de Luz, when he was endeavouring, though not very 
successfully, to shake off the after-effects of his last Somaliland cam- 
paign. He was then engaged in correcting the proofs of the volume of 
his Staff College lectures which was subsequently published under the 
title Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville (Rees) — a most vivid and 
convincing narrative. In the intervals of work and golf he spent much 
of his time in visiting Wellington's adjacent battlefields and studying 
his passage of the Bidassoa and forcing of the Pyrenees. 



xxxu 



ORDEAL BY BATTLE 



Ordeal 

BY 

Battle. 

Hugh 
Dawnay 
and Joh* 

Gough. 



system, not only on the ground that we had chosen 
to rely upon training our national forces after war 
had actually broken out (in his view a most disas- 
trous decision) ; but also because we had not taken 
care to provide ourselves against the very emergency 
which was contemplated, by having a reserve of offi- 
cers competent to undertake the training of the new 
army in case of need. 

I went to see him at Aldershot on the Friday be- 
fore war was declared, and found, as I expected, that 
he regarded it as inevitable. He had undergone a 
very severe operation in the early summer, and was 
still quite unfit to stand the strain of hard exercise. 
It had been arranged that we were to go together, 
a few days later, to Sweden, for six weeks ' shooting 
and fishing in the mountains. He was very anxious 
to return to England for the September manoeuvres. 
His surgeon, 1 however, forbade this, on the ground 
that even by that time he would not be fit to sit 
for a whole day in the saddle. 

He was in two moods on this occasion. He was as 
light-hearted as a boy who is unexpectedly released 
from school ; the reason being that the Army Medical 
Officer had that morning passed him as physically fit 
to go abroad with Sir Douglas Haig, to whom he had 
acted as Senior Staff Officer since the previous autumn. 

1 Gough 's many friends will ever feel a double debt of gratitude to 
that distinguished surgeon, Sir Berkeley Moynihan, who by this opera- 
tion restored him, after several years of ill-health and suffering, almost 
to complete health; and who once again — when by a strange coinci- 
dence of war he found his former patient lying in the hospital at 
Estaires the day after he was brought in wounded — came to his aid, 
and all but achieved the miracle of saving his life. 



PREFACE xxxiii 

His other mood was very different. The war Preface. 
which he had foreseen and dreaded, the war which Hugh 
in his view might have been avoided upon one con- and John 
dition, and one only — if England had been prepared 
— had come at last. I don 't think I have ever known 
any one — certainly never any anti-militarist — whose 
hatred and horror of war gave the same impression 
of intensity and reality as his. Not metaphorically, 
but as a bare fact, his feelings with regard to it were 
too deep for words; he would suddenly break off 
speaking about things which had occurred in his 
own experience; in particular, about loss of friends 
and comrades. He was an Irishman, and had not 
the impassive coldness of some of the great soldiers. 
But most of all he hated war when it was not in- 
evitable — when with foresight and courage it might 
have been averted — as in his opinion this war might 
have been. 

In radium there is said to be a virtue which 
enables it to affect adjacent objects with its own 
properties, and to turn them, for a time, and for 
certain purposes, into things of the same nature 
as itself. Certain rare human characters possess a 
similar virtue; but although I have met with several 
of these in my life, there is none of them all who 
seemed to me to possess this quality in quite so high* 
a degree as Gough. He was an alchemist who made 
fine soldiers out of all sorts and conditions of men, 
and whose spirit turned despondency out of doors. 

The clearness of his instinct and the power of his 



xxxiv OEDEAL BY BATTLE 

Ordeal mind were not more remarkable than his swiftness 
Battle, of decision and indomitable will. There are scores — 
Hugh probably hundreds — of young officers who fought 
fndXL by his side, or under him, at Ypres and elsewhere, 
Gough ' who years hence, when they are themselves dis- 
tinguished — perhaps great and famous — and come, 
in the evening of their days, to reckon up and con- 
sider the influences which have shaped their careers, 
will place his influence first. And there are boys 
looking forward to the day when they shall be old 
enough to serve in the King's Army, chiefly from 
the love and honour in which they held this hero, 
with his winning smile and superb self-confidence. 

He has left behind him a tradition, if ever man 
did. You will find it everywhere, among young and 
old — among all with whom he ever came into touch. 
Nor is the tradition which he has left merely among 
soldiers and with regard to the art of war, but also 
in other spheres of private conduct and public life. 
He had strong prejudices as well as affections, which 
made him sometimes judge men unfairly, also on 
the other hand too favourably; but he banished 
all meanness from his neighbourhood, all thoughts 
of self-interest and personal advancement. Duty, 
discipline, self-discipline, and the joy of life — these 
were the rules he walked by ; and if you found your- 
self in his company you had perforce to walk with 
him, keeping up with his stride as best you could. 

We value our friends for different qualities, and 
would have their tradition fulfil itself in different 



PREFACE xxxv 

ways. Those of us who counted these two — 'John- Preface. 

nie' Gough and Hugh Dawnay — among our friends Hugh 

will wish that our sons may be like them, and follow and John 
in their footsteps. 

F. S. 0. 

Checkendon Court, Oxfordshire, 
1st June 1915. 



Gougb. 



ORDEAL BY BATTLE 

PART I 

PAGE 

The Causes of War ...... 1 

PAET n 
The Spirit of German Policy ..... 85 

PAET III 
The Spirit of British Policy ..... 179 

PART rv 
Democracy and National Service .... 307 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAKT I 
THE CAUSES OF WAR 



CHAPTER I 

PEACE AND "WAR 

Peace is the greatest of British interests . 
Peaceful intentions will not ensure peace 
Futility of Pacifism 
Causes of wars in general . 
Causes of the American Civil War 
Influence of ideas of duty and self-sacrifice 



PAGE 

1 
2 
6 
8 
10 
11 



CHAPTER H 

THE OUTBREAK OP WAR 

July-August 1914 

Reality or illusion . 

The Serajevo murders 

Austria and Servia 

English efforts to preserve peace 

Mobilisation in Germany and Russia 

Questions of neutrality 

German Army enters Luxemburg, Belgium, and France 

General conflagration .... 



13 
15 
16 

17 
18 
19 
19 
20 
20 



XXXV111 



ORDEAL BY BATTLE 



CHAPTER III 

WHO WANTED WAE? 

PAGE 

Why did war occur? . . . . . .22 

Servia did not want war . . . . . .22 

Neither did Eussia or France . . . . .23 

Nor Belgium or England ... . . .25 

Austria wanted war with Servia alone . . . .26 

Germany encouraged Austria to bring on war . . .29 

Germany desired war believing that England would remain 

neutral ........ 29 

Austrian eleventh-hour efforts for peace frustrated by Germany 30 
Sir Edward Grey's miscalculation . . . .31 

M. Sazonof thought war could have been avoided by plain 

speaking . . . . . . .32 

Sir Edward Grey 's reasons against plain speaking . . 33 

Which was right? ....... 34 



CHAPTER TV 

THE PENALTY OF NEGLIGENCE 

Was war inevitable? ..... 

Not if England had been prepared morally and materially 
Previous apprehensions of war .... 
Peculiar characteristics of German animosity 
British public opinion refused to treat it seriously 



36 
37 
38 
39 
40 



CHAPTER V 



PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY 

Who actually caused the conflagration? . 
Influence of the Professors, Press, and People of Germany 
Influence of the Court, Army, and Bureaucracy . 
Various political characters .... 

The Kaiser ....... 

There was no master-spirit .... 



42 
43 
44 
46 
48 
51 



CONTENTS 



XXXIX 



CHAPTER VI 



GERMAN MISCALCULATIONS 



Hero-worship and sham super-men 

The Blunders of Bureaucracy 

As to the time-table of the war . 

As to the quality of the French Army 

As to the opinion of the world . 

As to the treatment of Belgium . 

As to British neutrality 

As to the prevalence of Pacifism in England 

As to Civil War in Ireland 

As to rebellion in South Africa . 

As to Indian sedition 

As to the spirit of the self-governing Dominions 

Lack of instinct and its consequences 



PAGE 

53 
55 
55 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
62 
64 
65 
67 
67 



CHAPTEE VII 



INTERNATIONAL ILL-WILL 



Great events do not proceed from small causes 

German hatred of England 

This is the German people 's war 

Their illusion that England brought it about 

Difficulties in the way of international understanding 

British and German diplomacy compared 

German distrust and British indifference 

British policy as it appears to German eyes 

Vacillation mistaken for duplicity 

German policy as it appears to British eyes 



69 
70 
71 
73 
73 
74 
78 
79 
80 
81 



PAET II 
THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY 



CHAPTER I 

THE BISMARCKIAN EPOCH 



National dreams 
1789 and after 



87 
87 



xl 



OEDEAL BY BATTLE 



The first German dream — Union 
How it was realised 
What the world thought of it 
Material development in Germany 
The peace policy of Bismarck 



89 
90 
91 
92 



CHAPTER II 



AFTEE BISMARCK 



Nightmares and illusions . 

Grievances against England, France, and Eussia 

The second German dream — Mastery of the World 

Absorption of Belgium, Holland, and Denmark 

The Austro-Hungarian inheritance 

The Balkan peninsula 

Turkey in Asia .... 

German diplomacy at Constantinople 

The Baghdad Railway 

The hoped-for fruits of 'inevitable' wars 

The possession of Africa . 

The Chinese Empire 



94 
96 

97 

98 

98 

99 

100 

101 

102 

103 

103 

104 



CHAPTER III 



THE GERMAN PROJECT OP EMPIRE 



Qualities of the German vision 

Symmetry and vastness are dangerous ideals 

Frederick the Great and Bismarck 

German predisposition to follow dreamers 

Grotesque proportions of the Second German -dream 

The two Americas ..... 

Pacifism and Militarism meet at infinity . 



106 
107 
108 
10S 
109 
110 
111 



CHAPTER IV 
THE NEW MORALISTS 

Germany goes in search of an ethical basis 
Special grievances against France and England 
German thinkers recast Christian morals . 



113 
114 
115 



CONTENTS 

Heinrich von Treitschke .... 
The principle of the state is power 
Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche 
His contempt for British and Prussian ideals . 
General von Bernhardi .... 

New morality never accepted by the German people 
Thrown over even by 'the brethren' when war occurred 
Causes of this apostasy . 



xli 

PAGE 

116 
117 
118 
119 
122 
123 
124 
126 



CHAPTER V 



THE STATECRAFT OP A PRIESTHOOD 

German education a drill system . 
Intellectuals are ranged on the government side 
Eighteenth-century France and modern Germany 
Contrast between their bureaucracies 
Between the attitude of their intellectuals 
Between their fashions of fancy dress 
Dangers to civilisation from within and without 
Political thinkers are usually destructive . 
Unfitness of priesthoods for practical affairs 
Contrast between priests and lawyers 
Natural affinity between soldiers and priests 
Unforeseen consequences of German thoroughness 
May lead ultimately to ostracism of Germany 
Types of German agents . 
Treacherous activities in time of peace . 
The German political creed 
The true aim of this war . 



127 
129 
129 
130 
131 
131 
132 
133 
135 
137 
139 
140 
140 
141 
142 
144 
146 



CHAPTER VI 

THE DEVIL'S ADVOCATE 

Intelligence and enterprise of the Germans . . . 149 

They are nevertheless devoted to their own institutions . 150 

German system is not reactionary but the reverse . . 151 

Experts are honoured and trusted .... 151 

German esteem for men of learning .... 152 

And for the military caste ..... 153 



xlii 



ORDEAL BY BATTLE 



PAGE 

And for their Kaiser ...... 155 

German contempt for party government .... 156 

And for the character of British official news . . . 157 

And for the failure of the British Government to trust the people 160 

And for its fear of asking the people to make sacrifices . 161 

And for the voluntary system ..... 162 

Their pride in the successes of German arms . . . 163 

And in the number and spirit of their new levies . . 163 

Which they contrast with British recruiting . . . 164 

The methods of which they despise .... 165 

What is meant by 'a popular basis' of government? . . 166 



CHAPTER VII 

THE CONFLICTS OF SYSTEMS AND IDEAS 

Two issues between England and Germany . . . 167 

Democracy cannot endure unless capable of self-defence . 168 

Democracy good and bad ...... 169 

Self-criticism may be carried too far .... 171 

The two dangers of democracy — German Arms and German Ideas 173 
Fundamental opposition between the spirit of German policy and 

our own ........ 173 

German people have not accepted the moral ideas of their priest- 
hood ........ 174 

Eecantation among 'the brethren' themselves on outbreak of 

war ........ 175 

The cult of war ....... 176 



part in 

THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 



CHAPTER I 

A REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD (JANUARY 1901-JULY 1914) 

In this war Democracy is fighting for its existence 
Against highly organised materialism 



181 
183 



CONTENTS 



xliii 



The opening of the twentieth century 

Spirit of constitutional change 

Disappearance of great figures from the scene 

Change in character of the House of Commons 

Dearth of leadership 

Consequent demoralisation of parti 

And widespread anxiety 

Pre-eminence of Mr. Asquith 

His Parliamentary supremacy 

His maxim — wait-and-see 

Character of his oratory . 

Increasing prominence of lawyers in politics 

Their influence on Parliamentary institutions and national policy 

Mr. Asquith 's limitations ...... 



186 
188 
189 
192 
194 
195 
196 
197 
198 
199 
199 
200 
201 
203 



CHAPTER II 

THREE GOVERNING IDEAS 

Situation at the death of Queen Victoria 

Comfort and security are not synonymous 

Two problems absorbed public attention 

Social and Constitutional Reform 

A third problem, security, was overlooked 

Social Reform intrinsically the most important 

The urgent need of peace . 

Earnestness of public opinion 

How it was baulked by circumstances 

Limitations of popular judgment 

Want of leadership . 

Strangulation of sincerity by party system 

The artificial opposition of three great ideas 



207 
208 
209 
209 
210 
211 
212 
212 
213 
214 
216 
218 
221 



CHAPTER III 

POLICY AND ARMAMENTS 

The aim of British policy .... 
Organised and unorganised defences 
Policy depends on armaments, armaments on policy 
Difficulty of keeping these principles in mind . 



223 
223 
225 
226 



xliv 



OEDEAL BY BATTLE 



PAGE 

Diplomacy to-day depends more than ever on armaments . 228 

The sad example of China ..... 229 

Policy should conform to national needs . . . 230 

Dangers threatening British security (1901-1914) . . 231 

The Committee of Imperial Defence .... 232 

Eeasons of its comparative failure .... 234 

Parliament and the people were left uneducated . . 235 

Naval preparations were adequate .... 236 

Military preparations were absurdly inadequate . . 237 
Our Foreign policy rested on an entirely false assumption as 

regards the adequacy of our Army .... 238 



CHAPTER TV 



THE BALANCE OF POWER 

Security required that we should take account of Europe . 241 

German aim — the suzerainty of Western Europe . . 243 

Maintenance of the Balance of Power .... 244 

This is the unalterable condition of British security . . 245 

This need produced the Triple Entente .... 247 

Splendid isolation no longer compatible with security . . 249 

Meaning of a defensive war ..... 249 

Defence of north-eastern frontier of France essential to British 

security ........ 250 



CHAPTER V 

THE MILITARY SITUATION (AUGUST 1911) 

The British 'Expeditionary Force' .... 252 

Numbers as a test of adequacy ..... 253 

Relations of Italy with Germany and Austria in event of war . 254 

Troops for defence of coasts and neutral frontiers . . 256 

Germany must hold Russia in cheek with superior numbers . 256 

Germany would then endeavour to crush France . . 257 

Having a superiority of 500,000 men available for this purpose 257 

Why neutrality of Holland was a German interest . . 258 

Why neutrality of Belgium was an obstacle to Germany . 259 

Inadequacy of our own Army to turn the scales . . 260 

Our armaments did not correspond with our policy . . 261 



CONTENTS xlv 

PAGE 

Ministerial confidence in the 'voluntary system' . .261 

Three periods of war — the onset, the grip, and the drag . 263 

In 1870 the onset decided the issue .... 264 

By 1914 the power of swift attack had increased . . 265 

Forecasts confirmed by experience (Aug.-Sept. 1914) . . 266 

Immense value of British sea-power .... 266 

No naval success, however, can win a European war . . 267 

Naval supremacy not the only essential to British security . 268 

CHAPTER VI 

THE MILITARY SITUATION (AUGUST 1914) 

Changes between August 1911 and August 1914 . . 269 

Sensational German increases in 1913 took full effect within 

a year ........ 270 

Inability of France to counter this effort unaided . . 270 

French increase could not take effect till 1916 . . . 271 

Russian and Austrian increases . . . . .272 

No attempt to increase British Army though it is below strength 273 
Balkan wars (1912-1913) . . . . . .273 

Their effect on Balance of Power .... 274 

Reasons why they did not lead to general conflagration . 275 

Germany's two dates: June 1914 — June 1916 . . . 275 

CHAPTER VII 

A TRAGEDY OP ERRORS 

Why should we suspect Germany of evil intentions? . . 277 

The German Fleet was a challenge to British security . . 278 

Candour of German publicists ..... 278 

British Government finds comfort in official assurances of Berlin 279 
Disregarded warnings ...... 279 

First Warning . . . . . . .279 

(1905-1906) Morocco incident . . . . .279 

After which British naval programme was reduced . . 280 

Second Warning ....... 281 

(1908-1909) Secret acceleration and increase of German naval 

programme ....... 281 

Imperial Defence Conference ..... 281 



xlvi 



ORDEAL BY BATTLE 



Third Warning .... 

(1910) German sincerity under suspicion 
The Constitutional Conference 
Secret de Polichinelle 

Failure of British Government to trust the peo 
Fourth Warning 

(1911) The Agadir incident 
Mr. Lloyd George's speech 
Consequences of various kinds 
Fifth Warning 

(1912) Lord Haldane's rebuff 
Menacing nature of German proposals 
Dangers of amateur diplomacy . 
German love of irregular missions 
Sixth Warning 

(1913) German Army Bill and War Loan 
British Government ignore the danger 
Neglect military preparations 
Shrink from speaking plainly to the people 
Difficulties of Sir Edward Grey . 
Enemies in his own household 
Radical attacks on Foreign Secretary and First 

miralty fomented by Germany 
Attitude of a leaderless Cabinet . 
Parallelogram of fears determines drift of policy 
Evil effects of failure to educate public opinion 
Danger of breaking the Liberal party 
Occasional efficacy of self-sacrifice 
War not inevitable had England been prepared 



pie 



Lord 



of Ad- 



PAGE 

282 
282 
283 
283 
284 
285 
285 
285 
286 
287 
287 
288 
289 
290 
294 
294 
295 
297 
298 
298 
299 

299 
300 
301 
302 
303 
303 
304 



PART IV 
DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 



CHAPTER I 

THE BRITISH ARMY AND THE PEACE OP EUROPE 

Public opinion puzzled by military problems 

The nation's growing anxiety and distrust (1909-1914) 



309 
310 



CONTENTS xlvii 

PAGE 

Army affairs a shuttlecock in the political game . . . 312 

'The blood taxes' ....... 313 

The nation realised it had not been treated with candour . 313 

Powerful British Army the best guarantee for European peace 314 
Alone among European nations Britain had not an army commen- 
surate to her population, policy, and resources . .316 



CHAPTER II 



THE COMPOSITION OF THE BRITISH ARMY 

The 'Regular Army . 

Three classes of reserves 

The Army Reserve . 

The Special Reserve 

The Territorial Army 

The numbers of trained soldiers immediately available for war 

These were inadequate to redress the balance against the Triple 

Entente ......•• 

In the onset period untrained and half -trained troops were of 

no use ........ 

Shortage of officers capable of training raw troops 

Lord Haldane's failure to carry out his own principles 

Moral effect of our support of France at Agadir crisis . 

Adverse changes between 1911 and 1914 . 

Size of British striking force necessary as complete insurance 

against a coolly calculated war . . . . 

Reserves required behind this striking force 
South African War no precedent for a European war . 



317 
318 
318 
319 
320 
321 

322 

322 
323 
324 
326 
326 

327 
328 
330 



CHAPTER III 

LORD ROBERTS 's WARNINGS 



The Manchester speech (October 22, 1912) 
Liberal denunciation and Unionist coolness 
Attack concentrated on three passages . 
Two of these have been proved true by events 



332 
332 
333 

334 



xlviii ORDEAL BY BATTLE 

PAGE 

The other was misinterpreted by its critics . . . 335 

Liberal criticism ....... 336 

Unionist criticism ....... 341 

Ministerial rebukes ....... 343 

No regret has ever been expressed subsequently for any of these 

attacks ........ 347 

CHAPTER IV 

LORD KITCHENER'S TASK 

All Lord Roberts's warnings were proved true . . . 350 
Many people nevertheless still believed that the voluntary system 

was a success ....... 351 

Lord Kitchener as Secretary of State for War . . . 353 

His previous record of success ..... 354 

His hold on public confidence ..... 354 

His grasp of the simple essentials .... 355 

His determination to support France and make a New Army . 355 

His remarkable achievements ..... 356 

His want of knowledge of British political and industrial 

conditions ....... 356 

His colleagues, however, understood these thoroughly . . 357 

CHAPTER V 

MATERIAL OF WAR 

Industrial congestion at the outbreak of war . . . 358 
Need for looking far ahead and organising production of war 

material ........ 359 

The danger of labour troubles ..... 360 

Outcry about shortage of supplies .... 360 

Official denials were disbelieved ..... 361 

CHAPTER VI 

METHODS OF RECRUITING 

The first need was men ...... 364 

A call for volunteers the only way of meeting it . . 364 



CONTENTS xlix 

PAGE 

The second need was a system to provide men as required over 

the period of the war ..... 365 

No system was devised ...... 365 

The Government shrank from exercising its authority . . 366 

Trusted to indirect pressure . 366 

And sensational appeals ....*. 367 

They secured a new army of the highest quality . . .368 

But they demoralised public opinion by their methods . .369 

Public opinion at the outbreak of war was admirable . .372 

It was ready to obey orders . . . . .373 

No orders came ....... 374 

The so-called triumph of the voluntary system . . .376 

From the point of view of a Belgian or a Frenchman the triumph 

is not so clear ....... 377 

The voluntary system is inadequate to our present situation . 379 
Folly of waiting for disaster to demonstrate the necessity of 

National Service ...... 380 



CHAPTEE VII 

PERVERSITIES OF THE ANTI-MILITARIST SPIRIT 

British methods of recruiting in normal times . . . 382 

The Conscription of Hunger ..... 382 

The cant of the voluntary principle .... 384 

The ' economic ' fallacy ...... 385 

The fallacy of underrating the morale of conscript armies . 387 

The army which we call 'voluntary' our enemies call 'mercenary' 389 
'Mercenary' describes not the British Army but the British 

People ........ 389 

The true description of the British Army is ' Prof essional ' . 390 

The theory of the British Army ..... 391 

That officers should pay for the privilege of serving . .391 

That the rank and file should contract for a term of years . 392 
Under pressure of want . . . . . .392 

At pay which is below the market rate .... 392 

This contract is drastically enforced .... 393 

With the full approval of anti-militarist opinion . . 393 

Inconsistencies of the anti-militarists .... 394 



1 ORDEAL BY BATTLE 



PAGE 



Their crowning inconsistency ..... 395 

Other industries put pressure on society .... 396 

Why should not a professional army? .... 396 

The example of Eome ...... 397 

A professional army when it first interferes in politics usually 

does so as a liberator ...... 397 

Then military despotism follows speedily . . . 399 

A fool's paradise ....... 399 



CHAPTER VIII 

SOME HISTORICAL REFLECTIONS 

Bugbears ........ 401 

Conflict of 'opinion' with 'the facts' . . . .402 

An army is no defence unless it is available for service abroad 402 
The Industrial Epoch (1832-1886) . . . .403 

Its grudging attitude towards the Army . . . 403 

Honour paid by conscript nations to their armies . . 406 

Democracy cannot subsist without personal service . . 406 
During the Industrial Epoch exemption from Personal Service 

was regarded as the essence of Freedom . . . 408 

War was regarded as an anachronism .... 409 
Since 1890 there has been a slow but steady reaction from 

these ideas ....... 410 

Volunteer movement and Territorial Army compared . . 411 

Effect of the Soudan campaign and South African War . . 411 

Effect of more recent events ..... 412 

Have we passed out of a normal condition into an abnormal 

one, or the reverse? ...... 412 

Germany's great grievance against Britain: we thought to 

hold our Empire without sacrifices .... 413 
The Freiherr von Hexenkuchen 's views — 

(1) On our present case of conscience .... 415 

(2) On our voluntary system . . . . .416 

The American Civil War ...... 417 

Lincoln insisted on conscription (1863) .... 418 

His difficulties ....... 418 

Eesults of his firmness ...... 419 



CONTENTS 

Difference in our own case . . . 

Our need for conscription is much greater 

It is also far easier for our Government to enforce it 



PAGE 

419 
419 
420 



CHAPTER IX 

THE CRUCIBLE OP WAR 

The objects of this book ...... 421 

Criticism of naval and military strategy is no part of its 

purpose ....... 422 

Nor the ultimate political settlement of Europe . . . 424 

Nor an inquisition into 'German atrocities' . . . 424 

But the basis of Germany 's policy must be understood . . 425 

And what we are fighting for and against . . . 425 

The causes of German strength ..... 427 

The causes of British weakness ..... 427 

Illusions as to the progress of the war .... 428 

The real cause of our going to war .... 430 

Democracy is not by its nature invincible . . .431 

Leadership is our chief need ..... 433 

The folly of telling half-truths to the People . . .435 



PART I 
THE CAUSES OF WAR 



Then Apollyon strodled quite over the whole breadth of the way, and 
said, I am void of fear in this matter, prepare thyself to die; for I 
swear by my infernal Den, that thou shalt go no further; here will I 
spill thy soul. 

And with that he threw a flaming Dart at his breast, but Christian 
had a shield in his hand, with which he caught it, and so prevented the 
danger of that. 

Then did Christian draw, for he saw 'twas time to bestir him: and 
Apollyon as fast made at him, throwing Darts as thick as Hail ; by the 
which, notwithstanding all that Christian could do to avoid it, Apollyon 
wounded him in his head, his hand, and foot : This made Christian give 
a little back; Apollyon therefore followed his work amain, and Christian 
again took courage, and resisted as manfully as he could. This sore 
Combat lasted for above half a day, even till Christian was almost 
quite spent ; for you must know that Christian, by reason of his wounds, 
must needs grow weaker and weaker. 

Then Apollyon espying his opportunity, began to gather up close to 
Christian, and wrestling with him, gave him a dreadful fall; and with 
that Christian's Sword flew out of his hand. Then said Apollyon, I am 
sure of thee now : and with that he had almost pressed him to death, so 
that Christian began to despair of life. But as God would have it, while 
Apollyon was fetching of his last blow, thereby to make a full end of 
this good man, Christian nimbly reached out his hand for his Sword, 
and caught it, saying, Eejoice not against me, O mine Enemy! when 
I fall I shall arise; and with that gave him a deadly thrust, which made 
him give back, as one that had received his mortal wound: Christian 
perceiving that, made at him again, saying, Nay, in all these things we 
are more than conquerors through him that loved us. And with that 
Apollyon spread forth his Dragon's wings, and sped him away, that 
Christian for a season saw him no more. 

In this Combat no man can imagine, unless he had seen and heard as 
I did, what yelling and hideous roaring, Apollyon made all the time of 
the fight; he spake like a Dragon. . . . 

The Pilgrim 's Progress. 



CHAPTER I 



PEACE AND WAR 



war. 



It is a considerable number of years since the most part I. 
distinguished Tory statesman of his time impressed Chapter 
upon his fellow-countrymen as a maxim of policy, • 
that Peace is the greatest of British interests. There Peace and 
was an unexpectedness about Lord Salisbury's 
words, coming as they did from the leader of a 
party which had hitherto lain under suspicion of 
jingoism, which gave the phrase almost the colour 
of an epigram. The truth of the saying, however, 
gradually became manifest to all men; and there- 
upon a new danger arose out of this very fact. 

As a nation we are in some ways a great deal 
too modest; or it may be, looking at the matter 
from a critical standpoint, too self-centred. We 
have always been inclined to assume in our calcula- 
tions that we ourselves are the only possible disturb- 
ers of the peace, and that if we do not seek war, or 
provoke it, no other Power will dream of forcing war 
upon us. This unfortunately has rarely been the 
case; and those persons who, in recent times, have 
refused most scornfully to consider the lessons of 
past history, have now at last learned from a sterner 
schoolmaster the falseness of their favourite doc- 
trine. 

The United Kingdom needed and desired peace, so 

3 



THE CAUSES OF WAR 



Part I. 

Chapter 

I. 

Peace and 



that it might proceed undistracted, and with firm 
purpose, to set its house in order. The Dominions 
needed peace, so that they might have time to people 
their fertile but empty lands, to strike deep roots 
and become secure. To the Indian Empire and the 
Dependencies peace was essential, if a system of 
government, which aimed, not unsuccessfully, at giv- 
ing justice and fostering well-being, was to maintain 
its power and prestige unshaken. The whole British 
race had nothing material to gain by war, but much 
to lose, much at any rate which would be put in 
jeopardy by war. In spite of all these weighty con- 
siderations which no man of sense and knowledge 
will venture to dispute, we should have been wiser 
had we taken into account the fact, that they did not 
apply to other nations, that in the main they affected 
ourselves alone, and that our case was no less singu- 
lar than, in one sense at all events, it was fortunate. 

We did not covet territory or new subjects. Still 
less were we likely to engage in campaigns out of a 
thirst for glory. In the latter particular at least we 
were on a par with the rest of the world. The cloud 
of anxiety which for ten or more years has brooded 
over the great conscript nations, growing steadily 
darker, contained many dangers, but among these 
we cannot reckon such antiquated motives as trivial 
bravado, light-hearted knight-errantry, or the vain 
pursuit of military renown. 

What is called in history books 'an insult' seemed 
also to have lost much of its ancient power for plung- 
ing nations into war. The Chancelleries of Europe 
had grown cautious, and were on the watch against 
being misled by the emotions of the moment. A sen- 
sational but unintended injury was not allowed to 



DANGERS TO PEACE 5 

drive us into war with Eussia in 1904, and this prece- Part i. 
dent seemed of good augury. Moreover, when every Chapter 
statesman in Europe was fully alive to the electric T - 
condition of the atmosphere, a deliberate insult was Peace and 
not very likely to be offered from mere ill-manners 
or in a fit of temper, but only if there were some 
serious purpose behind it, in which case it would fall 
under a different category. 

Fear was a great danger, and everybody knew it 
to be so — fear lest this nation, or that, might be 
secretly engaged in strengthening its position in or- 
der to crush one of its neighbours at some future 
date, unless that neighbour took time by the forelock 
and struck out forthwith. Among the causes which 
might bring about a surprise outbreak of war this 
was the most serious and probable. It was difficult 
to insure against it. But though perilous in the ex- 
treme while it lasts, panic is of the nature of an 
epidemic : it rages for a while and passes away. It 
had been raging now with great severity ever since 
1909, 1 and by midsummer 1914 optimists were in- 
clined to seek consolation in the thought that the 
crisis must surely be over. 

More dangerous to peace in the long run even than 
fear, were certain aims and aspirations, which from 
one standpoint were concrete and practical, but re- 
garded from another were among the cloudiest of 
abstractions — 'political interests,' need of new mar- 
kets, hunger for fresh territory to absorb the out- 
flow of emigrants, and the like; on the other hand, 
those hopes and anxieties which haunt the imagina- 

1 The increase and acceleration of German shipbuilding was discov- 
ered by the British Government in the autumn of 1908, and led to the 
Imperial Defence Conference in the summer of the following year. 



6 



THE CAUSES OF WAR 



Part I. 

Chapter 
I. 

Peace and 
war. 



tions of eager men as they look into the future, 
and dream dreams and see visions of a grand na- 
tional fulfilment. 

If the British race ever beheld a vision of this sort, 
it had been realised already. We should have been 
wise had we remembered that this accomplished 
fact, these staked-out claims of the British Empire, 
appeared to fall like a shadow across visions seen 
by other eyes, blotting out some of the fairest hopes, 
and spoiling the noble proportions of the patriot's 
dream. 

There is a region where words stumble after truth, 
like children chasing a rainbow across a meadow to 
find the pot of fairy gold. Multitudinous volumes 
stuffed with the cant of pacifism and militarism will 
never explain to us the nature of peace and war. But 
a few bars of music may sometimes make clear things 
which all the moralists, and divines, and philosophers 
— even the poets themselves for the most part, 
though they come nearer to it at times than the rest 
— have struggled vainly to show us in their true pro- 
portions. The songs of a nation, its national an- 
thems — if they be truly national and not merely some 
commissioned exercise — are better interpreters than 
state papers. A man will learn more of the causes 
of wars, perhaps even of the rights and wrongs of 
them, by listening to the burst and fall of the French 
hymn, the ebb and surge of the Russian, in Tschai- 
kovsky's famous overture, than he ever will from 
books or speeches, argument or oratory. 

Yet there are people who think it not impossible 
to prove to mankind by logical processes, that the 
loss which any great nation must inevitably sustain 
through war, will far outweigh any advantages which 



IMPOTENCE OF LOGIC 



can ensue from it, even if the arms of the conqueror 
were crowned with victories greater than those of 
Caesar or Napoleon. They draw us pictures of the 
exhaustion which must inevitably follow upon such 
a struggle conducted upon the modern scale, of the 
stupendous loss of capital, destruction of credit, 
paralysis of industry, arrest of progress in things 
spiritual as well as temporal, the shock to civilisa- 
tion, and the crippling for a generation, probably for 
several generations, possibly for ever, of the victori- 
ous country in its race with rivals who have wisely 
stood aside from the fray. These arguments may 
conceivably be true, may in no particular be over- 
coloured, or an under-valuation, either of the good 
which has been attained by battle, or of the evils 
which have been escaped. But they would be diffi- 
cult to establish even before an unbiassed court, and 
they are infinitely more difficult to stamp upon popu- 
lar belief. 

It is not sufficient either with statesmen or peoples 
to set before them a chain of reasoning which is 
logically unanswerable. Somehow or other the new 
faith which it is desired to implant, must be rendered 
independent of logic and unassailable by logic. It 
must rise into a higher order of convictions than the 
intellectual before it can begin to operate upon 
human affairs. For it is matched against opinions 
which have been held and acted upon so long, that 
they have become unquestionable save in purely 
academic discussions. At those decisive moments, 
when action follows upon thought like a flash, con- 
clusions which depend upon a train of reasoning are 
of no account : instinct will always get the better of 
any syllogism. 



PaktI. 

Chapter 

I. 

Peace and 
war. 



8 



THE CAUSES OF WAR 



Part I. 

Chapter 
I. 

Peace and 
war. 



So when nations are hovering on the brink of war, 
it is impulse, tradition, or some stuff of the imagina- 
tion — misused deliberately, as sometimes happens, 
by crafty manipulators — which determines action 
much more often than the business calculations of 
shopkeepers and economists. Some cherished insti- 
tution seems to be threatened. Some nationality 
supposed — very likely erroneously — to be of the 
same flesh and blood as ourselves, appears — very 
likely on faulty information — to be unjustly op- 
pressed. Two rival systems of civilisation, of mor- 
als, of religion, approach one another like thunder- 
clouds and come together in a clash. Where is the 
good at such times of casting up sums, and exhibiting 
profit-and-loss accounts to the public gaze? People 
will not listen, for in their view considerations of 
prosperity and the reverse are beside the question. 
Wealth, comfort, even life itself, are not regarded; 
nor are the possible sufferings of posterity allowed 
to count any more than the tribulations of to-day. In 
the eyes of the people the matter is one of duty not 
of interest. When men fight in this spirit the most 
lucid exposition of material drawbacks is worse than 
useless ; for the national mood, at such moments, is 
one of self-sacrifice. The philosopher, or the philan- 
thropist, is more likely to feed the flames than to put 
them out when he proves the certainty of loss and 
privation, and dwells upon the imminent peril of 
ruin and destruction. 

The strength of the fighter is the strength of his 
faith. Each new Gideon who goes out against the 
Midianites fancies that the sword of the Lord is in 
his hand. He risks all that he holds dear, in order 
that he may pull down the foul images of Baal and 



war. 



THE MOTIVES OF NATIONS 9 

build up an altar to Jehovah, in order that his race Pabt i. 
may not be shorn of its inheritance, in order that it Chapter 
may hold fast its own laws and institutions, and not I - 
pass under the yoke of the Gentiles. This habit of Peace and 
mind is unchanging throughout the ages. "What 
moved men to give their lives at Marathon moved* 
them equally, more than a thousand years later, to 
offer the same sacrifice under the walls of Tours. 
It is still moving them, after yet another thousand 
years and more have passed away, in the plains of 
Flanders and the Polish Marshes. 

When the Persian sought to force the dominion of 
his ideals upon the Greek, the states of Hellas made 
head against him from the love and honour in which 
they held their own. When the successors of the 
Prophet, zealous for their faith, confident in the 
protection of the One God, drove the soldiers of the 
Cross before them from the passes of the Pyrenees to 
the vineyards of Touraine, neither side would have 
listened with any patience to a dissertation upon the 
inconveniences resulting from a state of war and 
upon the economic advantages of peace. It was there 
one faith against another, one attitude towards life 
against another, one system of manners, customs, 
and laws against another. When a collision occurs 
in this region of human affairs there is seldom room 
for compromise or adjustment. Things unmerchant- 
able cannot be purchased with the finest of fine gold. 

In these instances, seen by us from far off, the 
truth of this is easily recognised. But what some of 
our recent moralists have overlooked, is the fact that 
forces of precisely the same order exist in the world 
of to-day, and are at work, not only among the fierce 
Balkan peoples, in the resurgent empire of Japan, 



10 THE CAUSES OF WAK 

Part i. and in the great military nations — the French, the 
Chapter Germans, and the Russians — but also in America 
L and England. The last two pride themselves upon 
Peace and a higher civilisation, and in return are despised by 
the prophets of militarism as worshippers of mate- 
rial gain. The unfavourable and the flattering esti- 
mate agree, however, upon a single point — in assum- 
ing that our own people and those of the United 
States are unlikely to yield themselves to unsophisti- 
cated impulse. This assumption is wholly false. 

If we search carefully, we shall find everywhere 
underlying the great struggles recorded in past his- 
tory, no less than those which have occurred, and are 
now occurring, in our own time, an antagonism of one 
kind or another between two systems, visions, or 
ideals, which in some particular were fundamentally 
opposed and could not be reconciled. State papers 
and the memoranda of diplomatists, when in due 
course they come to light, are not a little apt to con- 
fuse the real issues, by setting forth a diary of minor 
incidents and piquant details, not in their true pro- 
portions, but as they appeared at the moment of their 
occurrence to the eyes of harassed and suspicious of- 
ficials. But even so, all the emptying of desks and 
pigeon-holes since the great American Civil War, has 
not been able to cover up the essential fact, that in 
this case a million lives were sacrificed by one of the 
most intelligent, humane, and practical nations upon 
earth, and for no other cause than that there was an 
irreconcilable difference amongst them, with regard 
to what St. Paul has called ' the substance of things 
hoped for.' On the one side there was an ideal of 
Union and a determination to make it prevail: on 
the other side there was an ideal of Independence 



VIRTUES OF THE WAR SPIRIT 11 

and an equal determination to defend it whatsoever paetI. 
might be the cost. If war on such grounds be pos- Chapter 
sible within the confines of a single nation, nurtured L 
in the same traditions, and born to a large extent of Peace and 
the same stock, how futile is the assurance that eco- 
nomic and material considerations will suffice to 
make war impossible between nations, who have not" 
even the tie of a common mother-tongue ! 

A collision may occur, as we know only too well, 
even although one of two vessels be at anchor, if it 
happens to lie athwart the course of the other. It 
was therefore no security against war that British 
policy did not aim at any aggrandisement or seek for 
any territorial expansion. The essential questions 
were — had we possessions which appeared to ob- 
struct the national aspirations and ideals of others j 
and did these others believe that alone, or in alliance, 
they had the power to redress the balance I 

The real difficulty which besets the philanthropist 
in his endeavour to exorcise the spirit of war is 
caused, not by the vices of this spirit, but by its vir- 
tues. In so far as it springs from vainglory or cu- 
pidity, it is comparatively easy to deal with. In so 
far as it is base, there is room for a bargain. It can 
be compounded with and bought off, as we have seen 
before now, with some kind of material currency. It" 
will not stand out for very long against promises of 
prosperity and threats of dearth. But where, as at 
most crises, this spirit is not base, where its impulse 
is not less noble, but more noble than those which 
influence men day by day in the conduct of their 
worldly affairs, where the contrast which presents 
itself to their imagination is between duty on the 
one hand and gain on the other, between self-sacrifice 



12 THE CAUSES OF WAR 

PaktI. and self-interest, between their country's need and 

Chapter their own ease, it is not possible to quench the fires 

L by appeals proceeding from a lower plane. The 

peace and philanthropist, if he is to succeed, must take still 

higher ground, and higher ground than this it is not 

a very simple matter to discover. 






CHAPTER II 



THE OTJTBEEAK OF WAR 



break of 



When war came, it came suddenly. A man who had part i. 
happened to fall sick of a fever on St. Swithin's chapter 
day 1914, bnt was so far on the way to convalescence IL 
four weeks later as to desire news of the outside The out- 
world, must have been altogether incredulous of the 
tidings which first greeted his ears. 

When he fell ill the nations were at peace. The 
townspeople of Europe were in a holiday humour, 
packing their trunks and portmanteaus for 'land 
travel or sea-faring.' The country people were get- 
ting in their harvest or looking forward hopefully to 
the vintage. Business was prosperous. Credit was 
good. Money, in banking phraseology, was 'cheap.' 
The horror of the Serajevo assassinations had al- 
ready faded almost into oblivion. At the worst this 
sensational event was only an affair of police. Such 
real anxiety as existed in the United Kingdom had 
reference to Ireland. 

We can imagine the invalid's first feeble question 
on public affairs: — 'What has happened in Ulster?' 
— The answer, 'Nothing has happened in Ulster.' — 
The sigh of relief with which he sinks back on his 
pillows. 

When, however, they proceed to tell him what has 
happened, elsewhere than in Ulster, during the four 
weeks while they have been watching by his bedside, 

13 



14 



THE CAUSES OF WAR 



Part I. 

Chapter 

II. 

The out- 
break of 
war. 



will he not fancy that his supposed recovery is only 
an illusion, and that he is still struggling with the 
phantoms of his delirium? 

For what will they have to report? That the 
greater part of the world which professes Christian- 
ity has called out its armies; that more than half 
Europe has already joined battle; that England, 
France, Russia, Belgium, Servia, and Montenegro 
on the one side are ranged against Germany and 
Austria on the other. Japan, they will tell him, is 
upon the point of declaring war. The Turk is won- 
dering if, and when, he may venture to come in; 
while the Italian, the Roumanian, the Bulgar, the 
Greek, the Dutchman, the Dane, and the Swede are 
reckoning no less anxiously for how short or long a 
period it may still be safe for them to stand out. 
Three millions of men, or thereabouts — a British 
Army included — are advancing against one another 
along the mountain barriers of Luxemburg, Lor- 
raine, and Alsace. Another three millions are en- 
gaged in similar evolutions among the lakes of East 
Prussia, along the river-banks of Poland, and under 
the shadow of the Carpathians. A large part of Bel- 
gium is already devastated, her villages are in ashes 
or flames, her eastern fortresses invested, her capi- 
tal threatened by the invader. 

Nine-tenths or more of the navies of the world are 
cleared for action, and are either scouring the seas in 
pursuit, or are withdrawn under the shelter of land- 
batteries watching their opportunity for a stroke. 
Air-craft circle by day and night over the cities, 
dropping bombs, with a careless and impartial aim, 
upon buildings both private and public, both sacred 
and profane, upon churches, palaces, hospitals, and 



break of 
war. 



A NIGHTMARE 15 

arsenals. The North Sea and the Baltic are sown parti. 
with mines. The trade of the greater part of indus- Chapter 
trial Europe is at a standstill ; the rest is disorgan- n - 
ised ; while the credit and finances, not merely of The out- 
Europe, but of every continent, are temporarily in a 
state either of chaos or paralysis. 

To the bewildered convalescent all this may well 
have seemed incredible. It is hardly to be wondered 
at if he concluded that the fumes of his fever were 
not yet dispersed, and that this frightful phantas- 
magoria had been produced, not by external real- 
ities, but by the disorders of his own brain. 

How long it might have taken to convince him of 
the truth and substance of these events we may judge 
from our own recent experience. How long was it 
after war broke out, before even we, who had 
watched the trouble brewing through all its stages, 
ceased to be haunted, even in broad daylight, by the 
feeling that we were asleep, and that the whole thing 
was a nightmare which must vanish when we awoke? 
We were faced (so at least it seemed at frequent 
moments) not by facts, but by a spectre, and one by 
no means unfamiliar — the spectre of Europe at war, 
so long dreaded by some, so scornfully derided by 
others, so often driven away, of late years so per- 
sistently reappearing. But this time the thing re- 
fused to be driven away. It sat, hunched up, with its 
head resting on its hands, as pitiless and inhuman as 
one of the gargoyles on a Gothic cathedral, staring 
through us, as if we were merely vapour, at some- 
thing beyond. 

So late as Wednesday, July 29 — the day on which 
Austria declared war on Servia — there was prob- 



16 THE CAUSES OF WAR 

Pakt i. ably not one Englishman in a hundred who believed 

Chapter it possible that, within a week, his own country would 

IL be at war ; still less, that a few days later the British 

The out- Army would be crossing the Channel to assist France 

war . and Belgium in repelling a German invasion. To the 

ordinary man — and not merely to the ordinary man, 

but equally to the press, and the great majority of 

politicians — such things were unthinkable until they 

occurred. Unfortunately, the inability to think a 

thing is no more a protection against its occurrence 

than the inability to see a thing gives security to the 

ostrich. 

The sequence of events which led up to the final' 
disaster is of great importance, although very far 
from being in itself a full explanation of the causes. 

On June 28, 1914, the heir to the throne of Austria- 
Hungary, together with his consort, was murdered 
by a young Bosnian at Serajevo, not far distant from 
the southern frontier. The Imperial authorities in- 
stituted a secret enquiry into the circumstances of 
the plot, as a result of which they professed to have 
discovered that it had been hatched at Belgrade, 
that Government officials were implicated in it, and 
that so far from being reprobated, it was approved 
by Servian public opinion. 1 

On Thursday, July 23 — a month after the tragedy 
— Austria suddenly delivered an ultimatum to Ser- 
via, and demanded an acceptance of its terms within 
forty-eight hours. The demands put forward were 
harsh, humiliating, and unconscionable. They were 

1 There is perhaps as much reason, certainly no more, for believing 
that an official clique at Belgrade plotted the Serajevo murders, as 
that an official clique at Vienna connived at them, by deliberately 
withdrawing police protection from the unfortunate and unpopular 
Archduke on the occasion of his visit to a notorious hotbed of sedition. 



THE SERVIAN EEPLY 



17 



such as could not have been accepted, as they stood, Parti. 
by any nation which desired to preserve a shred of Chapter 
its independence. They had been framed with the n - 
deliberate intention, either of provoking a refusal The <mt- 
which might afford a pretext for war, or of procur- w r a e r a . 
ing an acceptance which would at once reduce the 
Servian Kingdom to the position of a vassal. Even 
in Berlin it was admitted 1 that this ultimatum asked 
more than it was reasonable to expect Servia to yield. 
But none the less, there can be but little doubt that' 
the German ambassador at Vienna saw and approved 
the document before it was despatched, and it seems 
more than likely that he had a hand in drafting it. 
It also rests on good authority that the German 
Kaiser was informed beforehand of the contents, 
and that he did not demur to its presentation. 2 

On the evening of Saturday, July 25, the Servian 
Government, as required, handed in its answer. The 
purport of this, when it became known to the world, 
excited surprise by the humility of its tone and the 
substance of its submission. Almost everything that' 
Austria had demanded was agreed to. What re- 



1 Herr von Jagow ' ' also admitted that the Servian Government could 
'not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands. . . . He re- 
' peated very earnestly that, though he had been accused of knowing all 
'the contents of that note, he had in fact no such knowledge." — Sir 
H. Eumbold at Berlin to Sir Edward Grey (White Paper, No. 18). 

2 ' ' Although I am unable to verify it, I have private information that 
' the German Ambassador (i.e. at Vienna) knew the text of the Austrian 
' ultimatum to Servia before it was despatched and telegraphed it to the 
' German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself that 
' he endorses every line of it. ' ' — British Ambassador at Vienna to Sir 
Edward Grey (White Paper, No. 95). (Cf. also White Book, Nos. 95 
and 141; French Yellow Book, No. 87; Russian Orange Book, No. 41.) 

' ' The German Ambassador (i.e. in London) read me a telegram from 
' the German Foreign Office saying that his Government had not known 
'beforehand, and had no more than other Powers to do with the stiff 
'terms of the Austrian note to Servia." — Sir Edward Grey to the 
British Ambassador in Berlin (White Paper, No. 25). (Cf. also French 
Yellow Book, Nos. 17, 30, 36, 41, 57, and 94.) 



18 



THE CAUSES OF WAR 



PaetI. 

Chapter 
II. 

The out- 
break of 



mained outstanding was clearly not worth quarrel- 
ling about, unless a quarrel were the object of the 
ultimatum. The refusal, such as it was, did not close 
the door, but, on the contrary, contained an offer 
to submit the subjects of difference to the Hague 
Convention. 1 

The document was a lengthy one. The Austrian 
minister at Belgrade nevertheless found time to 
read it through, to weigh it carefully, to find it want- 
ing, to ask for his passports, and to catch his train, 
all within a period not exceeding three-quarters of 
an hour from the time at which it was put into his 
hands. 2 

When these occurrences became known, the Eng- 
lish Foreign Minister immediately made proposals 
for a conference between representatives of Ger- 
many, France, Italy, and Great Britain, with the 
object of discovering some means of peaceful settle- 
ment. 3 France and Italy promptly accepted his in- 
vitation. 4 Germany, while professing to desire medi- 
ation, did not accept it. 5 Consequently Sir Edward 
Grey's effort failed; and before he was able to renew 
it in any more acceptable form, Austria, acting with 
a promptitude almost unique in her annals, declared 
war upon Servia, and hostilities began. 

It is unnecessary to enter here into an examination 
of the feverish and fruitless attempts to preserve 
peace, which were made in various quarters during 
the next four and twenty hours. They present a 

1 Last paragraph of Eeply of Servian Government to Austro-Hun- 
garian note. 

2 White Paper, Nos. 20 and 23. 
s White Paper, No. 36. 

4 White Paper, Nos. 35, 42, and 52. 

6 White Paper, Nos. 43 and 71. Cf . also German White Book, Nos. 
12 and 15. 



MOBILISATION 19 

most pathetic appearance, like the efforts of a crew, part i. 

sitting with oars unshipped, arguing, exhorting, and Chapter 

imploring, while their boat drifts on to the smooth IL 

lip of the cataract. The out- 

break of 

war. 

Eussia ordered the mobilisation of her Southern 
armies, alleging that she could not stand by while 
a Slav nation was being crushed out of existence, 
despite the fact that it had made an abject submis- 
sion for an unproved offence. 1 

Subsequently, on Friday, July 31, Russia — having, 
as she considered, reasons for believing that Ger- 
many was secretly mobilising her whole forces — 
proceeded to do likewise. 2 

Germany simultaneously declared 'a state of war' 
within her own territories, and a veil instantly fell 
upon all her internal proceedings. She demanded 
that Russia should cease her mobilisation, and as 
no answer which satisfied her was forthcoming, but 
only an interchange of telegrams between the two 
sovereigns — disingenuous on the one side and not 
unreasonably suspicious on the other — Germany 
declared war on Russia on Saturday, August 1. 

On Saturday and Sunday, war on a grand scale 
being by this time certain, the chief interest centred 
in questions of neutrality. Germany enquired of 
France whether she would undertake to stand aside 
— knowing full well beforehand that the terms of the 
Dual Alliance compelled the Republic to lend assist- 
ance if Russia were attacked by more than one 

1 White Paper, No. 113; Russian Orange Book, No. 77; French 
Yellow Book, No. 95. 

3 These suspicions were well founded. German mobilisation began at 
least two days earlier (White Paper, No. 113; French Yellow Book, 

Nos. 60, 88, 89, and 106). 



20 



THE CAUSES OF WAR 



Part I. 

Chapter 
II. 

The out- 
break of 



power. Sir Edward Grey enquired of France and 
Germany if they would undertake to respect the in- 
tegrity of Belgium. France replied in the affirma- 
tive. Germany declined to commit herself, and this 
was rightly construed as a refusal. 1 

While this matter was still the subject of diplo- 
matic discussion the German Army advanced into 
the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, and was correctly 
reported as having entered Belgian territory near 
Liege and French territory near Cirey. 

On the evening of Sunday, August 2, the German 
Government presented an ultimatum to Belgium 2 
demanding free passage for its troops, thereby put- 
ting its intentions beyond all doubt. 

On the same day Italy issued a declaration of 
neutrality, making it clear that, although a member 
of the Triple Alliance, she did not consider herself 
bound to support her allies in a war of aggression. 3 

Meanwhile Germany had been making enquiries 
as to the attitude of England, and, startled to dis- 
cover that this country might not be willing tamely 
to submit to the violation of Belgium and invasion of 
France, proceeded to state, under cross-examina- 
tion, the price she was prepared to pay, or at any 
rate to promise, for the sake of securing British 
neutrality. 4 

On Tuesday, August 4, the British Ambassador 
at Berlin presented an ultimatum which demanded 
an assurance, before midnight, that the integrity of 
Belgium would not be violated. The answer was 
given informally at a much earlier hour by the bom- 

1 White Paper, Nos. 114, 122, 123, and 125. 

2 Belgian Grey Book, No. 20 ; French Yellow Book, No. 141. 

3 White Paper, No. 152 ; French Yellow Book, No. 124. 

4 White Paper, Nos. 85 and 123. 



ENGLAND DECLARES WAR 21 

bardment of Liege; and shortly before midnight parti. 

England declared war on Germany. 1 Chapter 

Two days later Austria declared herself to be at IL 
war with Russia, and within a week from that date The out- 
Great Britain and France issued a similar declara- w r a e r a . 
tion against Austria. 

1 " I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once 
'began a harangue which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said 
' that the step taken by His Majesty 's Government was terrible to a 
' degree : just for a word — ' neutrality, ' a word which in war time had so 
' often been disregarded — just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was 
'going to make war on a kindred nation, who desired nothing better 
'than to be friends with her." — British Ambassador at Berlin to Sir 
Edward Grey (White Paper, No. 160). 



CHAPTER III 



WHO WANTED WAR I 



Part I. 

Chapter 

III. 

Who 

wanted 

war? 



Such is the chronological order of events; but on 
the face of it, it explains little of the underlying- 
causes of this conflagration. Why with the single 
exception of Italy had all the great naval and mili- 
tary powers of Europe, together with several smaller 
nations, suddenly plunged into war? Which of the 
combatants wanted war? ... To the latter question 
the answer can be given at once and with certainty 
— save Germany and Austria no nation wanted war, 
and even Germany and Austria did not want this 
war. 

Whatever opinion we may entertain of the Servian 
character or of her policy in recent times, it is at 
all events certain that she did not desire war with 
Austria. That she submitted to the very depths of 
humiliation in order to avoid war cannot be doubted 
by any one who has read her reply to the demands 
put forward by Vienna. Only a few months since, 
she had emerged from two sanguinary wars — the 
first against Turkey and the second against Bulgaria 
— and although victory had crowned her arms in both 
of these contests, her losses in men and material had 
been very severe. 

That Russia did not desire war was equally plain. 

22 



DESIRE FOR PEACE 23 

She was still engaged in repairing the gigantic losses part i. 
which she had sustained in her struggle with Japan. Chapter 
At least two years must elapse before her new fleet IIL 
would be in a condition to take the sea, and it was who 
generally understood that at least as long a period war? 
would be necessary, in order to carry through the 
scheme of reorganisation by which she hoped to place 
her army in a state of efficiency. Whatever might 
be the ultimate designs of Russia, it was altogether 
incredible that she would have sought to bring about 
a war, either at this time or in the near future. 

Russia, like England, had nothing to gain by war. 
Her development was proceeding rapidly. For years 
to come her highest interest must be peace. A 
supreme provocation was necessary in order to make 
her draw the sword. Such a provocation had been 
given in 1909 when, ignoring the terms of the Treaty 
of Berlin, Austria had formally annexed the prov- 
inces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. But at that time 
Russia's resources were not merely unprepared; 
they were utterly exhausted. Menaced simultane- 
ously by Vienna and Berlin, she had been forced on 
that occasion to stand by, while her prestige in the 
Balkan peninsula suffered a blow which she was 
powerless to ward off. Now a further encroachment 
was threatened from the same quarters. A Slav 
power which looked to St. Petersburg J for protec- 
tion was to be put under the heel of Austria. 

Nor can any one believe that France wanted war. 
It is true that for a year, or rather more, after the 
Agadir episode 2 the spirit of France was perturbed. 
But no Foreign Office in the world — least of all that 

1 The name of the Eussian capital was not changed until after the 
declaration of war, and therefore St. Petersburg is used in this chapter 
instead of Petrograd. 2 July-September 1911. 



24 THE CAUSES OF WAR 

Paet i. of Germany — was so ill-informed as to believe that 

Chapter the sporadic demonstrations, which occurred in the 

IIL press and elsewhere, were caused by any eagerness 

who for adventure or any ambition of conquest. They 

wanted -, -, -. . 

war? were due, as every calm observer was aware, to one 

thing and one thing only — the knowledge that the 
Republic had come to the very end of her human 
resources; that all her sons who were capable of 
bearing arms had already been enrolled in her army ; 
that she could do nothing further to strengthen her 
defences against Germany, who up to that time, had 
taken for military training barely one half of her 
available male population, and who was now engaged 
in increasing her striking power both by land and sea. 

The cause of this restlessness in France was the 
fear that Germany was preparing an invincible 
superiority and would strike so soon as her weapon 
was forged. If so, would it not be better for France 
to strike at once, while she had still a fighting chance, 
and before she was hopelessly outnumbered? But 
this mood, the product of anxiety and suspense, 
which had been somewhat prevalent in irresponsible 
quarters during the autumn of 1912 and the early 
part of the following year, had passed away. Partly 
it wore itself out; partly popular interest was di- 
verted to other objects of excitement. 

France, during the twelve months preceding 
Midsummer 1914, had been singularly quiescent as 
regards foreign affairs. Her internal conditions ab- 
sorbed attention. Various events had conspired to 
disturb public confidence in the fidelity of her rulers, 
and in the adequacy of their military preparations. 
The popular mood had been sobered, disquieted, and 
scandalised to such a point that war, so far from 



THE CASE OF BELGIUM 25 

being sought after, was the thing of all others which' Part i. 
France most wished to avoid. Chapter 

It is unnecessary to waste words in establishing IIL 
the aversion of Belgium from war. There was noth- w* 
ing which she could hope to gain by it in any event, war? 
Suffering and loss — how great suffering and loss 
even Belgium herself can hardly have foreseen — 
were inevitable to her civil population, as well as to 
her soldiers, whether the war went well or ill. Her 
territory lay in the direct way of the invaders, and 
was likely, as in times past, to become the 'cockpit 
of Europe. ' She was asked to allow the free passage 
of the Germanic forces. She was promised restora- 
tion of her independence and integrity at the end of 
the war. But to grant this arrogant demand would 
have been to destroy her dynasty and wreck her 
institutions; for what King or Constitution could 
have withstood the popular contempt for a govern- 
ment which acquiesced in national degradation? 
And to believe the promise, was a thing only possible 
for simpletons; for what was such an assurance 
worth, seeing that, at the very moment of the offer, 
Germany was engaged in breaking her former under- 
taking, solemnly guaranteed and recorded, that the 
neutrality of Belgium should be respected? That 
the sympathies of Belgium would have been with 
France in any event cannot of course be doubted; 
for a French victory threatened no danger, whereas 
the success of German arms was a menace to her 
independence, and a prelude to vassalage or absorp- 
tion in the Empire. 

Neither the British people nor their Government 
wanted war. In the end they accepted it reluctantly, 
and only after most strenuous efforts had been made 



26 THE CAUSES OF WAR 

part i. to prevent its occurrence. To the intelligent foreign 

Chapter observer, however unfriendly, who has a thorough 

IIL understanding of British interests, ideas, and habits 

who of mind this is self-evident. He does not need a 

wa"? e White Paper to prove it to him. 

It is clear that Austria wanted war — not this war 
certainly, but a snug little war with a troublesome 
little neighbour, as to the outcome of which, with the 
ring kept, there could be no possibility of doubt. 
She obviously hoped that indirectly, and as a sort of 
by-product of this convenient little war, she would 
secure a great victory of the diplomatic sort over 
her most powerful neighbour — a matter of infinitely 
more consequence to her than the ostensible object of 
her efforts. 

The crushing of Servia would mean the humiliation 
of Russia, and would shake, for a second time within 
five years, the confidence of the Balkan peoples in 
the power of the Slav Empire to protect its kindred 
and co-religionists against the aggression of the 
Teutons and Magyars. Anything which would lower 
the credit of Russia in the Balkan peninsula would 
be a gain to Austria. To her more ambitious states- 
men such an achievement might well seem to open 
the way for coveted expansions towards the Aegean 
Sea, which had been closed against her, to her great 
chagrin, by the Treaty of Bucharest. 1 To others, 
whose chief anxiety was to preserve peace in their 
own time, and to prevent the Austro-Hungarian 
State from splitting asunder, the repression of Ser- 
via seemed to promise security against the growing 
unrest and discontent of the vast Slav population 
which was included in the Empire. 

1 August 1913. 



AUSTRIAN ILL-FORTUNE 27 

For something nearer two centuries than one the paetI. 
Austro-Hungarian Empire has been miscalculating Chapter 
and suffering for its miscalculations, until its blun- IIL 
ders and ill-fortune have become a byword. Schem- who 
ing ever for safety, Austria has never found it. The ^ar? e 
very modesty of her aim has helped to secure its own 
defeat. Her unvarying method has been a timid and 
unimaginative repression. In politics, as in most 
other human affairs, equilibrium is more easily at- 
tained by moving forward than by standing still. 
Austria has sought security for powers, and systems, 
and balances which were worn out, unsuited to our 
modern world, and therefore incapable of being 
secured at all. The more she had schemed for safety 
the more precarious her integrity has become. There 
are things which scheming will never accomplish — 
things which for their achievement need a change of 
spirit, some new birth of faith or freedom. But in 
Vienna, change in any direction is ill-regarded, and 
new births are ever more likely to be strangled in 
their cradles than to arrive at maturity. 

Distracted by the problem of her divers, discord- 
ant, and unwelded 1 races, Austria has always in- 
clined to put her trust in schemers who were able to 
produce some plausible system, some ingenious de- 
vice, some promising ladder of calculation, or mis- 
calculation, for reaching the moon without going 
through the clouds. In the present case there can 
be no doubt that she allowed herself to be persuaded 
by her German neighbours that Russia was not in a 

1 The total population of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, including 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, is roughly 50 millions. Of these 11 millions are 
Germans and 10 millions Magyars. About 24 millions are composed of 
a strange variety of Slav races. The remaining 5 millions consist of 
Italians, Eoumanians, and Jews. 



28 



THE CAUSES OF WAR 



Who 

wanted 

war? 



Part i. position to make an effective fight, and would there- 
Chapter fore probably stand by, growling and showing her 
m - teeth. Consequently it was safe to take a bold line ; 
to present Servia with an ultimatum which had been 
made completely watertight against acceptance of 
the unconditional and immediate kind; to reject any 
acceptance which was not unconditional and immedi- 
ate ; to allow the Government of King Peter no time 
for second thoughts, the European Powers no time 
for mediation, her own Minister at Belgrade time 
only to give one hasty glance at the reply, call for his 
passports, and catch his train. So far as poor hu- 
manity can make certain of anything, Austria, with 
German approval and under German guidance, made 
certain of war with Servia. 

But the impression produced, when this matter 
first began to excite public attention, was somewhat 
different. Foreign newspaper correspondents at 
Vienna and Berlin were specially well cared for after 
the Serajevo murders, and when the ultimatum was 
delivered, they immediately sent to England and 
elsewhere accounts of the position which made it 
appear, that the Austrian Government and people, 
provoked beyond endurance by the intrigues of Ser- 
via, had acted impetuously, possibly unwisely, but 
not altogether inexcusably. 

At this stage the idea was also sedulously put 
about that the Kaiser was behaving like a gentleman. 
It was suggested that Germany had been left very 
much in the dark until the explosion actually oc- 
curred, and that she was now paying the penalty of 
loyalty to an indiscreet friend, by suffering herself 
to be dragged into a quarrel in which she had neither 
interest nor concern. In these early days, when 



GERMANY USES AUSTRIA 29 

Sir Edward Grey was striving hopefully, if some- parti. 
what innocently, after peace, it was assumed by Chapter 
the world in general, that Germany, for her own IIL 
reasons, must desire, at least as ardently as the Brit- who 
ish Foreign Minister, to find a means of escape from ^ ? 
an exceedingly awkward position, and that she would 
accordingly use her great influence with her ally to 
this end. If there had been a grain of truth in this 
assumption, peace would have been assured, for 
France and Italy had already promised their sup- 
port. But this theory broke down very speedily; 
and as soon as the official papers were published, it 
was seen never to have rested on the smallest basis 
of fact. 

So far from Germany having been dragged in 
against her will, it was clear that from the beginning 
she had been using Austria as an agent, who was 
not unwilling to stir up strife, but was only half- 
conscious of the nature and dimensions of the contest 
which was bound to follow. It is not credible that 
Germany was blind to the all-but-inevitable results 
of letting Austria loose to range around, of hallooing 
her on, and of comforting her with assurances of 
loyal support. But it may well be believed that 
Austria herself did not see the situation in the same 
clear light, and remained almost up to the last, under 
the delusion, which had been so industriously fos- 
tered by the German ambassador at Vienna, that 
Russia could not fight effectively and therefore would 
probably choose not to fight at all. 

But although Austria may have had no adequate 
conception of the consequences which her action 
would bring about, it is certain that Germany fore- 
saw them, with the single exception of British inter- 



30 



THE CAUSES OF WAE 



Part I. 

Chapter 

III. 

Who 

wanted 

■war? 



vention ; that what she foresaw she also desired ; and 
further, that at the right moment she did her part, 
boldly but clumsily, to guard against any miscarriage 
of her schemes. 

Germany continued to make light of all appre- 
hensions of serious danger from St. Petersburg ; but 
at the eleventh hour Austria appears suddenly to 
have realised for herself the appalling nature of the 
catastrophe which impended. Something happened ; 
what it was we do not know, and the present genera- 
tion will probably never know. We may conjecture, 
however — but it is only conjecture — that by some 
means or other the intrigues of the war cabal at 
Vienna — the instrument of German policy, owing 
more fealty to the Kaiser than to their own Em- 
peror — had been unmasked. In hot haste they were 
disavowed, and Austria opened discussions with 
Eussia 'in a perfectly friendly manner,' * and with 
good hopes of success, as to how the catastrophe 
might still be averted. 

On Thursday, July 30, we are informed, the ten- 
sion between Vienna and St. Petersburg had greatly 
relaxed. An arrangement compatible with the 
honour and interests of both empires seemed almost 
in sight when, on the following day, Germany sud- 
denly intervened with ultimatums to France and 
Eussia, of a kind to which only one answer was 
possible. The spirit of the Ems telegram 2 had in- 
ebriated a duller generation. "A few days' delay," 
our Ambassador at Vienna concludes, "might in all 

1 White Paper, No. 161. 

2 A harmless and unprovocative telegram from the King of Prussia to 
Bismarck in July 1870 was, by the latter, so altered in tone that when 
published it achieved the intention of its editor and served as ' a red rag 
to the Gallic bull ' and brought about the declaration of war by Napo- 
leon III. — Bismarck 's Reflections and Reminiscences, vol. ii. p. 100. 



SIR EDWAED GREY 31 

'probability have saved Europe from one of the parti. 
'greatest calamities in history." * Chapter 

As we turn over the official pages in which the IIL 
British Government has set out its case, we are wi»° 
inclined to marvel — knowing what we now know — war ? 
that our Foreign Minister should have shown so 
much zeal and innocence in pleading the cause of 
peace on high grounds of humanity, and with a faith, 
apparently unshaken to the last, that in principle 
at least, the German Government were in full agree- 
ment with his aims. The practical disadvantages 
of being a gentleman are that they are apt to make 
a man too credulous and not sufficiently inquisitive. 
Sir Edward Grey acted according to his nature. His 
miscalculation was one which his fellow-countrymen 
have not hesitated to forgive. But clearly he mis- 
judged the forces which were opposed to him. He 
was deceived by hollow assurances. He beat hope- 
fully, but vainly and pathetically, against a door 
which was already barred and bolted, and behind 
which (could he but have seen) the Kaiser, with his 
Ministers and Staff, was wholly absorbed in the 
study of war maps and tables of mobilisation. 

Sir Edward Grey failed to prevent war, and in 
the circumstances it is hardly to be wondered at. 
But if he failed in one direction he succeeded in 
another. His whole procedure from first to last was 
so transparently disinterested and above board that, 
when war did actually come upon us, it found us, 
not merely as a nation, but also as an Empire, more 
united than we have ever been at any crisis, since 
the Great Armada was sighted off Plymouth Sound. 
English people felt that whatever else there might 

1 White Paper, No. 161. 



32 



THE CAUSES OF WAE 



Part I. 

Chapter 
III. 

Who 

wanted 
war? 



be to reproach themselves with, they at any rate 
went into the fight with clean hands. What is even 
more remarkable, the people of all neutral countries, 
with the possible exception of the rigid moralists of 
Constantinople, appeared for once to share the same 
opinion. 

This was a great achievement; nearly, but not 
quite, the greatest of all. To have prevented war 
would have been a greater achievement still. . . . 
But was war inevitable 1 Or was M. Sazonof right, 
when he said to our Ambassador, on the morning of 
the day when Servia replied to the Austrian ulti- 
matum, 1 that if Britain then took her stand firmly 
with France and Kussia there would be no war ; but 
that if we failed them then, rivers of blood would 
flow, and in the end we should be dragged into war? 2 

Sir Edward Grey refused to take this course. He 
judged that a pronouncement of such a character 
would appear in the light of a menace to the govern- 
ments of Germany and Austria, and also to public 
opinion in those countries ; that it would only stiffen 
their backs ; that a more hopeful way of proceeding 
was for England to deal with Germany as a friend, 
letting it be understood that if our counsels of mod- 
eration were disregarded, we might be driven most 
reluctantly into the camp of her enemies. To this, 
when it was urged by our Ambassador at St. Peters- 
burg, the Russian Minister only replied — and the 
words seem to have in them a note of tragedy and 
weariness, as if the speaker well knew that he was 
talking to deaf ears — that unfortunately Germany 
was convinced that she could count upon the neutral- 
ity of Britain. 3 

1 Saturday, July 25. 2 White Paper, No. 17. s Ibid. Nos. 17 and 44. 



SIR EDWARD GREY 33 

The alternative was to speak out as Mr. Lloyd parti. 
George spoke at the time of the Agadir crisis, 'to Chapter 
rattle the sabre, ' and to take our stand ' in shining ar- IIL 
mour' beside the other two members of the Entente, who 

Sir Edward Grey believed that this procedure ^ ? e 
would not have the effect desired, but the reverse. 
Further, it would have committed this country to a 
policy which had never been submitted to it, and 
which it had never considered, far less approved, 
even in principle. The Agadir precedent could be 
distinguished. There the danger which threatened 
France arose directly out of treaty engagements 
with ourselves. Here there was no such particular 
justification, but a wide general question of the safety 
of Europe and the British Empire. 

"With regard to this wider question, notwithstand- 
ing its imminence for a good many years, the British 
Empire had not made up its mind, nor indeed had 
it ever been asked to do so by those in authority. 
Sir Edward Grey appears to have thought that, on . 
democratic principles, he had not the right to make 
such a pronouncement as M. Sazonof desired; and' 
that even if this pathway might have led to peace, it 
was one which he could not tread. 

The one alternative was tried, and failed. We 
proffered our good offices, we urged our counsels of 
moderation, all in vain. That, at any rate, is among 
the certainties. And it is also among the certainties 
that, although this alternative failed, it brought us 
two signal benefits, in the unity of our own people 
and the goodwill of the world. 

About the other alternative, which was not tried, 
we cannot of course speak with the same sureness. 
If Sir Edward Grey had taken the step which M. 



34 



THE CAUSES OF WAR 



in. 

Who 
wanted 
war ? 



part i. Sazonof desired him to take, he would at once have 
Chapter been vehemently opposed and denounced by a very 
large body of his own fellow-countrymen, who, never 
having been taken frankly into the confidence of 
the Government with regard to the foundations of 
British policy, were at this early stage of the pro- 
ceedings almost wholly ignorant of the motives and 
issues involved. This being so, if war had ensued, 
we should then have gone into it a divided instead 
of a united nation. On the other hand, if peace had 
ensued, it must have been a patched-up ill-natured 
peace; and it is not improbable that Sir Edward 
Grey would have been driven from office by enemies 
in his own household, playing the game of Germany 
unconsciously, as on previous occasions, and would" 
have brought the Cabinet down with him in his fall. 
For at this time, owing to domestic difficulties, the 
Government stood in a very perilous position, and it 
needed only such a mutiny, as a bold departure in 
foreign affairs would almost certainly have provoked 
among the Liberal party, to bring Mr. Asquith's 
government to an end. 

As one reads and re-reads the official documents 
in our present twilight, it is difficult to resist the 
conclusion that on the main point Sir Edward Grey 
was wrong and M. Sazonof right. Germany, with 
her eyes wide open, had determined on war with 
Russia and France, unless by Russia's surrender of 
her prestige in the Balkans — a surrender in its way 
almost as abject as that which had already been 
demanded of Servia — the results of victory could be 
secured without recourse to arms. Germany, never- 
theless, was not prepared for war with Britain. She 
was reckoning with confidence on our standing aside, 



THE CRIME OF GERMANY 35 

on our unwillingness and inability to intervene. 1 If Part i. 
it had been made clear to her, that in case she insisted Chapter 
on pressing things to extremity, we should on no IIL 
account stand aside, she might then have eagerly w*u> 
forwarded, instead of deliberately frustrating, Aus- war ? 
tria's eleventh-hour negotiations for an accommoda- 
tion with St. Petersburg. 

No one, except Germans, whose judgments, natur- 
ally enough, are disordered by the miscarriage of 
their plans, has dreamed of bringing the charge 
against Sir Edward Grey that he wished for war, or 
fomented it, or even that through levity or want of 
vigilance, he allowed it to occur. The criticism is, 
that although his intentions were of the best, and 
his industry unflagging, he failed to realise the situ- 
ation, and to adopt the only means which might have 
secured peace. 

The charge which is not only alleged, but estab- 
lished against Austria is of a wholly different order. 
It is that she provoked war — blindly perhaps, and 
not foreseeing what the war would be, but at any 
rate recklessly and obstinately. 

The crime of which Germany stands accused is 
that she deliberately aimed at war, and that when 
there seemed a chance of her plan miscarrying, she 
promptly took steps to render peace impossible. 
Among neutral countries is there one, the public 
opinion of which has acquitted her? And has not 
Italy, her own ally, condemned her by refusing as- 
sistance on the ground that this war is a war of 
German aggression? 

1 A proof of this is the outburst of hatred in Germany against Eng- 
land so soon as we ranged ourselves with France and Russia. 



CHAPTER IV 



THE PENALTY OE NEGLIGENCE 



part I. The East lias been drawn into the circle of this 

Chapter war as well as the West, the New World as well as 

IV - the Old ; nor can any man feel certain, or even hope- 

The ful, that the conflagration will be content to burn 

SSLce. itself out where it is now raging, and will not spread 

across further boundaries. ... It is therefore no 

matter of surprise that people should be asking 

themselves — "Of what nature is this war? Is it 

' one of those calamities, like earthquake or tempest, 

'drought or flood, which lawyers describe as 'the 

'act of God'? Or is it a thing which, having been 

'conceived and deliberately projected by the wit of 

'man, could have been averted by human courage 

'and judgment? Was this war, or was it not, in- 

' evitable ? "... To which it may be answered, that 

no war is inevitable until it occurs ; and then every 

war is apt to make pretensions to that character. 

In old times it was the Fates, superior even to 
Zeus, who decreed wars. In later days wars were 
regarded as the will of God. And to-day professional 
interpreters of events are as ready as ever with 
explanations why this war was, in the nature of 
things, unavoidable. Whether the prevailing priest- 
hood wears white robes and fillets, or rich vestments, 

36 



WAS WAR INEVITABLE? 37 

or cassocks and Geneva bands, or the severer modern part i. 
garb of the professor or politician, it appears to be Chapter 
equally prone to dogmatic blasphemy. There is no IV - 
proof that this war was pre-ordained either by a t^ 
Christian God or by the laws of Pagan Nature. Sigence. 

One may doubt if any war is inevitable. If states- 
men can gain time the chances are that they will gain 
peace. This was the view of public opinion through- 
out the British Empire down to July 1914. It was in 
a special sense the view of the Liberal party; and 
their view was endorsed, if not by the whole body of 
Unionists, at any rate by their leader, in terms which 
admitted of no misunderstanding. 1 It is also the point 
of view from which this book is written. . . . This 
war was not inevitable ; it could have been avoided, 
but on one condition — if England had been prepared. 

England was not prepared either morally or ma- 
terially. Her rulers had left her in the dark as to 
the dangers which surrounded her. They had neg- 
lected to make clear to her — probably even to them- 
selves — the essential principles of British policy, 
and the sacrifices which it entailed. They had failed 
to provide armaments to correspond with this pol- 
icy. When the crisis arose their hands were tied. 
They had to sit down hurriedly, and decipher their 
policy, and find out what it meant. Still more hur- 
riedly they had to get it approved, not merely by 
their fellow-countrymen, but by their own colleagues 
— a work, if rumour 2 speaks truly, of considerable 

1 " I hear it also constantly said — there is no use shutting our eyes or 
' ears to obvious facts — that owing to divergent interests, war some day 
' or other between this country and Germany is inevitable. I never be- 
'lieve in these inevitable wars." — Mr. Bonar Law in England and 
Germany. 

2 Eumour finds confirmation in the White Paper; also in an interview 
with Mr. Lloyd George, reported in Pearson's Magazine, March 1915, 
p. 265, col. ii. 



38 THE CAUSES OF WAR 

Part i. difficulty. Then they found that one of the main 
Chapter supports was wanting; and they had to set to work 
IV - frantically to make an army adequate to their 
The needs. 

Sngence. But it was too late. By this time their policy 
had fallen about their ears in ruins. For their policy 
was the neutrality of Belgium, and that was already 
violated. Their policy was the defence of France, 
and invasion had begun. Their policy was peace, 
and peace was broken. The nation which would en- 
joy peace must be strong enough to enforce peace. 

I 
The moods of nations pass like clouds, only more 

slowly. They bank up filled with menace; we look 
again and are surprised to find that they have 
melted away as silently and swiftly as they came. 
One does not need to be very old to recall various 
wars, deemed at one time or another to be inevitable, 
which never occurred. In the ' sixties ' war with the 
second Empire was judged to be inevitable; and 
along our coasts dismantled forts remain to this day 
as monuments of our fathers' firm belief in the im- 
minence of an invasion. In the 'seventies,' and in- 
deed until we had entered the present century, war 
with Russia was regarded as inevitable by a large 
number of well-informed people ; and for a part of 
this period war with the French Republic was judged 
to be no less so. Fortune on the whole was favour- 
able. Circumstances changed. The sense of a com- 
mon danger healed old antagonisms. Causes of 
chronic irritation disappeared of themselves, or were 
removed by diplomatic surgery. And with the dis- 
appearance of these inflammatory centres, misunder- 
standings, prejudices, and suspicions began to van- 



GERMAN JEALOUSY 39 

ish also. Gradually it became clear, that what had part l 
been mistaken on both sides for destiny was nothing- Chapter 
more inexorable than a fit of temper, or a conflict of ^_ 
business interests not incapable of adjustment. And The 
in a sense the German menace was less formidable negligence. 
than any of these others, for the reason that it was 
a fit of temper on one side only — a fit of temper, or 
megalomania. We became fully conscious of the 
German mood only after the end of the South Afri- 
can "War, when its persistence showed clearly that it 
arose, not from any sympathy with the Dutch, but 
from some internal cause. When this cause was ex- 
plained to us it seemed so inadequate, so absurd, so 
unreal, so contrary to the facts, that only a small 
fraction of our nation ever succeeded in believing 
that it actually existed. We had been taught by 
Carlyle, that while the verities draw immortal life 
from the facts to which they correspond, the falsities 
have but a phenomenal existence, and a brief influ- 
ence over the minds of men. Consequently the greater 
part of the British people troubled their heads very 
little about this matter, never thought things would 
come to a crisis, or lead to serious mischief; but 
trusted always that, in due time, the ridiculous il- 
lusions of our neighbours would vanish and die of 
their own inanity. 

We listened with an equal wonder and weariness 
to German complaints that we were jealous of her 
trade and bent on strangling it; that we grudged 
her colonial expansion, and were intriguing all the 
world over to prevent it; that we had isolated her 
and ringed her round with hostile alliances. We 
knew that these notions were all entirely false. We 
knew that, so far from hampering German com- 



40 THE CAUSES OF WAR 

Part i. merce, our Free Trade system in the United King- 

Chapter dom, in the Dependencies, and in the Indian Empire 
Iv ' had fostered it and helped its rapid and brilliant 

The success more than any other external factor. 

SgLce. For fully thirty years from 1870 — during which 
period what remained of the uncivilised portions of 
the world was divided up, during which period also 
Germany was the most powerful nation in Europe, 
and could have had anything she wanted of these 
new territories almost for the asking — Bismarck and 
the statesmen of his school, engrossed mainly in the 
European situation, set little store by colonies, 
thought of them rather as expensive and dangerous 
vanities, and abstained deliberately from taking an 
energetic part in the scramble. We knew, that in 
Africa and the East, Germany had nevertheless ob- 
tained considerable possessions, and that it was, pri- 
marily her own fault that she had not obtained more. 
We assumed, no doubt very foolishly, that she must 
ultimately become aware of her absurdity in blaming 
us for her own neglect. We forgot human nature, 
and the apologue of the drunkard who cursed the 
lamp-post for its clumsiness in getting in his way. 

The British people knew that Germany was talk- 
ing nonsense; but unfortunately they never fully 
realised that she was sincere, and meant all the 
things she said. They thought she only half believed 
in her complaints, as a man is apt to do when ill- 
temper upsets his equanimity. They were confident 
that in the end the falsities would perish and the 
verities remain, and that in the fulness of time the 
two nations would become friends. 

As to this last the British people probably judged 
correctly; but they entirely overlooked the fact, 



DANGERS OF ILL-TEMPER 41 

that if truth was to be given a chance of prevailing part i. 

in the end, it was important to provide against Chapter 
mischief which might very easily occur in the mean- IV - 

time. Nor did their rulers, whose duty it was, ever row 

- , - , . . penalty of 

warn them seriously or this necessity. negligence. 

When a man works himself up into a rage and 
proceeds to flourish a loaded revolver, something 
more is necessary for the security of the bystanders 
than the knowledge that his ill-temper does not rest 
upon a reasonable basis. War was not inevitable, 
certainly; but until the mood of Germany changed, 
it was exceedingly likely to occur unless the odds 
against the aggressor were made too formidable 
for him to face. None of the governments, however, 
which have controlled our national destinies since 
1900, ever developed sufficient energy to realise the 
position of affairs, or ever mustered up courage to 
tell the people clearly what the risks were, to state* 
the amount of the premium which was required to 
cover the risks, and to insist upon the immediate 
duty of the sacrifice which imperial security in- 
exorably demanded. 



CHAPTER V 



PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY 



Part I. 

Chapter. 
V. 

Personal 
responsi- 
bility. 



Although in a technical sense the present war was 
brought on by Austrian diplomacy, no one, in Eng- 
land at least, is inclined to rate the moral responsi- 
bility of that empire at the highest figure. It is in 
Germany that we find, or imagine ourselves to have 
found, not only the true and deep-seated causes of 
the war, but the immediate occasions of it. 

Not the least of our difficulties, however, is to 
decide the point — "Who is Germany? Who was her 
man of business? Who acted for her in the matter 
of this war? Who pulled the wires, or touched 
the button that set the conflagration blazing? Was 
this the work of an individual or a camarilla? Was 
it the result of one strong will prevailing, or of 
several wills getting to loggerheads — wills not par- 
ticularly strong, but obstinate, and flustered by in- 
ternal controversy and external events? What 
actually happened — was it meant by the 'super-men' 
to happen, or did it come as a shock — not upon 
'super-men' at all — but upon several groups of sur- 
prised blunderers? These questions are not likely 
to be answered for a generation or more — until, if 
ever, the archives of Vienna and Berlin give up their 

42 



MEN OF LETTERS 43 

secrets — and it would therefore be idle to waste too part I. 
much time in analysis of the probabilities. Chapter 

The immediate occasion of the catastrophe has been v - 
variously attributed to the German court, army, bu- Personal 

„ , , T „ responsi- 

reaucracy, professors, press, and people, it we are bmty. 
looking only for a single thing — the hand which lit the 
conflagration — and not for the profounder and more 
permanent causes and origins of the trouble, we can at 
once dismiss several of these suspects from the dock. 

Men of learning and letters, professors of every 
variety — a class which has been christened 'the 
Pedantocracy' by unfriendly critics — may be all 
struck off the charge-sheet as unconcerned in the 
actual delinquency of arson. 

In fact, if not in name, these are a kind of priest- 
hood, and a large part of their lives ' work has been to 
spread among German youth the worship of the 
State under Hohenzollern kingship. It is impossible 
of course to make 'a silk purse out of a sow's ear,' 
a religion out of a self -advertising dynasty, or a god 
out of a machine. Consequently, except for mischief, 
their efforts have been mainly wasted. Over a long 
period of years, however, they have been engaged in 
heaping up combustibles. They have filled men's 
minds to overflowing with notions which are very 
liable to lead to war, and which indeed were designed 
for no other purpose than to prepare public opinion 
for just such a war as this. Their responsibility 
therefore is no light one, and it will be dealt with 
later. But they are innocent at all events of com- 
plicity in this particular exploit of fire-raising; and 
if, after the event, they have sought to excuse, vindi- 
cate, and uphold the action of their rulers it would 
be hard measure to condemn them for that. 



44 THE CAUSES OF WAR 

part i. Nor did the press bring about the war. In other 

Chapter countries, where the press is free and irresponsible, 

it has frequently been the prime mover in such mis- 

personai chief ; but never in Germany. For in Germany the 

baity™" press is incapable of bringing about anything of the 

political kind, being merely an instrument and not 

a principal. 

Just as little can the charge of having produced the 
war be brought against the people. In other countries, 
where the people are used to give marching orders to 
their rulers, popular clamour has led to catastrophe 
of this kind more frequently than any other cause. 
But this, again, has never been so in Germany. The 
German people are sober, stedfast, and humble in 
matters of high policy. They have confidence in their 
rulers, believe what they are told, obey orders read- 
ily, but do not think of giving them. "When war was 
declared, all Germans responded to the call of duty 
with loyalty and devotion. Nay, having been pre- 
pared for at least a generation, they welcomed war 
with enthusiasm. According to the lights which were 
given them to judge by, they judged every whit as 
rightly as our own people. The lights were false 
lights, hung out deliberately to mislead them and to 
justify imperial policy. But this was no fault of 
theirs. Moreover, the judgment which they came 
to with regard to the war was made after the event, 
and cannot therefore in any case be held responsible 
for its occurrence. This is a people's war surely 
enough, but just as surely, the people had no hand 
in bringing it about. 

The circle of the accused is therefore narrowed 
down to the Court, the Army, and the Bureaucracy. 
And there we must leave it for the present — a joint 



GERMAN MILITARY OPINION 45 

indictment against all three. But whether these parti. 
parties were guilty, all three in equal measure, we Chapter 
cannot conjecture with the least approach to cer- v - 
tainty. Nor can we even say precisely of what they Personal 
were guilty — of misunderstanding — of a quarrel wSJ*"" 
among themselves — of a series of blunders — or of a 
crime so black and deliberate, that no apologist will 
be able ever to delete it from the pages of history. 
On all this posterity must be left to pronounce. 

It is only human nevertheless to be curious about 
personalities. Unfortunately for the satisfaction of 
this appetite, all is darkness as to the German Army. 
We may suspect that the Prussian junker, or country 
gentleman, controls and dominates it. But even as 
to this we may conceivably be wrong. The military 
genius of some Hanoverian, Saxon, or Bavarian 
may possess the mastery in council. As to the real 
heads of the army, as to their individual characters, 
and their potency in directing policy we know 
nothing at all. After nine months of war, we have 
arrived at no clear notion, even with regard to their 
relative values as soldiers in the field. We have even 
less knowledge as to their influence beforehand in 
shaping and deciding the issues of war and peace. 

This much, however, we may reasonably deduce 
from Bernhardi and other writers — that military 
opinion had been anxious for some considerable 
number of years past, and more particularly since 
the Agadir incident, 1 lest war, which it regarded as 
ultimately inevitable, should be delayed until the 
forces ranged against Germany, especially upon her 
Eastern frontier, were too strong for her to cope with. 

In the pages of various official publications, and 

1 July 1911. 



46 THE CAUSES OF WAE 

PaetI. in newspaper reports immediately before and after 

Chapter war began, we caught glimpses of certain characters 

at work; but these were not professional soldiers; 

personal they were members of the Court and the Bureau- 

responsi- 

bmty. cracy. 

Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, the Imperial Chan- 
cellor, comes upon the scene — a harassed and in- 
dignant official — sorely flustered — not by any means 
master of his temper — not altogether certain of his 
facts — in considerable doubt apparently as to 
whether things have not passed behind his back 
which he ought to have been told of by higher powers, 
but was not. He appears to us as a diligent and 
faithful servant, — one who does not seek to impose 
his own decisions, but to excuse, justify, and carry 
out, if he can, decisions which have been made by 
others, more highly placed and greedier of responsi- 
bility than himself. 

Herr von Jagow, the Foreign Minister, is much 
affected. He drops tears — or comes somewhere near 
dropping them — over the lost hopes of a peaceful 
understanding between England and Germany. "We 
can credit the sincerity of his sorrow all the more 
easily, for the reason that Herr von Jagow behaves 
throughout the crisis as the courteous gentleman; 
while others, who by position were even greater gen- 
tlemen^;, forget momentarily, in their excitement, the 
qualities which are usually associated with that title. 

Then there is the German Ambassador at Vienna 
— obviously a firebrand — enjoying, one imagines, the 
confidence of the war parties in both capitals: also 
apparently a busy intriguer. The documents show 
him acting behind the back of the Berlin Foreign 
Office, and communicating direct with the Kaiser. 



PEINCE LICHNOWSKY 47 

"We gather very clearly that he egged on the Parti. 
statesmen of Vienna, with great diligence and sue- Chapter 
cess, to press Servia to extremes, and to shear time v - 
so short that peace-makers had nothing left to catch Personal 
hold of. Russia, he assured them, would never carry binty™ 
her opposition to the point of war. Even if she 
did so, he argued with much plausibility, she would 
be negligible. For she stood midway in the great 
military and naval reformation, than which no 
situation is more deplorable for the purposes of 
carrying on a campaign. 

"When Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambas- 
sador in London, took his departure at the outbreak 
of war, he probably left no single enemy behind him. 
A simple, friendly, sanguine figure, with a pardon- 
able vanity which led him to believe the incredible. 
He produced what is called in the cant of the day 'an 
atmosphere,' mainly in drawing-rooms and news- 
paper offices, but occasionally, one conjectures, even 
in Downing Street itself. His artistry was purely 
in air and touched nothing solid. He was useful to 
his employers, mainly because he put England off 
her guard. He would not have been in the least 
useful if he had not been mainly sincere. 

But though he was useful to German policy, he 
was not trusted by the powers in Berlin to attend to 
their business at the Court of St. James's except 
under strict supervision. What precisely were the 
duties of Baron von Kuhlmann, Councillor to the 
Embassy? He was always very cheerful, and oblig- 
ing, and ready to smooth any little difficulty out 
of the way. On the other hand, he was also very 
deft at inserting an obstacle with an air of perfect 
innocence, which imposed on nearly every one — even 



48 



THE CAUSES OF WAR 



Part I. 

Chapter 
V. 

Personal 
responsi- 
bility. 



occasionally on the editors of newspapers. For 
some reason, however, very few people were willing 
to accept this plausible diplomatist's assurances 
without a grain or two of salt. Indeed quite a large 
number were so misled by their prejudices against 
him, that they were convinced his prime vocation 
was that of a spy — a spy on the country to which he 
was accredited and on the Ambassador under whom 
he served. 1 

We know more of the Kaiser than of any of these 
others, and we have known him over a much longer 
period. And yet our knowledge of him has never 
enabled us to forecast his actions with any certainty. 
British ministers and diplomatists, whose business it 
is to gauge, not only the muzzle-velocity of eminent 
characters, but also the forces of their recoil, never 
seem to have arrived at any definite conclusions with 
regard to this baffling personality. Whatever he 
did or did not do, they were always surprised by it, 
which gives us some measure of their capacity if 
not of his. 

The Kaiser is pre-eminently a man of moods. At 
one time he is Henry the Fifth, at another Richard 
the Second. Upon occasions he appears as Hamlet, 
cursing fate which impels him to make a decision. 
Within the same hour he is Autolycus crying up his 
wares with anunf eigned cheerfulness. He is possessed 
by the demon of quick-change and restlessness. We 



1 Prussian policy appears to be modelled upon the human body. Just 
as man is endowed with a duality of certain organs — eyes, nostrils, 
lungs, kidneys, etc. — so Prussian policy appears to proceed upon the 
principle of a double diplomatic representation, two separate Foreign 
Office departments, etc., etc. It is no doubt an excellent plan to have a 
second string to your bow; but it is not yet clear how far this can be 
carried with advantage in delicate negotiations without destroying con- 
fidence in your sincerity. 



THE KAISEE 49 

learn on good authority that he possesses an almost part I. 
incredible number of uniforms which he actually Chapter 
wears, and of royal residences which he occasionally 
inhabits. He clothes himself suitably for each brief Personal 
occasion, and sleeps rarely, if reports can be be- biiity" ' 
lieved, for more than two nights together under the 
same roof. He is like an American millionaire in his 
fondness for rapid and sudden journeys, and like a 
democratic politician in his passion for speech- 
making. 

The phenomena of the moment — those which 
flicker upon the surface of things — engage his eager 
and vivacious interest. Upon such matters his 
commentaries are often apt and entertaining. But 
when he attempts to deal with deeper issues, and 
with the underlying principles and causes of human 
action, his utterances immediately lose the mind's 
attention and keep hold only of the ears, by virtue 
of a certain resonance and blatancy. "When the 
Kaiser discourses to us, as he often does, upon the 
profundities of politics, philosophy, and religion, he 
falls instantly into set forms, which express nothing 
that is living and real. He would have the world be- 
lieve, and doubtless himself sincerely believes, that 
he has plunged, like a pearl-diver, into the deeps, and 
has returned thence laden with rich treasures of 
thought and experience. But in truth he has never 
visited this region at all, being of a nature far too 
buoyant for such enterprises. He has not found 
truth, but only remembered phrases. 

The Kaiser is frequently upbraided for his charm 
of manner by people who have come under its influ- 
ence and been misled. One of the commonest accusa- 
tions against him is that of duplicity; but indeed it 



50 



THE CAUSES OF WAR 



Part I. 

Chapter 

V. 

Personal 
responsi- 
bility. 



seems hardly more just to condemn him for duplicity 
than it would be to praise him for sincerity. He is a 
man dangerous to have dealings with, but this is ow- 
ing to the irresponsible effervescence of his ideas. 
At any given moment he probably means the greater 
part of what he says ; but the image of one moment is 
swiftly expelled and obliterated by that of the next. 
The Kaiser's untrustworthiness arises not from du- 
plicity, so much as from the quickness of his fancy, 
the impulsiveness of his judgment, and the shortness 
of his memory. That his communications frequently 
produce the same effects as duplicity, is due to the 
fact that he recognises no obligation either to stand 
by his word, or to correct the impression which his 
hasty assurances may have produced in the mind of 
his interlocutor. The statesman who is won over to- 
day by his advocacy of an English alliance, is 
astounded on the morrow to find him encouraging an 
English pogrom. 1 



1 A labour leader, highly impressed by the spectacle, gave a vivid 
description of an equestrian parade through the streets of Berlin after 
the declaration of war — the Kaiser in helmet of gold, seated on his white 
charger, frowning terribly, in a kind of immobility, as if his features 
had been frozen into this dramatically appropriate expression — follow- 
ing behind him in a carriage the Crown Prince and Princess, all vivacity 
and smiles, and bows to this side and the other — a remarkable contrast I 

It is interesting to contrast the ornate and flamboyant being whom 
we know as Kaiser Wilhelm the Second with Carlyle 's famous descrip- 
tion of the great Frederick: — 

' ' A highly interesting lean little old man, of alert though slightly 
' stooping figure ; whose name among strangers was King Friedrich the 
'Second, or Frederick the Great of Prussia, and at home among the 
' common people, who much loved and esteemed him, was Yater Frits, — 
' Father Fred, — a name of familiarity which had not bred contempt in 
' that instance. He is a King every inch of him, though without the 
'trappings of a King. Presents himself in a Spartan simplicity of 
'vesture; no crown but an old military cocked-hat, — generally old, or 
'trampled and kneaded into absolute softness, if new; — no sceptre but 
' one like Agamemnon 's, a walking-stick cut from the woods, which 
' serves also as a riding-stick (with which he hits the horse 'between the 
'ears' say authors) ; — and for royal robes, a mere soldier's blue coat 
' with red facings, coat likely to be old, and sure to have a good deal of 



THE IDEA OF ANTICHRIST 51 

When a violent convulsion shakes the world people Part i. 
immediately begin to look about them for some Chapter 
mighty and malevolent character who can be held re- v - 
sponsible for it. To the generations which knew Personal 
them, Cromwell, Napoleon, and Bismarck all figured bmty. 
as Antichrist. But in regard to the policy which 
produced the present war, of what man can it be said 
truly, either that he controlled that policy, or that he 
brought about the results which he aimed at? Which 
of the great personages concerned possesses the 
sublime qualities of the spirit of evil? x 

It is conceivable, though very unlikely, that behind 
the scenes there was some strong silent man who 
worked the others like puppets on a string; but 
among those who have made themselves known to 

' Spanish snuff on the breast of it ; rest of the apparel dim, unobtrusive 
' in colour or cut, ending in high over-knee military boots, which may be 
'brushed (and, I hope, kept soft with an underhand suspicion of oil), 
' but are not permitted to be blackened or varnished ; Day and Martin 
1 with their soot-pots forbidden to approach. 

' ' The man is not of godlike physiognomy, any more than of imposing 
'stature or costume; close-shut mouth with thin lips, prominent jaws 
'and nose, receding brow, by no means of Olympian height; head, how- 
' ever, is of long form, and has superlative gray eyes in it. Not what is 
'called a beautiful man; nor yet, by all appearance, what is called a 
' happy. On the contrary, the face bears evidence of many sorrows, as 
' they are termed, of much hard labour done in this world ; and seems to 
'anticipate nothing but more still coming. Quiet stoicism, capable 
'enough of what joy there were, but not expecting any worth mention; 
'great unconscious and some conscious pride, well tempered with a 
' cheery mockery of humour, — are written on that old face ; which carries 
'its chin well forward, in spite of the slight stoop about the neck; 
' snuffy nose rather flung into the air under its old cocked hat, — like an 
' old snuffy lion on the watch ; and such a pair of eyes as no man or lion 
' or lynx of that century bore elsewhere, according to all the testimony 
' we have. ' ' — Carlyle, History of Frederick the Great, Bk. I. chap. i. 

1 A friend who has been kind enough to read the proofs of this volume 
takes exception to the rating of Antichrist. The Devil, he maintains, is 
not at all a clever or profound spirit, though he is exceedingly indus- 
trious. The conception of him in the old Mystery Plays, where he 
figures as a kind of butt, whose elaborate and painfully constructed 
schemes are continually being upset owing to some ridiculous oversight, 
or by some trivial accident, is the true Satan; the Miltonic idea is a 
poetical myth, not in the least borne out by human experience. 



52 



THE CAUSES OF WAR 



Part I. 

Chapter 

V. 

Personal 
responsi- 
bility. 



us in the pages of White Papers and the like, there 
is none whose features bear the least resemblance 
to our conception of Antichrist ; none who had firm 
control of events, or even of himself. There is none 
of whom it is possible to say truly that he achieved 
the results at which he aimed. 

It is clear that the war which the joint efforts 
of these great personages brought into existence was 
a monstrous birth, and that it filled those who were 
responsible for it with dismay, only a degree less 
than it shocked other people. For proof of this, it 
is unnecessary to look further than the miscalcula- 
tions of the political kind which became recognised 
for such within a few weeks after war was declared. 



CHAPTER VI 



GERMAN MISCALCULATIONS 



In the world's play-house there are a number of parti. 
prominent and well-placed seats, which the instinct Cha pteb 

of veneration among mankind insists on reserving 1 

for Super-men ; and as mankind is never content <;ern ^ n 

1 ' miscaleula- 

unless the seats of the super-men are well filled, ' the tions. 
Management' — in other words, the press, the publi- 
cists, and other manipulators of opinion — have to 
do the best they can to find super-men to sit in them. 
When that is impossible, it is customary to burnish 
up, fig out, and pass off various colourable substi- 
tutes who, it is thought, may be trusted to comport 
themselves with propriety until the curtain falls. 
But those resplendent creatures whom we know so 
well by sight and fame, and upon whom all eyes and 
opera- glasses are directed during the entr'-actes, are 
for the most part not super-men at all, but merely 
what, in the slang of the box-office, is known as 
'paper.' Indeed there have been long periods, even 
generations, during which the supposed super-men 
have been wholly 'paper.' 

Of course so long as the super-men substitutes 
have only to walk to their places, to bow, smile, 
frown, overawe, and be admired, everything goes 
safely enough. The audience is satisfied and the 

53 



54 



THE CAUSES OF WAR 



'management' nibs its hands. But if anything has 
to be done beyond this parade business, if the un- 
expected happens, if, for instance, there is an alarm 
of fire — in which case the example set by the super- 
creatures might be of inestimable assistance — the 
'paper' element is certain to crumple up, according to 
the laws of its nature, being after all but dried pulp. 
Something of this kind appears to have happened 
in various great countries during the weeks which 
immediately preceded and followed the outbreak of 
war, and in none was the crumpling up of the super- 
men substitutes more noticeable than in Germany. 

The thoroughness of the German race is no empty 
boast. All the world knows as much by experience 
in peace as well as war. Consequently, people had 
said to themselves : ' ' However it may be with other 
'nations, in Germany at all events the strings of 
'foreign policy are firmly held in giant fingers." 
But as day succeeded day, unmasking one miscalcula- 
tion after another, it became clear that there must 
have been at least as much 'paper' in the political 
high places of Germany as elsewhere. 

Clearly, although this war was made in Germany, 
it did not at all follow the course which had been 
charted for it in the official forecasts. For the Ger- 
man bureaucracy and general staff had laid their 
plans to crush France at the first onset — to crush her 
till the bones stuck out through her skin. And they 
had reckoned to out-general Russia and roll back her 
multitudes, as yet unorganised — so at least it was 
conceived — in wave upon wave of encroaching defeat. 

Having achieved these aims before the fall of the 
leaf, Germany would have gained thereby another 
decade for the undisturbed development of wealth 



THE TIME-TABLE MISCARRIES 55 

and world-power. Under Prussian direction the Parti. 

power of Austria would then be consolidated within Chapter 
her own dominions and throughout the Balkan VL 

Peninsula. At the end of this interval of vigorous German 

. , , i • /"n i i i_ miscalcula- 

recuperation, or possibly earlier, Germany would at- tions . 
tack England, and England would fall an easy prey. 
For having stood aside from the former struggle she 
would be without allies. Her name would stink in 
the nostrils of Russia and France ; and indeed to the 
whole world she would be recognised for what she 
was — a decadent and coward nation. Even her 
own children would blush for her dishonour. 

That these were the main lines of the German 
forecast no man can doubt, who has watched and 
studied the development of events; and although 
it is as yet too early days to make sure that nothing 
of all this vast conception will ever be realised, much 
of it — the time-table at all events — has certainly 
miscarried for good and all. 

According to German calculations England would 
stand aside; but England took part. Italy would 
help her allies; but Italy refused. Servia was a 
thing of naught ; but Servia destroyed several army 
corps. Belgium would not count; and yet Belgium 
by her exertions counted, if for nothing more, for the 
loss of eight precious days, while by her sufferings 
she mobilised against the aggressor the condemna- 
tion of the whole world. 

The Germans reckoned that the army of France 
was terrible only upon paper. Forty-five years of 
corrupt government and political peculation must, 
according to their calculations, have paralysed the 
general staff and betrayed the national spirit. The 



56 



THE CAUSES OF WAR 



VI. 

German 
miscalcula- 
tions. 



Part I. sums voted for equipment, arms, and ammunition 
Chapter must assuredly have been spirited away, as under 
the Second Empire, into the pockets of ministers, 
senators, deputies, and contractors. The results of 
this regime would become apparent, as they had done 
in 1870, only in the present case sooner. 

War was declared by the Third Napoleon at mid- 
July, by William the Second not until August 1; 
but Sedan or its equivalent would occur, neverthe- 
less, in the first days of September, in 1914 as in 
1870. In the former contest Paris fell at the end of 
six months ; in this one, with the aid of howitzers, it 
would fall at the end of six weeks. 

Unfortunately for this confident prediction, what- 
ever may have been the deficiency in the French 
supplies, however dangerous the consequent hitches 
in mobilisation, things fell out quite differently. The 
spirit of the people of France, and the devotion of 
her soldiers, survived the misfeasances of the politi- 
cians, supposing indeed that such crimes had actually 
been committed. 



It was a feature of Bismarck's diplomacy that 
he put a high value upon the good opinion of the 
world, and took the greatest pains to avoid its con- 
demnation. In 1870, as we now know, he schemed 
successfully, to lure the government of Napoleon the 
Third into a declaration of war, thereby saddling the 
French government with the odium which attaches to 
peace-breakers. 1 But in the case of the present war, 
which, as it out-Bismarcked Bismarck in deliberate 



1 British public opinion in regard to that war was divided roughly- 
according to party lines, the Conservatives favouring France on senti- 
mental grounds, the Liberals favouring Germany as a highly-educated, 
peace-loving people who had been wantonly attacked. 



CRUELTIES IN BELGIUM 57 

aggressiveness, stood all the more in need of a tactful pakt i. 
introduction to the outside world, the precautions Chapter 
of that astute statesman were neglected or despised. VL 
From the beginning all neutral nations were resent- German 
ful of German procedure, and after the devastation tions. 
of Belgium and the destruction of Louvain, the spa- 
cious morality of the Young Turks alone was equal to 
the profession of friendship and admiration. 

The objects which Germany sought to gain by the 
cruelties perpetrated, under orders, by her soldiers 
in Belgium and Northern France are clear enough. 
These objects were certainly of considerable value in 
a military as well as in a political sense. One won- 
ders, however, if even Germany herself now con- 
siders them to have been worth the abhorrence and 
disgust which they have earned for her throughout 
the civilised world. 

In nothing is the sham super-man more easily 
detected than in the confidence and self-complacency 
with which he pounces upon the immediate small 
advantage, regardless of the penalty he will have to 
pay in the future. By spreading death and devasta- 
tion broadcast in Belgium the Germans hoped to at- 
tain three things, and it is not impossible that they 
have succeeded in attaining them all. They sought 
to secure their communications by putting the fear of 
death, and worse than death, into the hearts of the 
civil population. They sought to send the countryside 
fleeing terror-stricken before their advance, choking 
and cumbering the highways ; than which nothing is 
ever more hampering to the operations of an army in 
retreat, or more depressing to its spirits. But chiefly 
they desired to set a ruthless object-lesson before the 
eyes of Holland, in order to show her the conse- 



58 



THE CAUSES OF WAR 



VI. 

German 
miscalcula- 
tions. 



Part I. quences of resistance; so that when it came to her 
Chapter turn to answer a summons to surrender she might 
have the good sense not to make a fuss. They desired 
in their dully-calculating, official minds that Holland 
might never forget the clouds of smoke, from burning 
villages and homesteads, which the August breezes 
carried far across her frontiers ; the sights of horror, 
the tales of suffering and ruin which tens of thou- 
sands of starved, forlorn, and hurrying fugitives 
brought with them when they came seeking sanctuary 
in her territories. 

But if the Germans gained all this, and even if 
they gained in addition the loving admiration of the 
Young Turks, was it worth while to purchase these 
advantages at such a price? It seems a poor bargain 
to save your communications, if thereby you lose the 
good opinion of the whole world. 

What is of most interest to ourselves, however, in' 
the long list of miscalculations, is the confidence of 
Germany that Britain would remain neutral. For a 
variety of reasons which satisfied the able bureau- 
crats at Berlin, it was apparently taken for granted 
by them that we were determined to stand out ; and 
indeed that we were in no position to come in even if 
we would. We conjecture that the reports of German 
ambassadors, councillors, consuls, and secret service 
agents must have been very certain and unanimous 
in this prediction. 

According to the German theory, the British race, 
at home and abroad, was wholly immersed in gain, 
and in a kind of pseudo-philanthropy — in making 
money, and in paying blackmail to the working- 
classes in order to be allowed to go on making money. 



miscalcula- 
tions. 



GERMAN VIEW OF ENGLAND 59 

Our social legislation and our 'People's Budgets' parti. 
were regarded in Germany with contempt, as sops Chapter 
and shams, wanting in thoroughness and tainted with YL 

hypOCrisy. German 

English politicians, acting upon the advice of 
obliging financiers, had been engaged during recent 
years (so grossly was the situation misjudged by our 
neighbours) in imposing taxation which hit the 
trader, manufacturer, and country-gentleman as 
hard as possible; which also hit the working-class 
hard, though indirectly; but which left holes through 
which the financiers themselves — by virtue of their 
international connections and affiliations — could 
glide easily into comparative immunity. 

From these faulty premisses, Germans concluded 
that Britain was held in leading-strings by certain 
sentimentalists who wanted vaguely to do good ; and 
that these sentimentalists, again, were helped and 
guided by certain money-lenders and exploiters, who 
were all very much in favour of paying ransom out 
of other people's pockets. A nation which had come 
to this pass would be ready enough to sacrifice future 
interests — being blind to them — for the comforts of 
a present peace. 

The Governments of the United Kingdom and the 
Dominions were largely influenced — so it was be- 
lieved at Berlin — by crooks and cranks of various 
sorts, by speculators and 'speculatists,' 1 many of 
them of foreign origin or descent — who preached day 
in and day out the doctrine that war was an anachro- 
nism, vieux jeu, even an impossibility in the present 
situation of the world. 

1 ' Speculatists ' was a term used by contemporary American writers 
to describe the eloquent theorists who played so large a part in the 
French Revolution. 



60 THE CAUSES OF WAR 

part i. The British Government appeared to treat these 
Chapter materially-minded visionaries with the highest fa- 
VL vour. Their advice was constantly sought ; they were 
German recipients of the confidences of Ministers; they 
SonJ! CU played the part of Lords Bountiful to the party or- 
ganisations ; they were loaded with titles, if not with 
honour. Their abhorrence of militarism knew no 
bounds, and to a large extent it seemed to German, 
and even to English eyes, as if they carried the 
Cabinet, the party-machine, and the press along 
with them. 

'Militarism,' as used by these enthusiasts, was a 
comprehensive term. It covered with ridicule and 
disrepute even such things as preparation for the 
defence of the national existence. International law 
was solemnly recommended as a safer defence than 
battleships. 

Better certainly, they allowed, if militarism could 
be rooted out in all countries ; but at any rate Eng- 
land, the land of their birth or adoption, must be 
saved from the contamination of this brutalising 
idea. In their anxiety to discredit Continental exem- 
plars they even went so far as to evolve an ingenious 
theory, that foreign nations which followed in the 
paths of militarism, did so at serious loss to them- 
selves, but with wholly innocent intentions. More 
especially, they insisted, was this true in the case of 
Germany. 

The Liberal party appeared to listen to these 
opinions with respect; Radicals hailed them with 
enthusiasm ; while the Labour party was at one time 
so much impressed, as to propose through some of its 
more progressive spirits that, in the exceedingly 
unlikely event of a German landing, working-men 



ERRORS OF INFERENCE 61 

should continue steadily at their usual labours and Parti. 
pay no heed to the military operations of the in- Chapter 
vaders. 1 

In Berlin, apparently, all this respect and en- German 
thusiasm for pacifism, together with the concrete tions. 
proposals for putting its principles into practice, 
were taken at their face value. There at any rate 
it was confidently believed that the speculators and 
the 'speculatists' had succeeded in changing or eras- 
ing the spots of the English leopard. 

But in order to arrive at such a conclusion as this 
the able German bureaucrats must have understood 
very little, one would think, of human nature in 
general, and of British human nature in particular. 
Clearly they built more hopes on our supposed con- 
version to pacifism than the foundations would stand. 
They were right, of course, in counting it a benefit 
to themselves that we were unprepared and unsus- 
picious of attack ; that we had pared down our exigu- 
ous army and stinted our navy somewhat beyond 
the limits of prudence. They were foolish, however, 
not to perceive that if the British people found 
themselves confronted with the choice, between a 
war which they believed to be righteous, and a peace 
which they saw clearly would not only be wounding 
to their own honour but ruinous to their security, all 
their fine abstract convictions would go by the board ; 
that party distinctions would then for the time being 
disappear, and the speculators and 'speculatists' 
would be interned in the nethermost pit of national 
distrust. ... In so far, therefore, as the Germans 
reckoned on our unpreparedness they were wise; 
but in counting upon British neutrality they were 
singularly wide of the mark. 



62 



THE CAUSES OF WAR 



VI. 

German 
miscalcula- 
tions. 



Part i. One imagines that among the idealists of Berlin 
Chapter there must surely have been a few sceptics who did 
not altogether credit this wholesale conversion and 
quakerisation of the British race. But for these 
doubters, if indeed they existed, there were other 
considerations of a more practical kind which seemed 
to indicate that Britain must certainly stand aside. 

The first and most important of these was the 
imminence of civil war in Ireland. If Prince Lich- 
nowsky and Baron von Kuhlmann reported that this 
had become inevitable, small blame to their per- 
spicacity! For in this their judgment only tallied 
with that of most people in the United Kingdom who 
had any knowledge of the true facts. 

In March an incident occurred among the troops 
stationed in Ireland which must have given comfort 
at Berlin, even in greater measure than it caused 
disquiet at home. For it showed in a vivid flash 
the intrinsic dangers of the Irish situation, and the 
tension, almost to breaking-point, which existed be- 
tween the civil authorities and the fighting services. 

It also showed, what in the circumstances must 
have been peculiarly reassuring to the German Gov- 
ernment, that our Navy and Army were under the 
charge of Ministers whose judgments were apt to be 
led captive by their tempers. Although the Secre- 
tary of State for War did not remain in office for 
many days to encourage the hearts of the general 
staff at Berlin, his important post was never filled. 
It was only occupied and kept warm by the Prime 
Minister, whose labours and responsibilities — ac- 
cording to the notions of the Germans, who are a 
painstaking and thorough people — were already 
enough for one man to undertake. Moreover, the 



THE DUBLIN RIOT 63 

First Lord of the Admiralty had not resigned ; and it Part I. 
was perhaps natural, looking at what had just hap- Chapter 
pened, to conclude that he would be wholly incapable VL 
of the sound and swift decision by which a few German 
months later he was destined to atone for his recent ™™ s . 
blunder. 

Moreover, although the Curragh incident, as it 
was called, had been patched over in a sort of way, 
the danger of civil war in Ireland had not diminished 
in the least by Midsummer. Indeed it had sensibly 
increased. During the interval large quantities of 
arms and ammunition had been imported by Ulster- 
men in defiance of the Government, and Nationalists 
were eagerly engaged in emulating their example. 
The emergency conference of the leaders of parties 
which the King, acting upon the desperate advice 
of his Ministers, had called together at Buckingham 
Palace ended in complete failure. 

On Monday the 27th of July readers of the morning 
newspapers, looking anxiously for news of the Serv- 
ian reply to the Austrian ultimatum, found their eyes 
distracted by even blacker headlines, which an- 
nounced that a Scots regiment had fired on a Dublin 
mob. 

How the bureaucrats of Berlin must have rubbed 
their hands and admired their own prescience ! Civil 
war in Ireland had actually begun, and in the very 
nick of time ! And this occurrence, no less dramatic 
than opportune, was a triumph not merely for Ger- 
man foresight but for German contrivance — like a 
good many other things, indeed, which have taken 
place of late. When the voyage of the good ship- 
Fanny, which in April carried arms to the coast of 
Antrim, comes to be written, and that of the anony- 



64 



THE CAUSES OF WAR 



Part I. 

Chapter 

VI. 

German 
miscalcula- 
tions. 



mous yacht which sailed from German waters, trans- 
shipped its cargo in the channel, whence it was safely 
conveyed by another craft to Dublin Bay to kindle 
this blaze in July — when these narratives are set out 
by some future historian, as they deserve to be, but 
not until then, it will be known how zealously, benev- 
olently, and impartially our loyal and kindly Teuton 
cousins forwarded and fomented the quarrel between 
Covenanter and Nationalist. What the German bu- 
reaucrats, however, with all their foresight, appar- 
ently did not in the least foresee, was that the wound 
which they had intentionally done so much to keep 
open, they would speedily be helping unintentionally 
to heal. 



With regard to South Africa, German miscalcula- 
tion and intrigue pursued a somewhat similar course, 
though with little better results. It was assumed 
that South Africa, having been fully incorporated 
in the Empire as a self-governing unit only twelve 
years earlier, and as the result of a prolonged and 
sanguinary war, must necessarily be bent on severing 
the British connection at the earliest opportunity. 
The Dutch, like the frogs in the fable, were imagined 
to be only awaiting a favourable moment to exchange 
the tyranny of King Log for the benevolent rule of 
King Stork. 

In these forecasts, however, various considera- 
tions were overlooked. In the first place, the meth- 
ods of incorporation pursued by the British in South 
Africa were as nearly as possible the opposite of 
those adopted by Prussia in Poland, in Schleswig- 
Holstein, and in Alsace-Lorraine. In many quarters 
there were doubtless bitter memories among the 



MISTAKES AS TO THE DUTCH 65 

Dutch, and in some others disappointed ambition pabtI. 
still ached; but these forces were not enough to Chapter 
plunge into serious civil war two races which, after VL 
nearly a century of strife and division, had but a German 
few years before entered into a solemn and voluntary Som! 101 " 1 *" 
covenant to make a firm union, and dwell henceforth 
in peace one with another. "What object could there 
be for Dutchmen to rise in rebellion against a govern- 
ment, which consisted almost exclusively of Dutch 
statesmen, and which had been put in office and was 
kept there by the popular vote? 

What German intrigue and bribery could do it 
did. But Dutchmen whose recollections went back 
so far as twenty years were little likely to place 
excessive confidence in the incitements and profes- 
sions of Berlin. They remembered with what busy 
intrigues Germany had in former times encouraged 
their ambitions, with what a rich bribery of promises 
she had urged them on to war, with what cold indif- 
ference, when war arose, she had left them to their 
fate. They also remembered how, when their aged 
President, an exiled and broken-hearted man, sought 
an interview with the great sovereign whose consid- 
eration for him in his more prosperous days had 
never lacked for warmth, he received for an answer, 
that Berlin was no place for people who had been 
beaten to come whining, and was turned from the 
door. 

In India, as in South Africa, Germany entertained 
confident hopes of a successful rising. Had not the 
Crown Prince, a shrewd judge, visited there a few 
years earlier and formed his own estimate of the 
situation? Was there not a widely spread network 



66 



THE CAUSES OF WAR 



Part I. 

Chapter 

VI. 

German 
miscalcula- 
tions. 



of sedition covering the whole of our Eastern Em- 
pire, an incendiary press, and orators who openly 
counselled violence and preached rebellion ? Had not 
riots been increasing rapidly in gravity and number ? 
Had not assassins been actively pursuing their 
trade? Had not a ship-load of Indians just been re- 
fused admission to Canada, thereby causing a not 
unnatural outburst of indignation? 

How far German statesmen had merely foreseen 
these things, how far they had actually contrived 
them, we are as yet in ignorance; but judging by 
what has happened in other places — in Ireland, South 
Africa, Belgium, and France — it would surprise no 
one to learn that the bombs which were thrown at 
the Viceroy and his wife with tragic consequences 
owed something to German teaching. It is unlikely 
that German emissaries had been less active in fo- 
menting unrest in India than elsewhere among the 
subjects of nations with which they were ostensibly 
at peace; while the fact that the Crown Prince had 
but recently enjoyed the hospitality of the Viceregal 
Court was only a sentimental consideration un- 
worthy of the attention of super-men. 

Moreover, it had for long been abundantly clear, 
on a priori grounds, to thinkers like Treitschke and 
Bernhardi that India was already ripe for rebellion 
on a grand scale. There are but two things which 
affect the Indian mind with awe and submission — a 
sublime philosophy and a genius for war. The Eng- 
lish had never been philosophers, and they had ceased 
to be warriors. How, then, could a race which wor- 
shipped only soldiers and sages be expected to rever- 
ence and obey a garrison of clerks and shopkeepers ? 
A war between England and Germany would provide 



MISTAKES AS TO DOMINIONS 67 

an opportunity for making an end for ever of the parti. 

British Raj. Chapter 

The self-governing Dominions were believed to be VL 
affected with the same decadent spirit and fantastic German 
illusions as their Mother Country; only with them "iw" 
these cankers had spread more widely, were more 
logically followed out in practice, and less tempered 
and restrained by aristocratic tradition. Their elo- 
quent outpourings of devotion and cohesion were in 
reality quite valueless; merely what in their own 
slang is known as 'hot air.' They hated militarism 
in theory and practice, and they loved making money 
with at least an equal fervour. Consequently, it was 
absurd to suppose that their professions of loyalty 
would stand the strain of a war, by which not only 
their national exchequers, but the whole mass of the 
people must inevitably be impoverished, in which 
the manhood of the Dominions would be called on 
for military service, and their defenceless territories 
placed in danger of invasion. 

It was incredible to the wise men at Berlin that 
the timid but clear minds of English Statesmen had 
not appreciated these obvious facts. War, there- 
fore, would be avoided as long as possible. And 
when at a later date, war was forced by Germany 
upon the pusillanimous islanders, the Dominions 
would immediately discern various highly moral 
pleas for standing aloof. Germany, honouring these 
pleas for the time being with a mock respect, would 
defer devouring the Dominions until she had digested 
the more serious meal. 

It will be seen from all this how good the grounds 
were on which the best-informed and most efficient 



68 



THE CAUSES OF WAR 



German 

miscalcula 

tions. 



part i. bureaucracy in the world decided that the British 
Chapter Empire would remain neutral in the present war. 
VL Looked at from the strictly intellectual standpoint, 
the reasons which satisfied German Statesmen with 
regard to Britain's neutrality were overwhelming, and 
might well have convinced others, of a similar outlook 
and training, who had no personal interest whatso- 
ever in coming to one conclusion rather than another. 
None the less the judgment of the Kaiser and his 
Ministers was not only bad, but inexcusably bad. 
We expect more from statesmen than that they 
should arrive at logical conclusions. Logic in such 
cases is nothing ; all that matters is to be right ; but 
unless instinct rules and reason serves, right judg- 
ment will rarely be arrived at in such matters as 
these. If a man cannot feel as well as reason, if he 
cannot gauge the forces which are at work among the 
nations by some kind of second-sight, he has no title 
to set up his bills as a statesman. It is incredible 
that Lincoln, Cavour, or Bismarck would ever have 
blundered into such a war as this, under the delusion 
that Britain could remain neutral even if she would. 
Nor would any of these three have been so far out in 
his reckoning as to believe, that the immediate effect 
of such a war, if Britain joined in it, would be the 
disruption of her empire. They might have cal- 
culated that in the event of the war being prolonged 
and disastrous to England, disintegration would in 
the end come about ; but without stopping to reason 
the matter out, they would have known by instinct, 
that the first effect produced by such a war would 
be a consolidation and knitting together of the loose 
Imperial fabric, and a suspension, or at least a dimin- 
ution, of internal differences. 



CHAPTER VII 



INTERNATIONAL ILL-WILL 



In the foregoing pages an attempt has been made Parti. 
to consider the series of events which immediately Chapter 

VII 

preceded the recent outbreak of war. But the most 1 

complete account of moves and counter-moves, and J^onai 
of all the pretexts, arguments, demands, and appeals ni-wm. 
which were put forward by the various governments 
concerned, with the object of forcing on, justifying, 
circumscribing, or preventing the present struggle, 
can never give us the true explanation of why it 
occurred. For this we must look much further back 
than Midsummer last, and at other things besides 
the correspondence between Foreign Ministers and 
Ambassadors. 

Nobody in his senses believes that Europe is at 
present in a convulsion because the heir-presumptive 
to the throne of Austria was murdered at Serajevo 
on the 28th of June. This event was tragic and de- 
plorable, but it was merely a spark — one of that 
cloud of sparks which is always issuing from the 
chimney-stack of the European furnace. This one 
by ill-luck happened to fall upon a heap of combus- 
tibles, and set it in a blaze. 

Great events, as the Greeks discovered several 
thousand years ago, do not spring from small causes, 

69 



70 THE CAUSES OF WAR 

part i. though more often than not they have some trivial 
Chapter beginning. How came it that so much inflammable 

VIL material was lying ready to catch fire ? 
inter- To answer this question truthfully we need more 

iD-w°u. knowledge of men and things than is given in those 
books, of varying hue, which the Chancelleries of 
Europe have published to explain their causes of 
action. The official sources provide much valuable 
information; but they will never explain to us why 
public opinion in Germany, ever since the beginning 
of the present century, has been inflamed with hatred 
against this country. Nor will they ever give us any 
clear idea as to what extent, and where, the practical 
aims and policies of that nation and our own were 
in conflict. 

According to the state papers, it would appear 
that Russia was drawn into this war because of Ser- 
via, and France because of Russia, and Belgium be- 
cause of France, and we ourselves because of Bel- 
gium ; but it may well be doubted if even the first of 
this row of ninepins would have been allowed to fall, 
had it not been for the feelings which the German 
people and their rulers entertained towards Britain. 
It is always hard for a man to believe in the 
sincerity, friendliness, and peaceful intentions of one 
against whom he is himself engaged in plotting an 
injury. German distrust of England was based upon 
the surest of all foundations — upon her own fixed 
and envious determination to overthrow our empire 
and rob us of our property. Her own mind being 
filled with this ambition, how could she be otherwise 
than incredulous of our expressions of goodwill'? 
How could she conceive that we were so blind as not 
to have penetrated her thoughts, so deaf as not to 



THE DANGER POINT 71 

have heard the threats which her public characters paetI. 
were proclaiming so openly? Consequently when Chapter 
British Statesmen uttered amiable assurances they 
were judged guilty of a treacherous dissimulation, inter- 
. . . One can only shrug one *s shoulders, marvelling ni-^n! 
at the nightmares and suspicions which a bad con- 
science is capable of producing even among intelli- 
gent people. 

It has been the fashion for half a century or more 
to talk of the Balkans as the danger-point of Euro- 
pean peace. In a sense this is true. The crust is very 
thin in that region, and violent eruptions are of 
common occurrence. But the real danger of up- 
heaval comes, not so much from the thinness of the 
crust, as from the strength of the subterranean 
forces. Of these, by far the most formidable in 
recent times have been the attitude of public opinion 
in Germany towards England — the hatred of Eng- 
land which has been sedulously and systematically 
inculcated among the people of all ranks — the sus- 
picions of our policy which have been sown broadcast 
— the envy of our position in the world which has 
been instilled, without remission, by all and sundry 
the agencies and individuals subject to the orders 
and inspiration of government. An obsession has 
been created, by these means, which has distorted 
the whole field of German vision. National ill-will 
accordingly has refused to yield to any persuasion. 
Like its contrary, the passion of love, it has burned 
all the more fiercely, being unrequited. 

The fact which it is necessary to face, fairly and 
squarely, is that we are fighting the whole German 
people. We may blame, and blame justly, the Prus- 



national 
ill-will. 



72 THE CAUSES OF WAE 

parti, sian junkers, the German bureaucracy, the Kaiser 

Chapter himself, for having desired this war, schemed for it, 

VIL set the match to it by intention or through a blunder ; 

inter- but to regard it as a Kaiser's war, or a junkers' war, 

or a bureaucrats' war is merely to deceive ourselves. 

It is a people's war if ever there was one. It could 

not have been more a people's war than it is, even 

if Germany had been a democracy like France or 

England. 

The Kaiser, as regards this matter, is the mirror 
of his people. The Army and the Navy are his 
trusted servants against whom not a word will be 
believed. The wisdom of the bureaucracy is unques- 
tioned. In matters of faith the zealous eloquence of 
the learned men is wholly approved. All classes are 
as one in devotion, and are moved by the same spirit 
of self-sacrifice. Hardly a murmur of criticism has 
been heard, even from the multitudes who at other 
times march under the red flag of Socialism. 

Although a German panic with regard to Russia 
may have been the proximate occasion of this war, 
the force which most sustains it in its course is 
German hatred of England. We must recognise this 
fact with candour, however painful it may be. And 
we must also note that, during the past nine months, 
the feelings against England have undergone a 
change by no means for the better. 

At the beginning the German people, if we may 
judge from published utterances, were convinced 
that the war had been engineered by Russia, and 
that England had meanly joined in it, because she 
saw her chance of crushing a dangerous and envied 
rival. 

Two months later, however, it was equally clear 



FANTASTIC ERRORS 73 

that the German people were persuaded — Heaven Parti. 
knows how or why! — that the war had been engi- Chapter 

neered by England, who was using France and Russia 1 

as her tools. Behind Russia, France, Belgium, Ser- Inter - 

-i -r tjj-1*" -1 -r» • national 

via, and Japan — according to this view — stood Brit- m-wui. 
ain — perfidious throughout the ages — guiding her 
puppets with indefatigable skill to the destruction of 
German trade, colonies, navy, and world-power. 

Confiding Germany, in spite of all her unremitting 
abuse of Britain, had apparently, for some reason, 
really believed her to be a friend and a fellow Teu- 
ton! Could any treachery have been blacker than 
our own in outraging these family affections 1 And 
for Britain to support the Slav and the Celt against 
the Teuton, was judged to be the worst treachery of 
all — race treachery — especially by the Prussians, 
who, having forgotten that they themselves are half 
Slavs, seemed also to have forgotten that the British 
are largely Celts. 

Every Englishman, whether he be an admirer of 
Sir Edward Grey's administration of Foreign Af- 
fairs or not, knows these dark suspicions to be merely 
nonsense. He knows this as one of the common cer- 
tainties of existence — just as he knows that ginger is 
hot i' the mouth. Every Englishman knows that Sir 
Edward Grey, his colleagues, his advisers, his sup- 
porters in Parliament and out of it, and the whole 
British race throughout the world, hated the idea of 
war, and would have done — and in fact did, so far as 
in them lay — everything they could think of to avert 
it. Yet the German people do not at present believe 
a single word of this ; and there must be some reason 
for their disbelief as for other things. 

Unfortunately the nations of the world never see 



74 



THE CAUSES OF WAR 



Part I. 

Chapter 

VII. 

Inter- 
national 
ill-will. 



one another face to face. They carry on their inter- 
course, friendly and otherwise, by high-angle fire, 
from hidden batteries of journalistic howitzers. 
Sometimes the projectiles which they exchange are 
charged with ideal hate which explodes and kills ; at 
others with ideal love and admiration which dissolve 
in golden showers, delightful and amazing to behold. 
But always the gunners are invisible to each other, 
and the ideal love and admiration are often as far re- 
moved from the real merits of their objective as the 
ideal hate. 

That there was no excuse, beyond mere fancy on 
Germany's part, for her distrust of British policy, 
no one, unless he were wholly ignorant of the facts, 
would dream of maintaining. During the years 
which have passed since 1870, our intentions have 
very rarely been unfriendly. Still more rarely, how- 
ever, have we ever shown any real comprehension of 
the German point of view. Never have we made our 
policy clear. The last is hardly to be wondered at, 
seeing that we had not ourselves taken the pains to 
understand it. 

On occasions, it is true, we have been effusive, and 
have somewhat overstepped the limits of dignity, 
plunging into a gushing sentimentality, or else 
wheedling and coaxing, with some material object — 
the abatement of naval expenditure, for example — 
showing very plainly through our blandishments. 
And as our methods at these times have been lacking 
in self-respect, it is not wonderful if they have earned 
little or no respect from others. Our protestations 
that we were friends, our babble about blood-rela- 
tionship, were suspected to have their origin in ti- 
midity ; our appeals for restriction of armaments, to 



FAULTS OF ENGLISH METHODS 75 
our aversion from personal sacrifice and our senile Parti. 

penuriousneSS. Chapter 

Until lately these lapses into excessive amiability, VIL 
it must be allowed, were not very frequent. The Inter - 

p r* ... , „ national 

main excuse lor German suspicion is to be found m-wiii. 
elsewhere — in the dilatoriness of our foreign policy 
— in its inability to make up its mind — in its change- 
ability after its mind might have been supposed made 
up — in its vagueness with regard to the nature of 
our obligations towards other powers — whom we 
would support, and to what extent, and upon what 
pleas. 

Irritation on the part of Germany would have 
been natural in these circumstances, even if she had 
not been in the mood to suspect dark motives in the 
background. From the days of Lord Granville to 
those of Sir Edward Grey, we had been dealing with 
a neighbour who, whatever her failings might be, 
was essentially businesslike in her methods. We, on 
the other hand, continued to exhibit many of those 
faults which are most ill-regarded by business men. 
We would not say clearly what regions came within 
our sphere of influence. We would not say clearly 
where Germany might go and where we should object 
to her going; but wherever she went, we were apt 
after the event to grumble and make trouble. 

The delay and indecision which marked Lord 
Granville's dealings with Bismarck over the parti- 
tion of Africa were both bad manners in the inter- 
national sense, and bad policy. The neglect of Sir 
Edward Grey, after Agadir, to make clear to his 
fellow-countrymen, and to the world at large, the 
nature and extent of our obligations to France, was 
bad business. Next to the British people and our 



76 THE CAUSES OF WAR 

Pakt i. present allies, Germany had the best reason to com- 
Chapter plain of this procedure, or rather of this failure to 

VIL proceed. 
inter- The blame for this unfortunate record rests mainly 

m-w°m. upon our political system, rather than on individuals. 
We cannot enjoy the benefits of the most highly 
developed party system in the world, without losing 
by it in various directions. A change of Govern- 
ment, actual or impending, has more often been the 
cause of procrastination and uncertainty than change 
in the mind of the Foreign Minister. There are peo- 
ple who assure us that this must always be so, that it 
is one of the inherent weaknesses of party govern- 
ment, and even of democracy itself. This is not 
altogether true. It is true, however, that whereas 
statesmen may be reticent and keep their own coun- 
sel under an autocracy, they are bound to be frank, 
and simple, and outspoken as to their aims, where 
their power is drawn directly from popular support. 
The criticism against British foreign policy for 
upwards of a century, is that it has aimed at manag- 
ing our international relations on a system of hood- 
winking the people, which is altogether incompatible 
with the nature of our institutions. The evils which 
have resulted from this mistake are not confined to 
ourselves, but have reacted abroad. "With whom," 
we can imagine some perplexed foreign Chancellor 
asking himself — "with whom does power really rest 
'in England? With the Government or with the 
'people? With which of these am I to deal? To 
'which must I address myself? As regards France 
'there is little difficulty, for her policy is national, and 
'agreed on all hands. But in England, so far as we 
' can judge, the people have no idea of being dragged 



BAD DIPLOMACY 77 

'under any circumstances into a European war; Parti. 
' while on the other hand, the Government is obviously Chapter 
'drifting, consciously or unconsciously, into conti- VIL 
'nental relations which, in certain events, can lead to inter- 
'no other result. ..." Nor is it surprising that m-^m. 
under these conditions German diplomacy should 
have directed itself of late, with much industry, to 
the cultivation of public opinion in this country, and 
should at times have treated our Government with 
scant respect. 

The fact is that the two nations, which had most 
to gain by clear-sighted and tactful foreign policy, 
were perhaps of all nations in the world the least 
well served in that particular. English relations 
with Germany have for many years past been more 
mismanaged than anything except German relations 
with England. In their mutual diplomacy the fingers 
of both nations have been all thumbs. 

It is not to be wondered at that two characters so 
antagonistic in their natures and methods as English 
and German foreign policy should have come to re- 
gard one another as impossible. The aggressive 
personage who does know his own mind, and the 
vague, supercilious personage who does not, have 
only one point in common — that they understand and 
care very little about the feelings of other people. 
But although this is a point in common, it is anything 
but a point of agreement. 1 

1 If we may offer a very homely simile — German policy may be com- 
pared to a rude heavy fellow, who comes shoving his way into a crowded 
bus, snorting aggressively, treading on everybody 's corns, poking his 
umbrella into people 's eyes, and finally plumping himself down without 
a word of regret or apology, between the two meekest and most helpless- 
looking of the passengers. 

British diplomacy, on the other hand, bears a close resemblance to a 
nuisance, equally well known to the bus public, and no less dreaded. It 



78 THE CAUSES OF WAR 

Part i. The causes of what has happened will never be 

Chapter clear to us unless we can arrive at some understand- 

VIL ing of the ideas, aspirations, and dreams which have 

inter- filled the minds of the German people and our own 

m-im* during recent years. On logical grounds we must 

consider the case of Germany first, for the reason 

that all the warmth of enmity has proceeded from her 

side, and, until recent events suddenly aroused the 

Old Adam in us, the uncharitable sentiments of our 

neighbours were not at all cordially reciprocated 

over here. 

As in romantic drama, according to the cynics, 
there is usually one which loves and another which 
allows itself to be loved, so in this case there was 
one which hated and another which allowed itself to 
be hated. The British nation could not understand 
why the Germans were so angry and suspicious. Nor 
would it trouble to understand. It was bored with 
the whole subject; and even the irritation which it 
felt at having to find huge sums annually for the 
Navy did not succeed in shaking it out of its bore- 
dom. 

The most careful analysis of our thoughts about 
Germany would do little to explain matters, because, 
as it happened, by far the greater part of our 
thoughts was occupied with other things. Indeed we 
thought about Germany as little as we could help 
thinking ; and although we regretted her annoyance, 

reminds us constantly of that dawdling, disobliging female who never 
can make up her mind, till the bus has actually started, whether she 
wants to go to Shepherd's Bush or the Mansion House. If she has 
taken a seat she insists on stopping the conveyance in order to get out. 
If she has remained gaping on the pavement she hails it in order to get 
in. She cares nothing about the inconvenience caused thereby to other 
passengers, who do know whither they want to be conveyed, and desire 
to arrive at their destination as quickly as possible. 



INTERNATIONAL MISCONCEPTIONS 79 
our consciences absolved us from any responsibility parti. 

for it. Chapter 

It was entirely different with Germany. For many YIL 
years past she had been more occupied with her inter- 
grievances against Britain, and with the complica- JJ.S. 
tions and dangers which would beset any attempt at 
redress, than with any other single subject; or in- 
deed, so it would appear, with all other subjects put 
together. 

It is important to understand the German point 
of view, but it is difficult. For at once we are faced 
with the eternal obstacle of the foreigner, who sets 
out in search of a simple explanation. The mind of 
the ordinary man, like that of the philosopher, is 
hypnotised by a basic assumption of the One-ness of 
Things. He wants to trace all trouble to a single 
root, as if it were a corn and could be extracted. But 
in an enquiry like the present we are confronted at 
every turn with the Two-ness of Things, or indeed 
with the Multiplicity of Things. 

We have only to read a few pages of any German 
book on England to see that the other party to the 
dispute is confronted with exactly the same difficulty. 
We are amazed, and perhaps not altogether cha- 
grined, to discover that, to German eyes, British pol- 
icy appears to be a thing of the most rigorous con- 
sistency. It is deliberate, far-sighted, and ruthless. 
It is pursued with constancy from decade to decade — 
nay from century to century — never faltering, never 
retreating, but always going forward under Whig 
and Tory, Liberal and Conservative alike, to the 
same goal. And we of course know, if we know any- 
thing, that this picture, though very flattering to our 
political instinct, is untrue. 



80 THE CAUSES OF WAR 

Part i. If Englishmen know anything at all, they know 
Chapter that the foreign policy of this country during the 
VIL last fifty years — under Lord Beaconsfield, and Mr. 
inter- Gladstone, Lord Salisbury, and Mr. Asquith — has 
m-w°iL been at times a series of the most eccentric wobbles 
and plunges, like a kite which is drawn at the wrong 
angle to the wind. Nay, even as regards our par- 
ticipation in this very War — which in the German 
White Book is asserted to have been preconceived 
and undertaken by us with a craft and coolness 
worthy of Machiavelli himself — we can see from our 
own White Paper that the final decision wavered 
this way and the other, from day to day during the 
critical week, neither the Cabinet nor public opinion 
being clear and unanimous as to the course which 
ought to be pursued. 

Vacillation in national policy usually appears to 
hostile observers in the light of perfidy. And it 
must be admitted that there is good excuse for the 
mistake, seeing that weakness in such high matters is 
quite as likely to injure everybody concerned as 
wickedness itself. 

Assuredly no sensible person who was required 
to make a defence of British foreign policy, either 
during the century which has passed since the battle 
of Waterloo, or in the much shorter period since the 
death of Queen Victoria, would ever dream of doing 
so on the ground that its guiding principles have 
been consistency and singleness of purpose. These, 
indeed, are almost the last virtues he would think 
of claiming for it. And yet these are the very quali- 
ties which foreign nations are inclined to attribute 
to British statesmen, by way of praise or blame. 
Our failures are apt to be overlooked by outside 



THE TRIANGLE OF FORCES 81 

observers ; our successes on the other hand are plain part I. 
and memorable. Other nations assume that because Chapter 
we have happened to achieve some particular result, vn - 
we must therefore have deliberately and patiently inter- 
set out to achieve it. Much more often this result m-^m. 
has been due either to pure good luck or else to some 
happy inspiration of the moment. 

A wise apologist for our foreign policy would at 
once concede that it has frequently been character- 
ised by feebleness and indecision, and almost always 
by a want of clear perception of the end in view ; but 
he could contend with justice that upon the whole, 
for upwards of a century, it has meant well by other 
nations, and that accusations of far-sighted duplicity 
are purely ridiculous. 

Our own temptation on the other hand is to visual- 
ise a single, gross, overbearing, and opinionated 
type of the Teuton species. We tend to ignore im- 
portant differences ; and because German public opin- 
ion appears to be unanimous in regard to the present 
War, we are apt to overlook the fact that the love 
and admiration of the Bavarian and the Saxon for 
the Prussian are probably some degrees less cordial 
than those which the men of Kerry and Connemara 
entertain for the Belfast Covenanters. And we in- 
cline also to forget, that though opinion in Germany 
in favour of war became solid so soon as war was 
apprehended, and certainly before it was declared, it 
is exceedingly unlikely, that even in governing cir- 
cles, there was an equal unanimity as to the proce- 
dure which led up to the climax. 

If it were really so, the case is unique in history, 
which shows us at every other crisis of this sort al- 
ways the same triangle of forces — a War party, a 



82 



THE CAUSES OF WAR 



VII. 

Inter- 
national 
ill-will. 



part l Peace party, and a Wait-and-See party ; each of them 
Chapter pulling vigorously in its own direction ; each intrigu- 
ing against, and caballing with, the other two by 
turns ; until at last the group, still struggling, falls 
back on the side of safety or, as in the recent instance, 
pitches over the edge of the precipice. 

It would be very hard to persuade any student of 
history that something of this sort was not occurring 
both in Vienna and Berlin during the months of 
June and July 1914. While he would admit to more 
than a suspicion that intelligences had been passing 
for a considerably longer period — for a year at least l 
— between the War parties in these two capitals, he 
would be inclined to take the view, that in the last 
stage of all, the Berlin group went staggering to 
perdition, dragging after it the Vienna group, which 
by that time was struggling feebly in the opposite 
direction. 

When we come to consider the German case it is 
wise to bear in mind the erroneous judgments which 
foreigners have passed upon ourselves. It is prob- 
able that the One-ness of things which we discover 
in their actions is to some extent an illusion, like that 
which they have discovered in our own. Indeed it is 
a fruitless task to hunt for logic and consistency in 
things which, in their nature, are neither logical nor 
consistent. For most of us, who have but a limited 
range of German books, state papers, journalism, 
and acquaintances to judge from, it would be vain 
and foolish to pretend that in a chapter, or a volume, 
we can lay bare the German attitude of mind. The 

1 We have recently learned from Signor Giolitti, ex-Premier of Italy, 
that in August 1913 the Foreign Minister, the late Marquis di San 
Giuliano, was sounded by Austria-Hungary as to whether he would join 
in an attack upon Servia. 



LIMITS OF ENQUIRY 83 

most we can hope to do is to illuminate this complex part i. 
subject at certain points ; and these for the most part Chapter 
are where the edges rub, and where German policy VIL 
and temperament have happened to come into con- Inter - 

national 

flict with our own. m-wiii. 



PART II 
THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY 



Christian: Met you with nothing else in that Valley? 

Faithful: Yes, I met with Shame. But of all the Men I met with 
in my Pilgrimage, he I think bears the wrong name: . . . this bold- 
faced Shame, would never have done. 

Christian: Why, what did he say to you? 

Faithful: What! why he objected against Eeligion itself; he said 
it was a pitiful low sneaking business for a Man to mind Eeligion ; he 
said that a tender conscience was an unmanly thing, and that for a Man 
to watch over his words and ways, so as to tye up himself from that 
hectoring liberty that the brave spirits of the times accustom themselves 
unto, would make me the Eidicule of the times. 

He objected also, that but few of the Mighty, Eich, or Wise, were 
ever of my opinion; nor any of them, neither, before they were per- 
swaded to be Fools, and to be of a voluntary fondness to venture the 
loss of all, for no body else knows what. 

Yea, he did hold me to it at that rate also about a great many more 
things than here I relate; as, that it was a shame .... to ask my 
neighbour forgiveness for petty faults, or to make restitution where I 
had taken from any. He said also that Eeligion made a man grow 
strange to the great because of a few vices (which he called by finer 
names). . . . 

The Pilgrim 's Progress. 



CHAPTER I 



THE BISMAKCKIAN EPOCH 



All nations dream — some more than others; while PartII. 
some are more ready than others to follow their Chapter 
dreams into action. Nor does the prevalence, or ' 
even the intensity, of these national dreams seem to The ^ is ~ 

. . marckian 

bear any fixed relation to the strength of will which epoch, 
seeks to tnrn them into achievement. 

After 1789 there was a great deal of dreaming 
among the nations of Europe. At the beginning of 
it all was revolutionary France, who dreamed of 
offering freedom to all mankind. A few years later, 
an altogether different France was dreaming furi- 
ously of glory for her own arms. In the end it was 
still France who dreamed ; and this time she sought 
to impose the blessings of peace, order, and uniform- 
ity upon the whole world. Her first dream was real- 
ised in part, the second wholly; but the third ended 
in ruin. 

Following upon this momentous failure came a 
short period when the exhausted nations slept much 
too soundly to dream dreams. During this epoch 
Europe was parcelled out artificially, like a patch- 
work quilt, by practical and unimaginative diploma- 
tists, anxious certainly to take securities for a lasting 



88 THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY 

Part ii. peace, but still more anxious to bolster up the ancient 

Chapter dynasties. 

• Against their arbitrary expedients there was soon 

The Bis- a strong reaction, and dreaming began once more 
epoch. among the nations, as they turned in their sleep, and 
tried to stretch their hampered limbs. At the begin- 
ning their dreaming was of a mild and somewhat 
futile type. It called itself 'liberalism' — a name 
coined upon the continent of Europe. It aimed by 
methods of peaceful persuasion, at reaching the 
double goal of nationality as the ideal unit of the 
state, and popular representation as the ideal system 
of government. Then the seams of the patchwork, 
which had been put together with so much labour at 
Vienna 1 and Aix-la-Chapelle, 2 began to gape. 
Greece struggled with some success to free herself 
from the Turk, 3 and Belgium broke away from Hol- 
land, 4 as at a much later date Norway severed her 
union with Sweden. 5 In 1848 there were revolutions 
all over Europe, the objects of which were the set- 
ting up of parliamentary systems. In all directions 
it seemed as if the dynastic stitches were coming 
undone. Italy dreamed of union and finally achieved 
it, 6 expelling the Austrian encroachers — though not 
by peaceful persuasion — and disordering still fur- 
ther the neatly sewn handiwork of Talleyrand, Met- 
ternich, and Castlereagh. Finally, the Balkans be- 
gan to dream of Slav destinies, unrealisable either 
under the auspices of the Sublime Porte or in tute- 
lage to the Habsburgs. 7 

But of all the nations which have dreamed since 
days long before Napoleon, none has dreamed more 

»1814. 2 1818. 3 1821-1829. 4 1830. 

"1905. "1859-1861. '1875-1878. 



MAKING OF THE GERMAN UNION 89 

nobly or more persistently than Germany. For the part ii. 
first half of the nineteenth century it seemed as if Chapter 
the Germans were satisfied to behold a vision without L 
attempting to turn it into a reality. Their aspira- The ks- 
tions issued in no effective action. They dreamed epoch"" 
of union between their many kingdoms, principali- 
ties, and duchies, and of building up a firm empire 
against which all enemies would beat in vain; but 
until 1864 they had gone but a few steps towards the 
achievement of this end. 

Then within a period of seven years, Prussia, the 
most powerful of the German states, planned, pro- 
voked, and carried to a successful issue three wars 
of aggression. By a series of swift strokes, the 
genius of Bismarck snatched Schleswig-Holstein 
from the Danes, beat down the pretensions of Aus- 
tria to the leadership of the Teutonic races, and 
wrested the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine from 
France. When Denmark was invaded by Germanic 
armies in February 1864, the vision of unity seemed 
as remote as ever; by January 1871 it was fully 
achieved. When at Versailles, in the Hall of Mirrors, 
in the stately palace of the Bourbons, King William 
accepted from the hands of his peers — the sovereign 
rulers of Germany — an imperial crown, the dream 
of centuries was fulfilled. 

Austria, indeed, stood aloof; but both by reason 
of her geographical situation and the heterogeneous 
ancestry of her people that was a matter only of 
small account. Union was, for all practical purposes 
complete. And what made the achievement all the 
more marvellous was the fact, that the vision had 
been realised by methods which had no place in the 
gentle speculations of those, who had cherished the 



90 THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY 

pabt ii. hope of unity with the most fervent loyalty. It had 
Chapter been accomplished by the Prussians, who of all races 
I - between the Alps and the Baltic, between the moun- 
The Bis- tain barriers of Burgundy and the Polish Marshes, 
Soch. ian are the least German in blood, 1 and who of all Ger- 
mans dream the least. It had been carried through, 
not by peaceful persuasion, nor on any principles of 
Liberalism, nor in any of the ways foreseen by the 
philosophers and poets who had beheld visions of the 
millennium. Union was the triumph of craft 
and calculation, courage and resolve, 'blood and 
iron. ' 

The world in general, whose thoughts at this time 
were much more congenially occupied with Inter- 
national Exhibitions, and Peace Societies, and the 
ideals of Manchester statesmanship, was inclined to 
regard the whole of this series of events as an an- 
achronism — as the belated offspring of 'militarism' 
and 'feudalism.' These were well known to be both 
in their dotage ; they could not possibly survive for 
many years. What had happened, therefore, did not 
startle mankind, simply because the nature of it was 
not understood. The spirit of the age, wholly pos- 
sessed, as it was, by an opposite set of ideas, was 
unable to comprehend, to believe in, or even to con- 
sider with patience, phenomena which, according to 
prevailing theories, had no reasonable basis of exist- 
ence. 

In some quarters, indeed, efforts were made to 
gloss over the proceedings of Prince Bismarck, and 
to fit them into the fashionable theory of a universe, 
flowing with the milk of human kindness and the 

1 The admixture of Slavonic and Wendish blood in the Prussian stock 
is usually calculated by ethnologists at about half and half. 



GERMAN PROSPERITY AFTER UNION 91 

honey of material prosperity. It was urged that the part ii. 
Germans were a people, pure in their morals, in- Chapter 
dustrious in their habits, the pioneers of higher edu- L 
cation and domestic economy. For the most part, The Bis- 
British and American public opinion was inclined to ^,och. an 
regard these various occurrences and conquests as 
a mediaeval masquerade, in rather doubtful taste, but 
of no particular significance and involving no serious 
consequences. Even in that enlightened age, how- 
ever, there were still a few superstitious persons who 
saw ghosts. To their eyes the shade of Richard Cob- 
den seemed in some danger of being eclipsed in the 
near future by that of Niccolo Machiavelli; though 
the former had died in great honour and prestige 
only a few years earlier, while the latter had been 
dead, discredited, and disavowed for almost as many 
centuries. 

After 1870 Germany entered upon a period of 
jpeaceful prosperity. Forges clanged, workshops 
throbbed, looms hummed, and within twenty years, 
the ebb of emigration had entirely ceased. Indeed, 
not only was there work in the Fatherland for all its 
sons, but for others besides ; so that long before an- 
other twenty years had passed away, the tide had 
turned and immigrants were pouring in. 

At first the larger part of German exports was 
cheap and nasty, with a piratical habit of sailing un- 
der false colours, and simulating well-known British 
and other national trade-marks. But this was a brief 
interlude. The sagacity, thoroughness, and enter- 
prise of manufacturers and merchants soon guided 
their steps past this dangerous quicksand, and 
the label made in Germany ceased to be a 
reproach. 



92 THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY 

Part ii. Students and lovers of truth laboured at discov- 

Chapter ery; and hard upon their heels followed a crowd of 

L practical inventors — the gleaners, scavengers, and 

The Bis- rag-pickers of science. Never had the trade of any 

"poch. 1 " country thriven with a more wonderful rapidity. 

Though still of necessity a borrower by very reason 

of her marvellous expansion, Germany nevertheless 

began to make her influence felt in the financial 

sphere. Her own ships carried her products to the 

ends of the earth, and fetched home raw materials 

in exchange. And not only this, her merchant fleets 

began to enter into successful competition for the 

carrying trade of the world, even with the Mistress 

of the Seas herself. 

For a score of years after the fall of Paris, Ger- 
many found but little time for dreaming. Mean- 
while, by an astute if somewhat tortuous policy, and 
under the impenetrable shield of the finest army in 
Europe, Bismarck kept safe the empire which he 
had founded. He declined to be drawn into adven- 
tures either at home or abroad, either in the new 
world or the old. He opposed the colonial aspira- 
tions of a few visionaries, who began to make some 
noise towards the end of his long reign, and silenced 
them with some spacious but easy acquisitions in 
Africa and the East. He consolidated the Prussian 
autocracy, and brought its servant, the bureaucracy, 
to the highest pitch of efficiency. He played with the 
political parties in the Reichstag as if they had been 
a box of dominoes, combining them into what pat- 
terns he pleased. At the same time he fostered the 
national well-being with ceaseless vigilance, and kept 
down popular discontent by the boldness and thor- 
oughness of his social legislation. But for Bismarck 



LIFE'S WORK OF BISMARCK 93 

himself the age of adventure was past. It was enough p ART n. 

that by the labours of an arduous lifetime, he had Chapter 
made of Germany a puissant state, in which all her L 

children, even the most restless, could find full scope Th e ~mT 

for their soaring ambitions. marckian 

° epoch. 



CHAPTER II 



AFTER BISMARCK 



Part II. 

Chapter 

II. 

After 
Bismarck. 



With the dismissal of Bismarck in 1890, Germany- 
entered upon a new phase. Then once again her peo- 
ple began to dream, and this time furiously. They 
had conquered in war. They had won great victories 
in peace. According to their own estimate they were 
the foremost thinkers of the world. They found 
themselves impelled by a limitless ambition and a 
superb self-confidence. But the vision which now 
presented itself to their eyes was disordered and 
tumultuous. Indeed it was less dream than night- 
mare; and in some degree, no doubt, it owed its 
origin, like other nightmares, to a sudden surfeit — 
to a glut of material prosperity. 1 

Why did Germany with her larger population still 
lag behind Britain in commerce and shipping? 
Surely the reason could only be that Britain, at 
every turn, sought to cripple the enterprise of her 
young rival. Why had Britain a great and thriving 
colonial empire, while Germany had only a few tracts 
of tropical jungle and light soil, not particularly 
prosperous or promising? The reason could only 
be that, out of jealousy, Britain had obstructed Teu- 
tonic acquisition. Why was Germany tending to 



; ' L 'Alleinand est ne bete ; la civilisation 1 'a rendu mechant. ' ' — Heine. 

94 



Bismarck. 



GERMAN NIGHTMARES 95 

become more and more isolated and unpopular in partII. 
Europe? The reason could only be that the crafty Chapter 
and unscrupulous policy of Britain had intrigued, n - 
with some success, for her political ostracism. After 

It is useless to argue with a man in a nightmare. 
He brushes reason aside and cares not for facts. But 
to seekers after truth it was obvious, that so far 
from making any attack upon German commerce, 
Britain, by adhering to her system of free trade at 
home and in her dependencies, had conferred a boon 
immeasurable on this new and eager competitor. So 
far from hindering Germany's acquisition of colo- 
nies, Britain had been careless and indifferent in the 
matter; perhaps too much so for the security of some 
of her own possessions. It was Bismarck, much 
more than Britain, who had put obstacles in the 
way of German colonial expansion. With a sigh of 
relief (as we may imagine) this great statesman saw 
the partition of the vacant territories of the world 
completed, and his fellow-countrymen thereby 
estopped from wasting their substance, and dissipat- 
ing their energies, in costly and embarrassing adven- 
tures. So far from holding aloof from Germany or 
attempting to isolate her among European nations, 
we had persisted in treating her with friendliness, 
long after she had ceased to be friendly. One of our 
leading statesmen had even gone the length of sug- 
gesting an alliance, and had been denounced imme- 
diately by the whole German press, although it was 
understood at the time that he had spoken with the 
august encouragement of the Kaiser and his Chan- 
cellor. 1 It was Germany herself, deprived of the 
guidance of Bismarck, who by blustering at her 

1 Mr. Chamberlain at Leicester on November 30, 1899. 



96 THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY 



Part II. 

Chapter 

II. 

After 
Bismarck. 



various neighbours, and threatening them in turn, 
had aroused their suspicions and achieved her own 
isolation. 

The grievances against Britain which figured in 
the phantasmagoria of the German nightmare were 
obviously tinged with envy. There were other griev- 
ances against France, and these were tinged with 
annoyance. For France, although she had been 
beaten on to her knees, had nevertheless had the im- 
pudence to make a successful recovery. There were 
also grievances against Russia, and these were tinged 
with fear. Her vast adjacent territories and teeming 
population, her social and industrial progress, the 
reformation of her government, and the rapid recu- 
peration of her military and naval power, constituted 
in German eyes the gravest menace of all. 

Self-confidence and ambition were the original 
stuff — the warp and the weft — of which the German 
dream was made; but these admirable and healthy 
qualities rapidly underwent a morbid deterioration. 
Ambition degenerated into groundless suspicion, 
and self-confidence into arrogance. It was a consid- 
erable time, however, before Germany was realised 
to have become a public danger by reason of her 
mental affliction. Until her prophets and high 
priests began preaching from the housetops as a 
divine ordinance, that Germany was now so great, 
prosperous, and prolific as to need the lands of her 
neighbours for her expansion, her symptoms were 
not generally recognised. It was not really pressure 
of population, but only the oppression of a night- 
mare which had brought her to this restless and ex- 
cited condition. In terms of psychology, the disease 
from which Germany has been suffering of late years 



TWO FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS 97 

is known as megalomania, in the slang of the street- part ii. 
corner as madness of the swollen head. Chapter 

The dreams of a nation may be guided well or ill IL 
by statesmen, or they may be left altogether un- After 
guided. The dreams of Italy under Cavour, and 
those of Germany under Bismarck, were skilfully 
fostered and directed with great shrewdness to cer- 
tain practical ends. But in considering the case of 
Germany under William the Second, our feeling is 
that although popular imaginings have been con- 
trolled from above with even greater solicitude than 
before, the persons who inspired and regulated them 
have been lacking in the sense of proportion. The 
governing power would seem to have been the victim 
of changing moods, conflicting policies, and disor- 
dered purposes. 

When we piece together the various schemes for 
the aggrandisement of the Fatherland, which Ger- 
man writers have set forth with increasing boldness 
and perfect gravity during the past ten years, we are 
confronted with an immense mosaic — a conception 
of the most grandiose character. On examination 
each of these projects is found to be based upon two 
fundamental assumptions : — The first, that the pres- 
ent boundaries of Germany and her possessions 
overseas are too narrow to contain the legitimate 
aspirations of the German race : — The second that it 
is the immediate interest of Germany, as well as a 
duty which she owes to posterity, to remedy this de- 
ficiency, by taking from her neighbours by force 
what she requires for her own expansion. There is 
a third assumption, not however of a political so 
much as an ethical character, which is stated with 



98 THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY 

Part ii. equal frankness and conviction — that war on an ex- 
Chapter tensive scale is necessary, from time to time, in order 
II - to preserve the vigour of the German people and 
After their noble spirit. 

One school of dreamers, with its gaze fixed upon 
the Atlantic trade-routes, insists upon the absurdity 
of resting content with a western sea-board of some 
two hundred miles. The estuaries of the Elbe and 
the Weser alone are exclusively German ; that of the 
Ems is shared with the Dutch; while the far more 
valuable harbour-mouths of the Rhine and the 
Scheldt are in the possession of Holland and Bel- 
gium. Put into plain language what this means is, 
that both Holland and Belgium must be incorporated 
in the German Empire ; if by treaty, so much the bet- 
ter for all parties concerned ; but if diplomacy should 
fail to accomplish the desired absorption, then it 
must be brought about by war. Nor has it been over- 
looked, that in order to complete the rectification, 
and to secure the keys of the Baltic, it would be 
necessary to 'admit' Denmark also into the privileges 
of the Germanic Empire. 

Another school looks to the south-east and broods 
upon the day, not far distant, when the Germans of 
Austria-Hungary — a small but dominating minority 
of the whole population — will be driven, by reasons 
of self-defence, to seek a federal inclusion in the Em- 
pire of the Hohenzollerns. And it is surmised that 
for somewhat similar reasons the Magyars of Hun- 
gary will at the same time elect to throw in their lot 
with Teutons rather than with Slavs. 

When that day arrives, however, it is not merely 
the German and Magyar territories of the Habsburg 
Emperor-King which will need to be incorporated 



Bismarck. 



THE AUSTRIAN DOWRY 99 

in the Hohenzollern Empire, but the whole congeries part ii. 
of nations which at present submits, more or less Chapter 
reluctantly, to the rule of Vienna and Buda-Pest. IL 
There must be no break-up of the empire of Francis After 
Joseph, no sentimental sacrifice to the mumbo-jum- 
bos of nationality. The Italians of Trieste and 
Fiume, the Bohemians, the Croats, the Serbs, the 
Roumanians of Transylvania, and the Poles of Gali- 
cia must all be kept together in one state, even more 
firmly than they are to-day. The Germans of Aus- 
tria will not be cordially welcomed, unless they 
bring this dowry with them to the altar of imperial 
union. 

But to clear eyes, looking into the future, more 
even than this appears to be necessary. Austria will 
be required to bring with her, not merely all her pres- 
ent possessions, but also her reversionary prospects, 
contingent remainders, and all and sundry her rights 
of action throughout the whole Balkan peninsula, 
which sooner or later must either accept the hege- 
mony of the German Empire or submit to annexation 
at the sword's point. Advantageous as it would be 
for the Fatherland to obtain great harbours for her 
commerce at the head of the Adriatic, these acquisi- 
tions might easily become valueless in practice if 
some rival barred the right of entry through the 
Straits of Otranto. Salonica again, in her snug and 
sheltered corner of the Aegean, is essential as the 
natural entrepot for the trade of Asia Minor and the 
East; while there can be no hope, until the mouths 
of the Danube, as well as the Dardanelles and the 
Bosphorus, are firmly held, of turning the Black Sea 
into a Germanic lake. 

The absorption of the Balkan peninsula, involving 



100 THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY 



Part II. 

Chapter 

II. 

After 
Bismarck. 



as it must the occupation of Constantinople and Eu- 
ropean Turkey, would carry with it, as a natural 
consequence, the custody of the Sultan and the con- 
trol of his Asiatic dominions. These vast terri- 
tories which extend from Smyrna to the Caucasus, 
from Syria to the Persian Gulf, from the Black Sea 
to the Gulf of Aden, contain some of the richest and 
most fertile tracts upon the surface of the globe. 
Massacre, misrule, and oppression have indeed con- 
verted the greater part of these regions into a state 
hardly to be distinguished from the barest deserts 
of Arabia. But a culture which has lapsed through 
long neglect may be reclaimed by new enterprise. 
All that is required to this end is such shelter and 
encouragement as a stable government would af- 
ford. 

What more suitable instrument for this beneficent 
recovery than the peculiar genius of the Teuton 
race! Would not the whole world gain by the sub- 
stitution of settled order for a murderous anarchy, 
of tilth and industry for a barren desolation? The 
waters of Tigris and Euphrates are still sweet. It 
needs but the energy and art of man to lead them in 
channelled courses, quenching the longings of a 
thirsty land, and filling the Mesopotamian waste with 
the music of a myriad streams. The doom of Baby- 
lon is no curse eternal. It awaits but the sword of 
Siegfried to end the slumbers of two thousand years. 
Where great cities and an ancient civilisation lie 
buried under drifted sand, great cities may be raised 
once more, the habitations of a hardier race, the 
seminaries of a nobler civilisation. 

This vision, more fanciful and poetically inspired 
than the rest, has already advanced some consider- 



THE WOOING OF TURKEY 101 

able way beyond the frontiers of dreamland. When part ii. 
the Turko-Russian War came to an end l the influ- Chapter 
ence of Germany at Constantinople was as nearly as n - 
possible nil; and so long as Bismarck remained in After 
power, no very serious efforts were made to increase 
it. But from the date of Bismarck's dismissal 2 down 
to the present day, it has been the steady aim of 
German policy to control the destinies of the Turkish 
Empire. These attempts have been persistent, and 
in the main successful. 

It mattered not what dubious personage or party 
might happen to be in the ascendant at Stamboul, 
the friendship of Germany was always forthcoming. 
It was extended with an equal cordiality to Abdul 
Hamid; to the Young Turks when they overthrew 
Abdul Hamid ; to the Reactionaries when they over- 
threw the Young Turks; to the Young Turks again 
when they compounded matters with the Reaction- 
aries. The largesse of Berlin bankers refreshed the 
empty treasuries of each despot and camarilla in 
turn, so soon as proofs could be produced of posi- 
tive, or even of presumptive predominance. At the 
same time the makers of armaments, at Essen and 
elsewhere, looked to it, that a sufficient portion of 
these generous loans was paid in kind, and that the 
national gain was not confined to high policy and 
high finance. The reform of the Turkish army was 
taken in hand zealously by Prussian soldiers." Im- 
perial courtesies cemented the bricks which usury, 
commerce, and diplomacy had laid so well. At a time 
when the late Sultan was ill-regarded by the whole 
of Europe, on account of his supposed complicity in 
Armenian massacres, the magnanimity of the Kaiser 

1 March 1878. Treaty of Berlin, July 1878. 2 1890. 



102 THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY 



Part II. 

Chapter 

II. 

After 
Bismarck. 



took pity on the pariah, and a visit of honour to the 
Bosphorus formed an incident in the Hohenzollern 
pilgrimage to the Holy Sepulchre. 

The harvest of these endeavours was reaped at 
a later date in the form of vast concessions for lines 
of railway running through Asia Minor to the Per- 
sian Gulf. It is needless to enter here into a dis- 
cussion of the famous and still unsettled controversy 
regarding the Baghdad route, except to say that this 
project for the benefit, not merely of Turkey, but of 
the whole human race, was to be realised under Ger- 
man direction and according to German plans and 
specifications ; it was to be administered under Ger- 
man control; but it was to be paid for in the main 
out of the savings of England and France. 

The scheme was no less bold than ingenious. Ob- 
ligations were imposed upon Turkey which it was 
clearly impossible for Turkey to discharge. In the 
event of her failure it was likely to go hard with the 
original shareholders, and somewhat hard with the 
Sublime Porte itself; but on the other hand it was 
not likely to go hard with Germany, or to involve her 
in anything more irksome than a labour of love — a 
protectorate over Asia Minor and Arabia. 1 

These are the main dreams which German writers, 
with a genuine enthusiasm and an engaging frank- 
ness, have set out in the pages of books and periodi- 
cals — the North Sea dream, the Austrian dream, the 
Balkan dream, and the Levantine dream. But these 
dreams by no means exhaust the Teuton fancy. 

Wars are contemplated calmly as inevitable inci- 
dents in the acquisition of world-power — war with 
France, war with England, war either of army corps 

1 Cf. The Anglo-German Problem, by C. Sarolea, p. 247, and following. 



ACQUISITION OF AFRICA 103 

or diplomacy with Belgium, Holland, and Denmark, part ii. 
And as victory is also contemplated, just as confident- Chapter 
ly, various bye-products of considerable value are IL 
likely to be secured during the process, and as a After 

n i Bismarck. 

result. 

The greater part of north-western Africa, which 
lies along the seaboards of the Mediterranean and 
the Atlantic, is under the French flag. The greater 
part of eastern Africa from Alexandria to Capetown 
is in the hands of the British. The central region of 
Africa is Belgian. In the north there is Tripoli 
which is now Italian ; and in various quarters patches 
and scattered islands which are Portuguese. The 
former might be tolerated as a harmless enclave; 
the latter might readily be acquired by compulsory 
purchase. What would then remain of the Dark 
Continent is already German. So that, as the results 
of the wars and victories which are considered by 
German thinkers to be inevitable, the whole of Africa 
would shortly pass into German hands. 

With the destinies of Africa in the keeping of 
a virile race, accustomed to face great problems in 
no piecemeal fashion, but as a whole, vast trans- 
formations must ensue. Before their indomitable 
will and scientific thoroughness, the dusky savage 
will lay aside his ferocity, and toil joyously at the 
arts of peace. Under an indefatigable and intelli- 
gent administration, desert, jungle, forest, and 
swamp will yield their appropriate harvests. Tim- 
ber, oil, cotton, rubber, tea, coffee, and every variety 
of raw material will gradually become available in 
limitless supplies. Jewels and precious metals will 
be dug out of the bowels of the earth. Flocks and 
herds will roam in safety over the rich uplands — no 



104 THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY 



Part II. 

Chapter 

II. 

After 
Bismarck. 



robber bands to drive them off; no wild beasts to 
tear them limb from limb ; no murrain or envenomed 
fly to strike them down by tens of thousands. For 
as the armies of the Kaiser are invincible against all 
human foes, so also are his men of science invincible, 
in their ceaseless war against disease of man and 
beast. In the end they also will conquer in their own 
sphere, no less certainly than the soldier in his ; for 
their courage is as high and their devotion faces 
death, or worse than death, with equanimity. 

The Dark Continent, which in all its history has 
never known either peace or order, will then at last 
know both. Even the stiff-necked Africander, jeal- 
ous of his antique shibboleths of freedom, will not 
refuse incorporation in an Empire to which the land 
of his forefathers will already have become bound 
in federal ties. And the dowry which Holland is 
expected to bring with her, will be not only the good 
will of the South African Dutch, but the rich islands 
of the East, where merchant-adventurers planted 
her flag, in days when the fleets of Rotterdam dis- 
puted, not unsuccessfully, with London herself the 
primacy of the seas. 

Finally, there is the dream of the farthest East. 
This is of such simple grandeur that it may be stated 
in a few sentences. When the war between China 
and Japan came to an end in 1895 Germany, acting 
in concert with France and Russia, forced the victori- 
ous troops of the Mikado to forgo all the fruits of 
their conquest. When three years later Germany 
herself seized upon the reversion of Kiao-Chau, she 
saw a vision of an empire, greater than that which 
had been secured to her envied rival by the daring of 
Clive and the forethought of Warren Hastings. If 



THE EASTERN DREAM 105 

England could hold and rule India, a mightier PartIL 
than England could surely hold and rule China, Chapter 
containing though it does a full quarter of the hu- 1 

Aftpr 

mal1 raCe - Bismarck. 



CHAPTER III 



THE GERMAN PROJECT OF EMPIRE 



Part II. 

Chapter 

III. 

The 

German 
project of 
empire. 



The German project of empire is a gorgeous fabric. 
The weft of it is thread of gold, but the warp of it 
has been dipped in the centaur's blood. It is the 
pride of its possessor ; but it is likely to be his un- 
doing. It ravishes his fancy with the symmetry and 
vastness of the pattern ; yet these very two qualities, 
which so much excite his admiration, have shown 
themselves in the past singularly unpropitious to 
high imperial adventures. 

No man of action worthy of the name will ever 
take history for his guide. He would rightly refuse 
to do so, even were it possible, which it is not, to 
write history truthfully. But with all their de- 
ficiencies, history books have certain sibylline quali- 
ties which make them worth consulting upon occa- 
sions ; and as to symmetry and vastness this oracle, 
if consulted, would speak clearly enough. Of all 
false enticements which have lured great princes to 
their ruin, these two have the biggest tale of victims 
to their score. 

The British Empire, like the Roman, built itself 
slowly. It was the way of both nations to deal with 
needs as needs occurred, and not before. Neither 
of them charted out their projects in advance, there- 

106 



SYMMETRY AND VASTNESS 107 

after working to them, like Lenotre, when he laid partII. 
out the gardens of Versailles. On the contrary, a Chapter 
strip was added here, a kingdom there, as time went IIL 
on, but not in accordance with any plan or system, t^ 
In certain cases, no doubt, the reason for annexa- project of 
tion was a simple desire for possession. But much em P ire - 
more of ten the motive was apprehension of one kind 
or another. Empire-builders have usually achieved 
empire as an accident attending their search after 
security — security against the ambition of a neigh- 
bour, against lawless hordes which threaten the 
frontier, against the fires of revolution and disorder 
spreading from adjacent territories. Britain, like 
Rome before her, built up her empire piecemeal; 
for the most part reluctantly ; always reckoning up 
and dreading the cost, labour, and burden of it; 
hating the responsibility of expansion, and shoulder- 
ing it only when there seemed to be no other course 
open to her in honour or safety. Symmetry did not 
appeal to either of these nations any more than vast- 
ness. Their realms spread out and extended, as 
chance and circumstances willed they should, like 
pools of water in the fields when floods are out. 

We cannot but distrust the soundness of recent 
German policy, with its grandiose visions of univer- 
sal empire, if we consider it in the light of other 
things which happened when the world was some- 
what younger, though possibly no less wise. The 
great imaginative conquerors, though the fame of 
their deeds still rings down the ages, do not make so 
brave a show, when we begin to examine into the 
permanency of their achievements. The imperial 
projects of Alexander, of the Habsburgs, the Grand 
Monarque, and Napoleon — each of whom drew out 



108 THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY 



Part II. 

Chapter 

III. 

The 

German 
project of 
empire. 



a vast pattern and worked to it — are not among 
those things which can be said with any justice to 
have endured. None of them were ever fully 
achieved; while some were broken in pieces, even 
during the lifetimes of their architects. 

To treat the whole world as if it were a huge 
garden, for which one small race of men, who have 
worked busily in a single corner of it, can aspire to 
make and carry out an all-comprehending plan, is 
in reality a proof of littleness and not largeness of 
mind. Such vaulting ambitions are the symptoms 
of a dangerous disease, to be noted and distrusted. 
And none ever noted these tendencies more carefully 
or distrusted them more heartily than the two great- 
est statesmen whom Prussia has produced. Fred- 
erick the Great rode his own Pegasus-vision on curb 
and martingale. The Great Bismarck reined back 
the Pegasus-vision of his fellow-countrymen on to 
its haunches with an even sterner hand. ' ' One can- 
not," so he wrote in later years — "one cannot see 
'the cards of Providence so closely as to anticipate 
'historical development according to one's own 
'calculation." 

Those very qualities of vastness and symmetry 
which appear to have such fatal attraction for the 
pedantocracy repel the practical statesman; and 
woe to the nation which follows after the former 
class rather than the latter, when the ways of the 
two part company! To the foreign observer it 
seems as if Germany, for a good many years past, 
has been making this mistake. Perhaps it is her 
destiny so to do. Possibly the reigns of Frederick 
and Bismarck were only interludes. For Germany 
followed the pedantocracy during a century or more, 



MASTERY OF THE WORLD 109 

while it preached political inaction and contentment Part ii. 

with a shorn and parcelled Fatherland. She was Chapter 

following it still, when Bismarck turned constitu- 1 

tionalism out of doors and went his own stern way The 

* German 

to union. And now once again she seems to be project of 
marching in a fatal procession after the same Pied empire - 
Pipers, who this time are engaged, with a surpass- 
ing eloquence and fervour, in preaching discontent 
with the narrow limits of a united empire, and in 
exhorting their fellow-countrymen to proceed to the 
Mastery of the World. 

Among an imaginative race like the Germans, 
those who wield the weapons of rhetoric and fancy 
are only too likely to get the better of those surer 
guides, who know from hard experience that the 
world is a diverse and incalculable place, where no 
man, and no acre of land, are precisely the same as 
their next-door neighbours, where history never 
repeats itself, and refuses always — out of malice or 
disdain — to travel along the way which ingenious 
Titans have charted for it. But it is not every 
generation which succeeds in producing a Frederick 
the Great or a Bismarck, to tame the dreamers and 
use them as beasts of draught and burden. 

The complete mosaic of the German vision is an 
empire incomparably greater in extent, in riches, 
and in population, than any which has yet existed 
since the world first began to keep its records. 
Visionaries are always in a hurry. This stupendous 
rearrangement of the Earth's surface is confidently 
anticipated to occur within the first half of the 
present century. It is to be accomplished by a 
race distinguished for its courage, industry, and 
devotion, — let us admit so much without grudging. 



110 THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY 

Part ii. But in numbers — even if we count the Teutons of 

Chapter the Habsburg Empire along with those of the Hohen- 

IIL zollern — it amounts upon the highest computation 

t^ to less than eighty millions. This is the grain of 

project of mustard-seed which is confidently believed to have 

empire. j n y. t ^ e property to get up and spread, ' until within 

little more than a generation, it will dominate and 

control more than seven hundred millions of human 

souls. 

Nor to German eyes, which dwell lovingly, and 
apparently without misgiving, upon this appalling 
prospect of symmetry and vastness, are these the 
sum total of its attractions. The achievement of 
their vision would bring peace to mankind. For 
there would then be but two empires remaining, 
which need give the overlords of the world the small- 
est concern. Of these Russia, in their opinion, needs 
a century at least in which to emerge out of' primi- 
tive barbarism and become a serious danger ; while 
in less than a century, the United States must in- 
evitably crumble to nonentity, through the worship 
of false gods and the corruption of a decadent 
democracy. Neither of these two empires could ever 
hope to challenge the German Mastery of the World. 
In South America as in North, there is already 
a German garrison, possessing great wealth and 
influence. And in the South, at any rate, it may well 
become, very speedily, an imperative obligation on 
the Fatherland to secure, for its exiled children, 
more settled conditions under which to extend the 
advantages of German commerce and Kultur. Pres- 
ident Monroe has already been dead a hundred years 
or more. According to the calculations of the pe- 
dantocracy, his famous doctrine will need teome 



empire. 



UNIVERSAL PEACE 111 

stronger backing than the moral disapprobation of PartIL 

a hundred millions of materially-minded and unwar- Chapter 
like people, in order to withstand the pressure of IIL 

German diplomacy, if it should summon war-ships The 

. • German 

and transports to its aid. project of 

So in the end we arrive at an exceedingly strange 
conclusion. For that very thing, which the 
philanthropists have all these years been vainly 
endeavouring to bring about by means of congresses 
of good men, and resolutions which breathe a un- 
animity of noble aspirations, may be achieved in a 
single lifetime by a series of bold strokes with the 
German sword. Then at last Universal Peace will 
have been secured. 

At this point the Prussian professor and the 
pacifist apostle, who turned their backs upon one 
another so angrily at the beginning, and started off, 
as it seemed, in opposite directions, are confronting 
one another unexpectedly at the other side of the 
circle of human endeavour. They ought surely to 
shake hands; for each, if he be honest, will have 
to own himself the convert of the other. "You 
' admit then after all," cries the triumphant Pacifist, 
"that Peace is the real end of human endeavour !" 
"Whether or no," grunts the other in reply, "this 
'at any rate was the only road to it." 

One wonders — will the Pacifist be content? He 
has reached his goal sure enough ; though by means 
which he has been accustomed to denounce as the 
end of all true morality ? Will the Professor, on the 
other hand, be well pleased when he discovers that 
by the very triumph of his doctrines he has made 
war for ever impossible, — manliness, therefore, and 
all true virtue likewise impossible, — thereby damn- 



112 THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY 



Part II. 

Chapter 

III. 

The 

German 
project of 
empire. 



ing the souls of posterity to the end of time? "To 
'put questions in this quarter with a hammer, and 
'to hear perchance that well-known hollow sound 
'which tells of blown-out frogs" 1 — this is a joy, no 
doubt; and it is all we are ever likely to arrive at 
by the cross-examination of dreamers. 



1 Nietzsche, The Twilight of Idols. 



CHAPTER IV 



THE NEW MORALISTS 



The dream of German expansion, as year by year PartII. 
it took firmer hold upon the popular imagination, Chapter 
produced, as might have been expected, a desire 
that it might be realised. From the stage of vague The new 

,-.,.. , , , moralists. 

and ardent longing it was but a short way to the 
next, where a determined will began to put forth 
efforts towards achievement. But as mankind in 
the mass, whether in Germany or England, is still 
to some extent hampered by human nature, by a 
number of habits, traditions, and instincts, and by 
various notions of good and evil, justice and injus- 
tice — which the subtlest philosophers and most elo- 
quent rhetoricians have not yet succeeded in eradi- 
cating — a need was felt for what the text-books in 
their solemn nomenclature call an ethical basis. In 
plain words, the German people wanted to have right 
on their side — if possible, old-fashioned, Sunday- 
school, copy-book Right. Failing that, even such a 
plea as the wolf maintained against the lamb would 
be a great deal better than nothing. 

This tendency in a nation to look about for justi- 
fication and a righteous plea, when it is preparing to 
possess itself of property belongingto its neighbours, 
is for the most part a subconscious process, not only 

113 



114 THE SPIEIT OF GERMAN POLICY 



The new 
moralists, 



pakt ii. among the common people, but also among the lead- 
Chapter ers themselves. It resembles the instinct among hens 
Iv - which produces in them an appetite for lime when 
the season has come to begin laying. It was through 
some natural impulse of this sort, and not through 
mere cynicism, hypocrisy, or cool calculation, that 
German publicists discovered all the grievances which 
have been already touched upon. For even if the 
possession of these grievances did not altogether give 
the would-be aggressors right up to the point of 
righteousness, it certainly put their neighbours in the 
wrong, and branded the French dove and the British 
lamb with turpitude in the eyes of the German people. 
The grievances against France were, that although 
she had been vanquished in 1870, although her popu- 
lation had actually decreased since that date, and 
although therefore she had neither the right to nor 
any need for expansion, she had nevertheless ex- 
panded in Africa as well as in the East, to a far 
greater extent than Germany herself, the victorious 
power, whose own population had meanwhile been 
increasing by leaps and bounds. 

The grievances against Britain were that she was 
supposed to have made war upon German trade, to 
have prevented her young rival from acquiring col- 
onies, and to have intrigued to surround the Teuton 
peoples with a ring of foes. Britain had helped 
France to occupy and hold her new territories. 
Britain had been mainly responsible for the diplo- 
matic defeat of Germany at Algeciras in 1905 and 
again over Agadir in 1911. Moreover when Ger- 
many, during the South African war, had attempted, 
in the interests of international morality, to combine 
the nations against us, we had foiled her high-minded 



GRIEVANCES AGAINST ENGLAND 115 

and unselfish endeavours. When at an earlier date PartII. 
she had sought, by the seizure of Kiao-Chau and Chapter 
by a vigorous concentration, to oust British influence ly " 
and trade from their position of predominance in The new 
China, we had countered her efforts by the occupa- 
tion of Wei-hai-wei and the Japanese alliance. 

As regards command of the sea we had likewise 
frustrated German ambitions. After a certain 
amount of vacillation, and a somewhat piteous plea 
for a general diminution of armaments — backed up 
by an arrest of our own, which Germany interpreted, 
perhaps not unnaturally, as a throwing up of the 
sponge and beginning of the end of our naval 
supremacy — we had actually had the treachery (for 
it was nothing less) to upset all her calculations, 
and turn all her efforts and acceleration to foolish- 
ness, by resuming the race for sea-power with re- 
doubled energy. And although to our own eyes, and 
even possibly to the eyes of impartial observers, none 
of these doings of ours — in so far as they were truly 
alleged — could be rightly held to constitute any real 
grievance, that consideration was irrelevant. For 
when a man is in search of a grievance he will find 
it, if he be earnest enough, in the mere fact that his 
intended adversary stammers, or has a wart upon 
his nose. 

German statesmen were happy in having estab- 
lished these grievances to their own satisfaction; 
but something more was necessary in order that their 
morality might rest upon a sure foundation. German 
policy must be absolutely right, and not merely 
relatively right by contrast with those neighbours 
whose power she sought to overthrow, and whose 
territories she wished to annex. And although this 



116 THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY 



Part II. 

Chapter 

IV. 

The new 
moralists. 



effort to establish German policy on the principle 
of Right involved a recasting of Christian morality, 
it was not shirked on that account. On the con- 
trary it was undertaken in a most energetic spirit. 

The first great influence in this readjustment of 
popular conceptions of right and wrong was the 
historian Heinrich von Treitschke. 1 He boldly dif- 
ferentiated the moral obligations of the private indi- 
vidual from those of a government charged with the 
destinies of a nation. 2 The duties of a man to his 
family, neighbours, and society Treitschke left undis- 
turbed. In this sphere of human life the teaching of 
the Sermon on the Mount not only remained 
unchallenged, but was upheld and reinforced. State- 
craft, however, fell under a different category. 

The true principle of private conduct was Love for 
one's Neighbour, but the true principle of the state 
was Power. The duty of a virtuous ruler was to 
seek power, more power, and always more power, on 
behalf of the nation he was called upon to govern. 
The internal power of the state over the action of its 
own subjects was absolute, and it was a duty owed 
by each generation of rulers to posterity, to see to 
it that in their own time, the external power of the 

1 Heinrich von Treitschke, son of a Saxon general of Bohemian- 
Slavonic origin; born at Dresden 1834. Deafness following upon a 
fever in childhood prevented him from adopting the profession of arms; 
1858-1863 lectured on history at Leipzig; 1863-1866 professor at Frei- 
burg; 1866-1874 professor at Heidelberg; 1874 until his death in 1896 
professor of history and politics at Berlin. 

2 ' ' Thus it follows from this, that we must distinguish between public 
'and private morality. The order of rank of the various duties must 
' necessarily be for the State, as it is power, quite other than for indi- 
' vidual men. A whole series of these duties, which are obligatory on the 
'individual, are not to be thought of in any case for the State. To 
' maintain itself counts for it always as the highest commandment ; that 
' is absolutely moral for it. And on that account we must declare that 
'of all political sins that of weakness is the most reprehensible and 
' the most contemptible ; it is in politics the siu against the Holy 
' Ghost. . . . ' '—Selections, p. 32. 



THE STATE IS POWEE 117 

state was increased at the expense of its neighbours. 1 Part ii. 
To secure this end wars were inevitable ; and despite Chapter 
the sufferings which wars entailed, they were far Iv - 
from regrettable, for the reason that they preserved The new 
the vigour, unity, and devotion of the race, while morahsts - 
stimulating the virtues of courage and self-sacrifice 
among private citizens. 2 

Nations, he maintained, cannot safely stand still. 
They must either increase their power or lose it, 
expand their territories or be prepared to see them 
shorn away. No growth of spiritual force or ma- 
terial well-being within the state will preserve it, if 
it fails to extend its authority and power among its 
neighbours. Feelings of friendliness, chivalry, and 
pity are absurd as between nations. To speak even 
of justice in such a connection is absurd. Need and 
Might together constitute Right. Nor ought the 
world to regret the eating-up of weak nations by 
the strong, of small nations by the great, because — 
a somewhat bold conclusion — great and powerful 
nations alone are capable of producing what the 
world requires in thought, art, action, and virtue. 
For how can these things flourish nobly in a timid, 
cowering state, which finds itself driven by force 
of circumstances to make-believes and fictions, to 

1 ' ' That must not hinder us from declaring joyfully that the gifted 
' Florentine, with all the vast consequence of his thinking, was the first to 
'set in the centre of all politics the great thought: The State is power. 
' For that is the truth ; and he who is not man enough to look this truth 
' in the face ought to keep his hands off politics. ' ' — Ibid. p. 28. 

2 " . . . to the historian who lives in the world of will it is immedi- 
'ately clear that the demand for a perpetual peace is thoroughly reac- 
' tionary ; he sees that with war all movement, all growth, must be struck 
' out of history. It has always been the tired, unintelligent, and 
'enervated periods that have played with the dream of perpetual 
'peace. . . ." — Selections, p. 25. 

"It is precisely political idealism that demands wars, while ma- 
' terialism condemns them. What a perversion of morality to wish to 
'eliminate heroism from humanity! " — Ibid. p. 24. 



118 THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY 



Part II. 

Chapter 

IV. 

The new 
moralists. 



the meanest supplications and to devices of low 
cunning, in order to preserve an independence which, 
as it can only exist on sufferance, is nothing better 
than a sham? * 

As the Hohenzollerns, the noblest and most ca- 
pable of modern dynasties, had never been content 
merely to reign, but had always maintained their 
'divine right' of ruling and dominating the Prussian 
Kingdom — as Prussia itself, the most manly and 
energetic of modern nations, had not been content 
merely to serve as the figurehead of a loose con- 
federation, but had insisted upon becoming supreme 
master and imposing its own system, policy, and 
ideals upon all Germany — so was it the duty and 
destiny of united Germany, under these happy 
auspices, having been taught and seasoned by long 
centuries of stern and painful apprenticeship, to 
issue forth in the meridian vigour of her age and 
seize upon the Mastery of the "World. 

If Treitschke, the eloquent historian, succeeded 
to his own satisfaction and that of a very large pro- 
portion of German statesmen, soldiers, intellectuals, 
and publicists in taking high policy altogether out of 
the jurisdiction of Christian morals, Friedrich 
Wilhelm Nietzsche, 2 the even more eloquent and 
infinitely more subtle poet-philosopher, made a 

1 " . . . if we survey history in the mass, it is clear that all real 
' masterpieces of poetry and art arose upon the soil of great nationali- 
' ties ' ' ; and ' ' The poet and artist must be able to react upon a great 
'nation. When did a masterpiece ever arise among a petty little 
'nation?"— Ibid. p. 19. 

' Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, son of a village pastor of Polish 
ancestry ; born at Roeken in Saxony 1844 ; served in the German army 
for a few months in 1867; injured in mounting his horse; 1869-1879 
professor of classical philology at Bale which entailed naturalisation as 
a Swiss subject; served in ambulance in war of 1870-1871; 1879-1889 
in bad health, wrote and travelled ; 1889 became insane and remained so 
till his death in 1900. 



FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE 119 

cleaner and bolder cut, and got rid of Christian partII. 
morality even in the sphere of private conduct. Chapter 

Nietzsche was but little interested or concerned IVj 
in the practical problems of statecraft which en- The new 
grossed the patriotic mind of Treitschke. The des- 
tinies of the German nation were for him a small 
matter in comparison with those of the human race. 
But nevertheless his vigorously expressed contempt 
for the English, their ways of life and thought, the 
meanness of their practical aims, and the degrada- 
tion of their philosophic ideals, 1 was comforting to 
his fellow-countrymen, who were relieved to find that 
the nation whom they desired to despoil was so 
despicable and corrupt. This train of argument 
was deceptive and somewhat dangerous; for it led 
his German readers to overlook the fact, that the 
broad front of his attack aimed at enveloping and 
crushing the cherished traditions of the Teuton race 
no less than those of the Anglo-Saxon. 2 

1 ' ' What is lacking in England, and has always been lacking, that 
'half -actor and rhetorician knew well enough, the absurd muddlehead, 
' Carlyle, who sought to conceal under passionate grimaces what he knew 
'about himself: namely, what was lacking in Carlyle, real power of 
' intellect, real depth of intellectual perception, in short, philosophy. ' ' — 
Beyond Good and Evil, p. 210. 

' ' The Englishman, more gloomy, sensual, headstrong, and brutal than 
' the German — is for that very reason, as the baser of the two, also the 
'most pious." — Ibid. p. 211. 

' ' The English coarseness and rustic demureness is still more satisf ac- 
'torily disguised by Christian pantomime, and by praying and psalm- 
' singing ( or, more correctly, it is thereby explained and differently 
'expressed) ; and for the herd of drunkards and rakes who formerly 
'learned moral grunting under the influence of Methodism (and more 
'recently as the 'Salvation Army'), a penitential fit may really be the 
'relatively highest manifestation of 'humanity' to which they can be 
' elevated. "—Ibid. p. 211. 

"The European ignobleness, the plebeianism of modern ideas, is 
' England 's work and invention. ' ' — Ibid. p. 213. 

a " I believe only in French culture, and regard everything else in 
'Europe which calls itself 'culture' as a misunderstanding. I do not 
' even take the German kind into consideration. . . . The few instances 
' of higher culture with which I have met in Germany were all French in 
' their origin. ' ' — Ecce Homo, p. 27. 



120 THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY 



Part II. 

Chapter 
IV. 

The new 
moralists. 



Nietzsche's derision and dislike of the Prussian 
spirit, of militarism, and of what he conceived to 
be the spurious principle of nationality, his vague, 
disinterested cosmopolitanism or Europeanism, are 
as the poles apart from the aims and ideas of 
Treitschke and the German patriots. 1 Nietzsche is 
not concerned to evolve a sovereign and omnipotent 
state, but a high overmastering type of man, who 
shall inherit the earth and dominate — not for their 
good, but for his own — the millions who inhabit it. 
His ideal is a glorious aristocracy of intellect, beauty, 
courage, self-control, felicity, and power, scornfully 
smiling, exuberantly vital. The evolution, ever 
higher and higher, of this fine oligarchy of super- 
men is the one absolute end of human endeavour. 
The super-men will use and direct the force and in- 
stincts of 'the herd' — even the capacities of kings. 



' ' Wherever Germany extends her sway, she ruins culture. ' ' — Ibid. 
p. 38. 

"Culture and the state are antagonists: a 'culture- state' is merely a 
'modern idea. The one lives upon the other, the one nourishes at the 
' expense of the other. All great periods of culture have been periods of 
' political decline ; that which was great from the standpoint of culture 
'was always unpolitical — even anti-political. ... In the history of 
'European culture the rise of the (German) Empire signifies, above all, 
' a displacement of the centre of gravity. Everywhere people are already 
' aware of this : in things that really matter — and these after all consti- 
' tute culture — the Germans are no longer worth considering. . . . The 
' fact that there is no longer a single German philosopher worth men- 
' tioning is an increasing wonder. ' ' — The Twilight of the Idols, p. 54. 

' ' Every great crime against culture for the last four centuries lies on 
'their [the German] conscience. ... It was the Germans who caused 
' Europe to lose the fruits, the whole meaning of her last period of 
' greatness — the period of the Eenaissance. . . . ' ' — Ecce Homo, p. 124. 

' ' The future of German culture rests with the sons of Prussian 
' officers. ' ' — The Genealogy of Morals, p. 222. 

' ' If any one wishes to see the ' German soul ' demonstrated ad oculos, 
' let him only look at German taste, at German arts and manners : what 
' boorish indifference to ' taste ' ! ' ' — The Antichrist. 

1 ' ' What quagmires and mendacity there must be about if it is pos- 
' sible, in the modern European hotchpotch, to raise questions of race. ' ' 

A Nation — ' ' Men who speak one language and read the same news- 
' papers. ' ' — The Genealogy of Morals, p. 226. 



THE BLONDE BRUTE 121 

soldiers, law-givers, and administrators — to make partII. 
the world a fit place for their own development. The Chapter 
millions of slaves are to be considered merely as a IV- 
means to this end. Concern about them for their own The new 
sakes, above all pity for their sufferings, or regard 
on the part of the super-men for their resentment 
— except to guard against it — is a mistake. The 
serenity of the super-man must not allow itself to 
be disturbed and distracted by any such considera- 
tions. It is for him to take what he needs or desires, 
to impose order on the world, so that it may be a fit 
environment for the evolution of his own caste, and, 
so far as he can compass it, to live like the gods. 1 

It is clear that although Nietzsche chaunts a paean 
in admiration of "the magnificent blonde brute, 
'avidly rampant for spoil and victory," 2 and al- 
though he is constantly found, as it were, humming 
this refrain, he had no intention of taking the Prus- 
sian as his ideal type — still less of personifying 
Prussia itself as a super-state engaged in a contest 
for supremacy with a herd of inferior nations. He 
does not trouble himself in the least about nations, 
but only about individual men. Yet, like others who 
have had the gift of memorable speech, he might 

1 " A boldly daring, splendidly overbearing, high-flying, and alof t-up- 
' dragging class of higher men, who had first to teach their century — and 
' it is the century of the masses — the conception ' higher man. ' ' ' — 
Beyond Good and Evil, p. 219. 

' ' This man of the future, this tocsin of noon and of the great verdict, 
' which renders the will again free, who gives back to the world its goal 
' and to man his hope, this Antichrist and Antinihilist, this conqueror of 
' God and of Nothingness — he must one day come. ' ' — The Genealogy of 
Morals, p. 117. 

2 ' ' The blonde beast that lies at the core of all aristocratic races. ' ' — 
The Genealogy of Morals, p. 42. 

' ' The profound, icy mistrust which the German provokes, as soon as 
' he arrives at power, — even at the present time, — is always still an 
' aftermath of that inextinguishable horror with which for whole cen- 
' turies Europe has regarded the wrath of the blonde Teuton beast. ' ' — 
Ibid. 



moralists. 



122 THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY 

Part II. well marvel, were he still alive, at the purposes 
Chapter to which his words have been turned by orators and 
Iv - journalists, desirous to grind an edge on their own 
The new blunt axes. 

General von Bernhardi * may be taken as a type 
of the sincere but unoriginal writer who turns all 
texts to the support of his own sermon. He is an 
honest, literal fellow. In spite of all his ecstatic 
flights of rhetoric he is never at all in the clouds — 
never any farther from the earth's surface than 
hopping distance. Notwithstanding, he quietly ap- 
propriates any Nietzschean aphorisms the sound and 
shape of which appear to suit his purpose, and uses 
them to drive home his very simple and concrete 
proposition that it is the duty of Germany to conquer 
the world. 

One imagines from his writings that Bernhardi 
has no quarrel with Christianity, no wish whatsoever 
to overturn our accepted notions of morality. He 
is merely a soldier with a fixed idea, and he is very 
much in earnest. His literary methods remind one 
somewhat of the starlings in spring-time, perched on 
the backs of sheep and cattle, picking off the loose 
hairs to line their nests. This is the highly practical 
and soldierly use to which he puts philosophers, 
poets, and men of letters generally — laying them 
under contribution to garnish his discourse. 

It is probably true that the average soldier who 
fought on the German side at Ypres and elsewhere 

1 Friedrieh von Bernhardi: born 1849 at St. Petersburg, where his 
father Theodor von Bernhardi was a Councillor of the Prussian Lega- 
tion; entered a Hussar regiment in 1869; military attache at Berne in 
1881 ; in 1897 he was chief of the General Staff of the 16th Army Corps; 
in 1908 he was appointed commander of the 7th Army Corps; retired in 
the following year. He was a distinguished cavalry general, and is 
probably the most influential German writer on current politico-military 
problems. 



INFLUENCE OF PHILOSOPHY 123 

was hardly more conversant with the writings of partII. 
Treitschke, Nietzsche, and Bernhardi than the Chapter 
average British soldier opposed to him was with IV - 
those of Herbert Spencer, Mr. Bernard Shaw, and The new 
Mr. Norman Angell. It is very unlikely, however, 
that the battle of Ypres would ever have been fought 
had it not been for the ideas which sprang from 
these and similar sources. The influence of the 
written and spoken word upon German policy and 
action is glaringly manifest. 1 It inspired and sup- 
ported the high bureaucrats at Berlin, and had 
equally to do, if indirectly, with the marching of 
the humblest raw recruits shoulder to shoulder to 
be shot down on the Menin Road. For by a process 
of percolation through the press and popular litera- 
ture, the doctrines of these teachers — diluted some- 
what, it is true, and a good deal disguised and 
perverted — had reached a very wide audience. 
Though the names of these authors were for the 
most part unknown, though their opinions had never 
been either understood or accepted by the common 
people, the effects of their teaching had made them- 
selves felt in every home in Germany. 

The German private soldier would not have been 
shot down unless these eloquent sermons had been 
preached. None the less, he had never grasped or 
understood, far less had he adhered to and professed, 
the cardinal doctrines which they contained. He 
still believed in the old-fashioned morality, and 
thought that states as well as individual men were 
bound to act justly. It was this faith which gave 

1 Probably not less so upon British policy and inaction. As water is 
the result of blending oxygen and hydrogen in certain proportions, so is 
the present war the resultant of German militarism and British anti- 
militarism in combination. 



124 THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY 



Part II. 

Chapter 

IV. 

The new 
moralists. 



him his strength, and made him die gladly. For he 
believed that Germany had acted justly, the Allies 
unjustly, that it was his task, along with other good 
men and true, to win victory for his Emperor and 
safety for his Fatherland, and to crush the treacher- 
ous and malignant aggressors. 

In spite of all this preliminary discoursing which 
had been going on for many years past, like artillery 
preparation before an infantry attack — about world- 
power, will-to-power, and all the rest of it — nothing 
is more remarkable than the contrast presented, 
immediately after war broke out, between the 
blatancy of those writers who had caused the war 
and the bleating of those (in many cases the same) 
who sought to justify Germany's part in it to their 
countrymen and the world. 

On the enlightened principles of Treitschke and 
Bernhardi, Britain would have acted not only wisely, 
but in the strictest accordance with her duty to her 
own state, had she indeed contrived and compassed 
this war, believing circumstances to be favourable 
for herself and unfavourable for Germany. Not 
another shred of right or reason was required. 1 But 
when war actually burst out, all these new-fangled, 
doctrines went by the board. Though the ink was 
hardly dry upon Bernhardi 's latest exhortation — of 
which several hundred thousand copies had been 
sold, and in which he urged his fellow-countrymen 
to watch their time and make war when it suited 



1 ' ' Every State has as sovereign the undoubted right to declare war 
'when it chooses, consequently every State is in the position of being 
' able to cancel any treaties which have been concluded. ' ' — Treitschke, 
Selections, p. 15. 

"It is not only the right, but the moral and political duty of the 
' statesman to bring about a war. ' ' — Bernhardi, Germany and the Next 
War, p. 41. 



APOSTASY WHEN WAR CAME 125 



them, without remorse and no matter on what plea — Part ii. 
in spite of this fact, there was a singular lack of Chapter 
Stoicism among 'the brethren' when war was de- IVm 
clared against Russia and France. When Britain The new 
joined in, and when things began to go less well than 
had been expected, Stoicism entirely disappeared. 
Indeed there is something highly ludicrous, at the 
same time painful — like all spectacles of human 
abasement — in the chorus of whines and shrill exe- 
cration, which at once went up to heaven from that 
very pedantocracy whose leaders, so short a time 
before, had been preaching that, as between the 
nations of the earth, Might is Right, and Craft is 
the trusty servant of Might. 1 

These scolding fakirs were of an infinite credulity, 
inasmuch as they believed that Sir Edward Grey 
was the reincarnation of Machiavelli. Yet on their 
own principles, what was there in this discovery to 
be in the least shocked at? British statesmen (it 
is hardly necessary to repeat it) had not walked in 
the footsteps of the Florentine; had not provoked 
the war; had not wished for it; had tried with all 
their might to prevent it ; but if they had done the 
very reverse, would they not merely have been 

1 Towards the end of March 1915 General von Bernhardi published in 
the New York Sun an article the object of which was to explain to the 
American people how much his previous writings had been misunder- 
stood and perverted by the malice of the enemy. Long before this date, 
however, there was strong presumptive evidence that the distinguished 
military author was unfavourably regarded by the Super-men at Berlin. 
He had been useful before the war for preparing the Teutonic youth for 
Armageddon; but after hostilities began it was discovered that, so far 
as neutral opinion was concerned, it would have been better had he been 
wholly interdicted from authorship under the national motto — verboten. 
As to the tenour of imperial communications to the popular fire-eating 
publicist during the winter 1914-1915, might we venture to paraphrase 
them into the vulgar vernacular as follows? — "We've got to thank you 
' and your damned books, more than anything else, for the present mess 
' with America. Get busy, and explain them all away if you can. ' ' — 
Any one of the labours of Hercules was easier. 



126 THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY 



Part II. 

Chapter 

IV. 

The new 
moralists. 



taking a leaf out of the sacred book of the pedanto- 
cracy — out of Bernhardi's book, out of Nietzsche's 
book, out of Treitschke's book? Why, then, all these 
unpleasant howlings and ravings? 

The answers are not hard to find. The careful 
plans and theories of the German bureaucrats had 
been turned topsy-turvy because England had 
joined in the war when, according to the calculations 
of the augurs, she should have remained neutral. 
That mistake must have been sufficiently annoying 
in itself to disturb the equanimity even of profes- 
sional philosophers. And further, in spite of all 
the ingenious, eloquent, and sophistical exhortations 
of the prophets, the old morality still kept its hold 
upon the hearts of men. When trouble arose they 
turned to it instinctively — priesthood as well as peo- 
ple — and the later gospel fell flat like a house of 
cards. Immediately war came there was an appeal 
to old-fashioned justice, and the altars of the little, 
new-fangled, will-to-power gods were deserted by 
their worshippers. 

When statesmen are laying out policies, and 
moralists are setting up systems, it is worth their 
while to make certain that they are not, in fact, 
engaged upon an attempt to make water flow uphill ; 
above all, that their ingenious new aqueducts will 
actually hold water, which in this instance they 
certainly did not. 



CHAPTER V 



THE STATECRAFT OF A PEIESTHOOD 



The thoroughness and efficiency of the Germans are 
admitted even by hostile critics. In the practical 
sphere they have excelled in military preparations, 
in the encouragement of industry, and in the organ- 
isation of finance. But they have achieved an even 
more remarkable success than any of these; for 
they have so arranged their educational system that 
it is drilled hardly less admirably than their army. 1 
From the primary schools to the universities every- 
thing is ordered, so that the plastic mind of youth is 
forced into a political mould which suits the purposes 
of government. Patriotism of the pattern approved 
by the authorities is inculcated directly or indirectly 
in every class-room. While thought is left osten- 
tatiously free in regard to private morals and re- 
ligious foundations, the duties of the citizen to the 
state, the duties of the state to posterity, the rela- 
tions of Germany to the outside world, are subjects 
upon which independent speculation is not tolerated. 

1 ' ' We may declare that the problem of training in arms and turning 
' to real account the energies of the nation was first undertaken in thor- 
' ough earnestness by Germany. We possess in our army a characteristic, 
' necessary continuation of the school-system. For many men there is no 
'better means of training; for them drilling, compulsory cleanliness, 
' and severe discipline are physically and morally indispensable in a time 
'like ours, which unchains all spirits." — Treitschke, Selections, pp. 
106-107. 

127 



Part II. 

Chapter 

V. 

The state- 
craft of a 
priesthood. 



128 THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY 



Past II. 

Chapter 

V. 

The state- 
craft of a 
priesthood. 



Even schoolmasters and professors have their 
ambitions; but unless they contribute their quota 
to the support of imperial ideals, their careers are 
unlikely to prosper. It is not enough that a lecturer 
should not run counter to state policy; he must 
actively promote its ends before he can hope to be 
transferred to a sphere of greater dignity and in- 
fluence. Pedagogy is a branch of the Civil Service 
just as much as the Treasury or the Public Health 
Department. Teachers from the lowest to the high- 
est grades are the stipendiaries of the bureaucracy. 
If they render useful services they are promoted. 
If they fail to render useful services they are passed 
over. If they indulge in dangerous speculations 
they are sent adrift. Not merely the army, but the 
whole German nation, is disciplined, during the 
period of its impressionable youth, with the object 
of inclining its mind to support state policy through 
thick and thin. 

The schools feed the universities ; the universities 
feed the press, the learned professions, and the 
higher grades in industry and finance. Private 
conversation, as well as what is published in news- 
papers, magazines, and books, bears the impress of 
the official mint to a degree unthinkable in England 
or America, Russia or France. Theories of politics 
are devised by ingenious sophists, exactly as the 
machinery at Essen is contrived by engineers — for 
the express purpose of forwarding Prussian policy. 
History is twisted and distorted in order to prepare 
the way for imperial ambitions by justifying them 
in advance. 

It is a signal triumph for the thoroughness of 
German methods that all the thinkers, dreamers, 



MOBILISATION OF INTELLECTUALS 129 

poets, and prophets, with but a few exceptions, partIL 
should have been commandeered and set to work Chapter 
thinking, dreaming, poetising, and prophesying to v - 
the glory of the Kaiser, and his army, and his The state- 
navy, and his counsellors, and his world policy, and priesthood. 
the conquests and expansion which are entailed 
therein. 

It is somewhat startling, however, to find the in- 
tellectuals thus mobilised, and all but unanimous, on 
the official side; for hitherto in history they have 
rarely agreed among themselves, and the greater 
part have usually favoured the Opposition rather 
than the Government. Nor does this close alliance 
between learning and the bureaucracy seem alto- 
gether satisfactory. For thought loses its fine edge 
when it is set to cut millstones of state. It loses its 
fine temper in the red heat of political controversy. 
By turning utilitarian it ceases to be universal ; and 
what is perhaps even worse, it ceases to be free. It 
tends more and more to become the mere inventor of 
things which will sell at a profit; less and less the 
discoverer of high principles which the gods have 
hidden out of sight. It would hardly be possible 
to imagine a more complete reversal of attitude than 
that which has occurred in Germany between the 
beginning of the nineteenth century and the present 
time ; and though this change may serve admirably 
the immediate purposes of the state, it does not 
augur well for the future of German thought. 

The similarities and contrasts of history are in- 
teresting to contemplate. In the ferment of thought 
and action which occurred in France during the 
generation preceding the battle of Valmy, and that 
other which has been going on in Germany in the 



130 THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY 



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Chapter 

V. 

The state- 
craft of a 
priesthood. 



generation preceding the battle of the Marne, there 
are various likenesses and unlikenesses. 

In France before the Revolution, as in Germany 
to-day, a bureaucracy, responsible solely to the 
monarch, directed policy and controlled administra- 
tion. But in France this bureaucracy was incom- 
petent, unpractical, and corrupt. Its machinery was 
clogged with dead matter of every kind, with 
prejudices, traditions, and statutes, many of which 
had outlived their original purposes. The Struld- 
brugs, discovered by Gulliver during his voyages, 
were a race of men whose mortal souls were incased 
in immortal bodies. The French monarchy was of 
this nature, and the soul of it was long since dead. 
Inefficiency was everywhere apparent; and, as a 
natural consequence, the whole system had become 
a butt, at which each brilliant writer in turn levelled 
his darts of derision and contempt. 

In Germany, although the political mechanism 
is the same, the conditions are diametrically the 
opposite. The bureaucracy and the monarchy which 
it supports, have proved themselves highly efficient 
and adaptive. The arrangement has worked with 
a marvellous success. It has cherished the material, 
if not the spiritual, well-being of the people. The 
wealth-producing and belly-filling activities of the 
race have been stimulated to an extent never yet 
attained by any form of government, either popular 
or despotic. Administration has been honest, thrifty, 
and singularly free from the usual dull negatives of 
officialdom and the pedantries of red tape. In all 
directions industrial prosperity has increased, under 
the fostering care of the state, by leaps and bounds. 
Anything more remote from the bankrupt empire of 



IDEAS OF THE FRENCH EEVOLUTION 131 

Louis XVI. it would be impossible to conceive. And partil 
as a natural consequence, brilliant German writers Chapter 
have for the most part * spent their forces of rhetoric v - 
and fancy in idealising the grandeur and nobility of The state- 
an order of things, under which resources, comfort, priesthood. 
and luxury have expanded with such amazing strides. 

In the case of France the aim of the intellectuals 
was to pull down existing institutions, in that of 
Germany it has been to bolster them up, to extend 
and develop them to their logical conclusions. But 
the second were no less agents of destruction than the 
first. Each alike, as a condition of success, required 
that a new order of moral and political ideas should 
be set up ; each attained a certain measure of success ; 
and the results which followed were those which usu- 
ally follow, when new wine is poured into old bottles. 

The ideas of the French Revolution cast them- 
selves into the mould of republicanism. A picture 
wholly imaginary and fictitious was drawn of the 
institutions of Greece and Rome in ancient days. 
Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity were believed to 
have been the foundations of these famous states. 
Patriots on the banks of the Seine conceived them- 
selves to be re-incarnations of Aristides and the 
Gracchi, of Pericles, of one Brutus or the other — 
it mattered little which. Political idealism passed 
rapidly into a kind of religious fervour. 

The German masquerade is very different from 
this, but it is no less a masquerade. What covers the 
new faith, indeed, is not plumage borrowed from the 
Greeks and Romans, but habiliments which are sup- 
posed to have clad the heroic forms of ancestral 
Teutons. The student on his way to doctor's degree 

1 Nietzsche is one of the rare exceptions. 



132 THE SPIEIT OF GERMAN POLICY 



Part II. 

Chapter 

V. 

The state- 
craft of a 
priesthood. 



— the intelligent clerk scanning the high-road to for- 
tune from the eminence of office-stool — dream in 
their pensive leisure to emulate the heroes of As- 
gard, to merit and enjoy the glories of Valhalla. But 
the noble shapes and gorgeous colourings in which 
the modern young German of honest, sober, and in- 
dustrious character has chosen to see his destiny 
prefigured, are no less imaginary and fictitious than 
those others, with which eloquent notaries '-clerks, 
and emancipated, unfrocked priests, decked them- 
selves out for the admiration of the Paris mob. In 
Germany as in France political idealism passed into 
a kind of religious fervour, which inspired men to a 
mimicry of old-Wardour-Street shams, and led them 
to neglect the development of their own true natures. 



During quiet times that stream of events, which 
we are wont to call human progress, is occupied in- 
cessantly in throwing up dams, of one sort or an- 
other, throughout the world. Tree-trunks and logs, 
which have been swept down by former floods of con- 
quest and invasion, jam at some convenient rocky 
angle, as the river falls to its normal level. Against 
these obstacles the drift and silt of habit, custom, 
law, convention, prejudice, and tradition slowly col- 
lect, settle, and consolidate. An embankment is grad- 
ually formed, and the waters are held up behind it 
ever higher and higher. The tribal pool becomes a 
pond or nation ; and this again, if conditions remain 
favourable — for so long, that is to say, as there are 
no more raging and destructive floods, — extends into 
a lake or inland sea of empire. . . . "See," cry the 
optimists, ' ' see what a fine, smooth, silvery sheet of 
'civilisation, culture, wealth, happiness, comfort, and 



RECENT ANXIETIES 133 

'what not besides, where formerly there was but an paetIL 
'insignificant torrent brawling in the gorge!" . . . Chapter 
But the pessimists, as is their nature, shake their v ' 
heads, talk anxiously of the weight of waters which t^ state - 
are banking up behind, and of the unreliable char- priesthood. 
acter of the materials out of which the dam has 
grown. "Some day," they warn us, "the embank- 
'ment will burst under the heavy pressure; or, more 
'likely still, some ignorant, heedless, or malicious 
' person will begin to fiddle and tamper with the cas- 
' ual structure ; and then what may we expect 1 ' ' 

There has been considerable nervousness of late 
among rulers of nations as to the soundness of their 
existing barrages. For the most part, however, they 
have concerned themselves with internal dangers — 
with watching propagandists of the socialist per- 
suasion — with keeping these under a kind of benev- 
olent police supervision, and in removing ostenta- 
tiously from time to time the more glaring of their 
alleged grievances. This procedure has been quite 
as noticeable in the case of autocracies, as in 
countries which enjoy popular institutions. 

Treitschke and Bernhardi — even Nietzsche him- 
self — valued themselves far more highly as builders- 
up than as pullers-down. It is always so with your 
inspired inaugurators of change. It was so with 
Eousseau and those other writers, whose thoughts, 
fermenting for a generation in the minds of French- 
men, brought about the Revolution. The intellectuals 
of the eighteenth century, like those of the nine- 
teenth, aimed at getting rid of a great accumulation 
of insanitary rubbish. But this was only a trouble- 
some preliminary, to be hurried through with as 
quickly as possible, in order that the much greater 



134 THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY 



Part II. 

Chapter 

V. 

The state- 
craft of a 
priesthood. 



work of construction might proceed upon the cleared 
site. 

Treitschke made a hole in the German dam when 
he cut an ancient commonplace in two, and tore out 
the one half of it. Nietzsche turned the hole into a 
much vaster cavity by pulling out the other half. 
Bernhardi and the pedantocracy worked lustily at 
the business, with the result that a great part of the 
sticks, stones, and mud of tradition are now dancing, 
rumbling, and boiling famously in the flood. 
Whether they have injured our dam as well as their 
own, we are hardly as yet in a position to judge. 

The profounder spirit of Nietzsche realised clearly 
enough the absurdity of supposing that the conflict- 
ing beliefs and aspirations of mankind could all be 
settled and squared in a few bustling decades — that 
the contradictions, paradoxes, and antinomies of 
national existence could be written off with a few 
bold strokes of the sword, and the world started off 
on the road to perfection, like a brisk debtor who has 
purged his insolvency in the Bankruptcy Court. But 
the enthusiasm of Trietschke and Bernhardi made 
them blind to these considerations. Had not the 
formula been discovered, which would overcome 
every obstacle — that stroke of genius, the famous 
bisection of the commonplace? For private conduct, 
the Sermon on the Mount; for high statecraft, 
Machiavelli's Prince I "Was ever anything simpler, 
except perhaps the way of Columbus with the eggl 



When we push our examination further, into the 
means which Germany has been urged by her great 
thinkers to employ in preparing for this premedi- 
tated war, for provoking it when the season should 



A POLITICAL PRIESTHOOD 135 

be ripe, and for securing victory and spoils, we are Part ii. 
struck more than ever by the gulf which separates Chapter 
the ideas of the German pedantocracy from those V- 
of the rest of the world. Nor can we fail to be im- t^ state- 
pressed by the matter-of-fact and businesslike way priesthood. 
in which the military and civil powers have set to 
work to translate those notions into practice. 

No kind of priesthood has ever yet exercised a 
great and direct influence upon national policy with- 
out producing calamity. And by an ill fate, it has 
always been the nature of these spiritual guides to 
clutch at political power whenever it has come within 
their reach. 

Of all classes in the community who are intellect- 
ually capable of having ideas upon public affairs, a 
priesthood — or what is the same thing, a pedanto- 
cracy — is undoubtedly the most mischievous, if it 
succeeds in obtaining power. It matters not a whit 
whether they thunder forth their edicts and incite- 
ments from church pulpits or university chairs, 
whether they carry their sophistical projects up the 
back stairs of Catholic King or Lutheran Kaiser, 
whether, having shaved their heads and assumed 
vows of celibacy, they dwell in ancient cloisters, or, 
having taken unto themselves wives and begotten 
children, they keep house in commonplace villa resi- 
dences. None of these differences is essential, or 
much worth considering. The one class is as much 
a priesthod as the other, and the evils which proceed 
from the predominance of the one, and the other, 
are hardly distinguishable. 

They stand ostentatiously aloof from the sordid 
competitions of worldly business. They have for- 
sworn, or at any rate forgone, the ordinary prizes of 



136 THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY 



Part II. 

Chapter 

V. 

The state- 
craft of a 
priesthood. 



wealth and position. And for these very reasons 
they are ill equipped for guiding practical affairs. 
Their abstinences are fatal impediments, and render 
them apt to leave human nature out of their reckon- 
ing. They are wanting in experience of the diffi- 
culties which beset ordinary men, and of the motives 
which influence them. Knowing less of such matters 
(for all their book learning) than any other class of 
articulately-speaking men, they find it by so much 
the easier to lay down rules and regulations for 
the government of the world. 

To a priesthood, whether ecclesiastical or 
academic, problems of politics and war present 
themselves for consideration in an engaging sim- 
plicity. They evolve theories of how people live, 
of how they ought to live ; and both sets of theories 
are mainly cobwebs. There is no place in their 
philosophy for anything which is illogical or untidy. 
Ideas of compromise and give-and-take are 
abominations in priestly eyes — at any rate when they 
are engaged in contemplation of worldly affairs. And 
seeing that the priesthood aspires, nevertheless, to 
govern and direct a world which is illogical and 
needs humouring, there is nothing wonderful, if 
when it has achieved power, it should blunder on 
disaster in the name of principle, and incite men to 
cruelties in the name of humanity. ' Clericalism, ' 
said a French statesman, and English statesmen 
have echoed his words — 'Clericalism is the enemy.' 
And this is right, whether the priesthood be that of 
Rome or John Calvin, of economic professors ex- 
pounding Adam Smith in the interests of Manches- 
ter, or history professors improving upon Treitschke 
in the interests of the Hohenzollern dynasty. 



PRIESTS AND LAWYERS 137 

Priests and professors when they meddle in paktII. 
politics are always the same. They sit in their Chapter 
studies or cells, inventing fundamental principles; v - 
building thereon great edifices of reasoned or senti- i^e state - 
mental brickwork which splits in the sun and crum- priesthood. 
bles in the storm. Throughout the ages, as often as 
they have left their proper sphere, they have been 
subject to the same angry enthusiasms and savage 
obstinacies. Their errors of judgment have been 
comparable only to their arrogance. Acts of cruelty 
and treachery, meanness and dishonour, 1 which 
would revolt the ordinary German or Englishman, 
commend themselves readily, on grounds of sophis- 
try or logic, to these morbid ascetics, so soon as 
they begin busying themselves with the direction of 
public affairs. 

It would be unfair to judge any country by its 
political professors. At the same time, if any coun- 
try is so foolish as to follow such guides, there is a 
probability of mischief in national — still more in 
international — affairs. For they are as innocent as 
the lawyers themselves, of any knowledge of the real 
insides of things. They differ of course from the 
lawyers in many ways. They are ever for making 
changes for the sake of symmetry ; while the man of 
law is for keeping as he is until the last moment; 
or at any rate until it is clearly his interest to budge. 
A priesthood has a burning faith in its own hand- 
wrought idols ; the lawyer on the contrary, does not 
go readily to the stake, does not catch fire easily, 
being rather of the nature of asbestos. When law- 
yers monopolise political power — even when they 

1 Cf. Professor Kuno Meyer, Times, December 24, 1914, and March 8, 
1915. 



138 THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY 



Part II. 

Chapter 

V. 

The state- 
craft of a 
priesthood. 



merely preponderate, as of late years they have 
seemed to do more and more in all democratic coun- 
tries, whether of the monarchical or republican 
type — they invariably destroy by insensible grada- 
tions that which is most worth preserving in man or 
state, the soul. But they do not bring on sudden 
catastrophe as a priesthood does; their method is 
to strangle slowly like ivy. 

In England, nowadays — indeed every since the 
'eighties, when professors of Political Economy be- 
came discredited as political guides — there are not 
many evidences of priestly influence. Certainly 
there is nothing of an organised kind. What exists 
is erratic and incalculable. There is much clamour ; 
but it is contradictory, spasmodic, and inconstant, 
without any serious pretence, either of learning or 
science, to support it. Each of our prophets is in 
business for himself. There is no tinge of Erastian- 
ism about any of them. For the most part they 
are the grotesques and lions comiques of the world 
of letters, who prophesy standing on their heads, 
or grinning through horse-collars, and mistaking 
always "the twinkling of their own sophisticated 
'minds for wisdom." 

Alliance between a priesthood and a bureaucracy 
tends gradually to produce, as in the case of China, 
an oppressive uniformity — not unlike that aimed at 
by the more advanced socialists — where every fresh 
innovation is a restriction hampering the natural 
bent. On the other hand an alliance between a 
priesthood and a military caste — especially when 
the bureaucracy is ready to act in sympathy — 
is one of the commonest causes of international 
convulsions. 



PRIESTS AND SOLDIERS 139 

Oddly enough, the soldier, who affects to despise partII. 
men of words and make-believes, and who on this Chapter 
account has an instinctive dislike and distrust of v * 
the lawyer — so violent indeed that it often puts him The state- 
in the wrong, and leaves hhn at the mercy of the p r r i es thood. 
object of his contempt — is dangerously apt to become 
the tool of anything which bears a likeness to Peter 
the Hermit. It is not really the lawyer's confidence 
in the efficacy of words which revolts the soldier, 
nearly so much as the kind of words used, the tem- 
perament of him who uses them, and the character 
of the make-believes which it is sought to establish. 
The unworldliness, simplicity, idealism, and fervour 
of the priesthood make strong appeals to a military 
caste, which on the contrary is repelled by what it 
conceives to be the cynicism, opportunism, and self- 
seeking of lawyer statecraft. 

More especially is it difficult for the military caste 
to resist the influence of the priesthood when, as in 
Germany of recent years, they have insisted upon 
giving the warrior the most important niche in their 
temple, and on burning incense before him day and 
night. Working industriously in their studies and 
laboratories they have found moral justification for 
every course, however repugnant to established 
ideas, which may conceivably make it easier to at- 
tain victory and conquest. The soldier might have 
scruples about doing this or that; but when he is 
assured by inspired intellectuals, that what would 
best serve his military ends is also the most moral 
course of action, how can he — being a man of 
simple mind — presume to doubt it; though he may 
occasionally shudder as he proceeds to put it into 
execution % 



140 THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY 

Part ii. German thoroughness is an admirable quality, 
Chapter but even thoroughness may be carried to extremes 

which are absurd, or something worse. 
The state- No nation has a right to complain if another 
priesthood, chooses to drill armies, build fleets, accumulate stores 
of treasure, weapons, and material ; nor is it incum- 
bent upon any nation to wear its heart upon its 
sleeve, or to let the whole world into its secrets, 
military or political. In so far as Germany has 
acted upon these principles she was well within her 
rights. As a result we have suffered heavily; but 
we must blame ourselves for being ill-prepared; 
we have no justification for complaining because 
Germany was well-prepared. 

There are some kinds of preparation, however, 
which it does not seem possible to justify, if the 
world is to consist as heretofore of a large number 
of independent states, between whose citizens it 
is desirable to maintain a certain friendliness and 
freedom of intercourse. German activities in vari- 
ous directions, for many years before war broke out, 
make one wonder what state of things was contem- 
plated by German statesmen, as likely to prevail 
when war should be over. What, for instance, is to 
be the status of Germans visiting or residing in 
other countries — seeking to trade with them — to 
borrow money from them — to interchange with them 
the civilities of ordinary life, or those more solemn 
courtesies which are practised by societies of learn- 
ing and letters? Will the announcement civis 
Germanicus sum be enough henceforth to secure the 
stranger a warm welcome and respect ? Or will such 
revelation of his origin be more likely to lead to his 
speedy re-embarkation for the land of his nativity? 



GERMAN AGENCIES 141 

Spying has always been practised since the begin- partII. 
ning of time; but it has rarely been conducted in Chapter 
such a manner as to produce general uneasiness, or v - 
any sensible restraint upon private relations. Logic- The state- 
ally, it would be unfair to condemn recent German priesthood. 
enterprises in this direction, seeing that she has only 
extended an accepted nuisance on to a much vaster 
scale. But here again logic is a misleading guide. 
There is something in the very scale of German 
espionage which has changed the nature of this 
institution. It has grown into a huge organised 
industry for the debauching of vain, weak, and 
greedy natures ; for turning such men — for the most 
part without their being aware of it — into German 
agents. The result of Teutonic thoroughness in 
this instance is a domestic intrusion which is odious, 
as well as a national menace which cannot be dis- 
regarded. Many of these hostile agencies may 
surely be termed treacherous, seeing that they have 
aimed, under the guise of friendly intercourse, at 
forwarding schemes of invasion and conquest. 

We are familiar enough with the vain purse-proud 
fellow, who on the strength of a few civil speeches 
from the Kaiser — breathing friendship and the love 
of peace — has thenceforward flattered himself that 
his mission in life was to eradicate suspicion of 
German intentions from the minds of his British 
fellow-countrymen. This is the unconscious type 
of agent, useful especially in sophisticated circles, 
and among our more advanced politicians of anti- 
militarist sympathies. 

Then we have the naturalised, or unnaturalised, 
magnate of finance or industry, to whom business 
prosperity is the great reality of life, politics and 



142 THE SPIEIT OF GERMAN POLICY 



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Chapter 

V. 

The state- 
craft of a 
priesthood. 



patriotism being by comparison merely things of 
the illusory sort. It would cause him no very bitter 
anguish of heart to see England humiliated and her 
Empire dissolved, providing his own cosmopolitan 
undertakings continued to thrive undisturbed by 
horrid war. He, also, has very likely been the 
recipient of imperial suavities. In addition to this, 
however, he has been encouraged to imagine that 
he enjoys in a peculiar degree the confidence of the 
German Foreign Office. The difficulties which so 
shrewd a fellow must have in believing in the in- 
nocence of German intentions must be considerable 
at the outset; but they are worn away by the 
constant erosion of his private interests. Britain 
must not cross Germany: — that is his creed in a 
nutshell. This is the semi-conscious type of agent; 
and he carries great weight in business circles, and 
even sometimes in circles much higher than those 
frequented by the money-changers. 

We may resent such influences as these, now that 
we have become more or less sensible of the effect 
which they have had during recent years in hinder- 
ing our preparations for defence; but here we can- 
not fairly charge Germany with any breach of 
custom and tradition. We must blame ourselves 
for having given heed to these counsellors. But it 
is different when we come to such things as the 
wholesale corruption of the subjects of friendly 
nations — a network of careful intrigue for the pro- 
motion of rebellion — lavish subsidies and incite- 
ments for the purpose of fostering Indian unrest, 
Egyptian discontent, and South African treason — 
the supply of weapons and munitions of war on the 
shortest notice, and most favourable terms, to any 



GERMAN METHODS AT WORK 143 

one and every one who seems inclined to engage in PabtII. 
civil war in Ireland or elsewhere. Chapter 

The whole of this procedure has been justified v - 
in advance and advocated in detail by Bernhardi The state- 
and the priesthood. Belgium, France, Russia, and pSestLi. 
Britain are doubtless peculiarly alive to the iniquity 
of these practices, for the reason that their moral 
judgment has been sharpened by personal suffering. 
But they do not denounce the system solely because 
they themselves have been injured by it, but also 
because it seems to them to be totally at variance 
with all recent notions regarding the comity of 
nations. If we may use such an old-fashioned term, 
it appears to us to be wrong. 

If methods such as these are henceforth to be 
practised by the world in general, must not all inter- 
national communion become impossible, as much in 
time of peace as during a war? Indeed must not 
human existence itself become almost intolerable? 
Friendliness, hospitality, courtesies of every sort, 
between men and women of one country and those 
of another, must cease absolutely, if the world 
should become a convert to these German doctrines. 
Travel must cease; for no one likes to be stripped 
naked and searched at every frontier. Trade and 
financial operations must also be restricted, one 
would imagine, to such an extent that ultimately 
they will wither and die. 

And if the world in general after the war is ended 
does not become a convert to these German doctrines 
of treacherous preparation, made in friendly terri- 
tories during time of peace, what then will be 
its attitude towards Germany and the Germans ; for 
they presumably have no intention of abandoning 



144 THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY 



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Chapter 

V. 

The state- 
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priesthood. 



these practices? It is an unpleasant problem, but 
it will have to be faced sooner or later. 

For obviously, although every sensible man be- 
lieves, and many of us know by actual experience, 
that the instincts of Germans, in all private rela- 
tions, are as loyal and honourable as those of most 
other races which inhabit the earth, no nation can 
afford any longer to have dealings with them on 
equal terms, if they have decided to allow their 
instincts to be used and abused, over-ridden and 
perverted, by a bureaucracy whose ideal is thorough- 
ness, and by a priesthood which has invented a new 
system of morals to serve a particular set of ends. 
Not only the allied nations which are at present at 
war with Germany, but any country whose interests 
may conceivably, at any future time, come into con- 
flict with those of that far-sighted empire, will be 
forced in self-defence to take due precautions. It 
is clear enough that more efficacious means than 
mere scraps of naturalisation paper will be needed 
to secure mankind against the abuse of its hospitality 
by Teutonic theorists. 

The whole of this strange system, those methods 
which, even after somewhat painful experience of 
their effects, we are still inclined in our less re- 
flective moments to regard as utterly incredible — 
is it possible to summarise them in a few sentences ? 
What are the accepted maxims, the orthodox 
formulas of Prussian statecraft? 

Power, more power, world-power; these accord- 
ing to German theory, as well as practice, should 
be the dominant principles of the state. 

"When a nation desires territories belonging to its 
neighbours, let it take them, if it is strong enough. 



THE GERMAN CREED 145 

No further justification is needed than mere appetite PabtII. 
for possession, and the strength to satisfy it. Chapter 

War is in itself a good thing and not a bad. Like v - 
a purge, or a course of the waters of Aix, it should be The state- 
taken, every half -century or so, by all nations which priesthood 
aim at preserving the vigour of their constitutions. 

During the intervening periods the chief duty of 
the state is to prepare for war, so that when it 
comes, victory, and with it benefits of the material, 
as well as of the spiritual sort, may be secured. 

No means which will help to secure victory are 
immoral, whether in the years preceding the out- 
break of hostilities, or afterwards, when the war is 
in full course. If the state, aided by its men of 
science, could find any safe and secret means of 
sending a plague, as an advance guard, to ravage 
the enemy, where is the objection 1 ? The soul of a 
Prussian soldier might revolt against this form of 
warfare, but at what point would it conflict with 
the teachings of the priesthood? Nor can we imag- 
ine, were the thing possible, that the bureaucracy 
would allow itself to be hampered by any scruples. 

As to the declaration of war, let it be made when 
the state is in a strong position and its prey in a 
weak one. This is the all-important consideration. 
The actual pretext is only a secondary matter, 
though worthy of attention for the effect it may have 
on the action of neutrals. And as war is a game 
of chance, it is wise and right to 'correct fortune,' 
so far as this can be accomplished during years of 
peace and under the cloak of amity, by the aid of 
spies, secret agents, accomplices, traitors, rebels, 
and what not besides. 

The state which has evolved this system and laid 



146 THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY 



Pakt II. 

Chapter 

V. 

The state- 
craft of a 
priesthood. 



down these rules, withoutthe least attempt at secrecy 
or concealment, is the most efficient machine of the 
fighting and administrative kind at present existing 
in the world — perhaps which has ever existed in the 
world. But as you increase the size, power, and 
complexity of a machine there are obvious dangers 
unless you can also increase the calibre of the men 
who have to drive and direct it. This is a much 
more difficult problem than the other ; and there is no 
evidence to show that it has been solved in the case 
of Germany. The more powerful the machine, the 
greater is apt to be the disaster if it is mishandled. 

In history the blunders of bureaucracy are a by- 
word. They have been great and many, even when, 
as in Germany to-day, the bureaucracy is in the full 
vigour of its age, and in the first flower of upright- 
ness; for a bureaucracy, in order to retain its 
efficiency, must remain incorruptible, and that is 
one of the hardest things to secure. 

As for the priesthoods, if they are to be of any 
use, their faith must burn brightly. And the faith 
of a priesthood is very apt to burn itself out — very 
apt also to set fire to other things during the process ; 
even to the edifice of popular virtue and the imperial 
purple itself, which things — unlike the Phoenix, the 
Salamander, and the Saint — are none the better or 
stronger for being burned. 



We are constantly being told by high authorities 
that the moral objective of the present war is 'to 
put down militarism, ' and ' abolish it' off the face 
of the earth. There are few of us who do not wish 
that this aim may be crowned with success; but 
militarism is a tough weed to kill, and something 



MAIN OBJECT OF THE WAR 147 

more than the mere mowing of it down by some paetii. 
outside scythesman will be necessary, one imagines, Chapter 
in order to get rid of it. v * 

The true moral objective of the war is something The state- 
much more important than this. A blacker evil than priesthood. 
militarism is that violation of private trust and 
public honour which is known as the Prussian 
System, and which has recently been 'marching 
through rapine, to the disintegration, ' not of a single 
nation, or group of nations, but of the whole fabric 
of human society, including its own. It is an elab- 
orate contrivance of extreme artificiality, a strange 
perversion of the nature of man. These are its 
inherent weaknesses ; and fortunately, by reason of 
them, it is more vulnerable to hard blows than mili- 
tarism which, with all its vices, and extravagancies, 
is rooted in instincts which are neither depraved 
nor ignoble. 

Militarism might continue to thrive under adver- 
sity, and after the heaviest defeat, as it has done in 
times past; but the life of the Prussian System — 
that joint invention of the most efficient bureaucracy 
in the world, and of a priesthood whose industry 
can only be matched by its sycophancy and conceit 
— hangs upon the thread of success. Like the South 
Sea Bubble, or any of those other impostures of 
the financial sort, which have temporarily beguiled 
the confidence of mankind, it must collapse utterly 
under the shock of failure. It depends entirely 
on credit, and its powers of recuperation are nil. 
When its assets are disclosed, the characters of its 
promoters will be understood. The need, therefore, 
is to bring it at all costs to a complete demonstration 
of failure. 



148 THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY 



Part IE. 

Chapter 
V. 

The state- 
craft of a 

priesthood. 



We have been urged by our own anti-militarists 
not to inflict suffering and humiliation on Germany. 
But this is not a matter of the slightest importance 
one way or the other. It has but little to do with 
the issue which it is our business to settle, if we 
have the good fortune to come out victorious from 
the present struggle. To set up the suffering and 
humiliation of Germany as the object of high policy 
would cover the Allies with contempt ; but to shrink 
from such things, if they should happen to stand be- 
tween the Allies and the utter moral bankruptcy of 
the Prussian System, would overwhelm them with a 
burden far heavier and more shameful than con- 
tempt. 

Note. — Since publication a friend has passed the just criticism upon 
pages 135 to 137, that their terms would include all the great statesmen 
of the Roman Church — Lanfrane, Ximenes, Wolsey, Eichelieu, etc., etc. 
This of course was not the writer 's intention ; but it is impossible in a 
footnote to do more than admit the error. There is an essential dis- 
tinction between the Priest as Statesman, clothed with power and 
responsibility, and Priestly Influence in statecraft — influence without 
responsibility. 



CHAPTER VI 

THE DEVIL'S ADVOCATE 

A German might fairly contend that British criti- PartII. 
cism of his moral ideas and political system is tainted Chapter 
throughout by ignorance and prejudice, and that all V1, 
our talk of autocracy, bureaucracy, pedantocracy, The devil's 
military caste, and sham constitutionalism is merely 
an attempt to avoid the real issue by calling things, 
which we happen to dislike, by bad names. Political 
institutions, he might insist, must be judged by their 
fruits. 

"We Germans," writes a correspondent, the 
Freiherr von Hexenkuchen, 1 ' ' are not inferior in in- 
telligence or education to any other race. Had 
'this been so, we could never have reached, in so 
'short a period as four decades, the proud position 
'which we now occupy in science, invention, manu- 
'facture, commerce, finance, and administration. 2 
'Consequently, if we are well content to live under 
'the institutions we possess, this cannot be put down 
'either to our want of enterprise or to the dulness 
'of our understandings. 

1 This letter, which is dated April 1, 1915, arrived at its destination 
(via Christiania and Bergen) about ten days later. 

2 The empires which during the past forty years have made the 
greatest relative material progress are undoubtedly Germany and Japan 
— neither of them a democracy, but both military states. 

149 



150 THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY 



Part II. 

Chapter 
VI. 

The devil's 
advocate. 



"Our people have already shown that they are 
'willing to fight and die for these very institutions 
'which you Englishmen affect to regard with so much 
1 contempt. Possibly your people are equally willing 
'to fight and die for theirs. I do not deny this; 
'but it is not yet proved; it remains to be proved. 

"I do not assert that your people are inferior to 
'mine in their readiness to fight and die when they 
'are actually faced with a great national danger. 
'But I do claim that mine are superior to yours in 
'the constancy of their devotion to duty. For a 
'hundred years past — not only in periods of stress 
'and danger, which stirred the national imagination, 
'but equally in times of peace and prosperity, which 
' always tend to encourage the growth of comfort and 
'the love of ease — each succeeding generation has 
'been found willing to train itself in the use of arms, 
'so as to be prepared, if occasion should arise, to 
'defend the Fatherland. 

"When the present war broke out was there a 
'firmer loyalty or a more patriotic response to the 
'call to arms among your people or among mine? 
'Will your people fight and suffer more gladly for 
'their 'democratic' ideals than mine will for their 
'Kaiser and Fatherland? . . . Surely, upon your 
'own principles no comparison should be possible 
'between the warmth of your devotion and the 
'tepidity of ours. 

' ' Is our system really so reactionary and mechani- 
'cal as you imagine? In an age which has learned 
'as its special lesson the advantages, in ordinary 
'business affairs of life, of organisation, thorough- 
'ness, long views, reticence, and combined effort, 
'guided by a strong central control, is it reaction, or 



THE GERMAN BUREAUCRACY 151 



'is it progress, to aim at applying the same princi- 
ples to the greatest, most complex, and infinitely 
'most important of all businesses — that of govern- 
'ment itself? Can a nation hope to survive which re- 
' fuses, in the name of freedom, to submit to control 
'in these respects, if it should be faced by competi- 
'tion with another, which has been wise enough to 
'employ quiet experts instead of loquacious ama- 
'teurs — any more than a cotton mill could escape 
'bankruptcy were it managed on a system of party 
'government? 

"Our civil service, which you are pleased to de- 
' scribe as a Bureaucracy, is distinguished among all 
'others existing at the present time, by the calibre 
' of its members, by its efficiency and honesty, by its 
'poverty, and not less by the honour in which it is 
'held notwithstanding its poverty. You laugh at 
'our love for calling men, and also their wives, by 
'the titles of their various offices — Herr this and 
'Frau that, from the humblest inspector of drains to 
'the Imperial Chancellor himself! And no doubt 
'there is a ludicrous side to this practice. But it 
'marks at least one important thing — that member- 
'ship of our civil service is regarded as conferring 
'honour. So far, we have succeeded in maintaining 
'public officials of all grades in higher popular re- 
' spect than men who devote their lives to building up 
'private fortunes, and also to those others who de- 
' light and excel in interminable debate. 

"You are used to boast, and I daresay rightly, of 
'the personal honesty and pecuniary disinterested- 
'ness of your politicians; and you assume as a mat- 
' ter of course that your civil servants, with such high 
' standards and examples ever before their eyes, are 



Part II. 

Chapter 
VI. 

The devil's 
advocate. 



152 THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY 



Part II. 

Chapter 

VI. 

The devil's 
advocate. 



likewise incorruptible. We invert this order. With 
us the honour of our civil servants is the chief thing ; 
we assume that our politicians must follow suit. 
They are probably as upright as your own, thanks 
partly to tradition, but also to the vigilance of their 
superiors, the professionals, who carry on the ac- 
tual business of government. With you the fame of 
the showy amateur fills the mouths of the public. 
We, on the contrary, exalt the expert, the man who 
has been trained to the job he undertakes. In so 
doing we may be reactionaries and you may be pro- 
gressives ; but the progress of Germany since 1870 
— a progress in which we are everywhere either al- 
ready in front of you, or else treading closely on 
your heels — does not seem to furnish you with a 
conclusive argument. 

"As for what you call our Pedantocracy, meaning 
thereby our professors and men of letters, it is true 
that these exercise a great influence upon public 
opinion. We have always respected learning and 
thought. It is in the German nature so to do. I 
admit that our learned ones are rather too much 
inclined to imagine, that because they are students 
of theory, they are therefore qualified to engage in 
practice. They are apt to offer their advice and 
services officiously, and occasionally in a ridiculous 
manner. But, if my recollection of the English 
newspapers be correct, this is no more so with us 
than with you. There is apparently something 
in the professional nature which impels men of this 
calling to the drafting of manifestoes and the sign- 
ing of round-robins in times of excitement. They 
may be officious and absurd, but they are not wholly 
despicable, since they act thus quite as much from 



THE MILITAEY CASTE 153 

'earnestness as from vanity. If our academicians PabtII. 

'on such occasions mislead more people than your Chapter 
'own it is due to their virtues, to the greater zeal VL 

'and success with which they have won the conn- The devii-a 

advocate. 

' dence of their former pupils. 

"You are fond of sneering at our Military Caste 
'and attribute to it the most malign influence upon 
'public affairs. But there again, believe me, you 
'exaggerate. Our officers are undoubtedly held in 
'great respect, even in some awe. And the reason 
'is that they are known to be brave, and like those 
'you call the bureaucracy, to have preferred com- 
'parative poverty in the public service to tne pursuit 
'of riches. To say that they have no influence upon 
'policy would of course be absurd. It is inevitable 
' that, in the present state of the world, soldiers will 
' always have great influence in certain departments 
'of public affairs. This must be so in any country 
'which is not plunged in dreams. For it is their 
'business to guarantee national security, and to keep 
'watch over the growth of military strength among 
'the neighbours and rivals of Germany. If the 

1 It is not quite clear to what incidents the Freiherr is referring. He 
may be thinking of a certain round-robin which appeared a few days 
before the war, giving a most handsome academic testimonial of human- 
ity and probity to the German system ; or he may have in mind a later 
manifestation in February last, when there suddenly flighted into the 
correspondence columns of the Nation a 'gaggle' of university geese, 
headed appropriately enough by a Professor of Political Economy, by 
name Pigou, who may be taken as the type of that peculiarly British 
product, the unemotional sentimentalist. To this ' gaggle ' of the heavier 
fowls there succeeded in due course a 'glory' of poetical and literary 
finches, twittering the same tune — the obligation on the Allies not to 
inflict suffering and humiliation on Germany — on Germany, be it remem- 
bered, as yet unbeaten, though this was rather slurred over in their 
spring-song of lovingkindness. The Freiherr, plunged in his heathen 
darkness, no doubt still believed Germany to be not only unbeaten but 
victorious, and likely to continue on the same course. He must therefore 
have been somewhat puzzled by so much tender concern on the part of 
our professors, etc. for sparing his feelings at the end of the war. 



154 THE SPIEIT OF GERMAN POLICY 



Part II. 

Chapter 

VI. 

The devil's 
advocate. 



'general staff foresees dangers, and can give reason- 
'able grounds for its anticipations, it is clear that 
'the military view must carry weight with the Kaiser 
'and his ministers. And surely there can be no 
'question that this is right. 

"The officers of the German Army are a caste, 
'if you like to put it that way. But in every form 
'of government under the sun, unless conceivably 
'in some tiny oriental despotism, the predominance 
'of a certain caste, or the competition between dif- 
ferent castes, is absolutely essential to the working 
'of the machinery. 

"It is not regrettable in our opinion if a caste, 
'which has considerable weight in public affairs, is 
'a manly one, contemptuous of wealth and sophistry, 
' ready always to risk its own life for the faith which 
'is in it. The influence of a military caste may have 
'its drawbacks; but at any rate it has kept the 
'peace in Germany for not far short of half a century 
1 — kept it successfully until, as some people have 
'thought, the professors acquired too large a share 
'of power. 

"Is it so certain, moreover, that the lawyer 
'caste, the self-advertising caste, and the financial 
'caste are not all of them a great deal worse, even a 
'great deal more dangerous to peace? Is a country 
'any more likely to be safe, happy, and prosperous 
'under the regime of a Talking Caste — of windbags 
'resourcefully keeping their bellows full of air, and 
'wheedling the most numerous with transparent 
' falsehoods — than where civil servants of tried wis- 
'dom and experience are responsible for carrying 
'on affairs of state, aided at their high task by sober 
'military opinion? 



GERMAN SELF-KNOWLEDGE 155 

"As for our Kaiser, whom you regard as a crafty PaetII. 
and ambitious tyrant, he appears in our view as Chapter 
the incarnation of patriotic duty, burdened though VL 
not overwhelmed by care — a lover of peace, so long The devil's 
as peace may be had with honour and safety; but 
if this may not be, then a stern, though reluctant, 
drawer of the sword. It is true that the Kaiser's 
government is in many important respects a purely 
personal government. His is the ultimate responsi- 
bility for high policy. He fulfils the function in 
our system of that strong central power, without 
which the most ingeniously constructed organisa- 
tion is but impotence. 

"The German people are ahead of the English 
and the Americans in self-knowledge; for they 
realise that there are many things appertaining 
to government, which cannot be discussed in the 
newspapers, or on the platform, any more than the 
policy and conduct of a great business can be made 
known in advance to the staff, and to trade com- 
petitors all over the world. And so, believing the 
Kaiser's government to be honest, capable, and de- 
voted to the public weal, the German people trust 
it without reservation to decide when action shall 
be taken in a variety of spheres. 

"For the safety and well-being of a nation it is 
just as necessary that the People should trust the 
Government, as that the Government should trust 
the People. And is it not perhaps here that we 
have the most marked advantage over yourselves? 

"Our people have undertaken the full burden of 
citizenship as it is understood among all European 
nations except the English. They have trained 
themselves to defend their Fatherland. Having 



156 THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY 



Part II. 

Chapter 

VI. 

The devil's 
advocate. 



done this they know — and believe me they are happy 
in the knowledge — that they will be cared for by the 
State in sickness, old age, and misfortune. 

' ' Our Bureaucracy, as you call it, has to its credit 
not only the most efficient war-machine the world 
has ever seen, but an industrial development with- 
out parallel in the annals of any nation or group of 
nations. And it has achieved even more than this. 
Our time-expired soldiers, and citizens no longer 
liable for military service, have no fear of destitu- 
tion in their declining years. We have no army of 
idlers in the upper class, or of incompetents and de- 
generates in the lower social strata. We do not leave 
behind us in the wake of our industrial progress a 
vast human wreckage. Can your democratic insti- 
tutions show a record as clean as this f 

' ' This system of ours which is founded in reason, 
and in experience of modern conditions, and which 
is upheld by the unfaltering confidence of a great 
people, you are wont to condemn as tyrannical and 
reactionary. But can democracy stand against it? 
— Democracy infirm of purpose, jealous, grudging, 
timid, changeable, unthorough, unready, without 
foresight, obscure in its aims, blundering along in 
an age of lucidity guided only by a faltering and 
confused instinct! Given anything like an equal' 
contest, is it conceivable that such an undisci- 
plined chaos can prevail against the Hohenzollern 
Empire ? 

"Of late your newspapers have been busily com- 
plaining of what they call 'German lies,' 'boast- 
fulness,' and 'vulgar abuse/ They have taunted 
our government with not daring to trust the people. 
Our Headquarters bulletins have been vigorously 



TRUST IN THE PEOPLE 157 

' taken to task by the Allies on these and other PaetII. 

'grounds. Chapter 

* 'But all nations will acclaim their victories louder VI - 
'than they will trumpet their defeats. This is in The devirs 
'human nature. No official communique will ever 
'be a perfect mirror of truth. It will never give the 
'whole picture, but only a part; and by giving only 
'a part it will often mislead. 

"I read your newspapers, and I read our own. 
'I do not think our journalists, though they do their 
'best, can fairly claim to excel yours in the contest 
'of boastfulness and vulgar abuse. And as regards 
'the utterances of responsible public men in our 
'two countries, can you really contend that we 
'Germans are more open to the reproach of vain- 
' glorious and undignified speech than the British? 
' Our Kaiser denies having used the words, so often 
'attributed to him in your press, about 'General 
' French 's contemptible little army, ' and in Germany 
'we believe his denial. But even if he did in fact 
'utter this expression, is it not quite as seemly and 
'restrained as references to 'digging rats out of a 
'hole' — as applied to our gallant navy — or to that 
'later announcement from the same quarter which 
'was recently addressed to the Mayor of Scarbor- 
ough about 'baby-killers'? Such expressions are re- 
'grettable, no doubt, but not of the first importance. 
' They are a matter of temperament. An ill-balanced, 
' or even a very highly-strung nature, will be betrayed 
'into blunders of this sort more readily than the 
'phlegmatic person, or than one whose upbringing 
'has been in circles where self-control is the rule 
' of manners. 

"But what puzzles us Germans perhaps more than 



158 THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY 



Part II. 

Chapter 

VI. 

The devil's 
advocate. 



any of your other charges against us is, when you 
say that our rulers do not trust the people as the 
British Government does. 

' ' You accuse our War Office of publishing accounts 
of imaginary victories to revive our drooping con- 
fidence, and of concealing actual disasters lest our 
country should fall into a panic of despondency. 
There was surely nothing imaginary about the fall 
of Liege, Namur, Maubeuge, Laon, or La Fere. 
The engagements before Metz, at Mons, Charleroi, 
and Amiens, the battles of Lodz and Lyck, were 
not inconsiderable successes for German arms, 
or at the very least for German generalship. 
The victory of Tannenberg was among the greatest 
in history, reckoning in numbers alone. Our 
government made no secret of the German retire- 
ment — retreat if you prefer the term — from the 
Marne to the Aisne, or of that other falling back 
after the first attempt on Warsaw. Naturally they 
laid less emphasis on reverses than on conquests, 
but what government has ever acted otherwise? 
Certainly not the French, or the Russian, or your 
own. And what actual disasters have we concealed? 
In what respect, as regards the conduct of this war, 
have we, the German people, been trusted less than 
yours ? 

"I am especially interested, I confess, as a student 
of British politics, in this matter of ' trusting the 
people.' All your great writers have led me to be- 
lieve that here lies the essential difference between 
your system and ours, and that the great superiority 
of yours to ours is demonstrated in the confidence 
which your statesmen never hesitate to place in 
the wisdom, fortitude, and patriotism of the people. 



advocate. 



THE BRITISH PEESS BUREAU 159 

Frankly, I do not understand it. Trust must surely part ii. 
have some esoteric meaning when applied to your Chapter 
populace which foreigners are unable to apprehend. VL 
I can discover no other sense in your phrase about The devn-s 
'trusting the people,' than that they are trusted 
not to find out their politicians. It certainly 
cannot be believed that you trust your people to 
hear the truth ; for if so why has your government 
practised so rigorous an economy of this virtue, 
doling it out very much as we have lately been doing 
with our wheat and potatoes? 

"Has your government not concealed actual dis- 
aster — concealed it from their own people, though 
from no one else ; for all the world was on the broad 
grin? Everybody knew of your misfortune save 
a certain large portion of the British public. The 
motive of your government could not have been 
to hide it away from the Germans, or the Austrians, 
or from neutrals ; for the illustrated papers all over 
the globe, even in your own colonies, contained 
pictures reproduced from photographs of the occur- 
rence. It was only possible to muzzle the press and 
blindfold the people of the United Kingdom, and 
these things your government did ;, acting no doubt 
very wisely. 

"Why did your Press Bureau, during the heavy 
fighting from the middle of October to the middle of 
November, persist in maintaining that 'the British 
are still gaining ground.' The British resistance 
from the beginning to the end of the four weeks ' bat- 
tle round Ypres is not likely to be forgotten by our 
German soldiers, still less to be belittled by them. 
It was surely a great enough feat of arms to bear the 
light of truth. But is the same true of the British 



160 THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY 



Part II. 

Chapter 

VI. 

The devil's 
advocate. 



people? Can they be trusted to bear the light of 
truth? 

"You cannot wonder if we Germans, and for that 
matter the whole world, have drawn certain con- 
clusions from these and other incidents. We do 
not doubt that your ministers have acted wisely 
in suppressing bad tidings; but why should they 
have taken all those pains and endured the derision, 
while incurring the distrust, of foreign countries — 
a material injury, mind you, and not merely a 
sentimental one — unless they had known, only too 
well, that publication of this or that piece of news 
would have too painfully affected the nerves of your 
people? Concealment of checks, reverses, and dis- 
asters which had not already become known to 
the Austrians and ourselves might have served 
a useful military purpose; but what purpose 
except that of a sedative for British public 
opinion could be served by the concealment of 
such matters when we, your enemies, knew them 
already? 

"Shortly before Christmas one of your legal min- 
isters, who, I understand, is specially responsible 
for looking after the Press Bureau, explained to the 
House of Commons the principles by which he had 
been guided in the suppression of news and com- 
ment. He should refuse, he said, to publish any criti- 
cism which might tend to disturb popular confidence 
in the Government, or which might cause the peo- 
ple of England to think that their affairs were in 
a really serious state. On practical grounds there 
is no doubt something to be said for such a pol- 
icy; but (will you tell me?) has any autocratic 
government ever laid down a more drastic rule 



advocate. 



BRITISH PATRIOTISM 161 

for blindfolding the people in order to preserve its PartII. 

own existence? 1 Chapter 

"Your Prime Minister, speaking in the early ^_ 
autumn, thus adjured the men of Wales: — 'Be ^J^j 1 ' 8 
'worthy of those who went before you, and leave to 
'your children the richest of all inheritances, the 
'memory of fathers who, in a great cause, put self- 
' sacrifice before ease, and honour above life itself.' 
These are noble words, of Periclean grandeur. 
But have they met with a general response? Are 
these sentiments prevalent outside government 
circles, among those — the bulk of your people — 
who do not come under the direct influence of minis- 
terial inspiration and example? If so, why then 
have your rulers not screwed up their courage 
to call for National Service? "Why do they still 
continue to depend for their recruits upon sensa- 
tional advertisements, newspaper puffs, oratorical 
entreaties, and private influence of a singularly 
irregular sort? 

"Is not this the reason? — Your government is 
afraid — even in this great struggle, where (as they 
put it) your future existence as a nation is at stake 
— that the English people — or at any rate so large 
a proportion of them, as if rendered uncomfortable 
could create a political disturbance — is not even 

1 The basis of this extraordinary charge seems to be the following 
passage from a speech by Sir Stanley Buckmaster, the Solicitor-General 
and Chairman of the Press Bureau on November 12, 1914. It is dis- 
tressing to see how far national prejudice is apt to mislead a hostile 
critic like the Freiherr von Hexenkiichen: "Criticism of the Govern- 
1 ment, or of members of the Government, is not that which I have ever 
' stopped, except when such criticism is of such a character that it might 
' destroy public confidence in the Government, which at this moment is 
' charged with the conduct of the war, or might in any way weaken the 
' confidence of the people in the administration of affairs, or otherwise 
' cause distress or disturbance amongst people in thinking their affairs 
' were in a really serious state. ' ' 



162 THE SPIRIT OF GEEMAN POLICY 



Part II. 

Chapter 
VI. 

The devil's 
advocate. 



yet prepared to make the necessary sacrifices. 
And so, to the amazement of ns Germans, you 
let the older men, with families dependent on 
them, go forth to the war, urged on by a high 
sense of duty, while hundreds of thousands of 
young unmarried men are still allowed to stay at 
home. 

"You are still, it would appear, enamoured of your 
voluntary system. You have not yet abandoned 
your belief that it is the duty of the man, who pos- 
sesses a sense of duty, to protect the skin, family, 
and property of the man who does not. To us 
this seems a topsy-turvy creed, and not more 
topsy-turvy than contemptible. In Germany and 
France — where for generations past the doctrine of 
private sacrifice for the public weal is ingrained, 
and has been approved in principle and applied in 
practice with unfaltering devotion — a ' voluntary' 
system might conceivably have some chance of pro- 
viding such an army as you are in search of. But 
to the United Kingdom surely it is singularly in- 
applicable? Let me illustrate my meaning by a 
comparison. 

"Our Kaiser in his New Year's message — which 
in Germany we all read with enthusiasm, and con- 
sidered very noble and appropriate — summed up the 
military situation by saying that after five months ' 
hard and hot fighting the war was still being 
waged almost everywhere off German soil, and on 
the enemies' territories. And he summed up the 
domestic situation by saying (and this, believe me, 
is true) that our nation stands in unexampled 
harmony, prepared to sacrifice its heart's blood for 
the defence of the Fatherland. Another three 



COMPARISON OF RECRUITING 163 

months have passed away, and these statements PartII. 

Still hold good. Chapter 

"The point to which I chiefly wish to call your VI - 
attention is one of numbers, and I will take my The devira 

■ • i a t n j_ p advocate. 

estimates of numbers irom your own most famous 
newspaper experts. 

"Your claim, as I understand it, is that on New 
Year's Day 1915 you had — exclusive of Indian 
troops and Dominion contingents — between 2,000,- 
000 and 2,500,000 men training and in the field. 

"Germany alone (here again I quote your English 
experts), without reckoning Austria, has actually 
put into the field during the past five months 
5,000,000 men. Of these it is stated by your news- 
papers that she has lost in round figures 1,500,000, 
who have either been killed, or taken prisoners, 
or are too severely wounded to return as yet to 
the fighting line. But in spite of this depletion, 
your military statisticians tell us that Germany 
and her ally, at New Year's Day, still outnumbered 
the Allies on both the Eastern and the Western 
frontier. 

"The same high authorities tell us further, that 
during this period of five months, the German Gov- 
ernment has called upon the civil population, has 
appealed to able-bodied men who had previously 
been exempt from military service, and that by 
this means it has obtained, and has been engaged in 
training, arming, and equipping another 4,000,000 
or 4,500,000 who, it is anticipated, will become 
available for war purposes in new formations, dur- 
ing the spring and summer of the present year. 

"Our Government, therefore, according to your 
'own account, has not been afraid to ask the civil 



164 THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY 



Part II. 

Chapter 

VI. 

The devil's 
advocate. 



' population to serve, and this is the response. Does 
'it look as if the national spirit had been quenched 
'under our autocratic system? 

' ' Out of our whole population of sixty-five millions 
'we have apparently raised for military service on 
' land and naval service at sea, between 9,000,000 and 
'11,000,000 men since this war began. Out of your 
'whole population of forty-five millions you have 
'succeeded in raising for these same purposes only 
'something between 2,000,000 and 2,500,000 men. 
'And in your case, be it observed, in order to attract 
'recruits, you have offered good wages and munifi- 
'cent separation allowances, while in our case men 
' serve without pay. 

"This numerical comparison is worth carrying a 
' stage further. Germany and her ally have between 
'them a total population of 115,000,000. The United 
'Kingdom (including the people of European stock 
'who inhabit the various Dominions), France, Rus- 
'sia, Belgium, Servia, and Montenegro number in 
'round figures about 280,000,000. Roughly speaking, 
'these are odds of seven to three against us. And I 
'am leaving out of account all the non-European 
' races — the Turks on the one side, the Japanese and 
'the Indians on the other. If these were included 
' the odds would be much heavier. 

"And yet our Kaiser spoke but the simple 
'truth, when he told us on New Year's Day that, 
'after five months of war, the German armies were 
'almost everywhere on the territories of their en- 
' emies. We are not only keeping you back and defy- 
' ing all your efforts to invade us ; but like the infant 
' Hercules, we have gripped you by your throats, and 
'are holding you out at arm's length! 



METHODS OF EECRUITING 165 

"I do not of course pretend to look at this matter PartII. 
except from the German standpoint; but is there Chapter 
any flaw in my reasoning, is there anything at all VI - 
unfair, if I thus sum up my conclusions ? — By Mid- The devirs 
summer next — after stupendous efforts of the ora- 
torical and journalistic kind — after an enormous 
amount of shouting, music-hall singing, cinema 
films, and showy advertising of every description — 
after making great play with the name and features 
of a popular field-marshal, in a manner which must 
have shocked both his natural modesty and soldierly 
pride — after all this you expect, or say you expect, 
that you will possess between two and two-and-a- 
half millions of men trained, armed, equipped and 
ready to take the field. 

"As against this, during the same period, and 
out of the less military half of our male population, 
without any shouting or advertising to speak of, 
we shall have provided approximately double that 
number. We have raised these new forces quietly, 
without any fuss, and without a word of protest 
from any of our people. We are training them 
without any serious difficulty. We are arming them, 
equipping them, clothing them, and housing them 
without any difficulty at all. 

' ' To conclude this interesting contrast, may I ask 
you — is it true, as the French newspapers allege, 
that you are about to invite, or have already invited, 
your Japanese Allies to send some portion of their 
Army to European battlefields? With what face 
can you make this appeal when you have not yet 
called upon your own people to do, what every other 
people engaged in the present struggle, has already 
done? 



166 THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY 



Part II. 

Chapter 
VI. 

The devil's 
advocate. 



"After you have pondered upon this strange and 
' startling contrast, will you still hold to the opinion 
'that the German system — which you have affected 
' to despise, on the ground that it does not rest upon 
'what you are pleased to term 'a popular basis' — is 
'at any point inferior to your own in its hold upon 
'the hearts of the people? 

"What is meant by the phrase — 'a popular 
'basis'? Is it something different from the support 
'of the people, the will of the people, the devotion 
'of the people? And if it is different, is it better — 
'judging, that is, by its results in times of trouble — 
'or is it worse?" 

So the cultured Freiherr, watching democracy a€ 
work in Britain, its ancient home, concludes with 
this question — "Is this timid, jealous, and distracted 
' thing possessed of any real faith in itself ; and if so, 
'will it fight for its faith to the bitter end? Is the 
'British system one which even the utmost faith in it 
'can succeed in propping up? Does it possess any 
' inherent strength ; or is it merely a thing of paste- 
' board and make-believe, fore-ordained to perish?" 



and ideas. 



CHAPTER VII 

THE CONFLICT OF SYSTEMS AND IDEAS 

The Freiherr's discourse raises a large number of PartII. 

questions, some of them unarguable. Others again Chapter 

are too much so ; for if once started upon, argument 1 

with regard to them need never end. Some of his T!"; ? 1 " 

° ... fiict °* 

contentions have already been dealt with in previous systems 

chapters; some on the other hand, such as the 

British methods of recruiting, will be considered 

later on. It must, however, be admitted that his 

taunts and criticisms do not all rebound with blunted 

points from our shield of self-complacency ; some, if 

only a few, get home and rankle. 

We are challenged to contrast our faith in our 
own political institutions with that of the Germans 
in theirs; also to measure the intrinsic strength of 
that form of political organisation called ' democracy* 
against that other form whichis known as ' autocracy. ' 

The German state is the most highly developed 
and efficient type of personal monarchy at present 
known to the world. Its triumphs in certain 
directions have been apparent from the beginning. 
It would be sheer waste of time to dispute the fact 
that Germany was incomparably better prepared, 
organised, and educated for this war — the purpose 
of which was the spoliation of her neighbours— 

167 



168 THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICE 



Part II. 

Chapter 

VII. 

The con- 
flict of 
systems 
and ideas. 



than any of her neighbours were for offering resist- 
ance. 

But what the Freiherr does not touch upon at all 
is the conflict between certain underlying ideas of 
right and wrong — old ideas, which are held by Rus- 
sia, France, and ourselves, and which now find them- 
selves confronted by new and strange ideas which 
have been exceedingly prevalent among the govern- 
ing classes in Germany for many years past. He does 
not raise this issue, any more than his fellow-coun- 
trymen now raise it either in America or at home. It 
is true that there was a flamboyant outburst from a 
few faithful Treitschkians and Nietzschians, both in 
prose and poetry, during those weeks of August and 
September which teemed with German successes; 
but their voices soon sank below audibility — possibly 
by order verboten — in a swiftly dying fall. We, 
however, cannot agree to let this aspect of the matter 
drop, merely because patriotic Germans happen to 
have concluded that the present time is inopportune 
for the discussion of it. 

There are two clear and separate issues. From 
the point of view of posterity the more important 
of these, perhaps, may prove to be this conflict in 
the region of moral ideas. From the point of view 
of the present generation, however, the chief matter 
of practical interest is the result of a struggle for the 
preservation of our own institutions, against the 
aggression of a race which has not yet learned the 
last and hardest lesson of civilisation — how to live 
and let live. 

The present war may result in the bankruptcy 
of the Habsburg and Hohenzollern dynasties. It 
is very desirable, however, to make clear the fact 



DEMOCBACY 169 

that the alternative is the bankruptcy of 'demo- PartII. 
cracy. ' Our institutions are now being subjected to Chapter 
a severer strain than they have ever yet experienced. VII ° 
Popular government is standing its trial. It will be The con- 
judged by the result ; and no one can say that this is g^tema 
an unfair test to apply to human institutions. and ideas - 

No nation, unless it be utterly mad, will retain 
a form of government which from some inherent 
defect is unable to protect itself against external 
attack. Is democratic government capable of looking 
ahead, making adequate and timely preparation, call- 
ing for and obtaining from its people the sacrifices 
which are necessary in order to preserve their own 
existence 1 ? Can it recover ground which has been 
lost, and maintain a long, costly, and arduous strug- 
gle, until, by victory, it has placed national security 
beyond the reach of danger? 

Defeat in the present war would shake popular 
institutions to their foundations in England as well 
as France; possibly also in regions which are more 
remote than either of these. But something far 
short of defeat — anything indeed in the nature of a 
drawn game or stalemate — would assuredly bring 
the credit of democracy so low that it would be 
driven to make a composition with its creditors. 

"Words, like other currencies, have a way of chang- 
ing their values as the world grows older. Until 
comparatively recent times 'democracy' was a term 
of contempt, as 'demagogue' still is to-day. 

The founders of American Union abhorred 'De- 
mocracy, ' 1 and took every precaution which occurred 
to them in order to ward it off. Their aim was 

1 Washington, Hamilton, Madison, Jay. 



170 THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY 



Part II. 

Chapter 

VII. 

The con- 
flict of 
systems 
and ideas. 



* Popular,' or 'Representative Government' — a thing 
which they conceived to lie almost at the opposite 
pole. Their ideal was a state, the citizens of which 
chose their leaders at stated intervals, and trusted 
them. Democracy, as it appeared in their eyes, was a 
political chaos where the people chose its servants, 
and expected from them only servility. There was 
an ever-present danger, calling for stringent safe- 
guards, that the first, which they esteemed the best 
of all constitutional arrangements, would degenerate 
into the second, which they judged to be the worst. 

Until times not so very remote it was only the 
enemies of Representative Government, or its most 
cringing flatterers, who spoke of it by the title of 
Democracy. Gradually, however, in the looseness of 
popular discussions, the sharpness of the original 
distinction wore off, so that the ideal system and its 
opposite — the good and the evil — are now confound- 
ed together under one name. There is no use fighting 
against current terminology; but it is well to bear 
in mind that terminology has no power to alter facts, 
and that the difference between the two principles 
still remains as wide as it was at the beginning. 

When a people becomes so self-complacent that 
it mistakes its own ignorance for omniscience — so 
jealous of authority and impatient of contradiction 
that it refuses to invest with more than a mere shad- 
ow of power those whose business it is to govern — 
when the stock of leadership gives out, or remains 
hidden and undiscovered under a litter of showy ref- 
use — when those who succeed in pushing themselves 
to the front are chiefly concerned not to lead, but 
merely to act the parts of leaders 'in silver slippers 
and amid applause' — when the chiefs of parties are 



DANGERS OF SELF-CRITICISM 171 

so fearful of unpopularity that they will not assert partii. 
their own opinions, or utter timely warnings, or pro- Chapter 
claim what they know to be the truth — when such vn - 
things as these come to pass the nation has reached The con- 
that state which was dreaded by the framers of systems 
the American Constitution, and which — intending and ideas - 
to warn mankind against it — they branded as 
' Democracy. ' 

Self-criticism makes for health in a people; but 
it may be overdone. If it purges the national spirit 
it is good ; but if it should lead to pessimism, or to 
some impatient breach with tradition, it is one of 
the worst evils. One is conscious of a somewhat 
dangerous tendency in certain quarters at the pres- 
ent time to assume the worst with regard to the 
working of our own institutions. 

Critics of this school have pointed out (what is 
undoubtedly true) that Germany has been far ahead 
of us in her preparations. Every month since war 
began has furnished fresh evidence of the far-sight- 
edness, resourcefulness, thoroughness, and efficiency 
of all her military arrangements. Her commercial 
and financial resources have also been husbanded, 
and organised in a manner which excites our unwill- 
ing admiration. And what perhaps has been the 
rudest shock of all, is the apparent unity and devo- 
tion of the whole German people, in support of a 
war which, without exaggeration, may be said to have 
cast the shadow of death on every German home. 

These critics further insist that our own nation 
has not shown itself more loyal, and that it did not 
rouse itself to the emergency with anything approach- 
ing the same swiftness. Timidity and a wilful self- 



172 THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY 



Part II. 

Chapter 

VII. 

The con- 
flict of 
systems 
and ideas. 



deception, they say, have marked our policy for 
years before this war broke out. They marked it 
again when the crisis came upon us. Have they not 
marked it ever since war began? And who can 
have confidence that they will not continue to mark 
it until the end, whatever the end may be? 

The conclusion therefore at which our more de- 
spondent spirits have arrived, is that the representa- 
tive system has already failed us — that it has suffered 
that very degradation which liberal minds of the 
eighteenth century feared so much. How can demo- 
cracy in the bad sense — democracy which has become 
decadent — which is concerned mainly with its rights 
instead of with its duties — with its comforts more 
than with the sacrifices which are essential to its own 
preservation — how can such a system make head 
against an efficient monarchy sustained by the enthu- 
siastic devotion of a vigorous and intelligent people? 

It does not seem altogether wise to despair of 
one's own institutions at the first check. Even 
democracy, in the best sense, is not a flawless thing. 
Of all forms of government it is the most delicate, 
more dependent than any other upon the supply of 
leaders. There are times of dearth when the crop 
of leadership is a short one. Nor are popular in- 
stitutions, any more than our own vile bodies, ex- 
empt from disease. Disease, however, is not neces- 
sarily fatal. The patient may recover, and in the 
bracing air of a national crisis, such as the present, 
conditions are favourable for a cure. 

And, after all, we may remind these critics that in 
1792 democracy did in fact make head pretty success- 
fully against monarchy. Though it was miserably un- 
provided, untrained, inferior to its enemies in every- 



IRRECONCILABLE OPPOSITIONS 173 

thing save spirit and leadership, the states of Europe PartII. 
nevertheless — all but England — went down before it, Chapter 
in the years which followed, like a row of ninepins. VI1, 
Then as now, England, guarded by seas and sea- t^ con- 
power, had a breathing-space allowed her, in which to systems 
adjust the spirit of her people to the new conditions. and ideaa - 

That Germany will not conquer us with her arms 
we may well feel confident. But unless we conquer 
her with our arms — and this is a much longer step 
— there is a considerable danger that she may yet 
conquer us with her ideas. In that case the world 
will be thrown back several hundred years ; and the 
blame for this disaster, should it occur, will be laid — ■ 
and laid rightly — at the door of Democracy, because 
it vaunted a system which it had neither the forti- 
tude nor the strength to uphold. 

When we pass from the conflict between systems 
of government, and come to the other conflict of 
ideas as to right and wrong, we find ourselves faced 
with an antagonism which is wholly incapable of ac- 
commodation. In this war the stakes are something 
more than any of the material interests involved. 
It is a conflict where one faith is pitted against an- 
other. No casuistry will reconcile the ideal which 
inspires English policy with the ideal which inspires 
German policy. There is no sense — nothing indeed 
but danger — in arguing round the circle to prove 
that the rulers of these two nations are victims of 
some frightful misunderstanding, and that really at 
the bottom of their hearts they believe the same 
things. This is entirely untrue; they believe quite 
different things ; things indeed which are as nearly 
as possible opposites. 



174 THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY 



Part II. 

Chapter 

VII. 

The con- 
flict of 
systems 
and ideas. 



Our own belief is old, ingrained, and universal. 
It is accepted equally by the people and their rulers. 
We have held it so long that the articles of our creed 
have become somewhat blurred in outline — over- 
grown, like a memorial tablet, by moss and lichen. 

In the case of our enemy the tablet is new and the 
inscription sharp. He who runs may read it in bold 
clear-cut lettering. But the belief of the German 
people in the doctrine which has been carved upon 
the stone is not yet universal, or anything like 
universal. It is not even general. It is fully under- 
stood and accepted only in certain strata of society ; 
but it is responsible, without a doubt, for the making 
in cold blood of the policy which has led to this war„ 
When the hour struck which the German rulers 
deemed favourable for conquest, war, according to 
their creed, became the duty as well as the interest 
of the Fatherland. 

But so soon as war had been declared, the German 
people were allowed and even encouraged to believe 
that the making of war from motives of self-interest 
was a crime against humanity — the Sin against the 
Holy Ghost. They were allowed and encouraged 
to believe that the Allies were guilty of this crime and 
sin. And not only this, but war itself, which had 
been hymned in so many professorial rhapsodies, 
as a noble and splendid restorer of vigour and virtue, 
was now execrated with wailing and gnashing of 
teeth, as the most hideous of all human calamities. 

It is clear from all this that the greater part of 
the German people regarded war in exactly the same 
light as the whole of the English people did. In 
itself it was a curse ; and the man who deliberately 
contrived it for his own ends, or even for those of his 



APOSTASY OF THE PEIESTHOOD 175 

country, was a criminal. The German people applied Part ii. 
the same tests as we did, and it is not possible to donbt Chapter 
that in so doing they were perfectly sincere. They VI1, 
acted upon instinct. They had not learned the later ^ con- 
doctrines of the pedantocracy, or how to steer by Sterns 
a new magnetic pole. They still held by the old and ideas - 
Christian rules as to duties which exist between neigh- 
bours. To their simple old-fashioned loyalty what 
their Kaiser said must be the truth. And what their 
Kaiser said was that the Fatherland was attacked 
by treacherous foes. That was enough to banish all 
doubts. For the common people that was the reality 
and the only reality. Phrases about world-power 
and will-to-power — supposing they had ever heard 
or noticed them — were only mouthfuls of strange 
words, such as preachers of all kinds love to chew 
in the intervals of their discourses. 

When the priests and prophets found themselves 
at last confronted by those very horrors which they 
had so often invoked, did their new-found faith 
desert them, or was it only that their tongues, for 
some reason, refused to speak the old jargon? 
Judging by their high-flown indignation against the 
Allies it would rather seem as if, in the day of wrath, 
they had hastily abandoned sophistication for the 
pious memories of their unlettered childhood. Their 
apostasy was too well done to have been hypocrisy. 

With the rulers it was different. They knew 
clearly enough what they had done, what they were 
doing, and what they meant to do. When they re- 
mained sympathetically silent, amid the popular bab- 
ble about the horrors of war and iniquity of peace- 
breakers, their tongues were not paralysed by re- 
morse — they were merely in their cheeks. Their 



176 THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY 

Part II. sole concern was to humour public opinion, the re- 
Chapter suits of whose disapproval they feared, quite as 

VIL much as they despised its judgment. 
The con- That war draws out and gives scope to some of 

systems the noblest human qualities, which in peace-time are 
and ideas. ^ £ ^q hidden out of sight, no one will deny. That 
it is a great getter-rid of words and phrases, which 
have no real meaning behind them — that it is a great 
winnower of true men from shams, of staunch men 
from boasters and blowers of their own trumpets — 
that it is a great binder-together of classes, a great 
purifier of the hearts of nations, there is no need 
to dispute. Occasionally, though very rarely, it has 
proved itself to be a great destroyer of misunder- 
standing between the combatants themselves. 

But although the whole of this is true, it does 
not lighten the guilt of the deliberate peace-breaker. 
Many of the same benefits, though in a lesser degree, 
arise out of a pestilence, a famine, or any other great 
national calamity; and it is the acknowledged duty 
of man to strive to the uttermost against these and 
to ward them off with all his strength. It is the same 
with war. To argue, as German intellectuals have 
done of late, that in order to expand their territories 
they were justified in scattering infection and deliber- 
ately inviting this plague, that the plague itself was 
a thing greatly for the advantage of the moral sanita- 
tion of the world — all this is merely the casuistry of 
a priesthood whom the vanity of rubbing elbows 
with men of action has beguiled of their salvation. 

Somewhere in one of his essays Emerson introduces 
an interlocutor whom he salutes as 'little Sir.' One 
feels tempted to personify the whole corporation of 
German pedants under the same title. "When they 



THE ARROGANCE OF PEDANTS 177 

talk so vehemently and pompously about the duty PaetII. 
of deliberate war-making for the expansion of the Chapter 
Fatherland, for the fulfilment of the theory of evolu- VIL 
tion, even for the glory of God on high, our minds The con- 
are filled with wonder and a kind of pity. systems 

Have they ever seen war except in their dreams, and ideas - 
or a countryside in devastation 1 ? Have they ever 
looked with their own eyes on shattered limbs, or 
faces defaced, of which cases, and the like, there are 
already some hundreds of thousands in the hospitals 
of Europe, and may be some millions before this war 
is ended? Have they ever reckoned — except in col- 
umns of numerals without human meaning — how 
many more hundreds of thousands, in the flower of 
their age, have died and will die, or — more to be pit- 
ied — will linger on maimed and impotent when the 
war is ended? Have they realised any of these 
things, except in diagrams, and curves, and statisti- 
cal tables, dealing with the matter — as they would 
say themselves, in their own dull and dry fashion — 
'under its broader aspects' — in terms, that is, of pop- 
ulation, food-supply, and economic output? 

Death, and suffering of many sorts occur in all 
wars — even in the most humane war. And this is 
not a humane war which the pedants have let loose 
upon us. Indeed, they have taught with some em- 
phasis that humanity, under such conditions, is alto- 
gether a mistake. 

"Sentimentality!" cries the 'little Sir' impatient- 
ly, "sickly sentimentality! In a world of men such 
1 things must be. God has ordained war. ' ' 

Possibly. But what one feels is that the making 
of war is the Lord's own business and not the 'little 
Sir's.' It is the Lord's, as vengeance is, and earth- 



178 THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY 



Paet II. 

Chapter 

VII. 

The con- 
flict of 
systems 
and ideas. 



quakes, floods, and droughts ; not an office to be un- 
dertaken by mortals. 

The 'little Sir,' however, has devised a new order 
for the world, and apparently he will never rest 
satisfied until Heaven itself conforms to his initia- 
tive. He is audacious, for like the Titans he has chal- 
lenged Zeus. But at times we are inclined to wonder 
— is he not perhaps trying too much? Is he not in 
fact engaged in an attempt to outflank Providence, 
whose pivot is infinity 1 ? And for this he is relying 
solely upon the resources of his own active little 
finite mind. He presses his attack most gallantly 
against human nature — back and forwards, up and 
down — but opposing all his efforts is there not a 
screen of adamantine crystal which cannot be 
pierced, of interminable superficies which cannot be 
circumvented! Is he not in some ways like a wasp, 
which beats itself angrily against a pane of glass 1 



paet in 

THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 



I saw then in my Dream that he went on thus, even until he came at a 
bottom, where he saw, a little out of the way, three Men fast asleep with 
Fetters upon their heels. 

The name of the one was Simple, another Sloth, and the third 
Presumption. 

Christian then seeing them lie in this ease, went to them, if perad- 
venture he might awake them. And cried, You are like them that sleep 
on the top of a Mast, for the dead Sea is under you, a Gulf that hath no 
bottom. Awake therefore and come away; be willing also, and I will 
help you off with your Irons. He also told them, If he that goeth about 
like a roaring Lion comes by, you will certainly become a prey to his 
teeth. 

With that they lookt upon him, and began to reply in this sort: 
Simple said, I see no danger; Sloth said, Yet a little more sleep; and 
Presumption said, Every Vat must stand upon his own bottom. And so 
they lay down to sleep again, and Christian went on his way. 

The Pilgrim's Progress. 



CHAPTER I 

A REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD 

{January VdQl-July 1914) 

It is not true to say that this is a war between PartIIL 
the rival principles of democracy and autocracy. A Chapter 

too great absorption in our own particular sector of !_ 

the situation has led certain writers to put forward, * revolu - 

x ' tionary 

as a general explanation, this formula which is not period. 
only inadequate, but misleading. The real issue is 
something wider and deeper than a struggle between 
forms of government. It is concerned with the 
groundwork of human beliefs. 

And yet it is unquestionably true to say, that by 
reason of Germany's procedure, this war is being 
waged against democracy — not perhaps by intention, 
but certainly in effect. For if the Allies should be 
defeated, or even if they should fail to conquer their 
present enemies, the result must necessarily be 
wounding to the credit of popular institutions all 
the world over, fatal to their existence in Europe at 
any rate, fatal conceivably at no long distance of 
time to their existence elsewhere than in Europe. 
For mankind, we may be sure, is not going to put 
up with any kind of government merely because it 
is ideally beautiful. No system will be tolerated 

181 



182 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 

Part in. indefinitely which does not enable the people who 
Chapter live under it to protect themselves from their ene- 
L mies. The instinct of self-preservation will drive 
a revoiu- them to seek for some other political arrangement 
period. which is competent, in the present imperfect condi- 
tion of the world, to provide the first essential of a 
state, which is Security. 

But although the whole fabric of democracy is 
threatened by this war, the principle of autocracy is 
not challenged by it either directly or indirectly. 
France and England are not fighting against personal 
monarchy any more than Russia is fighting against 
popular government. So far as the forms of con- 
stitutions are concerned each of the Allies would be 
well content to live and let live. They are none of 
them spurred on by propagandist illusions like the 
armies of the First Republic. Among Russians, de- 
votion to their own institutions, and attachment to 
the person of their Emperor are inspired not merely 
by dictates of political expediency and patriotism, 
but also by their sense of religious duty. 1 It is 
inconceivable that the national spirit of Russia could 
ever have been roused to universal enthusiasm mere- 
ly in order to fight the battles of democracy. And yet 
Russia is now ranged side by side with the French 
Republic and the British Commonwealth in perfect 
unison. What has induced her to submit to sacrifices 
— less indeed than those of Belgium, but equal to 
those of France, and much greater so far than our 
own — unless some issue was at stake wider and 
deeper even than the future of popular government? 
The instincts of a people are vague and obscure. 
The reasons which are put forward, the motives 

1 Cf. 'Eussia and her Ideals,' Bound Table, December 191*. 



GERMAN MATERIALISM 183 

which appear upon the surface, the provocations PaktIU 
which lead to action, the immediate ends which are Chapter 
sought after and pursued, rarely explain the true L 
causes or proportions of any great national strug- a revoiu- 
gle. But for all that, the main issue, as a rule, is ^17. 
realised by the masses who are engaged, although it 
is not realised through the medium of coherent ar- 
gument or articulate speech. 

The present war is a fight, not between democracy 
and autocracy, but between the modern spirit of 
Germany and the unchanging spirit of civilisation. 
And it is well to bear in mind that the second of these 
is not invincible. It has suffered defeat before now, 
at various epochs in the world's history, when at- 
tacked by the same forces which assail it to-day. 
Barbarism is not any the less barbarism because it 
employs weapons of precision, because it avails itself 
of the discoveries of science and the mechanism of 
finance, or because it thinks it worth while to hire 
bands of learned men to shriek paeans in its praise 
and invectives against its victims. Barbarism is not 
any the less barbarism because its methods are 
up to date. It is known for what it is by the ends 
which it pursues and the spirit in which it pursues 
them. 

The modern spirit of Germany is materialism in 
its crudest form — the undistracted pursuit of wealth, 
and of power as a means to wealth. It is material- 
ism, rampant and self-confident, fostered by the 
state — subsidised, regulated, and, where thought ad- 
visable, controlled by the state — supported every- 
where by the diplomatic resources of the state — 
backed in the last resort by the fleets and armies of 
the state. It is the most highly organised machine, 



184 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 



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Chapter 

I. 

A revolu- 
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period. 



the most deliberate and thorough-going system, for 
arriving at material ends which has ever yet been 
devised by man. It is far more efficient, bnt not a 
whit less material, than 'Manchesterism' of the Vic- 
torian era, which placed its hopes in 'free' compe- 
tition, and also than that later development of trusts 
and syndicates — hailing from America — which aims 
at levying tribute on society by means of 'volun- 
tary' co-operation. And just as the English pro- 
fessors, who fell prostrate in adoration before the 
prosperity of cotton-spinners, found no difficulty in 
placing self-interest upon the loftiest pedestal of 
morality, so German professors have succeeded in 
erecting for the joint worship of the Golden Calf and 
the War-god Wotun, high twin altars which look 
down with pity and contempt upon the humbler 
shrines of the Christian faith. 

The morality made in Manchester has long ago 
lost its reputation. That which has been made in 
Germany more recently must in the end follow suit ; 
for, like its predecessor, it is founded upon a false 
conception of human nature and cannot endure. But 
in the interval, if it be allowed to triumph, it may 
work evil, in comparison with which that done by 
our own devil-take-the-hindmost philosophers sinks 
into insignificance. 

Looking at the present war from the standpoint 
of the Allies, the object of it is to repel the encroach- 
ments of materialism, working its way through the 
ruin of ideas, which have been cherished always, save 
in the dark ages when civilisation was overwhelmed 
by barbarism. Looking at the matter from our own 
particular standpoint, it is also incidentally a strug- 
gle for the existence of democracy. The chief ques- 



WANT OF A NATIONAL POLICY 185 

tion we have to ask ourselves is whether our people Pakt hi. 
will fight for their faith and traditions with the same Chapter 
skill and courage as the Germans for their material *• 
ends. Will they endure sacrifices with the same A«voiu- 
fortitude as France and Bussia? Will they face the p^i. 
inevitable eagerly and promptly, or will they play 
the laggard and by delay ruin all — themselves most 
of all? . . . This war is not going to be won for us 
by other people, or by some miraculous intervention 
of Providence, or by the Germans running short of 
copper, or by revolutions in Berlin, nor even by the 
break-up of the Austrian Empire. In order to win it 
we shall have to put out our full strength, to organise 
our resources in men and material as we have never 
done before during the whole of our history. We 
have not accomplished these things as yet, although 
we have expressed our determination, and are indeed 
willing to attempt them. We were taken by surprise, 
and the immediate result has been a great confusion, 
very hard to disentangle. 

Considering how little, before war began, our 
people had been taken into the confidence of suc- 
cessive governments, as to the relations of the British 
Empire with the outside world ; how little education 
of opinion there had been, as to risks, and dangers, 
and means of defence ; how little leading and clear 
guidance, both before and since, as to duties — con- 
sidering all these omissions one can only marvel that 
the popular response has been what it is, and that 
the confusion was not many times worse. 

What was the mood of the British race when this 
war broke upon them so unexpectedly? To what 
extent were they provided against it in a material 
sense? And still more important, how far were 



186 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 



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Chapter 

I. 

A revolu- 
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period. 



their minds and hearts prepared to encounter it? 
It is important to understand those things, but in 
order to do this it is necessary to look back over a 
few years. 

By a coincidence which may prove convenient to 
historians, the end of the nineteenth century marked 
the beginning of a new epoch * — an interlude, of brief 
duration as it proved — upon which the curtain was 
rung down shortly before midnight on the 4th of 
August 1914. 

Between these two dates, in a space of something 
over thirteen years, events had happened in a quick 
succession, both within the empire and abroad, 
which disturbed or dissolved many ancient under- 
standings. The spirit of change had been busy with 
mankind, and needs unknown to a former generation 
had grown clamorous. Objects of hope had present- 
ed themselves, driving old ideas to the wall, and un- 
foreseen dangers had produced fresh groupings, 
compacts, and associations between states, and par- 
ties, and individual men. 

In Europe during this period the manifest de- 
termination of Germany to challenge the naval su- 
premacy of Britain, by the creation of a fleet de- 
signed and projected as the counterpart of her over- 
whelming army, had threatened the security of the 
whole continent, and had put France, Russia, and 
England upon terms not far removed from those of an 
alliance. The gravity of this emergency had induced 
our politicians to exclude, for the time being, this 
department of public affairs from the bitterness of 
their party struggles ; and it had also drawn the gov- 

1 Queen Victoria died on January 22, 1901. 



DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EAST 187 

ernments of the United Kingdom and the Dominions Part hi. 
into relations closer than ever before, for the pur- Chapter 
pose of mutual defence. 1 T - 

In the meanwhile there had been developments Arevoiu- 
even more startling in the hitherto unchanging East, perio? 
Japan, as the result of a great war, 2 had become a 
first-class power, redoubtable both by sea and land. 
China, the most populous, the most ancient, and the 
most conservative of despotisms, had suddenly- 
sought her salvation under the milder institutions of 
a republic. 3 

The South African war, ended by the Peace of 
Pretoria, had paved the way for South African 
Union. 4 The achievement of this endeavour had been 
applauded by men of all parties ; some finding in it a 
welcome confirmation of their theories with regard 
to liberty and self-government; others again draw- 
ing from it encouragement to a still bolder undertak- 
ing. For if South Africa had made a precedent, the 
existing state of the world had supplied a motive, 
for the closer union of the empire. 

Within the narrower limits of the United Kingdom 
changes had also occurred within this period which, 
from another point of view, were equally momentous. 
In 1903 Mr. Chamberlain had poured new wine into 
old bottles, and in so doing had hastened the in- 
evitable end of Unionist predominance by changing 
on a sudden the direction of party policy. In the 
unparalleled defeat which ensued two and a half 
years later the Labour party appeared for the first 
time, formidable both in numbers and ideas. 

A revolution had likewise been proceeding in 

1 Imperial Conference on Defence, summer of 1909. 
2 1904-1905. »1911. 4 May 1902. 



188 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 



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Chapter 

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A revolu- 
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period. 



our institutions as well as in the minds of our people. 
The balance of the state had been shifted by a cur- 
tailment of the powers of the House of Lords * — the 
first change which had been made by statute in the 
fundamental principle of the Constitution since the 
passing of the Act of Settlement. 2 In July 1914 
further changes of a similar character, hardly less 
important under a practical aspect, were upon the 
point of receiving the Royal Assent. 3 

Both these sets of changes — that which had been 
already accomplished and the other which was about 
to pass into law — had this in common, that even 
upon the admissions of their own authors they were 
incomplete. Neither in the Parliament Act nor in 
the Home Rule Act was there finality. The com- 
position of the Second Chamber had been set down 
for early consideration, whilst a revision of the con- 
stitutional relations between England, Scotland, and 
Wales was promised so soon as the case of Ireland 
had been dealt with. 

It seemed as if the modern spirit had at last, in 
earnest, opened an inquisition upon the adequacy of 
our ancient unwritten compact, which upon the 
whole, had served its purpose well for upwards of 
two hundred years. It seemed as if that compact 
were in the near future to be tested thoroughly, and 
examined in respect of its fitness for dealing with the 
needs of the time — with the complexities and the 
vastness of the British Empire — with the evils which 
prey upon us from within, and with the dangers 
which threaten us from without. 

Questioners were not drawn from one party alone. 



1 Parliament Act became law August 1911. 

3 Home Rule Bill became law August 1914. 



1689. 



CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES 189 

They were pressing forwards from all sides. It was part in. 
not merely the case of Ireland, or the powers of the Chapter 
Second Chamber, or its composition, or the general I - 
congestion of business, or the efficiency of the House a revoiu- 
of Commons : it was the whole machinery of govern- p e ° r "^ 
ment which seemed to need overhauling and re- 
consideration in the light of new conditions. Most 
important of all these constitutional issues was that 
which concerned the closer union of the Empire. 

It was little more than eighty years since the Iron 
Duke had described the British Constitution as an 
incomparably devised perfection which none but a 
madman would seek to change. That was not now 
the creed of any political party or indeed of any 
thinking man. No one was satisfied with things as 
they were. Many of the most respectable old phrases 
had become known for empty husks, out of which 
long since had dropped whatever seed they may orig- 
inally have contained. Many of the old traditions 
were dead or sickly, and their former adherents were 
now wandering at large, like soldiers in the middle 
ages, when armies were disbanded in foreign parts, 
seeking a new allegiance, and constituting in the 
meanwhile a danger to security and the public 
peace. 

And also, within this brief period, the highest 
offices had become vacant, and many great figures 
had passed from the scene. Two sovereigns had 
died full of honour. Two Prime Ministers had also 
died, having first put off the burden of office, each at 
the zenith of his popularity. Of the two famous men 
upon the Unionist side who remained when Lord 
Salisbury tendered his resignation, the one since 
1906 had been wholly withdrawn from public life, 



190 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 



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Chapter 

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A revolu- 
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period. 



while the other, four years later, had passed the 
leadership into younger hands. 1 

There is room for an almost infinite variety of 
estimate as to the influence which is exercised by 
pre-eminent characters upon public affairs and 
national ideals. The verdict of the day after is al- 
ways different from that of a year after. The verdict 
of the next generation, while differing from both, is 
apt to be markedly different from that of the genera- 
tion which follows it. The admiration or censure of 
the moment is followed by a reaction no less surely 
than the reaction itself is followed by a counter-reac- 
tion. Gradually the oscillations become shorter, as 
matters pass out of the hands of journalists and poli- 
ticians into those of the historian. Possibly later 
judgments are more true. We have more knowledge, 
of a kind. Seals are broken one by one, and we learn 
how this man really thought and how the other acted, 
in both cases differently from what had been sup- 
posed. We have new facts submitted to us, and pos- 
sibly come nearer the truth. But while we gain so 
much, we also lose in other directions. We lose the 
sharp savour of the air. The keen glance and alert 
curiosity of contemporary vigilance are lacking. 
Conditions and circumstances are no longer clear, 
and as generation after generation passes away they 
become more dim. The narratives of the great his- 
torians and novelists are to a large extent either 
faded or false. We do not trust the most vivid pre- 
sentments written by the man of genius in his study 
a century after the event, while we know well that 
even the shrewdest of contemporaneous observers 



1 Mr. Chamberlain died July 2, 1914 ; Mr. Balfour resigned the leader- 
ship of the Unionist party on November 8, 1911. 



DEATH OF QUEEN VICTOEIA 191 

is certain to omit many of the essentials. If Macau- PartIH. 
lay is inadequate in one direction, Pepys is equally Chapter 
inadequate in another. And if the chronicler at the Im 
moment, and the historian in the future are not to A revol «- 
be wholly believed, the writer who comments after ^Z7. 
a decade or less upon things which are fresh in his 
memory is liable to another form of error ; for either 
he is swept away by the full current of the reaction, 
or else his judgments are embittered by a sense of the 
hopelessness of swimming against it. 

This much, however, may be said safely — that the 
withdrawal of any pre-eminent character from the 
scene, whether it be Queen Victoria or King Edward, 
Lord Salisbury or Mr. Chamberlain, produces in a 
greater or less degree that same loosening of allegi- 
ance and disturbance of ideas, which are so much 
dreaded by the conservative temperament from the 
removal of an ancient institution. For a pre-emi- 
nent character is of the same nature as an institution. 
The beliefs, loyalties, and ideals of millions were at- 
tached to the personality of the Queen. The whole of 
that prestige which Queen Victoria drew from the 
awe, reverence, affection, and prayers of her people 
could not be passed along with the crown to King Ed- 
ward. The office of sovereign was for the moment 
stripped and impoverished of some part of its 
strength, and was only gradually replenished as the 
new monarch created a new, and to some extent a 
different, loyalty of his own. So much is a truism. 
But, when there is already a ferment in men's minds, 
the disappearance in rapid succession of the pre-emi- 
nent characters of the age helps on revolution by put- 
ting an end to a multitude of customary attachments, 



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Chapter 

I. 

A revolu- 
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period. 



and by setting sentiments adrift to wander in search 
of new heroes. 

A change of some importance had also come over 
the character of the House of Commons. The old 
idea that it was a kind of grand jury of plain men, 
capable in times of crisis of breaking with their par- 
ties, had at last finally disappeared. In politics there 
was no longer any place for plain men. The need 
was for professionals, and professionals of this sort, 
like experts in other walks of life, were worthy of 
their hire. 

The decision to pay members of Parliament came 
as no surprise. The marvel was rather that it had 
not been taken at an earlier date, seeing that for con- 
siderably more than a century this item had figured 
in the programmes of all advanced reformers. The 
change, nevertheless, when it came, was no trivial oc- 
currence, but one which was bound fundamentally to 
affect the character of the popular assembly; wheth- 
er for better or worse was a matter of dispute. 

Immense, however, as were the possibilities con- 
tained in the conversion of unpaid amateurs into pro- 
fessional and stipendiary politicians, what excited 
even more notice at the time than the thing itself, was 
the way in which it was brought about. No attempt 
was made to place this great constitutional reform 
definitely and securely upon the statute book. To 
have followed this course would have meant submit- 
ting a bill, and a bill would have invited discussion 
at all its various stages. Moreover, the measure 
might have been challenged by the House of Lords, 
in which case delay would have ensued ; and a subject, 
peculiarly susceptible to malicious misrepresenta- 
tion, would have been kept — possibly for so long as 



CHANGE IN HOUSE OF COMMONS 193 

three years — under the critical eyes of public opin- Part in. 
ion. Apparently this benevolent proposal was one Chapter 
of those instances, so rare in modern political life, L 
where neither publicity nor advertisement was Arevoiu- 
sought. On the contrary, the object seemed to be to ^ZZ 
do good by stealth; and for this purpose a simple 
financial resolution was all that the law required. 
The Lords had recently been warned off and forbid- 
den to interfere with money matters, their judgment 
being under suspicion, owing to its supposed liability 
to be affected by motives of self-interest. The House 
of Commons was therefore sole custodian of the 
public purse ; and in this capacity its members were 
invited to vote themselves four hundred pounds 
a year all round, as the shortest and least ostenta- 
tious way of raising the character and improving 
the quality of the people's representatives. 

Even by July 1914 the effect of this constitutional 
amendment upon our old political traditions had 
become noticeable in various directions. But the 
means by which it was accomplished are no less 
worthy of note than the reform itself, when we are 
endeavouring to estimate the changes which have 
come over Parliament during this short but revolu- 
tionary epoch. The method adopted seemed to indi- 
cate a novel attitude on the part of members of the 
House of Commons towards the Imperial Exchequer, 
on the part of the Government towards members of 
the House of Commons, and on the part of both 
towards the people whom they trusted. It was 
adroit, expeditious, and businesslike; and to this 
extent seemed to promise well for years to come, 
when the professionals should have finally got rid of 
the amateurs, and taken things wholly into their own 



194 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 



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Chapter 

I. 

A revolu- 
tionary 
period. 



hands. Hostile critics, it is true, denounced the re- 
form bluntly as corruption, and the method of its 
achievement as furtive and cynical ; but for this class 
of persons no slander is ever too gross — They have 
said. Quhat say they? Let them be saying. 



The party leaders were probably neither worse 
men nor better than they had been in the past ; but 
they were certainly smaller ; while on the other hand 
the issues with which they found themselves con- 
fronted were bigger. 

Great characters are like tent-pegs. One of their 
uses is to prevent the political camp from being 
blown to ribbons. Where they are too short or too 
frail, we may look for such disorders as have repeat- 
ed themselves at intervals during the past few years. 
A blast of anger or ill-temper has blown, or a gust of 
sentiment, or even a gentle zephyr of sentimentality, 
and the whole scene has at once become a confusion 
of flapping canvas, tangled cordage, and shouting, 
struggling humanity. Such unstable conditions are 
fatal to equanimity ; they disturb the fortitude of the 
most stalwart follower, and cause doubt and distrust 
on every hand. 

Since the Liberal Government came into power in 
the autumn of 1905, neither of the great parties had 
succeeded in earning the respect of the other; and 
as the nature of man is not subject to violent fluctua- 
tions, it may safely be concluded that this misfortune 
had been due either to some defect or inadequacy 
of leadership, or else to conditions of an altogether 
extraordinary character. 

During these ten sessions the bulk of the statute 
book had greatly increased, and much of this increase 



DEMOCRACY AND LEADERSHIP 195 

was no doubt healthy tissue. This period, notwith- Part in. 
standing, will ever dwell in the memory as a squalid Chapter 
episode. Especially is this the case when we contrast .*• 
the high hopes and promises, not of one party alone, a revoiu- 
with the results which were actually achieved. period 

Democracy, if the best, is also the most delicate 
form of human government. None suffers so swiftly 
or so sorely from any shortage in the crop of charac- 
ter. None is so dependent upon men, and so little ca- 
pable of being supported by the machine alone. 
When the leading of parties is in the hands of those 
who lack vision and firmness, the first effect which 
manifests itself is that parties begin to slip their 
principles. Some secondary object calls for and ob- 
tains the sacrifice of an ideal. So the Unionists in 
1909 threw over the order and tradition of the state, 
the very ark of their political covenant, when they 
procured the rejection of the Budget by the House of 
Lords. So the Liberal Government in 1910, having 
solemnly undertaken to reform the constitution — a 
work not unworthy of the most earnest endeavour — 
went back upon their word, and abandoned their 
original purpose. For one thing they grew afraid of 
the clamour of their partisans. For another they 
were tempted by the opportunity of advantages which 
— as they fondly imagined — could be easily and safe- 
ly secured during the interval while all legislative 
powers were temporarily vested in the Commons. Nor 
were these the only instances where traditional policy 
had been diverted, and where ideals had been bar- 
gained away, in the hope that thereby objects of a 
more material sort might be had at once in exchange. 

The business of leadership is to prevent the aban- 
donment of the long aim for the sake of the short. 



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The rank and file of every army is at all times most 
dangerously inclined to this fatal temptation, not 
necessarily dishonestly, but from a lack of foresight 
and sense of proportion. 

Some dim perception of cause and effect had begun 
to dawn during the years 1912 and 1913 upon the 
country, and even upon the more sober section of the 
politicians. An apprehension had been growing rap- 
idly, and defied concealment, that the country was 
faced by a very formidable something, to which men 
hesitated to give a name, but which was clearly not 
to be got rid of by the customary methods of hold- 
ing high debates about it, and thereafter marching 
into division lobbies. While in public, each party 
was concerned to attribute the appearance of this 
unwelcome monster solely to the misdeeds of their 
opponents, each party knew well enough in their 
hearts that the danger was due at least in some 
measure to their own abandonment of pledges, prin- 
ciples, and traditions. 

At Midsummer 1914 most people would probably 
have said that the immediate peril was Ireland and 
civil war. A few months earlier many imagined that 
trouble of a more general character was brewing 
between the civil and military powers, and that an 
issue which they described as that of 'the Army 
versus the People' would have to be faced. A few 
years earlier there was a widespread fear that the 
country might be confronted by some organised 
stoppage of industry, and that this would lead to 
revolution. Throughout the whole of this period of 
fourteen years the menace of war with Germany had 
been appearing, and disappearing, and reappearing, 
very much as a whale shows his back, dives, rises at 



MR. ASQUITH'S PRE-EMINENCE 197 

some different spot, and dives again. For the moment, Part hi. 
however, this particular anxiety did not weigh heav- Chapter 
ily on the public mind. The man in the street had L 
been assured of late by the greater part of the press a revoiu- 
and politicians — even by ministers themselves — that ^71 
our relations with this formidable neighbour were 
friendlier and more satisfactory than they had been 
for some considerable time. 

At Midsummer 1914, that is to say about six weeks 
before war broke out, the pre-eminent character in 
British politics was the Prime Minister. No other 
on either side of the House approached him in pres- 
tige, and so much was freely admitted by foes as well 
as friends. 

When we are able to arrive at a fair estimate of 
the man who is regarded as the chief figure of his 
age, we have an important clue to the aspirations and 
modes of thought of the period in which he lived. A 
people may be known to some extent by the leaders 
whom it has chosen to follow. 

Mr. Asquith entered Parliament in 1886, and be- 
fore many months had passed his reputation was 
secure. Mr. Gladstone, ever watchful for youthful 
talent, promoted him at a bound to be Home Secre- 
tary, when the Cabinet of 1892 came into precarious 
existence. No member of this government justified 
his selection more admirably. But the period of 
office was brief. Three years later, the Liberal party 
found itself once again in the wilderness, where it 
continued to wander, rent by dissensions both as to 
persons and principles, for rather more than a 
decade. 

When Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman returned 



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to office in the autumn of 1905, Mr. Asquith became 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, and was speedily ac- 
cepted as the minister next in succession to his chief. 
He was then just turned fifty, so that, despite the 
delays which had occurred, it could not be said that 
fortune had behaved altogether unkindly. Two 
and a half years later, in April 1908, he suc- 
ceeded to the premiership without a rival, and with- 
out a dissentient voice. 

The ambition, however, which brought him so 
successfully to the highest post appeared to have 
exhausted a great part of its force in attainment, and 
to have left its possessor without sufficient energy 
for exercising those functions which the post itself 
required. The career of Mr. Asquith in the highest 
office reminds one a little of the fable of the Hare and 
the Tortoise. In the race which we all run with slow- 
footed fate, he had a signal advantage in the speed of 
his intellect, in his capacity for overtaking arrears 
of work which would have appalled any other minis- 
ter, and for finding, on the spur of the moment, means 
for extricating his administration from the most 
threatening positions. But of late, like the Hare, he 
had come to believe himself invincible, and had yield- 
ed more and more to a drowsy inclination. He had 
seemed to fall asleep for long periods, apparently in 
serene confidence that, before the Tortoise could 
pass the winning-post, somebody or something — 
in all probability the Unionist party with the clamour 
of a premature jubilation — would awaken him in 
time to save the race. 

So far as Parliament was concerned, his confi- 
dence in his own qualities was not misplaced. Again 
and again, the unleadered energies or ungoaded in- 



WAIT AND SEE 199 

dolence of his colleagues landed the Government in PabtIII 
a mess. But as often as this happened Mr. Asquith Chapter 
always advanced upon the scene and rescued his L 
party, by putting the worst blunder in the best light, a revoiu- 
He obligingly picked his stumbling lieutenants out peS 
of the bogs into which — largely, it must be admitted, 
for want of proper guidance from their chief — they 
had had the misfortune to fall. Having done this in 
the most chivalrous manner imaginable, he earned 
their gratitude and devotion. Id this way he main- 
tained a firm hold upon the leadership; if indeed 
it can properly be termed leadership to be the best 
acrobat of the troupe, and to step forward and do the 
feats after your companions have failed, and the 
audience has begun to 'boo.' 

Some years ago Mr. Asquith propounded a maxim 
— wait-and-see — which greatly scandalised and an- 
noyed the other side. This formula was the perfectly 
natural expression of his character and policy. In 
the peculiar circumstances of the case it proved itself 
to be a successful parliamentary expedient. Again 
and again it wrought confusion among his simple- 
minded opponents, who — not being held together by 
any firm authority — followed their own noses, now in 
one direction, now in another, upon the impulse of 
the moment. It is probable that against a powerful 
leader, who had his party well in hand, this policy of 
makeshift and delay would have brought its author 
to grief. But Unionists were neither disciplined nor 
united, and they had lacked leadership ever since 
they entered upon opposition. 

For all its excellency, Mr. Asquith 's oratory never 
touched the heart. And very rarely indeed did it 
succeed in convincing the cool judgment of people 



200 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 



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Chapter 
I. 

A revolu- 
tionary 
period. 



who had experience at first hand of the matters 
under discussion. There was lacking anything in 
the nature of a personal note, which might have re- 
lated the ego of the speaker to the sentiments which 
he announced so admirably. Also there was some- 
thing which suggested that his knowledge had not 
been gained by looking at the facts face to face; 
but rather by the rapid digestion of minutes and 
memoranda, which had been prepared for him by 
clerks and secretaries, and which purported to pro- 
vide, in convenient tabloids, all that it was necessary 
for a parliamentarian to know. 

The style of speaking which is popular nowadays, 
and of which Mr. Asquith is by far the greatest 
master, would not have been listened to with an equal 
favour in the days of our grandfathers. In the 
Parliaments which assembled at "Westminster in the 
period between the passing of the Reform Bill and 
the founding of the Eighty Club, 1 the country-gen- 
tlemen and the men-of-business — two classes of hu- 
manity who are constantly in touch with, and draw- 
ing strength from, our mother earth of hard fact 2 
— met and fought out their differences during two 
generations. In that golden age it was all but un- 
thinkable that a practising barrister should ever 
have become Prime Minister. The legal profession 
at this time had but little influence in counsel t still 



1 1832-1880. 

2 They had an excellent sense of reality as regards their own affairs, 
and there between them covered a fairly wide area ; but they were singu- 
larly lacking either in sympathy or imagination with regard to the af- 
fairs of other nations and classes. Their interest in the poor was con- 
fined for the most part to criticism of one another with regard to con- 
ditions of labour. The millowners thought that the oppression of the 
peasantry was a scandal ; while the landowners considered that the state 
of things prevailing in factories was much worse than slavery. Cf. 
Disraeli 7 s Sybil. 



POLITICAL LAWYERS 201 

less in Parliament and on the platform. The middle Paet hi. 
classes were every whit as jealous and distrustful Chapter 
of the intervention of the lawyer-advocate in public Ij 
affairs as the landed gentry themselves. But in the A revolu - 
stage of democratic evolution, which we entered on period. 
the morrow of the Mid-Lothian campaigns, and in 
which we still remain, the popular, and even the 
parliamentary, audience has gradually ceased to con- 
sist mainly of country-gentlemen interested in the 
land, and of the middle-classes who are engaged in 
trade. It has grown to be at once less discriminat- 
ing as to the substance of speeches, and more exact- 
ing as to their form. 

A representative assembly which entirely lacked 
lawyers would be impoverished; but one in which 
they are the predominant, or even a very important 
element, is usually in its decline. It is strange that 
an order of men, who in their private and profes- 
sional capacities are so admirable, should neverthe- 
less produce baleful effects when they come to play 
too great a part in public affairs. Trusty friends, de- 
lightful companions, stricter perhaps than any other 
civil profession in all rules of honour, they are none 
the less, without seeking to be so, the worst enemies 
of representative institutions. The peculiar danger 
of personal monarchy is that it so easily submits to 
draw its inspiration from an adulatory priesthood, 
and the peculiar danger of that modern form of con- 
stitutional government which we call democracy, is 
that lawyers, with the most patriotic intentions, are 
so apt to undo it. 

Lawyers see too much of life in one way, too little 
in another, to make them safe guides in practical 
matters. Their experience of human affairs is made 



202 THE SPIEIT OF BRITISH POLICY 

Part in. up of an infinite number of scraps cut out of other 
Chapter people's lives. They learn and do hardly anything 
L except through intermediaries. Their clients are 
a revoiu- introduced, not in person, but in the first instance, 
perioZ on paper — through the medium of solicitors ' ' instruc- 
tions.' Litigants appear at consultations in their 
counsel's chambers under the chaperonage of their 
attorneys ; their case is considered ; they receive ad- 
vice. Then perhaps, if the issue comes into court, 
they appear once again — in the witness-box — and are 
there examined, cross-examined, and re-examined 
under that admirable system for the discovery of 
truth which is ordained in Anglo-Saxon countries, 
and which consists in turning, for the time being, 
nine people in every ten out of their true natures 
into hypnotised rabbits. Then the whole thing is 
ended, and the client disappears into the void from 
whence he came. What happens to him afterwards 
seldom reaches the ears of his former counsel. 
Whether the advice given to him in consultation has 
proved right or wrong in practice, rarely becomes 
known to the great man who gave it. 

Plausibility, an alert eye for the technical trip or 
fall — the great qualities of an advocate — do not 
necessarily imply judgment of the most valuable 
sort outside courts of law. The farmer who manures, 
ploughs, harrows, sows, and rolls in his crop is pun- 
ished in his income, if he has done any one of these 
things wrongly, or at the wrong season. The shop- 
keeper who blunders in his buying or his selling, or 
the manufacturer who makes things as they should 
not be made, suffers painful consequences to a cer- 
tainty. His error pounds him relentlessly on the 
head. Not so the lawyer. His errors for the most 



MR. ASQUITH'S ORATORY 203 

part are visited on others. His own success or non- Part hi. 
success is largely a matter of words and pose. If he Chapter 
is confident and adroit, the dulness of the jury or the T - 
senility of the bench can be made to appear, in the ^ revoiu- 
eyes of the worsted client, as the true causes of period 
his defeat. And the misfortune is that in politics, 
which under its modern aspect is a trade very much 
akin to advocacy, there is a temptation, with all but 
the most patriotic lawyers, to turn to account at 
"Westminster the skill which they have so laboriously 
acquired in the Temple. 

Of course there have been, and will ever be, ex- 
ceptions. Alexander Hamilton was a lawyer, though 
he was a soldier in the first instance. Abraham 
Lincoln was a lawyer. But we should have to go back 
to the 'glorious revolution' of 1688 before we could 
find a parallel to either of these two in our own his- 
tory. Until the last two decades England has never 
looked favourably on lawyer leaders. This was re- 
garded by some as a national peculiarity ; by others 
as a safeguard of our institutions. But by the 
beginning of the twentieth century it was clear 
that lawyers had succeeded in establishing their 
predominance in the higher walks of English poli- 
tics, as thoroughly as they had already done wher- 
ever parliamentary government exists throughout 
the world. 

During this epoch, when everything was sacrificed 
to perspicuity and the avoidance of boredom, Mr. 
Asquith's utterances led the fashion. His ministry 
was composed to a large extent of politicians bred 
in the same profession and proficient in the same 
arts as himself; but he towered above them all, the 
supreme type of the lawyer-statesman. 



204 THE SPIRIT OP BRITISH POLICY 



Part III. 

Chapter 

I. 

A revolu- 
tionary 
period. 



His method was supremely skilful. In its own 
way it had the charm of perfect artistry, even though 
the product of the art was hardly more permanent 
than that of the cordon bleu who confections ices in 
fancy patterns. And not only was the method well 
suited to the taste of popular audiences, but equally 
so to the modern House of Commons. That body, 
also, was now much better educated in matters which 
can be learned out of newspapers and books; far 
more capable of expressing its meanings in well- 
chosen phrases arranged in a logical sequence; far 
more critical of words — if somewhat less observant 
of things — than it was during the greater part of the 
reign of Queen Victoria. 

To a large extent the House of Commons consisted 
of persons with whom public utterance was a trade. 
There were lawyers in vast numbers, journalists, po- 
litical organisers, and professional lecturers on a 
large variety of subjects. And even among the la- 
bour party, where we might have expected to find 
a corrective, the same tendency was at work, perhaps 
as strongly as in any other quarter. For although 
few types of mankind have a shrewder judgment be- 
tween reality and dialectic than a thoroughly com- 
petent ' workman,' labour leaders were not chosen 
because they were first-class workmen, but because 
they happened to be effective speakers on the plat- 
form or at the committee table. 

To a critic, looking on at the play from outside, 
Mr. Asquith's oratory appeared to lack heart and 
the instinct for reality; his leadership, the quali- 
ties of vigilance, steadfastness, and authority. He 
did not prevail by personal force, but by adroit con- 
futation. His debating, as distinguished from his 



HIS CHARACTER 



205 



political, courage would have been admitted with PartIH. 
few reservations even by an opponent. Few were Chapter 
so ready to meet their enemies in the gate of dis- L 
cussion. Few, if any, were so capable of retriev- a revok- 
ing the fortunes of their party — even when things J^J 
looked blackest — if it were at all possible to accom- 
plish this by the weapons of debate. But the medium 
must be debate — not action or counsel — if Mr. As- 
quith's pre-eminence was to assert itself. In debate 
he had all the confidence and valour of the maitre 
d' amies, who knows himself to be the superior in 
skill of any fencer in his own school. 

Next to Lord Rosebery he was the figure of most 
authority among the Liberal Imperialists, and yet 
this did not sustain his resolution when the Cabinet 
of 1905 proceeded to pare down the naval estimates. 
He was the champion of equal justice, as regards the 
status of Trades Unions, repelling the idea of ex- 
ceptional and favouring legislation with an eloquent 
scorn. Yet he continued to hold his place when his 
principles were thrown overboard by his colleagues 
in 1906. Again when he met Parliament in February 
1910 he announced his programme with an air of 
heroic firmness. 1 It is unnecessary to recall the 
particulars of this episode, and how he was upheld 
in his command only upon condition that he would 
alter his course to suit the wishes of mutineers. And 
in regard to the question of Home Rule, his treat- 
ment of it from first to last had been characterised 
by the virtues of patience and humility, rather than 
by those of prescience or courage. 

A 'stellar and undiminishable ' something, around 



1 I.e. curtailment of the powers of the House of Lords and its reform. 
Only the first was proceeded with. 



206 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 



Part III. 

Chapter 

I. 

A revolu- 
tionary 
period. 



which the qualities and capacities of a man revolve 
obediently, and under harmonious restraint — like 
the planetary bodies — is perhaps as near as we can 
get to a definition of human greatness. But in the 
case of Mr. Asquith, for some years prior to July 
1914, the central force of his nature had seemed in- 
adequate for imposing the law of its will upon those 
brilliant satellites his talents. As a result, the solar 
system of his character had fallen into confusion, and 
especially since the opening of that year had ap- 
peared to be swinging lop-sided across the political 
firmament hastening to inevitable disaster. 



CHAPTER II 



THREE GOVERNING IDEAS 



At the death of Queen Victoria the development PartIH. 
of the British Commonwealth entered upon a new Chapter 
phase. The epoch which followed has no precedent IL 
in our own previous experience as a nation, nor can ' Fhiee 
we discover in the records of other empires anything fae™ ns 
which offers more than a superficial and misleading 
resemblance to it. The issues of this period presented 
themselves to different minds in a variety of differ- 
ent lights ; but to all it was clear that we had reached 
one of the great turning-points in our history. 

The passengers on a great ocean liner are apt to 
imagine, because their stomachs are now so little 
troubled by the perturbation of the waves, that it 
no longer profits them to offer up the familiar prayer 
'for those in peril on the sea.' It is difficult for them 
to believe in danger where everything appears so 
steady and well-ordered, and where they can enjoy 
most of the distractions of urban life, from a cine- 
matograph theatre to a skittle-alley, merely by de- 
scending a gilded staircase or crossing a brightly 
panelled corridor. But this agreeable sense of safety 
is perhaps due in a greater degree to fancy, than to 
the changes which have taken place in the essential 
facts. As dangers have been diminished in one direc- 

207 



208 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 

part ii. tion risks have been incurred in another. A blunder to- 

Chapter day is more irreparable than formerly, and the havoc 

IL which ensues upon a blunder is vastly more appal- 

Three ling. An error of observation or of judgment — the 

idels." 1 wrong lever pulled or the wrong button pressed — an 

order which miscarries or is overlooked — and twenty 

thousand tons travelling at twenty knots an hour 

goes to the bottom, with its freight of humanity, 

merchandise, and treasure, more easily, and with 

greater speed and certainty, than in the days of the 

old galleons — than in the days when Drake, in the 

Golden Hind of a hundred tons burden, beat up 

against head winds in the Straits of Magellan, and 

ran before the following gale off the Cape of Storms. 

Comfort, whether in ships of travel or of state, is 
not the same thing as security. It never has been, 
and it never will be. 

The position after Queen Victoria's death also 
differed from all previous times in another way. 
After more than three centuries of turmoil and ex- 
pansion, the British race had entered into possession 
of an estate so vast, so rich in all natural resources, 
that a sane mind could not hope for, or even dream 
of, any further aggrandisement. Whatever may be 
the diseases from which the British race suffered dur- 
ing the short epoch between January 1901 and July 
1914, megalomania was certainly not one of them. 

The period of acquisition being now acknowledged 
at an end, popular imagination became much occu- 
pied with other things. It assumed, too lightly and 
readily perhaps, that nothing was likely to interfere 
with our continuing to hold what we had got. If there 
was not precisely a law of nature, which precluded 
the possessions of the British Empire from ever be- 



SOCIAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 209 

ing taken away, at any rate there was the law of na- PartIH. 
tions. The public opinion of the world would surely Chapter 
revolt against so heinous a form of sacrilege. Hav- IL 
ing assumed so much, placidly and contentedly, and t^** 
without even a tremor either as to the good-will or id eas. 
the potency of the famous Concert of Europe, the 
larger part of public opinion tended to become more 
and more engrossed in other problems. It began to 
concern itself earnestly with the improvement of the 
condition of the people, and with the reform and 
consolidation of institutions. Incidentally, and as a 
part of each of these endeavours, the development of 
an estate which had come, mainly by inheritance, 
into the trusteeship of the British people, began seri- 
ously to occupy their thoughts. 

These were problems of great worth and dignity, 
but nevertheless there was one condition of their suc- 
cessful solution, which ought to have been kept in 
mind, but which possibly was somewhat overlooked. 
If we allowed ourselves to be so much absorbed by 
these two problems that we gave insufficient heed to 
our defences, it was as certain as any human forecast 
could be, that the solution of a great deal, which was 
perplexing us in the management of our internal 
affairs, would be summarily taken out of the hands 
of Britain and her Dominions and solved according 
to the ideas of strangers. 

If we were to bring our policy of social and con- 
stitutional improvement and the development of 
our estate to a successful issue, we must be safe 
from interruption from outside. We must secure 
ourselves against foreign aggression ; for we needed 
time. Our various problems could not be solved 
in a day or even in a generation. The most urgent 



210 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 



Part III. 

Chapter 
II. 

Three 

governing 

ideas. 



of all matters was security, for it was the prime con- 
dition of all the rest. 

We desired, not merely to hold what we had got, 
but to enjoy it, and make it fructify and prosper, in 
our own way, and under our own institutions. For 
this we needed peace within our own sphere; and 
therefore it was necessary that we should be strong 
enough to enforce peace. 

During the post- Victorian period — this short 
epoch of transition — there were therefore three sepa- 
rate sets of problems which between them absorbed 
the energies of public men and occupied the thoughts 
of all private persons, at home and in the Dominions, 
to whom the present and future well-being of their 
country was a matter of concern. 

The first of these problems was Defence: How 
might the British Commonwealth, which held so vast 
a portion of the habitable globe, and which was re- 
sponsible for the government of a full quarter of all 
the people who dwelt thereon — how might it best 
secure itself against the dangers which threatened 
it from without ? 

The second was the problem of the Constitution: 
How could we best develop, to what extent must we 
remake or remould, our ancient institutions, so as 
to fit them for those duties and responsibilities which 
new conditions required that they should be able to 
perform? Under this head we were faced with 
projects, not merely of local self-government, of 
'Home Rule,' and of * Federalism'; not merely 
with the working of the Parliament Act, with the 
composition, functions, and powers of the Second 
Chamber, with the Referendum, the Franchise, and 



IMPORTANCE OF SOCIAL REFORM 211 

such like; but also with that vast and even more paetIH. 
perplexing question — what were to be the future re- Chapter 
lations between the Mother Country and the self -gov- IL 
erning Dominions on the one hand, and between Three 
these five democratic nations and the Indian Empire fdJaT"^ 
and the Dependencies upon the other? 

For the third set of problems no concise title has 
yet been found. Social Reform does not cover it, 
though perhaps it comes nearer doing so than any 
other. The matters involved here were so multifari- 
ous and, apparently at least, so detached one from 
another — they presented themselves to different 
minds at so many different angles and under such 
different aspects — that no single word or phrase was 
altogether satisfactory. But briefly, what all men 
were engaged in searching after — the Labour party, 
no more and no less than the Radicals and the Tories 
— was how we could raise the character and material 
conditions of our people ; how by better organisation 
we could root out needless misery of mind and body; 
how we could improve the health and the intelligence, 
stimulate the sense of duty and fellowship, the effi- 
ciency and the patriotism of the whole community. 

Of these three sets of problems with which the 
British race has recently been occupying itself, this, 
the third, is intrinsically by far the most important. 

It is the most important because it is an end in 
itself whereas the other two are only the means for 
achieving this end. Security against foreign attack 
is a desirable and worthy object only in order to en- 
able us to approach this goal. A strong and flexible 
constitution is an advantage only because we believe 
it will enable us to achieve our objects, better and 
more quickly, than if we are compelled to go on work- 



212 THE SPIEIT OF BRITISH POLICY 

pabtIIL j n g under a system which has become at once rigid 
Chapter an( j r i c k e ty. But while we were bound to realise the 

L superior nature of the third set of problems, we 

fbree . should have been careful at the same time to distin- 

governing 

ideas. guish between two things which are very apt to be 
confused in political discussions — ultimate impor- 
tance and immediate urgency. 

We ought to have taken into our reckoning both 
the present state of the world and the permanent 
nature of man — all the stuff that dreams and wars 
are made on. We desired peace. We needed peace. 
Peace was a matter of life and death to all our hopes. 
If defeat should once break into the ring of our 
commonwealth — scattered as it is all over the world, 
kept together only by the finest and most delicate 
attachments — it must be broken irreparably. Our 
most immediate interest was therefore to keep de- 
feat, and if possible, war, from bursting into our 
sphere — as Dutchmen by centuries of laborious vigi- 
lance have kept back the sea with dikes. 

The numbers of our people in themselves were no 
security ; nor our riches ; nor even the fact that we 
entertained no aggressive designs. For as it was said 
long ago, 'it never troubles a wolf how many the 
sheep be.' They find no salvation in their heavy 
fleeces and their fat haunches ; nor even in the meek- 
ness of their hearts, and in their innocence of all evil 
intentions. 

The characteristic of this period may be summed 
up in one short sentence; the vast majority of the 
British people were bent and determined — as they 
had never been bent and determined before — upon 
leaving their country better than they had found it. 



THE RESULTS OF CONFUSION 213 

To some this statement will seem a paradox. "Was part ni. 
* there ever a time," they may ask, "when there Chapter 
'had been so many evidences of popular unrest, dis- n - 
'content, bitterness and anger; or when there had T^ee 
'ever appeared to be so great an inclination, on the S^ 1 ™ 
' one hand to apathy and cynicism, on the other hand 
'to despair?" 

Were all this true, it would still be no paradox; 
but only a natural consequence. Things are very 
liable to slip into this state, when men who are 
in earnest — knowing the facts as they exist in 
their respective spheres; knowing the evils at first 
hand; believing (very often with reason) that they 
understand the true remedies — find themselves 
baulked, and foiled, and headed off at every turn, 
their objects misconceived and their motives mis- 
construed, and the current of their wasted efforts 
burying itself hopelessly in the sand. Under such 
conditions as these, public bodies and political par- 
ties alike — confused by the multitude and congestion 
of issues — are apt to bestow their dangerous atten- 
tions, now on one matter which happens to dart into 
the limelight, now upon another; but in the general 
hubbub and perplexity they lose all sense, both of 
true proportion and natural priority. Everything 
is talked about; much is attempted in a piecemeal, 
slap-dash, impulsive fashion; inconsiderably little 
is brought to any conclusion whatsoever; while 
nothing, or next to nothing, is considered on its 
merits, and carried through thoughtfully to a clean 
and abiding settlement. . . . The word 'thorough' 
seemed to have dropped out of the political vocabu- 
lary. In an age of specialism politics alone was 
abandoned to the Jack-of-all-trades. 



Past III. 

Chapter 

II. 

Three 

governing 

ideas. 



214 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 

This phenomenon — the depreciated currency of 
public character — was not peculiar to one party 
more than another. It was not even peculiar to 
this particular time. It has shown itself at various 
epochs — much in the same way as the small-pox and 
the plague — when favoured by insanitary conditions. 
The sedate Scots philosopher, Adam Smith, writing 
during the gloomy period which fell upon England 
after the glory of the great Chatham had departed, 
could not repress his bitterness against * ' that insidi- 
'ous and crafty animal, vulgarly called a statesman 
'or politician, whose councils are directed by the 
'momentary fluctuations of affairs." It would seem 
as if the body politic is not unlike the human, and 
becomes more readily a prey to vermin, when it has 
sunk into a morbid condition. 



Popular judgment may be trusted as a rule, and 
in the long run, to decide a clear issue between truth 
and falsehood, and to decide it in favour of the 
former. But it becomes perplexed, when it is called 
upon to discriminate between the assurances of two 
rival sets of showmen, whose eagerness to outbid 
each other in the public favour leaves truthfulness 
out of account. In the absence of gold, one brazen 
counterfeit rings very much like another. People 
may be suspicious of both coins; but on the whole 
their fancy is more readily caught by the optimist 
effigy than the pessimist. They may not place en- 
tire trust in the ' ever-cheerful man of sin,' with 
his flattery, his abounding sympathy, his flowery 
promises, and his undefeated hopefulness; but 
they prefer him at any rate to 'the melancholy 
Jaques,' booming maledictions with a mournful 



AETIFICIAL ANTAGONISMS 



215 



Three 

governing 

ideas. 



constancy, like some bittern in the desolation of the PartIIL 

marshes. Chapter 

So far as principles were concerned most of the II - 
trouble was unnecessary. Among the would-be re- 
formers — among those who sincerely desired to 
bring about efficiency within their own spheres — 
there was surprisingly little that can truly be called 
antagonism. But competition of an important kind 
— competition for public attention and priority of 
treatment — had produced many of the unfortunate 
results of antagonism. It was inevitable that this 
lamentable state of things must continue, until it 
had been realised that one small body of men, elected 
upon a variety of cross issues, could not safely be 
left in charge of the defence of the Empire, the do- 
mestic welfare of the United Kingdom, and the local 
government of its several units. 

It was not merely that the various aims were not 
opposed to one another; they were actually helpful 
to one another. Often, indeed, they were essential 
to the permanent success of one another. The man 
who desired to improve the conditions of the poor 
was not, therefore, the natural enemy of him who 
wanted to place the national defences on a secure 
footing. And neither of these was the natural enemy 
of others who wished to bring about a settlement of 
the Irish question, or of the Constitutional question, 
or of the Imperial question. But owing partly to the 
inadequacy of the machinery for giving a free course 
to these various aspirations — partly to the fact that 
the machinery itself was antiquated, in bad repair, 
and had become clogged with a variety of obstruc- 
tions — there was an unfortunate tendency on the 
part of every one who had any particular object very 



216 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 



Part III. 

Chapter 

II. 

Three 

governing 

ideas. 



much at heart, to regard every one else who was 
equally concerned about any other object as an im- 
pediment in his path. 

The need of the time, of course, was leadership — 
a great man — or better still two great men, one on 
each side — like the blades of a pair of scissors — to 
cut a way out of the confusion by bringing their keen 
edges into contact. But obviously, the greater the con- 
fusion the harder it is for leadership to assert itself. 
We may be sure enough that there were men of char- 
acter and capacity equal to the task if only they could 
have been discovered. But they were not discovered. 

There were other things besides the confusion of 
aims and ideas which made it hard for leaders to 
emerge. The loose coherency of parties which pre- 
vailed during the greater part of the nineteenth 
century had given place to a set of highly organised 
machines, which employed without remorse the 
oriental method of strangulation, against everything 
in the nature of independent effort and judgment. 
The politician class had increased greatly in num- 
bers and influence. The eminent and ornamental peo- 
ple who were returned to Westminster filled the pub- 
lic eye, but they were only a small proportion of 
the whole; nor is it certain that they exercised the 
largest share of authority. When in the autumn 
of 1913 Sir John Brunner determined to prevent 
Mr. Churchill from obtaining the provisions for the 
Navy which were judged necessary for the safety 
of the Empire, the method adopted was to raise the 
National Liberal Federation against the First Lord 
of the Admiralty, and through the agency of that 
powerful organisation to bring pressure to bear 



BAD MONEY DRIVES OUT GOOD 217 
upon the country, members of Parliament, and the partIIL 

Cabinet itself. Chapter 

It is unpopular to say that the House of Commons IL 
has deteriorated in character, but it is true. An Three 
assembly, the members of which cannot call their ^^ am 
souls their own, will never tend in an upward direc- 
tion. The machines which are managed with so 
much energy and skill by the external parasites of 
politics, have long ago taken over full responsibility 
for the souls of their nominees. According to ' Gres- 
ham's law,' bad money, if admitted into currency, 
will always end by driving out good. A similar 
principle has been at work for some time past in 
British public life, by virtue of which the baser kind 
of politicians, having got a footing, are driving out 
their betters at a rapid pace. Pew members of 
Parliament will admit this fact; but they are not 
impartial judges, for every one is naturally averse 
from disparaging an institution to which he belongs. 

During the nineteenth century, except at the very 
beginning, and again at the very end of it, very few 
people ever thought of going into Parliament, or 
even into politics, in order that they might thrive 
thereby, or find a field for improving their private 
fortunes. This cannot be said with truth of the 
epoch which has just ended. There has been a change 
both in tone and outlook during the last thirty years. 
Things have been done and approved by the House 
of Commons, elected in December 1910, which it 
is quite inconceivable that the House of Commons, 
returned in 1880, would ever have entertained. The 
Gladstonian era had its faults, but among them lax- 
ity in matters of finance did not figure. Indeed pri- 
vate members, as well as statesmen, not infrequently 



218 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 

Part ill. crossed the border-line which separates purism from 
Chapter pedantry; occasionally they carried strictness to 
II - the verge of absurdity; but this was a fault in the 
Three right direction — a great safeguard to the public in- 

ideaa mne terest, a peculiarly valuable tendency from the stand- 
point of democracy. 

A twelvemonth ago a number of very foolish per- 
sons were anxious to persuade us that the pre- 
dominant issue was the Army versus the People. 
But even the crispness of the phrase was powerless 
to convince public opinion of so staggering an un- 
truth. The predominant issue at that particular 
moment was only what it had been for a good many 
years before — the People versus the Party System. 
What is apt to be ignored is, that with the increase 
of wealth on the one hand, and the extension of the 
franchise on the other, the Party System has gradu- 
ally become a vested interest upon an enormous scale, 
— like the liquor trade of which we hear so much, or 
the haute finance of which perhaps we hear too little. 
Rich men are required in politics, for the reason that 
it is necessary to feed and clothe the steadily in- 
creasing swarms of mechanics who drive, and keep 
in repair, and add to, that elaborate machinery by 
means of which the Sovereign People is cajoled into 
the belief that its Will prevails. From the point of 
view of the orthodox political economist these work- 
ers are as unproductive as actors, bookmakers, or 
golf professionals ; but they have to be paid, other- 
wise they would starve, and the machines would stop. 
So long as there are plenty of rich men who desire 
to become even richer, or to decorate their names 
with titles, or to move in shining circles, this is 
not at all likely to occur, unless the Party System 



NEED OF RICH MEN 219 

suddenly collapsed, in which case there would be paetUI. 

acute distress. Chapter 

There are various grades of these artisans or IL 
mechanicians of politics, from the professional *niree 
organiser or agent who, upon the whole, is no more fdJi"" 
open to criticism than any other class of mankind 
which works honestly for its living — down to the 
committee-man who has no use for a candidate unless 
he keeps a table from which large crumbs fall in 
profusion. The man who supplements his income by 
means of politics is a greater danger than the other 
who openly makes politics his vocation. The jobbing 
printer, enthusiastically pacifist or protectionist, well 
paid for his hand-bills, and aspiring to more sub- 
stantial contracts ; the smart, ingratiating organiser, 
or hustling, bustling journalist, who receives a com- 
plimentary cheque, or a bundle of scrip, or a seat on 
a board of directors from the patron whom he has 
helped to win an election — very much as at ill- 
regulated shooting parties the head-keeper receives 
exorbitant tips from wealthy sportsmen whom he has 
placed to their satisfaction — all these are deeply 
interested in the preservation of the Party System. 
Innocent folk are often heard wondering why can- 
didates with such strange names — even stranger ap- 
pearance — accents and manner of speech which are 
strangest of all — are brought forward so frequently 
to woo the suffrages of urban constituencies. Clearly 
they are not chosen on account of their political 
knowledge; for they have none. There are other 
aspirants to political honours who, in comeliness 
and charm of manner, greatly excel them; whose 
speech is more eloquent, or at any rate less unin- 
telligible. Yet London caucuses in particular have 



220 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 



Part III. 

Chapter 

II. 

Three 

governing 

ideas. 



a great tenderness for these bejewelled patriots, and 
presumably there must be reasons for the preference 
which they receive. One imagines that in some in- 
scrutable way they are essential props of the Party 
System in its modern phase. 

The drawing together of the world by steam and 
electricity has brought conspicuous benefits to the 
British Empire. The five self-governing nations of 
which it is composed come closer together year by 
year. Statesmen and politicians broaden the horizons 
of their minds by swift and easy travel. But there 
are drawbacks as well as the reverse under these new 
conditions. To some extent the personnel of democ- 
racy has tended to become interchangeable, like the 
parts of a bicycle ; and public characters are able to 
transfer their activities from one state to another, 
and even from one hemisphere to another, without a 
great deal of difficulty. This has certain advantages, 
but possibly more from the point of view of the indi- 
vidual than from that of the Commonwealth. After 
failure in one sphere there is still hope in another. 
Mr. Micawber, or even Jeremy Diddler, may go the 
round, using up public confidence at one resting-place 
after another. For the Party System is a ready em- 
ployer, and providing a man has a glib tongue, a 
forehead of brass, or an open purse, a position will 
be found for him without too much enquiry made 
into his previous references. 

In a world filled with confusion and illusion the 
Party System has fought at great advantage. Indeed 
it is generally believed to be so firmly entrenched 
that nothing can ever dislodge it. There are dangers, 
however, in arguing too confidently from use and 
wont. Conspicuous failure or disaster might bring 



LAWYERISM AND LEADERSHIP 221 

ruin on this revered institution, as it has often done part hi. 
in history upon others no less venerable. The Party Chapter 
System has its weak side. Its wares are mainly I1, 
make-believes, and if a hurricane happens to burst T^ee 
suddenly, the caucus may be left in no better plight fdJi™" 1 
than Alnaschar with his overturned basket. The 
Party System is not invulnerable against a great man 
or a great idea. But of recent years it has been left 
at peace to go its own way, for the reason that no 
such man or idea has emerged, around which the 
English people have felt that they could cluster con- 
fidently. There has been no core on which human 
crystals could precipitate and attach themselves, fol- 
lowing the bent of their nature towards a firm and 
clear belief — or towards the prowess of a man — or to- 
wards a Man possessed by a Belief. The typical party 
leader during this epoch has neither been a man in 
the heroic sense, nor has he had any belief that could 
be called firm or clear. For the most part he has been 
merely a Whig or Tory tradesman, dealing in oppor- 
tunism ; and for the predominance of the Party Sys- 
tem this set of conditions was almost ideal. It was 
inconceivable that a policy of wait-and-see could ever 
resolve a situation of this sort. To fall back on 
lawyerism was perhaps inevitable in the circum- 
stances; but to think that it was possible to substi- 
tute lawyerism for leadership was absurd. 

And yet amid this confusion we were aware — even 
at the time — and can see much more clearly 
now the interlude is ended — that there were three 
great ideas running through it all, struggling to 
emerge, to make themselves understood, and to get 
themselves realised. But unfortunately what were 
realities to ordinary men were only counters accord- 



222 THE SPIEIT OF BRITISH POLICY 

Pabt ni. ing to the reckoning of the party mechanicians. The 
Chaptek first aim and the second — the improvement of the 
n - organisation of society and the conditions of the poor 
Three — the freeing of local aspirations and the knitting 
idJi together of the empire — were held in common by 
the great mass of the British people, although they 
were viewed by one section and another from differ- 
ent angles of vision. The third aim, however — the 
adequate defence of the empire — was not regarded 
warmly, or even with much active interest, by any 
organised section. The people who considered it 
most earnestly were not engaged in party politics. 
The manipulators of the machines looked upon the 
first and the second as means whereby power might 
be gained or retained, but they looked askance upon 
the third as a perilous problem which it was wiser 
and safer to leave alone. The great principles with 
which the names — among others — of Mr. Chamber- 
lain, Lord Roberts, and Mr. Lloyd George are asso- 
ciated, were at no point opposed one to another. 
Each indeed was dependent upon the other two for 
its full realisation. And yet, under the artificial en- 
tanglements of the Party System, the vigorous pur- 
suit of any one of the three seemed to imperil the 
success of both its competitors. 



arma- 
ments. 



CHAPTEE III 

POLICY AND ARMAMENTS 

In the post- Victorian epoch, which we have been partiii. 
engaged in considering, the aim of British foreign chapter 
policy may be summed up in one word — Security. ni - 
It was not aggression; it was not revenge; it was Poiicyand 
not conquest, or even expansion of territories; it 
was simply Security. 

It would be absurd, of course, to imagine that 
security is wholly, or even mainly, a question of 
military preparations. "All this is but a sheep in 
'a lion's skin, where the people are of weak cour- 
' age ; ' ' or where for any reason, the people are di- 
vided among themselves or disaffected towards their 
government. 

The defences of every nation are of two kinds, 
the organised and the unorganised; the disciplined 
strength of the Navy and the Army on the one 
hand, the vigour and spirit of the people upon the 
other. 

The vigour of the people will depend largely upon 
the conditions under which they live, upon sufficiency 
of food, the healthiness or otherwise of their employ- 
ments and homes, the proper nourishment and up- 
bringing of their children. It is not enough that 
rates of wages should be good, if those who earn them 

223 



224 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 



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have not the knowledge how to use them to the best 
advantage. It is not always where incomes are low- 
est that the conditions of life are worst. Measured 
by infant mortality, and by the health and general 
happiness of the community, the crofters of Scotland, 
who are very poor, seem to have learned the lesson 
how to live better than the highly paid workers in 
many of our great manufacturing towns. 

Education — by which is meant not merely board- 
school instruction, but the influence of the home and 
the surrounding society — is not a less necessary con- 
dition of vigour than wages, sanitary regulations, 
and such like. The spiritual as well as the physical 
training of children, the nature of their amusements, 
the bent of their interests, the character of their aims 
and ideals, at that critical period when the boy or 
girl is growing into manhood or womanhood — all 
these are things which conduce directly, as well as 
indirectly, to the vigour of the race. They are every 
bit as much a part of our system of national defence 
as the manoeuvring of army corps and the gun-prac- 
tice of dreadnoughts. 

The spirit of the people, on the other hand, will 
depend for its strength upon their attachment to 
their own country; upon their affection for its cus- 
toms, laws, and institutions; upon a belief in the 
general fairness and justice of its social arrange- 
ments ; upon the good relations of the various classes 
of which society is composed. The spirit of national 
unity is indispensable even in the case of the most 
powerful autocracy. It is the very foundation of 
democracy. Lacking it, popular government is but 
a house of cards, which the first serious challenge 
from without, or the first strong outburst of dis- 



arma- 
ments. 



A TWO-HEADED PRINCIPLE 225 

content from within will bring tumbling to the partIII. 
ground. Such a feeling of unity can only spring from Chapter 
the prevalence of an opinion among every class of IIL 
the community, that their own system, with all its Policy and 
faults, is better suited to their needs, habits, and 
traditions than any other, and that it is worth pre- 
serving, even at the cost of the greatest sacrifices, 
from foreign conquest and interference. 

While a people sapped by starvation and disease 
will be wanting in the vigour necessary for offering 
a prolonged and strenuous resistance, so will a peo- 
ple, seething with class hatred and a sense of tyran- 
ny and injustice, be wanting in the spirit. The prob- 
lem, however, of these unorganised defences, funda- 
mental though it is, stands outside the scope of the 
present chapter, which is concerned solely with those 
defences which are organised. 

The beginning of wisdom with respect to all prob- 
lems of defence is the recognition of the two-headed 
principle that Policy depends on Armaments just as 
certainly as Armaments depend on Policy. 

The duty of the Admiralty and the War Office 
is to keep their armaments abreast of the national 
endeavour. It is folly to do more: it is madness 
to do less. The duty of the Foreign Minister is to 
restrain and hold back his policy, and to prevent 
it from ambitiously outrunning the capacity of the 
armaments which are at his disposal. If he does 
otherwise the end is likely to be humiliation and 
disaster. 

When any nation is unable or unwilling to provide 
the armaments necessary for supporting the policy 
which it has been accustomed to pursue and would 



226 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 



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like to maintain, it should have the sense to abandon 
that policy for something of a humbler sort before 
the bluff is discovered by the world. 1 

It may possibly appear absurd to dwell with so 
much insistence upon a pair of propositions which, 
when they are set down in black and white, will at 
once be accepted as self-evident by ninety-nine men 
out of a hundred. But plain and obvious as they 
are, none in the whole region of politics have been 
more frequently ignored. These two principles have 
been constantly presenting themselves to the eyes of 
statesmen in a variety of different shapes ever since 
history began. 

It may very easily happen that the particular 
policy which the desire for security requires, is one 
which the strength of the national armaments at a 
given moment will not warrant the country in pur- 
suing. Faced with this unpleasant quandary, what 
is Government to do, if it be convinced of the futil- 
ity of trying to persuade the people to incur the sac- 
rifices necessary for realising the national aspira- 
tions? Is it to give up the traditional policy, and 
face the various consequences which it is reasonable 
to anticipate? Or is it to persevere in the policy, 
and continue acting as if the forces at its disposal 
were sufficient for its purpose, when in fact they are 
nothing of the kind? To follow the former course 



1 American writers have urged criticism of this sort against the arma- 
ments of the U.S.A., which they allege are inadequate to uphold the 
policy of the ' Monroe Doctrine. ' The German view of the matter has 
been stated by the Chancellor (April 7, 1913) when introducing the 
Army Bill: — "History knows of no people which came to disaster be- 
' cause it had exhausted itself in the making of its defences ; but history 
'knows of many peoples which have perished, because, living in pros- 
'perity and luxury, they neglected their defences. A people which 
'thinks that it is not rich enough to maintain its armaments shows 
' merely that it has played its part. ' ' 



POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES 227 

calls for a surrender which the spirit of the people PartIIL 
will not easily endure, and which may even be fatal Chapter 
to the independent existence of the state. But to IIL 
enter upon the latter is conduct worthy of a f raudu- p©ucy and 
lent bankrupt, since it trades upon an imposture, n^S. 
which, when it is found out by rival nations, will 
probably be visited by the severest penalties. 

But surely Government has only to make it clear 
to the people that, unless they are willing to bring 
their armaments abreast of their policy, national 
aspirations must be baulked and even national safety 
itself may be endangered. When men are made to 
understand these things, will they not certainly agree 
to do what is necessary, though they may give their 
consent with reluctance ? x 

It is very certain, however, that this outside view 
of the case enormously underrates the difficulties 
which stare the politician out of countenance. In 
matters of this sort it is not so easy a thing to arrive 
at the truth; much less to state it with such force 
and clearness that mankind will at once recognise 
it for truth, and what is said to the contrary for 
falsehood. The intentions of foreign governments, 
and the dangers arising out of that quarter, are sub- 
jects which it is singularly difficult to discuss frankly, 
without incurring the very evils which every govern- 
ment seeks to avoid. And if these things are not 
easy to discuss, it is exceedingly easy for faction or 
fanatics to misrepresent them. 2 Moreover, the lamen- 

1 So the argument runs, and the course of our naval policy since Mr. 
Stead 's famous press campaign in 1884 will be cited as an encourage- 
ment. 

2 E.g. in the winter of 1908 and spring of 1909, when an influential 
section of the supporters of the present Cabinet chose to believe the 
false assurances of the German Admiralty, and freely accused their own 
Government of mendacity. 



228 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 



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tations of the Hebrew prophets bear witness to the 
deafness and blindness of generations into whom ac- 
tual experience of the evils foretold had not already 
burnt the lesson which it was desired to teach. Evils 
which have never been suffered are hard things to 
clothe with reality until it is too late, and words, 
even the most eloquent and persuasive, are but a 
poor implement for the task. 

The policy of a nation is determined upon, so as 
to accord with what it conceives to be its honour, 
safety, and material interests. In the natural 
course of events this policy may check, or be checked 
by, the policy of some other nation. The efforts of 
diplomacy may be successful in clearing away these 
obstructions. If so, well and good ; but if not, there 
is nothing left to decide the issue between the two 
nations but the stern arbitrament of war. 

Moreover, diplomacy itself is dependent upon ar- 
maments in somewhat the same sense as the pros- 
perity of a merchant is dependent upon his credit 
with his bankers. The news system of the world has 
undergone a revolution since the days before steam 
and telegraphs. It is not merely more rapid, but 
much ampler. The various governments are kept 
far more fully informed of one another's affairs, 
and as a consequence the great issues between na- 
tions have become clear and sharp. The most crafty 
and smooth-tongued ambassador can rarely wheedle 
his opponents into concessions which are contrary to 
their interests, unless he has something more to 
rely upon than his own guile and plausibility. Army 
corps and battle fleets looming in the distance are 
better persuaders than the subtlest arguments and 
the deftest flattery. 



EXAMPLE OF CHINA 229 

What, then, is the position of a statesman who partiii. 
finds himself confronted by a clash of policies, if, Chapter 
when the diplomatic deadlock occurs, he realises that IIL 
his armaments are insufficient to support his aim? Policy and 
In such an event he is faced with the alternative ^^ 
of letting judgment go by default, or of adding al- 
most certain military disaster to the loss of those 
political stakes for which his nation is contending 
with its rival. Such a position must be ignominious 
in the extreme; it might even be ruinous; and yet 
it would be the inevitable fate of any country 
whose ministers had neglected the maxim that pol- 
icy in the last resort is dependent upon arma- 
ments. 

If we are in search of an example we shall find it 
ready to our hand. The Empire of China is com- 
parable to our own at least in numbers; for each 
of them contains, as nearly as may be, one quarter 
of the whole human race. And as China has hitherto 
failed utterly to make her armaments sufficient, un- 
der the stress of modern conditions, to support even 
that meek and passive policy of possession which 
she has endeavoured to pursue, so she has been com- 
pelled to watch in helplessness while her policy has 
been disregarded by every adventurer. She has 
been pressed by all the nations of the world and 
obliged to yield to their demands. Humiliating con- 
cessions have been wrung from her; favours even 
more onerous, in the shape of loans, have been 
forced upon her. The resources with which nature 
has endowed her have been exploited by foreigners 
against her will. Her lands have been shorn from 
her and parcelled out among those who were strong, 
and who hungered after them. This conquest and 



230 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 



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robbery has proceeded both by wholesale and retail. 
Because she yielded this to one claimant, another, 
to keep the balance even, has insisted upon that. 
Safe and convenient harbours, fortifiedplaces,islands, 
vast stretches of territory, have been demanded and 
taken from her almost without a struggle; and all 
this time she has abstained with a timid caution from 
anything which can justly be termed provocation. 
For more than half a century, none the less, China 
has not been mistress in her own house. 

The reason of this is plain enough — China had 
possessions which other nations coveted, and she 
failed to provide herself with the armaments which 
were necessary to maintain them. 

The British people likewise had possessions which 
other nations coveted — lands to take their settlers, 
markets to buy their goods, plantations to yield 
them raw materials. If it were our set determi- 
nation to hold what our forefathers won, two 
things were necessary: the first, that our policy 
should conform to this aim; the second, that our 
armaments should be sufficient to support our 
policy. 

A nation which desired to extend its possessions, 
to round off its territories, to obtain access to the 
sea, would probably regard conquest, or at all events 
absorption, as its highest immediate interest. This 
would be the constant aim of its policy, and if its 
armaments did not conform to this policy, the aim 
would not be realised. Examples both of failure and 
success are to be found in the history of Russia from 
the time of Peter the Great, and in that of Prussia 
from the days of the Great Elector. 

A nation — like England or Holland in the six- 



BKITISH CONTENTMENT 231 

teenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries — which Part hi. 
was seeking to secure against its commercial rivals, Chapter 
if necessary by force of arms, new markets among IIL 
civilised but unmilitary races, would require a policy Polic y and 
and armaments to correspond. ments. 

The British Empire in the stage of development 
which it had reached at the end of the Victorian 
era did not aim at acquisition of fresh territories 
or new markets, save such as might be won peace- 
fully by the skill and enterprise of its merchants. 
It sought only to hold what it already possessed, to 
develop its internal resources, and to retain equal 
rights with its commercial rivals in neutral spheres. 
But in order that those unaggressive objects might 
be realised, there was need of a policy, different 
indeed from that of Elizabeth, of Cromwell, or of 
Chatham, but none the less clear and definite with 
regard to its own ends. And to support this policy 
there was need of armaments, suitable in scale and 
character. 

It was frequently pointed out between the years 
1901 and 1914 (and it lay at the very root of the 
matter), that while we were perfectly satisfied with 
things as they stood, and should have been more than 
content — regarding the subject from the standpoint 
of our own interests — to have left the map of the 
world for ever, as it then was drawn, another nation 
was by no means so well pleased with existing ar- 
rangements. To this envious rival it appeared that 
we had taken more than our fair share — as people 
are apt to do who come early. We had wider terri- 
tories than we could yet fill with our own people; 
while our neighbour foresaw an early date at which 
his race would be overflowing its boundaries. We 



arma- 
ments 



232 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 

Part in. had limitless resources in the Dominions and De- 
Chapter pendencies overseas, which when developed would 
IIL provide a united empire with markets of inestimable 
policy and value. In these respects Germany was in a less fa- 
vourable position. Indeed, with the exceptions of 
Russia and the United States, no other great Power 
was so fortunately placed as ourselves; and even 
these two nations, although they had an advantage 
over the British Empire by reason of their huge 
compact and coterminous territories, still did not 
equal it in the vastness and variety of their unde- 
veloped resources. 

Clearly, therefore, the policy which the needs of 
our Commonwealth required at this great turning- 
point in its history, was not only something different 
from that of any other great Power, but also some- 
thing different from that which had served our own 
purposes in times gone by. Like China, our aim was 
peaceful possession. Unlike China, we ought to have 
kept in mind the conditions under which alone this 
aim was likely to be achieved. It might be irksome 
and contrary to our peaceful inclinations to maintain 
great armaments when we no longer dreamed cf 
making conquests; but in the existing state of the 
world, armaments were unfortunately quite as neces- 
sary for the purpose of enabling us to hold what we 
possessed, as they ever were when our forefathers 
set out to win the Empire. 

In 1904, with the object of promoting harmony 
between the policy and armaments of the British 
Empire, Mr. Balfour created the Committee of Im- 
perial Defence. This was undoubtedly a step of 
great importance. His purpose was to introduce a 
system, by means of which ministers and high offi- 



COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE 233 

cials responsible for the Navy and Army would be partIII. 
/be kept in close touch with the trend of national Chapter 
policy, in so far as it might affect the relations of the IIL 
Commonwealth with foreign Powers. In like manner Policy and 
those other ministers and high officials, whose busi- ^Ja. 
ness it was to conduct our diplomacy, maintain an 
understanding with the Dominions, administer our 
Dependencies, and govern India, would be made 
thoroughly conversant with the limitations to our 
naval and military strength. Having this knowledge, 
they would not severally embark on irreconcilable 
or impracticable projects or drift unknowingly into 
dangerous complications. The conception of the 
Committee of Imperial Defence, therefore, was due 
to a somewhat tardy recognition of the two-headed 
principle, that armaments are mere waste of money 
unless they conform to policy, and that policy in 
the last resort must depend on armaments. 

The Committee was maintained by Mr. Balfour's 
successors, and was not allowed (as too often happens 
when there is a change of government) to fall into 
discredit and disuse. 1 But in order that this body 
of statesmen and experts might achieve the ends in 
view, it was essential for them to have realised clearly, 
not only the general object of British policy — which 
indeed was contained in the single word 'Security' 
— but also the special dangers which loomed in the 
near future. They had then to consider what re- 
ciprocal obligations had already been contracted with 
other nations, whose interests were to some extent 
the same as our own, and what further undertakings 

1 Innovations of this particular sort have possibly a better chance of 
preserving their existence than some others. ' Boards are screens, ' wrote 
John Stuart Mill, or some other profound thinker; and in politics 
screens are always useful. 



234 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 



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of a similar character it might be desirable to enter 
into. Finally, there were the consequences which 
these obligations and undertakings would entail in 
certain contingencies. It was not enough merely to 
mumble the word 'Security' and leave it at that. 
What security implied in the then existing state of 
the world was a matter which required to be in- 
vestigated in a concrete, practical, and business-like 
way. 

Unfortunately, the greater part of these essential 
preliminaries was omitted, and as a consequence, the 
original idea of the Committee of Imperial Defence 
was never realised. Harmonious, flexible, and of 
considerable utility in certain directions, it did not 
work satisfactorily as a whole. The trend of policy 
was, no doubt, grasped in a general way; but, as 
subsequent events have proved, the conditions on 
which alone that line could be maintained, and the 
consequences which it involved, were not at any time 
clearly understood and boldly faced by this august 
body in its corporate capacity. 

The general direction may have been settled ; but 
certainly the course was not marked out ; the rocks 
and shoals remained for the most part uncharted. 
The committee, no doubt, had agreed upon a certain 
number of vague propositions, as, for example, that 
France must not be crushed by Germany, or the 
neutrality of Belgium violated by any one. They 
knew that we were committed to certain obligations 
— or, as some people called them, ' entanglements' — 
and that these again, in certain circumstances, might 
commit us to others. But what the whole amounted 
to was not realised in barest outline, by the country, 
or by Parliament, or by the Government, or even, 



CONFUSION WHEN WAR OCCURRED 235 

we may safely conjecture, by the Committee itself. PabtIIL 
We have the right to say this, because, if British Chapter 
policy had been realised as a whole by the Committee IIL 
of Imperial Defence, it would obviously have been Poifcyand 
communicated to the Cabinet, and in its broader menta. 
aspects to the people ; and this was never done. It is 
inconceivable that any Prime Minister, who believed, 
as Mr. Asquith does, in democratic principles, would 
have left the country uneducated, and his own 
colleagues unenlightened, on a matter of so great im- 
portance, had his own mind been clearly made up. 

When the crisis occurred in July 1914, when Ger- 
many proceeded to action, when events took place 
which for years past had been foretold and discussed 
very fully on both sides of the North Sea, it was as 
if a bolt had fallen from the blue. Uncertainty was- 
apparent in all quarters. The very thing which had 
been so often talked of had happened. Germany 
was collecting her armies and preparing to crush 
France. The neutrality of Belgium was threatened. 
Yet up to, and on, Sunday, August 2, there was 
doubt and hesitation in the Cabinet, and until some 
days later, also in Parliament and the country. 1 

When, finally, it was decided to declare war, the 
course of action which that step required still ap- 
pears to have remained obscure to our rulers. Until 
the Thursday following it was not decided to send 
the Expeditionary Force abroad. Then, out of timid- 
ity, only two-thirds of it were sent. 2 Transport ar- 
rangements which were all ready for moving the 

1 This is obvious from the White Paper without seeking further 
evidence in the ministerial press or elsewhere. 

* Of the six infantry divisions included in the Expeditionary Force 
only four were sent in the first instance ; a fifth arrived about August 
24: a sixth about mid-September. 



236 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 



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whole force had to be hastily readjusted. The delay 
was not less injurious than the parsimony; and the 
combination of the two nearly proved fatal. 

If the minds of the people and their leaders were 
not prepared for what happened, if in the moral 
sense there was unreadiness; still more inadequate 
were all preparations of the material kind — not only 
the actual numbers of our Army, but also the whole 
system for providing expansion, training, equipment, 
and munitions. It is asking too much of us to be- 
lieve that events could have happened as they did 
in England during the fortnight which followed the 
presentation of the Austrian Ultimatum to Servia, 
had the Committee of Imperial Defence and its dis- 
tinguished president taken pains beforehand to en- 
visage clearly the conditions and consequences in- 
volved in their policy of ' Security. ' 

As regards naval preparations, things were better 
indeed than might have been expected, considering 
the vagueness of ideas in the matter of policy. We 
were safeguarded here by tradition, and the general 
idea of direction had been nearly sufficient. There 
was always trouble, but not as a rule serious trouble, 
in establishing the case for increases necessary to 
keep ahead of German efforts. There had been 
pinchings and parings — especially in the matter of 
fast cruisers, for lack of which, when war broke out, 
we suffered heavy losses — but except in one instance — 
the abandonment of the Cawdor programme — these 
had not touched our security at any vital point. 

Thanks largely to Mr. Stead, but also to states- 
men of both parties, and to a succession of Naval 
Lords who did not hesitate, when occasion required 
it, to risk their careers (as faithful servants ever will) 



THE NAVAL POSITION 237 

rather than certify safety where they saw danger — Part hi. 
thanks, perhaps, most of all to a popular instinct, Chapter 
deeply implanted in the British mind, which had IIL 
grasped the need for supremacy at sea — our naval Polic y and 
preparations, upon the whole, had kept abreast of menta. 
our policy for nearly thirty years. 

As regards the Army, however, it was entirely 
different. There had been no intelligent effort to 
keep our military strength abreast of our policy; 
and as, in many instances, it would have been too 
bitter a humiliation to keep our policy within the 
limits of our military strength, the course actually 
pursued can only be described fitly as a game of 
bluff. 

There had never been anything approaching agree- 
ment with regard to the functions which the Army 
was expected to perform. Not only did political 
parties differ one from another upon this primary 
and fundamental question, but hardly two succeed- 
ing War Ministers had viewed it in the same light. 
There had been schemes of a bewildering variety; 
but as the final purpose for which soldiers existed 
had never yet been frankly laid down and accepted, 
each of these plans in turn had been discredited by 
attacks, which called in question the very basis of 
the proposed reformation. 

While naval policy had been framed and carried 
out in accordance with certain acknowledged necessi- 
ties of national existence, military policy had been 
alternately expanded and deflated in order to assuage 
the anxieties, while conforming to the prejudices — 
real or supposed — of the British public. In the case 
of the fleet, we had very fortunately arrived, more 
than a generation ago, at the point where it was a 



238 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 



Part III. 

Chapter 

III. 

Policy and 
arma- 
ments. 



question of what the country needed ; as regards the 
Army, it was still a question of what the country 
would stand. But how could even a politician know 
what the country would stand until the full case had 
been laid before the country? How was it that while 
Ministers of both parties had the courage to put the 
issue more or less nakedly in the matter of ships, 
they grew timid as soon as the discussion turned on 
army corps'? If the needs of the Commonwealth 
were to be the touchstone in the one case, why not 
also in the other? The country will stand a great 
deal more than the politicians think ; and it will stand 
almost anything better than vacillation, evasion, and 
untruth. In army matters, unfortunately, it has 
had experience of little else since the battle of Wa- 
terloo. 

Mathematicians, metaphysicians, and economists 
have a fondness for what is termed ' an assumption. ' 
They take for granted something which it would be 
inconvenient or impossible to prove, and thereupon 
proceed to build upon it a fabric which compels ad- 
miration in a less or greater degree, by reason of its 
logical consistency. There is no great harm in this 
method so long as the conclusions, which are drawn 
from the airy calculations of the study, are con- 
fined to the peaceful region of their birth; but so 
soon as they begin to sally forth into the harsh 
world of men and affairs, they are apt to break at 
once into shivers. "When the statesman makes an 
assumption he does so at his peril; or, perhaps, to 
speak more correctly, at the peril of his country. 
For if it be a false assumption the facts will 
speedily find it out, and disasters will inevitably 
ensue. 



TWO INCORRECT ASSUMPTIONS 239 

Our Governments, Tory and Radical alike, have PartIH. 
acted in recent times as if the British Army were Chapter 
what their policy required it to be — something, that IIL 
is, entirely different from what it really was. Judg- Policy and 
ing by its procedure, the Foreign Office would appear m™ts. 
to have made the singularly bold assumption that, 
in a military comparison with other nations, Britain 
was still in much the same relative position as in the 
days of Napoleon. Sustained by this tenacious but 
fantastic tradition, Ministers have not infrequently 
engaged in policies which wiser men would have 
avoided. They have uttered protests, warnings, 
threats which have gone unheeded. They have pre- 
sumed to say what would and would not be tol- 
erated in certain spheres; but having nothing bet- 
ter behind their despatches than a mere assumption 
which did not correspond with the facts, they have 
been compelled to endure rebuffs and humiliations. 
As they had not the prudence to cut their coat ac- 
cording to their cloth, it was only natural that oc- 
casionally they should have had to appear before 
the world in a somewhat ridiculous guise. 

British statesmen for nearly half a century had 
persisted in acting upon two most dangerous as- 
sumptions. They had assumed that one branch of 
the national armaments conformed to their policy, 
when in fact it did not. And they had assumed also, 
which is equally fatal, that policy, if only it be virtu- 
ous and unaggressive, is in some mysterious way 
self-supporting, and does not need to depend on ar- 
maments at all. 

The military preparations of Britain were inade- 
quate to maintain the policy of Security, which 
British Governments had nevertheless been engaged 



Paet III. 

Chapter 

III. 

Policy and 
arma- 
ments. 



240 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 

in pursuing for many years prior to the outbreak of 
the present war. 1 On the other hand, the abandon- 
ment of this policy was incompatible with the contin- 
uance of the Empire. We could not hope to hold 
our scattered Dependencies and to keep our Domin- 
ions safe against encroachments unless we were pre- 
pared to incur the necessary sacrifices. 

1 ' ' Our Army, as a belligerent factor in European polities, is almost 
' a negligible quantity. This Empire is at all times practically def ence- 
'lecs beyond its first line. Such an Empire invites war. Its assumed 
'security amid the armaments of Europe, and now of Asia, is insolent 
'and provocative" (Lord Eoberts, October 22, 1912). Nothing indeed 
is more insolent and provocative, or more likely to lead to a breach of 
the peace, than undefended riches among armed men. 






CHAPTER IV 



THE BALANCE OF POWER 



During the whole period of rather more than thir- paetIII. 
teen years — which has been referred to in previous Chapter 
pages as the post- Victorian epoch, and which ex- Iv - 
tended roughly from January 1901, when Queen The 
Victoria died, to July 1914, when war was declared P ower. e ° 
— the British Army remained inadequate for the pur- 
pose of upholding that policy which British states- 
men of both parties, and the British people, both at 
home and in the Dominions, were engaged in pursu- 
ing — whether they knew it or not — and were bound 
to pursue, unless they were prepared to sacrifice 
their independence. 

The aim of that policy was the security of the 
whole empire. This much at any rate was readily 
conceded on all hands. It was not enough, however, 
that we approved the general aim of British policy. 
A broad but clear conception of the means by which 
our Government hoped to maintain this policy, and 
the sacrifices which the country would have to make 
in order to support this policy, was no less necessary. 
So soon, however, as we began to ask for further 
particulars, we found ourselves in the region of acute 
controversy. ' Security ' was a convenient political for- 
mula, which could be accepted as readily by the man 
who placed his trust in international law, as by his 
neighbourwhobelieved in battle fleets and army corps. 

241 



242 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 

PaetIII. In considering this question of security we could 

Chapter not disregard Europe, for Europe was still the storm- 

• centre of the world. We could not afford to turn a 

^e blind eye towards the ambitions and anxieties of 

power the great continental Powers. We were bound to 

take into account not only their visions but their 

nightmares. We could not remain indifferent to 

their groupings and alliances, or to the strength and 

dispositions of their armaments. 

That the United Kingdom was a pair of islands 
lying on the western edge of Europe, and that the 
rest of the British Empire was remote, and unwilling 
to be interested in the rivalries of the Teuton, Slav, 
and Latin races, did not affect the matter in the least. 
Nowadays no habitable corner of the earth is really 
remote ; and as for willingness or unwillingness to be 
interested, that had nothing at all to do with the 
question. For it was clear that any Power, which 
succeeded in possessing itself of the suzerainty of 
Europe, could redraw the map of the world at its 
pleasure, and blow the Monroe Doctrine, no less than 
the British Empire, sky-high. 

Looking across thousands of leagues of ocean, it 
was difficult for the Dominions and the United 
States to understand how their fortunes, and the 
ultimate fate of their cherished institutions, could 
possibly be affected by the turmoil and jealousies of 
— what appeared in their eyes to be — a number of 
reactionary despotisms and chauvinistic democra- 
cies. Even the hundred and twenty leagues which 
separate Hull from Emden, or the seven which divide 
Dover from Calais, were enough to convince many 
people in the United Kingdom that we could safely 
allow Europe to ' stew in her own juice.' But unfor- 



GERMAN AIMS 243 

tunately for this theory, unless a great continental Part in. 
struggle ended like the battle of the Kilkenny cats, Chapter 
the outside world was likely to find itself in an awk- Iv " 
ward predicament, when the conqueror chose to speak The 
with it in the gates, at a time of his own choosing. power. 

British policy since 1901 had tended, with ever 
increasing self-consciousness, towards the definite 
aim of preventing Germany from acquiring the su- 
zerainty of Western Europe. It was obvious that 
German predominance, if secured, must ultimately 
force the other continental nations, either into a 
German alliance, or into a neutrality favourable to 
German interests. German policy would then inevi- 
tably be directed towards encroachments upon Brit- 
ish possessions. Germany had already boldly pro- 
claimed her ambitions overseas. Moreover, she 
would find it pleasanter to compensate, and soothe 
the susceptibilities of those nations whom she had 
overcome in diplomacy or war, and to reward their 
subsequent services as allies and friendly neutrals, 
by paying them out of our property rather than out 
of her own. For this reason, if for no other, we were 
deeply concerned that Germany should not dominate 
Europe if we could help it. 

During this period, on the other hand, Germany 
appeared to be setting herself more and more seri- 
ously to acquire this domination. Each succeeding 
year her writers expressed themselves in terms of 
greater candour and confidence. Her armaments 
were following her policy. The rapid creation of 
a fleet — the counterpart of the greatest army in 
Europe — and the recent additions to the striking 
power of her already enormous army could have no 
other object. Certainly from 1909 onwards, it was 



balance of 
power. 



244 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 

PartIIL impossible to regard German preparations as any- 
Chaptek thing else than a challenge, direct or indirect, to the 

Iv - security of the British Empire. 
The Consequently the direction of British policy re- 

turned, gradually, unavowedly, but with certainty, 
to its old lines, and became once more concerned with 
the maintenance of the Balance of Power as the 
prime necessity. The means adopted were the Triple 
Entente between Britain, France, and Russia. The 
object of this understanding was to resist the anti- 
cipated aggressions of the Triple Alliance, wherein 
Germany was the predominant partner. 

The tendency of phrases, as they grow old, is to 
turn into totems, for and against which political 
parties, and even great nations, fight unreasoningly. 
But before we either yield our allegiance to any of 
these venerable formulas, or decide to throw it out 
on the scrap-heap, there are advantages in looking to 
see whether or not there is some underlying meaning 
which may be worth attending to. It occasionally 
happens that circumstances have changed so much 
since the original idea was first crystallised in words, 
that the old saying contains no value or reality what- 
soever for the present generation. More often, how- 
ever, there is something of permanent importance 
behind, if only we can succeed in tearing off the husk 
of prejudice in which it has become encased. So, 
according to Disraeli, ''the divine right of Kings 
'may have been a plea for feeble tyrants, but the 
'divine right of government is the keystone of hu- 
'man progress." For many years the phrase Brit- 
ish interests, which used to figure so largely in 
speeches and leading articles, has dropped out of 
use, because it had come to be associated unfavour- 



DERELICT MAXIMS 245 

ably with bondholders' dividends. The fact that it Part in. 
also implied national honour and prestige, the per- Chapter 
f ormance of duties and the burden of responsibilities IV - 
was forgotten. Even the doctrine of laissez faire, The 
which politicians of all parties have lately agreed to po^T ° 
abjure and contemn, has, as regards industrial af- 
fairs, a large kernel of practical wisdom and sound 
policy hidden away in it. But of all these derelict 
maxims, that which until quite recently, appeared to 
be suffering from the greatest neglect, was the need 
for maintaining the Balance of Power in Europe. 
For close on two generations it had played no overt 
part in public controversy, except when some Tory 
matador produced it defiantly as a red rag to infuri- 
ate the Radical bull. 

If this policy of the maintenance of the Balance 
of Power has been little heard of since Waterloo, the 
reason is that since then, until quite recently, the 
Balance of Power has never appeared to be seriously 
threatened. 1 And because the policy of maintaining 
this balance was in abeyance, many people have come 
to believe that it was discredited. Because it was 
not visibly and actively in use it was supposed to 
have become entirely useless. 

This policy can never become useless. It must 
inevitably come into play, so soon as any Power 
appears to be aiming at the mastery of the continent. 
It will ever remain a matter of life or death, to the 
United Kingdom and to the British Empire, that 
no continental state shall be allowed to obtain com- 
mand, directly or indirectly, of the resources, diplo- 
macy, and armaments of Europe. 

1 It can hardly be overlooked, however, that this principle, rightly or 
wrongly interpreted, had something to do with the Crimean War (1854- 
56) and with the British attitude at the Congress of Berlin (1878). 



246 THE SPIEIT OF BRITISH POLICY 

Part hi. In the sixteenth century we fought Philip of Spain 
Chapter to prevent him from acquiring European predomi- 
IV - nance. In the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nine- 
The teenth centuries we fought Louis XIV., Louis XV., 

power. and Napoleon for the same reason. In order to pre- 
serve the balance of power, and with it our own se- 
curity, it was our interest under Elizabeth to pre- 
vent the Netherlands from being crushed by Spain. 
Under later monarchs it was our interest to prevent 
the Netherlands, the lesser German States, Prussia, 
Austria, and finally the whole of Europe from being 
crushed by France. And we can as ill afford to-day 
to allow France to be crushed by Germany, or Hol- 
land and Belgium to fall into her power. The wheel 
has come round full circle, but the essential British 
interest remains constant. 

The wheel is always turning, sometimes slowly, 
sometimes with startling swiftness. Years hence 
the present alliances will probably be discarded. It 
may be that some day the danger of a European 
predominance will appear from a different quarter 
— from one of our present allies, or from some up- 
start state which may rise to power with an even 
greater rapidity than the Electorate of Branden- 
burg. Or it may be that before long the New World, 
in fact as well as phrase, may have come in to redress 
the balance of the Old. We cannot say, because we 
cannot foresee what the future holds in store. But 
from the opening of the present century, the imme- 
diate danger came from Germany, who hardly trou- 
bled to conceal the fact that she was aiming at pre- 
dominance by mastery of the Low Countries and by 
crushing France. 

That this danger was from time to time regarded 



CONDITIONS OF BRITISH FREEDOM 247 

seriously by a section of the British Cabinet, we PartIII. 
know from their own statements both before war Chapter 
broke out and subsequently. It was no chimera con- IV - 
fined to the imaginations of irresponsible and panic- The 
stricken writers. In sober truth the balance of power pow^ ° 
in Europe was in as much danger, and the mainte- 
nance of it had become as supreme a British interest, 
under a Liberal government at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, as it ever was under a Whig gov- 
ernment at the close of the seventeenth and opening 
of the eighteenth. 

The stealthy return of this doctrine into the region 
of practical politics was not due to the prejudices of 
the party which happened to be in power. Quite the 
contrary. Most Liberals distrusted the phrase. The 
whole mass of the Radicals abhorred it. The idea 
which lay under and behind the phrase was never- 
theless irresistible, because it arose out of the facts. 
Had a Socialist Government held office, this policy 
must equally have imposed itself and been accepted 
with a good or ill grace, for the simple reason that, 
unless the balance of power is maintained in Europe, 
there can be no security for British freedom, under 
which we mean, with God's help, to work out our 
own problems in our own way. 

English statesmen had adopted this policy in fact, 
if unavowedly — perhaps even to some extent uncon- 
sciously — when they first entered into, and after- 
wards confirmed, the Triple Entente. And having 
once entered into the Triple Entente it was obvious 
that, without risking still graver consequences, we 
could never resume the detached position which we 
occupied before we took that step. It is difficult to 
believe — seeing how the danger of German predomi- 



248 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 



Part III. 

Chapter 
IV. 

The 

balance of 
power. 



nance threatened France and Russia as well as our- 
selves — that we should not have excited the ill-will 
of those two countries had we refused to make com- 
mon cause by joining the Triple Entente. It was 
obvious, however, to every one that we could not 
afterwards retire from this association without in- 
curring their hostility. If we had withdrawn we 
should have been left, not merely without a friend in 
Europe, but with all the chief Powers in Europe our 
enemies — ready upon the first favourable occasion to 
combine against us. 

There is only one precedent in our history for so 
perilous a situation — when Napoleon forced Europe 
into a combination against us in 1806. And this 
precedent, though it then threatened our Empire 
with grave dangers, did not threaten it with dangers 
comparable in gravity with those which menaced us 
a century later. 

The consequences of breaking away from the 
Triple Entente were sufficiently plain. "We may 
'build ships against one nation, or even against a 
'combination of nations. But we cannot build ships 
'against half Europe. If Western Europe, with all 
'its ports, its harbours, its arsenals, and its re- 
' sources, was to fall under the domination of a single 
'will, no effort of ours would be sufficient to retain 
'the command of the sea. It is a balance of power 
'on the continent, which alone makes it possible for 
'us to retain it. Thus the maintenance of the bal- 
'ance of power is vital to our superiority at sea, 
'which again is vital to the security of the British 
'Empire." 1 

Security in the widest sense was the ultimate end 

1 Viscount Milner in the United Service Magazine, January 1912. 



DEFENCE AND INVASION 249 

of our policy — security of mind, security from peri- Part hi. 

odic panic, as well as actual military security. Chapter 
Looked at more closely, the immediate end was de- Iv - 

fence — the defence of the British Empire and of the t^ 

tt 'j. ^ T7" t balance of 

United Kingdom. power . 

In the existing condition of the world a policy of 
'splendid isolation' was no longer possible. Con- 
ditions with which we are familiar in commercial 
affairs, had presented themselves in the political 
sphere, and co-operation on a large scale had become 
necessary in order to avoid bankruptcy. England 
had entered into the Triple Entente because her 
statesmen realised, clearly or vaguely, that by doing 
so we should be better able to defend our existence, 
and for no other reason. 

After 1911 it must have been obvious to most 
people who considered the matter carefully that in 
certain events the Triple Entente would become an 
alliance. It is the interest as well as the duty of 
allies to stand by one another from first to last, and 
act together in the manner most likely to result in vic- 
tory for the alliance. What then was the manner of 
co-operation most likely to result in victory for that 
alliance which lay dormant under the Triple Entente ? 

But first of all, to clear away one obscurity — In- 
vasion was not our problem ; Defence was our prob- 
lem; for the greater included the less. 

The word ' defence ' is apt to carry different mean- 
ings to different minds. The best defence of Eng- 
land and British interests, at any given time, may 
or may not consist in keeping our main army in 
the United Kingdom and waiting to be attacked here. 
It all depends upon the special circumstances of 
each case. The final decision must be governed by 



250 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 



Past III. 

Chapter 

IV. 

The 

balance of 
power. 



one consideration, and one only — how to strike the 
speediest, heaviest, and most disabling blow at the 
aggressor. If by keeping our army in England and 
endeavouring to lure the enemy into our toils, that 
end is most likely to be accomplished, then it is ob- 
viously best to keep our army here. If by sending 
it into the north of France to combine with the 
French the supreme military object has a superior 
chance of being achieved, then it is best to send it 
into the north of France. 

A defensive war cannot be defined and circum- 
scribed as a war to drive out invaders, or even to 
prevent the landing of invaders. The best way to 
defend your castle may be to man the walls, to fall 
upon the enemy at the ford, to harry his lands, or 
even to attack him in his castle. There is no fixed 
rule. The circumstances in each case make the rule. 

A war is not less a defensive war if you strike at 
your enemy in his own territory, or if you come to 
the aid of your ally, whose territory has been invaded 
or is threatened. In the circumstances which pre- 
vailed for a considerable number of years prior to 
the outbreak of the present war, it gradually became 
more and more obvious, that our soundest defence 
would be joint action with France upon her north- 
eastern frontier. For there, beyond any doubt, 
would Germany's supreme effort be made against 
the Triple Entente. If the attack failed at that point, 
it would be the heaviest and most disabling blow 
which our enemy could suffer. If, on the other hand, 
it succeeded, France and England would have to con- 
tinue the struggle on terms immensely less favour- 
able. 

This opinion was not by any means unanimously 



CO-OPERATION WITH FRANCE 251 

or clearly held ; but during the summer of 1911 and Part m, 
subsequently, it was undoubtedly the hypothesis Chapter 
upon which those members of our Government relied, IV - 
who were chiefly responsible for the conduct of for- The 
eign affairs. Unfortunately Parliament and the power! 
country had never accepted either the policy or its 
consequences; they had never been asked to accept 
either the one or the other; nor had they been edu- 
cated with a view to their acceptance. 

At that time the error was exceedingly prevalent, 
that it is a more comfortable business fighting in 
your own country than in somebody else's. From 
this it followed that it would be folly to engage in 
what were termed disapprovingly 'foreign adven- 
tures,' and that we should be wise to await attack 
behind our own shores. Recent events have wrought 
such a complete and rapid conversion from this 
heresy, that it is no longer worth while wasting words 
in exposing it. It is necessary, however, to recall 
how influential this view of the matter was, not only 
up to the declaration of war, but even for some time 
afterwards. 

As to the precise form of co-operation between 
the members of the Triple Entente in case of war, 
there could be no great mystery. It was obvious to 
any one who paid attention to what happened during 
the summer and autumn of 1911, that in the event of 
Germany attacking France over the Agadir dispute, 
we had let it be understood and expected, that we 
should send our Expeditionary Force across the 
Channel to co-operate with the French army on the 
north-eastern frontier. 



CHAPTER V 

THE MILITARY SITUATION" 

(August 1911) 

PabtIIL The full gravity of the Agadir incident, though ap- 
Chapter parent to other nations, was never realised by the 
v - people of this country. The crisis arose suddenly in 
The July 1911. Six weeks later it had subsided; but it 

BitTwuon. was n °t until well on in the autumn that its meanings 
were grasped, even by that comparatively small sec- 
tion of the public who interest themselves in prob- 
lems of defence and foreign affairs. From October 
onwards, however, an increasing number began to 
awake to the fact, that war had only been avoided 
by inches, and to consider seriously — many of them 
for the first time in their lives — what would have 
happened if England had become involved in a Euro- 
pean conflict. 

From various official statements, and from discus- 
sions which from time to time had taken place in 
Parliament, it was understood that our ' Expedition- 
ary Force' consisted of six infantry divisions, a cav- 
alry division, and army troops ; 1 also that the na- 
tional resources permitted of this force being kept up 
to full strength for a period of at least six months, 
after making all reasonable deductions for the wast- 

1 In all about 160,000 men, of whom some 25,000 were non-combatants. 

252 



THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 253 

age of war. Was this enough'? Enough for what? PartIH. 
... To uphold British policy; to preserve Imperial Chapter 
security; to enable the Triple Entente to maintain v> 
the balance of power in Europe. These were vague The 
phrases; what did they actually amount to? . . . StlatiMi. 
The adequacy or inadequacy of such an army as this 
for doing what was required of it — for securing 
speedy victory in event of war — or still better for 
preserving peace by the menace which it opposed to 
German schemes of aggression — can only be tested 
by considering the broad facts with regard to num- 
bers, efficiency, and readiness of all the armies which 
would be engaged directly, or indirectly, in a Euro- 
pean struggle. 

War, however, had been avoided in 1911, and not 
a few people were therefore convinced that the 
menace of the available British army, together with 
the other consequences to be apprehended from the 
participation of this country, had been sufficient to 
deter Germany from pursuing her schemes of ag- 
gression, if indeed she had actually harboured any 
notions of the kind. But others, not altogether sat- 
isfied with this explanation and conclusion, were in- 
clined to press their enquiries somewhat further. 
Supposing war had actually been declared, would the 
British force have been sufficient — acting in con- 
junction with the French army — to repel a German 
invasion of France and Belgium, to hurl back the 
aggressors and overwhelm them in defeat? Would 
it have been sufficient to accomplish the more modest 
aim of holding the enemy at his own frontiers, or 
even — supposing that by a swift surprise he had been 
able to overrun Belgium — at any rate to keep him 
out of France? 



254 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 



Part III. 

Chapter 

V. 

The 

military 

situation. 



When people proceeded to seek for answers to 
these questions, as many did during the year 1912, 
they speedily discovered that, in considerations of 
this sort, the governing factor is numbers — the num- 
bers of the opposing forces available at the outbreak 
of war and in the period immediately following. The 
tremendous power of national spirit must needs be 
left out of such calculations as a thing immeasurable, 
imponderable, and uncertain. It was also unsafe 
to assume that the courage, intelligence, efficiency, 
armament, transport, equipment, supplies, and lead- 
ership of the German and Austrian armies would be 
in any degree inferior to those of the Triple Entente. 
Certain things had to be allowed for in a rough and 
ready way ; x but the main enquiry was forced to con- 
cern itself with numerical strength. 

There was not room for much disagreement upon 
the broad facts of the military situation, among 
soldiers and civilians who, from 1911 onwards, gave 
themselves to the study of this subject at the availa- 
ble sources of information; and their estimates have 
been confirmed, in the main, by what has happened 
since war began. The Intelligence departments of 
London, Paris, and Petrograd — with much ampler 
means of knowledge at their disposal — can have ar- 
rived at no other conclusions. What the English War 
Office knew, the Committee of Imperial Defence like- 
wise knew; and the leading members of the Cabinet, 
if not the whole Government, must be presumed to 
have been equally well informed. 

It was assumed in these calculations, that in case 
of tension between the Triple Entente and the Triple 

1 Such, for instance, as the fact that the time-table of German mobi- 
lisation appeared to be somewhat more rapid than that of the French, 
and much more so than that of the Eussians. 



NEUTRALITY OF ITALY 255 

Alliance, the latter would not be able — in the first PartIH. 
instance at all events — to bring its full strength into Chapter 
the struggle. For unless Germany and Austria man- v - 
aged their diplomacy before the outbreak of hostili- The 
ties with incomparable skill, it seemed improbable StSSL 
that the Italian people would consent to engage in a 
costly, and perhaps ruinous, war — a war against 
France, with whom they had no quarrel; against 
England, towards whom they had long cher- 
ished feelings of friendship; on behalf of the 
Habsburg Empire, which they still regarded — and 
not altogether unreasonably — with suspicion and 
enmity. 

But although the neutrality of Italy might be re- 
garded as a likelihood at the opening of the war, it 
could not be reckoned on with any certainty as a per- 
manent condition. For as no one can forecast the 
course of a campaign, so no one can feel secure that 
the unexpected may not happen at any moment. The 
consequences of a defeat in this quarter or in that, 
may offer too great temptations to the cupidity of 
onlookers ; while diplomacy, though it may have bun- 
gled in the beginning, is sure to have many oppor- 
tunities of recovering its influence as the situation 
develops. Consequently, unless and until Italy ac- 
tually joined in the struggle on the side of the Triple 
Entente, a considerable section of the French army 
would, in common prudence, have to be left on guard 
upon the Savoy frontier. 

In a war brought on by the aggressive designs of 
Germany, the only nations whose participation could 
be reckoned on with certainty — and this only suppos- 
ing that Britain stood firmly by the policy upon 
which her Government had embarked — were Russia, 



256 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 



Part III. 

Chapter 

V. 

The 

military 
situation. 



France, and ourselves on the one side, Germany and 
Austria-Hungary on the other. 

It would certainly be necessary for Germany, as 
well as Austria, to provide troops for coast defences, 
and also for the frontiers of neutral countries, which 
might have the temptation, in certain circumstances, 
to deneutralise themselves at an inconvenient mo- 
ment, if they were left unwatched. On the north and 
west were Denmark, Holland, and Belgium, each 
of which had a small field army, besides garrison 
and fortress troops which might be turned to more 
active account upon an emergency. On the south 
and east were Montenegro, Servia, and Roumania, 
whose military resources were on a considerable 
scale, and whose neutrality was not a thing altogether 
to be counted on, even before the Balkan war x had 
lowered the prestige of Turkey. In addition there 
was Italy, who although a pledged ally in a defensive 
war was not likely, for that reason, to consider her- 
self bound to neutrality, benevolent or otherwise, 
if in her judgment, the particular contingencies 
which called for her support had not arisen at the 
outset. 

After taking such precautions as seemed prudent 
under these heads, Germany would then be obliged 
to detach for service, in co-operation with the Aus- 
trians in Poland, and along the whole eastern border, 
a sufficient number of army corps to secure substan- 
tial superiority over the maximum forces which Rus- 
sia, hampered by an inadequate railway system and 
various military considerations, 2 could be expected 

1 The first Balkan war broke out in the autumn of 1912. 

'Russia had anxieties of her own with regard to the intentions of 
Roumania, of Turkey in Persia and the Caucasus, and of China and 
Japan in the Far East. 



SUPERIORITY OF GERMAN NUMBERS 257 

to bring into the field and maintain there during the Part hi. 

first few months of the war. Chapter 

v. 

It was reckoned 1 after taking all these things into t^ 
account, that Germany would have available, for the ^tuauon. 
invasion of France, an army consisting of some 
ninety divisions — roughly, rather more than a mil- 
lion and three-quarters of men — and that she could 
maintain this force at its full strength — repairing 
the wastage of war out of her ample reserves — for a 
period of at least six months. It was assumed that 
the Kaiser, relying upon the much slower mobilisa- 
tion of Russia, would undoubtedly decide to use the 
whole of this huge force in the west, in the hope that 
before pressure could begin to make itself felt in the 
east, France would either have been crushed, as she 
was in 1870, or so much mangled that it would be pos- 
sible to send reinforcements of an overwhelming 
character to make victory secure in Poland. 

Against this German force of 1,800,000, France, 
according to the best information available, could 
put into the field and maintain at full strength for 
a similar period of six months about 1,300,000 men. 
But this was the utmost that could be expected of 
the French, and the initial deficiency of 500,000 men 
was very serious. It precluded all reasonable hope 
on their part of being able to take the offensive, to 
which form of warfare the genius of the people was 
most adapted. It would compel them to remain on 
the defensive, for which it was believed at that time 

1 These calculations were worked out in various ways, but the net 
results arrived at were always substantially the same. In view of the 
fact that the main conclusions have been amply proved by the results of 
the present war, it does not seem worth while to weary the reader with 
more sums in arithmetic than are absolutely necessary. 



258 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 



v. 

The 

military 

situation. 



Past in. — though wrongly, as events have proved— that 
Chapter they were ill suited by temperament as well as 
tradition. 

If England joined in the war by land as well as 
sea the numerical deficiency would be reduced to 
340,000 on the arrival of our Expeditionary Force. 
In this connection, as well as for other reasons, the 
attitude of Holland and Belgium, and that of Ger- 
many with respect to these two countries, were 
clearly matters of high importance. 

Holland had a field army of four divisions, and 
her interests could be summed up in the words, 
* preservation of independence.' She would natur- 
ally wish to avoid being actively embroiled in the war 
on one side or the other ; and, fortunately for her, she 
had every reason to believe that her neutrality would 
not be disturbed or questioned. Her territories lay 
to one side of the probable campaign area, and more- 
over, whatever might be the ulterior designs of Ger- 
many with regard to western expansion, it was ob- 
vious that her immediate interests must necessarily 
lie in Dutch neutrality, which would be infinitely 
more useful to her than a Dutch alliance. For Hol- 
land holds the mouths of the Scheldt and Rhine, and 
so long as she remained neutral, it was anticipated 
that imports and exports would readily find their 
way into and out of Germany. This advantage 
would cease were Britain to establish a blockade of 
these inlets, as she would certainly do if they be- 
longed to a hostile Power. 

In certain respects Belgium was in the same case 
as Holland. She likewise had a field army of four 
divisions, and her interests could be summed up in 
the words, 'preservation of independence. ' But 



POSITION OF BELGIUM 259 

here all resemblance between the two countries PartIIL 

ended. Chapter 

Belgium was not merely the southern portion v * 
(Holland being the northern) of that Naboth's vine- The 
yard, the possession of which German visionaries ^uaw 
had proclaimed to be essential to Teutonic world- 
power. Belgium was more even than this. If the 
permanent possession of Belgian territory was a po- 
litical object in the future, temporary occupation was 
no less a military necessity of the present. For in or- 
der that Germany might benefit in full measure by 
her numerical superiority, Belgian roads and rail- 
ways were required, along which to transport her 
troops, and Belgian hills and plains on which to de- 
ploy them. If Germany were confined to the use of 
her own frontiers she would not only lose in swiftness 
of attack, but her legions would be piled up, one be- 
hind another, like a crowd coming out of a theatre. 
She needed space on which to spread out her superior 
numbers in order that her superior numbers might 
make certain of victory. 

There was an idea at this time (1911-12) that Ger- 
many would be satisfied to keep to the south-east of 
the fortified line of the Meuse — moving through Lux- 
emburg and the mountains of the Ardennes — and 
that if Belgium saw fit to yield, under protest, to 
force majeure, the northern region, containing the 
great plain of Flanders and all cities of importance, 
would be left inviolate. This theory was probably 
erroneous, for the reason that — as the event has 
shown — Germany required a greater space and more 
favourable ground, than would have been provided 
under this arrangement, in order to bring her great 
superiority to bear. 



260 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 



Part III. 

Chapter 

V. 

The 

military 

situation. 



With the French on the other hand there was no 
similar advantage to be gained by the violation of 
Belgian neutrality. From their point of view the 
shorter the battle front could be kept the better. 
If Belgium chose to range herself by the side of 
France as a willing ally it would undoubtedly be a 
great gain; but if she chose to remain neutral the 
French could have no object in invading or occupy- 
ing her territories. 

It was assumed, and no doubt rightly, that, like 
Holland, Belgium would prefer to remain neutral — 
leaving the question of future absorption to take 
care of itself — provided she could do this without en- 
during the humiliation of allowing foreign armies to 
violate her soil. For she knew that, in the event of a 
French victory, her independence would remain as- 
sured ; whereas, if the Germans were successful, she 
would have avoided awakening their hostility and 
giving them an excuse for annexation. But even if 
Belgium, under gross provocation, were forced to 
take sides against Germany, the deficit in numbers 
on the side of the Triple Entente would only be re- 
duced by some eighty or a hundred thousand men. 
The deficit would still stand, roughly, at a quarter 
of a million men. 



In view of the foregoing considerations it was 
clearly absurd to think that our own small force was 
at all adequate, in a military sense, to deter Germany 
from engaging in a war of aggression. Had we been 
able, during the years 1912 to 1914, to see into the 
minds of the German General Staff we should prob- 
ably have realised that this inadequacy was even 
greater than it appeared. We should then have 



INADEQUACY OF BRITISH ARMY 261 

known that the numbers of the Kaiser's striking part in. 
force had been carefully understated; and that the Chapter 
amount of preparations in the way of material had v * 
been hidden away with an equal industry. We The 
should also have learned, that the sending of our JtVatuL 
army abroad was viewed with scepticism in German 
military circles, as an event hardly likely to occur. 
But even if our Expeditionary Force did go, it was 
altogether inadequate to redress the adverse balance, 
still more inadequate to bring an immediate victory 
within the range of practical possibility. It was in- 
adequate to hold back the premeditated invasion, 
either at the German frontier, or even at the French 
frontier. It was inadequate to make Belgian resist- 
ance effective, even if that nation should determine 
to throw in its lot with the Triple Entente. 

As a matter of the very simplest arithmetic our 
land forces were inadequate for any of these pur- 
poses. They were unequal to the task of maintaining 
the balance of power by giving a numerical superior- 
ity to the armies of the Triple Entente. Our arma- 
ments therefore did not correspond with our policy. 
It was clear that they would not be able to uphold 
that policy if it were put to the supreme test of war. 
It was impossible to abandon our policy. It was not 
impossible, and it was not even in 1912 too late, to 
have set about strengthening our armaments. Noth- 
ing of the kind, however, was undertaken by the 
Government, whose spokesmen, official and unofficial, 
employed themselves more congenially in deriding 
and rebuking Lord Roberts for calling attention to 
the danger. 

Of course if it had been possible to place reliance 
upon the statement of the English War Minister, 



262 THE SPIKIT OF BRITISH POLICY 



Pabt III. 

Chapter 

V. 

The 

military 

situation. 



made little more than a year before war broke out, 1 
that every soldier under the voluntary system is 
worth ten conscripts, we and our Allies would have 
been in a position of complete security. In that case 
our force of 160,000 would have been the equivalent 
of 1,600,000 Germans, and we should from the first 
have been in a superiority of more than a million 
over our enemies. 

Even if we could have credited the more modest 
assumption of Sir John Simon — made nearly four 
months after war broke out — that one volunteer was 
worth three 'pressed' men, the opposing forces 
would have been somewhere about an equality. 2 

Unfortunately both these methods of ready-reck- 
oning were at fault, except for their immediate pur- 
pose of soothing, or deluding the particular audi- 
ences to which they were addressed. The words were 
meaningles!* and absurd in a military sense ; though 
conceivably they possessed some occult political vir- 
tue, and might help, for a time at least, to avert the 
retribution which is due to unfaithful stewards. 

Both these distinguished statesmen, as well as 

1 Colonel Seely at Heanor, April 26, 1913. 

2 Sir John Simon (Attorney-General and a Cabinet Minister), at 
Ashton-under-Lyne, November 21, 1914. . . . This speech is instructive 
reading. It is also comforting for the assurance it contains, that if the 
speaker approved of our taking part in this war (as he vowed he did) 
his audience might rest satisfied that it was indeed a righteous war; 
seeing that war was a thing which, on principle, he (Sir John Simon) 
very much reprehended. And yet we are not wholly convinced and 
reassured. There is a touch of over-emphasis — as if perhaps, after all, 
the orator needed the support of his own vehemence to keep him re- 
minded of the righteousness. The pacifist in war-paint is apt to overact 
the unfamiliar part. One wonders from what sort of British officer at 
the front the Attorney-General had derived the impression that ' one ' of 
our own voluntary soldiers — gallant fellows though they are — is the 
equal of ' three ' of the Germans who face him, or of the Frenchmen who 
fight by his side. . . . This speech puts us not a little in mind of 
Evangelist's warning to Christian, with regard to Mr. Legality's fluent 
promises to relieve him of his burden — ' ' There is nothing in all this 
' noise save a design to beguile thee of thy salvation. ' ' 



THE THREE PERIODS OF WAR 263 

many of their colleagues and followers, were beset pabtIII. 
by the error of false opposites. A soldier who has Chapter 
enlisted voluntarily, and another who is a conscript v> 
or 'pressed' man, have equally to fight their coun- The 
try's enemies when they are ordered to do so. In Sutton. 
both cases the particular war may be against their 
consciences and judgments; and their participation 
in it may therefore be involuntary. 

Of two men — equal in age, strength, training, and 
courage — one of whom believes his cause to be just, 
while the other does not, there can be no doubt that 
the former will fight better than the latter — even 
though the latter was enlisted under the voluntary 
system while the former was a conscript or 'pressed' 
man. In this sense the superiority of the 'voluntary' 
principle is incontestable. But is there any evidence 
to show, that either the original soldiers, or the new 
levies, of the German army are risking their lives in 
this war any less willingly than our own countrymen, 
who went out with the Expeditionary Force, or those 
others who have since responded to Lord Kitchener's 
appeal? Is there any reason to suppose that they 
are fighting any less bravely and intelligently ? x 

Another matter of importance in these calcula- 
tions with regard to the military strength of the 
Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance was the time 
limit. 

There are three periods in war. There is the 
onset of war, where swiftness of action is what tells 
most; there is the grip of war, where numbers of 

1 Sir John Simon clinched his arithmetical calculation of 'three' to 
' one, ' by stating that ' the Kaiser already knew it ' ; and this reassuring 
statement was received with ' laughter and cheers. ' The laughter we 
can understand. 



264 THE SPIEIT OF BRITISH POLICY 



Part III. 

Chapter 

V. 

The 

military 

situation. 



trained men are what tell most; and there is the 
drag of war, when what tells most is the purse. 

Speaking by the book, it is of course numbers 
which tell all the way through. At the beginning — 
in the onset — the aim is to hurl superior numbers 
at a vital point — taking the enemy by surprise, and 
thereby disordering his whole plan of campaign — 
very much as you knock a limpet off a rock, with a 
sharp unexpected blow. 

If this effort fails to settle matters, then we are 
in the grip. Here it is a case of sheer heavy slog- 
ging of all the available trained troops. The weaker 
side is driven to the defensive. It is found making 
use of every artificial and natural advantage to coun 
teract the superiority which threatens it, and which 
must speedily prevail, if only it be superior enough. 

Finally, after a longer or shorter period of in- 
decisive deadlock, the time comes when trained 
troops and material of war accumulated in advance 
begin to run short — when new levies, raised since 
the war broke out, begin to take the field, well or ill 
equipped, well or ill armed, as the case may be. 
"When this stage is reached we are in the drag of 
war; and the side which can best afford to feed, 
clothe, and arm its fresh reinforcements stands at 
an enormous advantage. 

In 1870 war was announced on July 15th, and 
formally declared on the 19th. Three weeks later, 
on August 6th, the important battles of Woerth and 
Spicheren were won by the Germans. On September 
2nd, the issue of the war was decided, when the Em- 
peror of the French, with his main army, sur- 
rendered at Sedan. Metz fell in the last days of Oc- 
tober, and Paris on the first day of March in the 



RESULTS OF SUCCESS IN ONSET 265 

following year. In that war the onset settled every- Pam-iii. 
thing. There was no real grip of the opposing Chapter 
forces. The German attack had been so swift, vig- v> 
orous, and successful that France was knocked out The 

• M n _i t military 

in the first round. situation. 

The speed with which great armies can be mobil- 
ised and hurled against one another has not dimin- 
ished in the forty odd years which have elapsed since 
the debacle. On the contrary, the art of war has been 
largely concerned in the interval with the vital ques- 
tion, how to get in the first deadly blow. 

The military view was, that probably not earlier 
than the fifteenth day — certainly not later than the 
twenty-first — a battle would take place which must 
be of the highest importance, and which might quite 
well be decisive. It might make ultimate German 
victory only a matter of time ; or it might only de- 
termine whether the ensuing campaign was to be 
waged on French or German soil — whether there was 
to be a German invasion of France or a Franco- 
British invasion of Germany. Consequently, if our 
Expeditionary Force was to render assistance at the 
critical time, it must reach its position on the fron- 
tier within a fortnight of the outbreak of war. 

As to the drag of war, the Triple Entente had the 
advantage, if that stage were ever reached. For the 
purses of England, France, and Russia were much 
longer than those of Germany and Austria. It was 
important, however, to remember that there would 
be no hope for us in the drag of war, if Germany 
could deliver a heavy enough blow at the beginning, 
as she did in 1870. 

These were the considerations as to time, which 
presented themselves to students of the military 



266 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 



The 

military 

situation 



Part hi. situation during the breathing space which followed 
Chapter upon the Agadir crisis. The substantial accuracy of 
Y ' this forecast was confirmed by what happened dur- 
ing August and September of last year. In 1914 war 
was declared by Germany on August 1st. For several 
days before she had been engaged actively in mobilis- 
ation. Three weeks later three important battles — on 
the road to Metz, at Charleroi, and at Mons J — were 
won by the Germans. If it had not been for the 
unexpected obstacle of Liege the last two engage- 
ments would in all probability have been fought at an 
even earlier date, and in circumstances much more 
unfavourable to the Franco-British forces. But in 
the early days of September, instead of the crushing 
defeat of Sedan, there was the victory of the Marne, 
and the Germans were forced to retreat to en- 
trenched positions north of the Aisne. 2 

The onset period was ended; but the issue had 
not been settled as in 1870. France and England had 
not been knocked out in the first round. To this ex- 
tent the supreme German endeavour had miscarried. 
Nevertheless a great advantage had been secured by 
our enemies, inasmuch as it was now apparent that 
the ensuing campaign — the gripvf war — wouldbe con- 
tested, not on German soil, but in France and Belgium. 






The value of the assistance which the British 
Navy would be able to render to the cause of the 
Triple Entente was a consideration of the highest 
importance. But while the fleet, if the national con- 
fidence in it were justified, would render invaluable 
assistance to military operations, it was necessary 

1 The battle in Northern Alsace was fought on August 21 and 22. A 
French army was driven back at Charleroi on the 22nd, and the British 
at Mons on the 23rd, J September 6-12. 



LIMITATIONS OF SEA POWER 267 

to bear in mind — what Englishmen in recent times Part ill. 
have been very apt to forget — that no success at sea, Chapter 
whether it consisted in the wholesale destruction of v - 
hostile ships, or in an absolute blockade of the en- The 
emy's coast, could by itself determine the main issue ^JuSi. 
of a European contest of this character. Disaster in 
a land battle could not be compensated for, nor could 
the balance of power be maintained, by any naval 
victory. "War would not be brought to an end fa- 
vourable to the Triple Entente, even by a victory as 
complete as that of Trafalgar. It is also well to 
remember that peace came, not after Trafalgar, but 
after Waterloo, nearly ten years later. 

The strange idea that the security of the British 
Empire can be maintained by the Navy alone, seems 
to be derived by a false process of reasoning, from 
the undeniable truth, that the supremacy of our Navy 
is essential to our security. But though it is essen- 
tial — and the first essential — it is not the only essen- 
tial of security. 

An insular Power, largely dependent on sea-borne 
food supplies and raw materials for its industries — 
a Power which governs an empire in the East, which 
has dependencies scattered in every sea, which is 
politically united with immense but sparsely peopled 
dominions in the four quarters of the globe — must 
keep command of the sea. If that supremacy were 
once lost the British Empire, as an empire, would 
come to an end. Its early dissolution would be in- 
evitable. Therefore it is true enough to say that if 
the German Alliance — or any other alliance — were to 
win a decisive naval victory against Britain, it would 
end the war completely and effectively so far as we 
were concerned. 



268 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 



Part III. 

Chapter 

V. 

The 

military 

situation. 



But the converse is not the case, and for obvious 
reasons. In a contest with a continental enemy who 
conquers on land, while we win victory after vic- 
tory at sea, the result will not be a settlement in our 
favour, but a drawn issue. And the draw will be 
to his advantage, not our own. For having over- 
thrown the balance of power by reason of his success- 
ful campaign and invasions, he will then be free to 
concentrate his whole energies upon wresting away 
naval supremacy from the British Empire. In time 
the Sea Power which is only a Sea Power will be 
overborne with numbers, and finally worsted by the 
victorious Land Power. For how is it possible to 
fight with one hand against an enemy with two 
hands 1 The fleets of Europe which at last must be 
combined against us, if we allow any rival to obtain 
a European predominance, are too heavy odds. 
German preparations alone were already causing us 
grave anxiety nearly three years before the Agadir 
crisis occurred. How then could we hope to build 
against the whole of Europe 1 ? Or even against 
half of Europe, if the other half remained coldly 
neutral? 



CHAPTER VI 

THE MILITARY SITUATION 

(August 1914) 

Such was tne position of affairs at July 1911, as it pabtIIL 
appeared to the eyes of people who — during the en- chapter 
suing period — endeavoured to arrive at an under- VL 
standing of the problem without regard to the ex- The 
igencies of party politics. Between that date and SSL 
July 1914, when war broke out, various changes 
took place in the situation. The general effect of 
these changes was adverse to Britain and her allies. 

In 1911 the German estimates provided for con- 
siderable increases, especially in artillery and 
machine-guns. The peace strength of the Army 
was raised. 

In the following year, 1912, further additions were 
made to the peace strength, and two new army corps 
were formed out of existing units — one for the 
Polish, the other for the French frontier. Artillery 
and machine-guns were very greatly increased in 
the ordinary estimates of that year, and again in 
those of 1913. In addition, Germany at the same 
time added a squadron to her fleet in the North Sea, 
by arranging to keep more ships permanently in 
commission. 

269 



270 THE SPIEIT OF BRITISH POLICY 



Part III. 

Chapter 

VI. 

The 

military 

situation. 



But early in 1913 it became known, that the Ger- 
man Government was about to introduce an Army 
Bill, providing for immense and sensational addi- 
tions. The sum of £50,000,000 was to be raised by 
loan for initial expenditure. The increased cost of 
upkeep on the proposed new establishment would 
amount to £9,500,000 per annum. Sixty-three thou- 
sand more recruits were to be taken each year. The 
total peace strength of the Army was to be raised 
by approximately 200,000 men. Nearly four millions 
sterling was to be spent on aircraft, and ten and a 
half on fortifications ; while the war-chest was to be 
raised from six to eighteen millions. Twenty-seven 
thousand additional horses were to be purchased. 

These proposals were timed to take effect the same 
autumn; so that by the following Midsummer 
(1914), the military strength of Germany would have 
reaped the main benefit which was anticipated from 
the enormous additions. 

It was not in the power of France to increase the 
actual total of her numbers, because for many years 
past she had already taken every man who was phys- 
ically fit for military service. About eighty per cent 
of the young Frenchmen who came each year before 
the revision boards had been enlisted; whereas in 
Germany — up to the passing of the new Army Law 
— considerably less than fifty per cent had been re- 
quired to serve. The German Army as a conse- 
quence was composed of picked men, while the 
French Army contained a considerable proportion 
who were inferior both in character and physique. 

But in the face of the new German menace France 
had to do the best she could. She had to do it 
alone, for the reason that the British Government 



MILITARY INCREASES 271 

entertained conscientious and insuperable objections PartIii. 
to bearing its due share of the burden. Chapter 

Already, prior to the sensational expansion of Ger- VI - 
many in 1913, France had endeavoured to counteract The 
the current yearly increases in the military estimates StuatYcfn. 
of her neighbour, by various reorganisations and re- 
groupings of active units, and by improvements cal- 
culated to improve the efficiency of the reserves. But 
when information was forthcoming 1 as to the nature 
and extent of the developments proposed under the 
German Army Bill of 1913, it was at once realised 
that more drastic measures were essential to national 
safety. 

Before the German projects were officially an- 
nounced, the French Government took the bold step 
of asking the legislature to sanction a lengthening of 
the period of active military service from two years 
to three, and an extension of the age limit of the re- 
serves from forty-seven to forty-nine. Power was 
also taken to summon, in case of emergency, the an- 
nual contingent of recruits a year before their due 
time. Increases in artillery, engineers, railways, 
barrack accommodation, and subsidiary services 
were asked for and obtained. The cost of these, 
when the whole sum came to be calculated, was found 
to amount to £32,000,000. 

Apart, therefore, from material preparations of 
one kind and another, Germany was taking steps to 
add 200,000 men to her striking force, and the inten- 
tions of France were approximately the same. In the 

1 Germany took time by the forelock, and began to carry through the 
contemplated programme before disclosing the terms of the Army Bill 
to the legislature. Consequently her intentions were known in a gen- 
eral way to every Intelligence department in Europe, long before they 
were actually announced. 



272 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 

Pabtiii. case of Germany, however, the increases of strength 

Chapter would be operative by Midsummer 1914, while with 
VI - France they would not take effect until two years 

The later. 1 

Stiatfon. Germany, moreover, was arranging to take 63,000 
more recruits annually. France was unable to obtain 
any more recruits, as she already took all that were 
fit to bear arms. The increase in her striking force 
was made mainly at the expense of her reserves. 
Year by year, therefore, the numerical inferiority of 
France must become more marked. 

Russia meanwhile was proceeding with her pro- 
gramme of military extension and reorganisation 
which had been decided on after the Japanese war. 
A great part of her expenditure was being devoted 
to the improvement of her exceedingly defective sys- 
tem of railways and communications, and to the 
fortification of the Gulf of Finland. 

Austria did not remain stationary in military 
preparations any more than her neighbours. Her in- 
take of recruits was 181,000 in 1912. It was de- 
cided to raise it to 206,000 in 1913, and again to 
216,000 in 1914. 

In the British Army, during this critical period, 

1 In going through the memoranda upon which this chapter is based, I 
came across a paper written at the end of July 1913 by a retired soldier 
friend, in answer to a request on my part for certain technical informa- 
tion as to French and German preparations. On the margin of the 
document, which gives a very full and able analysis, he had added the 
following postscript as an expression of his personal opinion. ' ' N.B. — 
' Most Important : The German Bill takes immediate effect. The French 
' only takes effect in 1916 because (1) the French are not going to retain 
'the class which finishes its service this year with the colours; (2) com- 
'paratively few are fit for enrolment at twenty; (3) there has been 
'great delay in Parliament . . . A year from now will be the critical 
'time. Germany will have had the full benefit from her Bill, whereas 
' France will have a mass of young recruits still under instruction. The 
' strain on officers will be tremendous in order to knock this mass of raw 
' men into shape. " It is rarely that a prophecy is fulfilled practically 
to a day. 



EFFECT OF BALKAN WARS 273 

there had of course been no increases, but the reverse, pakt ni. 

The Regular Forces, which had been reduced in Chapter 
1906 by nine battalions, 1 were in 1914 some eight VI - 
thousand men under their nominal strength. The The 
Territorials, which had never yet reached the figure ^tuaw 
postulated by their originator, were at this date 
about 47,000 short. The Army Eeserve was doomed 
in the near future to an automatic shrinkage on a 
considerable scale, owing to the reductions which had 
been effected in the Regular Forces, from which the 
reservists were drawn at the expiry of their terms 
of service. 

Actually, therefore, the weakness of our own 
military position had become more marked since 
1911. Relatively it had undergone an even greater 
change for the worse, owing to the stupendous Ger- 
man programme, to the fact that we had lagged be- 
hind in the matter of aircraft, and that our naval 
preponderance was not so great as it had been three 
years earlier. 

The events which occurred in the Turkish penin- 
sula between October 1912, when the first Balkan 
war broke out, and August 1913, when the second was 
ended by the Treaty of Bucharest, were not without 
their bearing upon the general balance of power in 

*Mr. Haldane, the Secretary of State for War, in justifying this 
reduction explained that ' his infantry was in excess, the artillery was 
deficient. ' He would rather not have cut off these nine battalions, ' ' but 
'he could not use them. He had four more than he could mobilise" 
(Auchterarder, December 29, 1906). In his view "the first step to 
' doing anything for developing the national basis of the Army was to 
'cut something off the Regular Forces" (Newcastle, September 15, 
1906). "He did not think Compulsory Training would be adopted in 
'this country until after England had been invaded once or twice" 
(London, December 1, 1911). The British, however, had the best rea- 
sons for feeling secure: they "were always a nation of splendid 
'fighters. They were never ready, but they fought the better the less 
'ready they were ..." (Glasgow, January 6, 1912). 



274 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 



Part III. 

Chapter 
VI. 

The 

military 

situation. 



Europe. Turkey had collapsed before the onset of 
the allied states of Montenegro, Servia, Bulgaria, 
and Greece, and this was a serious injury to German 
interests. The Ottoman Empire had been warmly 
suitored, over a long period of years, by the diplo- 
macy of Berlin, with a view to co-operation in certain 
contingencies. On the other hand, the result of the 
second war — fomented by the intrigues of Vienna — ■ 
in which Bulgaria was finally overpowered by the 
other three states, destroyed for the time being Slav 
solidarity, and thereby considerably relieved the ap- 
prehensions of Austria with regard to her southern 
frontier and recently annexed provinces of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. . . . Profit-and-loss accounts of 
this sort are impossible to work out upon an arith- 
metical basis, and perhaps the chief importance of 
such occurrences as these lies in the effect which they 
produce upon the nerves of the onlookers. On the 
whole — judging by the tone of diplomacy at the time 
— the Balkan series of events appeared to have raised 
greater anxieties in the Chancelleries of Germany and 
Austria than in any other quarter ; though why this 
should have been so, it is difficult to understand. 

Looking back at the Balkan struggle in the light 
of subsequent events, it appears to us now a great 
deal less remarkable for what it actually produced 
than for what it failed to produce. It failed to set 
Europe in a blaze, and yet it afforded far better 
opportunities for doing this than the Serajevo mur- 
ders in June 1914. 

The full inner history of the negotiations between 
the Great Powers, for six months prior to the Treaty 
of Bucharest, will be interesting reading, if it ever 
sees the light. If even one of them had chosen to 



GERMANY'S TWO DATES 275 

work for war during this period, nothing could have Part hi. 
kept the peace. If one or two of them had been Chapter 
apathetic, war must inevitably have come of itself. VL 
But even France — who at that time was showing ^ 
signs of superficial excitement, and on that account situation. 
was credited, not only in the German press, but in 
a section of our own, with chauvinistic designs — 
worked hard for peace. It is certain that Germany 
desired peace; many well-informed people indeed 
believed that at this time she desired peace more 
ardently than any other state. It is true that a few 
days before the Treaty of Bucharest was signed, 
Italy had been secretly sounded by Austria as to 
whether she would join with her two allies in making 
an attack on Servia ; but the Italian reply being of a 
kind that took away all hope of securing the military 
assistance of that country in the proposed adventure, 
the Concert of Europe continued to perform the pa- 
cific symphony apparently in perfect accord. 

The policy of Germany, in 1912 and 1913, to pre- 
serve peace, and her efforts — equally successful — 
in the following year to provoke war, were probably 
due to one and the same cause. Two dates from 
Germany's point of view were of supreme impor- 
tance — the summer of 1914, when her new military 
preparations would be complete, and when the Kiel 
Canal — having been widened and deepened 1 — would 

1 On June 23, 1914, the Emperor William opened the new lock at the 
North Sea end of the. Kiel Canal. On the following day he performed 
the same function at the Baltic end. The Times correspondent remarks 
that the Emperor 's passage through the Canal on this occasion was of 
symbolical rather than practical significance, as on the one hand German 
Dreadnoughts had already used the widened passage experimentally, 
while on the other hand it would be a long time before the whole work 
was finished. He continues : ' ' The extension works, which were begun 
'in 1907, are, however, of vast importance, especially to the Navy. The 
'Canal has been made two metres deeper, and has been doubled in 



276 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 



Part III. 

Chapter 

VI. 

The 
military 

situation. 



be available for the passage of Dreadnoughts; the 
summer of 1916, by which date the French Army 
increases were due to take effect, and the Russian 
scheme of military reorganisation would have been 
carried through. From the point of view of Berlin 
and Vienna war could be waged to greatest advan- 
tage so soon as the first of these two dates had been 
reached. If, however, Italy, always a doubtful par- 
ticipator, could have been tempted by self-interest 
to make common cause with her allies in the summer 
of 1913, the certainty of her adherence would have 
turned the scales in favour of the earlier date. For 
Italy could put an army of 700,000 men into the 
field ; and this no doubt would have more than com- 
pensated for the benefits which might have been lost 
by anticipating the ideal moment by a year. 

'breadth. The places at which large ships can pass one another have 
'been increased in number, and at four of them Dreadnoughts can be 
'turned. There are now four, instead of two, at each end, which means 
'a great saving of time in getting a fleet through. Above all, the 
'distance between Kiel and Wilhelmshaven for battleship purposes is 
' reduced from more than 500 to only 80 nautical miles. The new locks 
'at Brunsbiittel and Holtenau are the largest in the world." — The 
Times, June 25, 1914. 



CHAPTER VII 



A TRAGEDY OP ERRORS 



It may be said — up to the very outbreak of war it Partiii. 
was said very frequently — that the mere power and Chapter 
opportunity to make an outrageous attack are noth- VI1 - 
ing without the will to do so. And this is true enough, a tragedy 
Every barber who holds his client by the nose could o£ errors " 
cut his throat as easily as shave his chin. Every 
horse could kick the groom, who rubs him down, 
into the next world if he chose to do so. What sense, 
then, could there be in allowing our minds to be 
disturbed by base suspicions of our enterpris- 
ing and cultured neighbour? What iota of 
proof was there that Germany nourished evil 
thoughts, or was brooding on visions of conquest 
and rapine? 

So ran the argument of almost the whole Liberal 
press; and a considerable portion of the Unionist 
press echoed it. Warnings were not heeded. They 
came only from unofficial quarters, and therefore 
lacked authority. Only the Government could have 
spoken with authority; and the main concern of 
members of the Government, when addressing par- 
liamentary or popular audiences, appeared to be to 
prove that there was no need for anxiety. They 
went further in many instances, and denounced those 

277 



of errors. 



278 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 

Part in. persons who ventured to express a different opinion 
Chapter from this, as either madmen or malefactors. 

VIL Nevertheless a good deal of proof had already 

a tragedy been published to the world — a good deal more was 
known privately to the British Government — all of 
which went to show that Germany had both the 
will and intention to provoke war, if a favourable 
opportunity for doing so should present itself. 

For many years past — in a multitude of books, 
pamphlets, leading articles, speeches, and university 
lectures — the Germans had been scolding us, and 
threatening us with attack at their own chosen mo- 
ment. When Mr. Churchill stated bluntly, in 1912, 
that the German fleet was intended as a challenge to 
the British Empire, he was only repeating, in shorter 
form and more sober language, the boasts which 
had been uttered with yearly increasing emphasis 
and fury, by hundreds of German patriots and pro- 
fessors. 

With an engaging candour and in every fount of 
type, unofficial Germany had made it abundantly 
clear how she intended to carry her designs into exe- 
cution — how, first of all, France was to be crushed by 
a swift and overwhelming attack — how Russia was 
then to be punished at leisure — how after that, some 
of the nations of Europe were to be forced into an al- 
liance against the British Empire, and the rest into a 
neutrality favourable to Germany — how finally the 
great war, which aimed at making an end of our 
existence, was to begin. And though, from time to 
time, there were bland official utterances which dis- 
avowed or ignored these outpourings, the outpour- 
ings continued all the same. And each year they be- 
came more copious, and achieved a readier sale. 



THE FIRST WARNING 



279 



VII. 

A tragedy 
of errors. 



Those, however, who were responsible for British Part hi. 
policy appear to have given more credit to the as- Chapter 
surances of German diplomacy than to this mass 
of popular incitement. The British nation has al- 
ways chosen to plume itself upon the fact that the 
hearts of British statesmen are stronger than their 
heads; and possibly their amiable credulity, in the 
present instance, might have been forgiven, had their 
means of ascertaining truth been confined to the 
statements of incontinent publicists and responsible 
statesmen. But there were other proofs available 
besides words of either sort. 



The Liberal Government came into office in the 
autumn of 1905. Ministers can hardly have had 
time to master the contents of their various port- 
folios, before German aggression burst rudely in 
upon them. Conceivably the too carefully calculat- 
ing diplomatists of Berlin had concluded, that the 
principles of the new Cabinet would tend to keep 
England neutral under any provocation, and that a 
heaven-sent opportunity had therefore arrived for 
proceeding with the first item in their programme by 
crushing France. It is a highly significant fact that 
early in 1906, only a few months after Sir Henry 
Campbell-Bannerman's advent to power, he found 
himself faced with the prospect of a European war, 
which was only averted when our Foreign Minister 
made it clear to Germany, that in such an event this 
country would range herself upon the side of France. 1 

1 The Editor of the Westminster Gazette should be an unimpeachable 
witness: "The (German) Emperor's visit to Tangier (March 1905) 
' was followed by a highly perilous passage of diplomacy, in which the 
' German Government appeared to be taking risks out of all proportion 
' to any interest they could have had in Morocco. The French sacrificed 
'their Foreign Minister (M. Delcasse) in order to keep the peace, but 



ol errors. 



280 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 
Part in. This was the first warning. 

Chapter 

VIL The British answer to it was to ntter renewed pro- 

a tragedy testations of friendly confidence. As an earnest of 
our good intentions, the shipbuilding programme x of 
the previous Government was immediately reduced. 
The burden of armaments became the burden of in- 
numerable speeches. In well-chosen words Germany 
was coaxed and cajoled to acquiesce in our continued 
command of the sea; but finding in our action or 
inaction an opportunity for challenging it, she turned 
a polite ear — but a deaf one — and pushed forward 
her preparations with redoubled speed. In vain did 
we on our part slow down work at our new naval 
base in the Firth of Forth. In vain did we reduce 
our slender army to even smaller dimensions. 2 In 
vain did we plead disinterestedly with Germany, for 
a reduction in the pace of competition in naval ar- 
maments, on the terms that we should be allowed 
to possess a fleet nearly twice as strong as her own. 
For the most part, during this period, official Ger- 
many remained discreetly silent, for the reason that 
silence served her purpose best; but when the per- 
sistency of our entreaties made some sort of answer 
necessary, we were given to understand by unoffi- 

' the Germans were not appeased, and the pressure continued. It was 
' the general belief at this time, that nothing but the support which the 
'British government gave to the French averted a catastrophe in the 
'early part of 1906, or induced the Germans to accept the Algeciras 
'conference as the way out of a dangerous situation." — The Founda- 
tions of British Policy (p. 15), by J. A. Spender. 

1 The Cawdor Programme. 

2 Mr. Haldane reduced the Army by nine battalions (i.e. 9000 men) in 
1906. He stated that he had no use for them. This meant a great deal 
more, when the reserve-making power is taken into consideration. . . . 
"The Regular Army . . . has been reduced by over 30,000 men; not 
' only a present, but a serious prospective loss. ' ' — Lord Eoberts in the 
House of Lords, April 3, 1913. 



THE SECOND WARNING 281 

cial Germany — rather roughly and gruffly — that a Part in. 
certain class of requests was inadmissible as be- Chapter 
tween gentlemen. VIL 

Then suddenly, having up to that time lulled our- a tragedy 
selves into the belief that our fine words had actually 
succeeded in buttering parsnips, we awoke — in the 
late autumn of 1908 — to the truth, and fell immedi- 
ately into a fit of panic. Panic increased during the 
winter and following spring, and culminated during 
the summer, in an Imperial Defence Conference with 
the Dominions. 

We had curtailed our shipbuilding programme 
and slowed down our preparations. Thereby we had 
hoped to induce Germany to follow suit. But the 
effect had been precisely the opposite: she had in- 
creased her programme and speeded up her prep- 
arations. At last our Government became alive to 
what was going on, and in tones of reverberant anx- 
iety informed an astonished nation that the naval es- 
timates called for large additions. 

Ministers, indeed, were between the devil and the 
deep sea. The supremacy of the British Fleet was 
menaced; the conscience of the Radical party was 
shocked — shocked not so much at the existence of the 
menace as at official recognition of it, and at the cost 
of insuring against it. It was so much shocked, in- 
deed, that it took refuge in incredulity; and — upon 
the strength of assurances which were of course 
abundantly forthcoming from the German Admir- 
alty, who averred upon their honour that there had 
been neither addition nor acceleration — roundly ac- 
cused its own anointed ministers of bearing false 
witness against an innocent neighbour. 

None the less, large sums were voted, and the 



282 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 



Part III. 

Chapter 

VII. 

A tragedy 
of errors. 



Dominions came forward with generous contribu- 
tions. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, indeed, who had been 
nourished and brought up on a diet of dried phrases, 
was sceptical. To this far-sighted statesman there 
appeared to be no German menace either then or sub- 
sequently. The whole thing was a mere nightmare, 
disturbing the innocent sleep of Liberalism and de- 
mocracy. 1 

This was the second warning. 



The third warning came in the form of subterra- 
nean rumblings, inaudible to the general public, but 
clearly heard by ministerial ears. 

In July 1909, while the Imperial Conference on 
Defence was in session, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg 
succeeded Prince Biilow as German Chancellor. Up 
to that time there had been the menace of the mailed 
fist, the rattling sabre, and the shining armour. 
Henceforward there was the additional menace 
of a diplomacy playing for time, with a careless 
and unconcealed contempt for the intelligence, the 
courage, and the honour of the British people and 
their statesmen. 2 The German Government had 
clearly formed the opinion that our ministers were 
growing more and more afraid of asking their party 
to support increased naval estimates, and that it 

*_Even four years later we find Sir Wilfrid Laurier wedded to the 
belief that the German Emperor was one of the great men of the present 
age ; wonderfully endowed by intellect, character, and moral fibre ; his 
potent influence was always directed towards peace. — Canadian House 
of Commons Debates, February 27, 1913, 4364. The whole of this 
speech (4357-4364) in opposition to Mr. Borden's Naval Forces Bill is 
interesting reading, as is also a later speech, April 7, 1913, on the same 
theme (7398-7411). 

2 How Britain Strove for Peace, by Sir Edward Cook : especially pp. 
18-35; also Why Britain is at War, by the same author. These two 
pamphlets are understood to be a semi-official statement authorised by 
the British Government. 



THE THIRD WARNING 283 

was only necessary to go on, alternately dangling Partiii. 
and withdrawing illusory proposals for a naval Chapter 
understanding and a general agreement, in order VIL 
to steal ahead of us in the race. Here, as in many a tragedy 
other instances, the Germans had observed not al- 
together incorrectly ; but they had drawn the wrong 
inference from the facts. 

During the summer and autumn of 1910 was held 
the famous but futile Constitutional Conference, the 
primary object of which was to settle the quarrel be- 
tween the two Houses of Parliament. With stead- 
ily increasing clumsiness, German diplomacy, 
through all this anxious time, was engaged in hold- 
ing out its hand and withdrawing it again ; until even 
men whose minds were worried with more immediate 
cares, could no longer ignore the gravity of the 
situation. 

The Conference adjourned for the holiday season, 
but resumed its sessions in October. The public as- 
surances of those who took part in it on both sides 
agree in this, that nothing except the special subject 
for which it had been called into existence was ever 
discussed at its meetings. But many other things 
were certainly discussed outside its meetings — on 
the doorstep and the staircase, and in the ante-rooms. 
Among these topics the dangers of the inter- 
national situation, and the peril of imperial security 
were the chief. 

In October and November 1910 there was a great 
secret of Polichinelle. Conceivably we may learn 
from some future historian even more about it than 
we knew at the time. All that need be said here 
with reference to the matter is, that many persons 
on both sides found themselves faced with a position 



284 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 

Part hi. of affairs, where the security of the country plainly 

Chapter required measures for its defence, of a character 

VIL and upon a scale, which neither political party could 

a tragedy no pe to carry through Parliament and commend to 

of errors. , . j-i-iji 

the country, unless it were supported by the more 
responsible section of its opponents. 

Neither party, however, was willing to pay the 
price necessary for the support of the other, and 
as a consequence imperial interests suffered. It is 
not necessary, however, to conclude from this la- 
mentable failure that a sordid spirit of faction was 
the explanation. In the constitutional sphere certain 
principles were in conflict, which the parties con- 
cerned had the honesty to hold by, but lacked the 
sympathy, and possibly the intelligence, to adjust. 
The acrimony of an immediate controversy distorted 
the vision of those engaged in it ; so that the propor- 
tions of domestic and foreign dangers were mis- 
judged. 

The failure of this constitutional conference was 
welcomed at the time by exultant shoutings among 
many, perhaps the majority, of the rank and file of 
politicians upon both sides. It was not so regarded, 
however, by the country, which in a remarkable de- 
gree refused to respond to the incitements of vio- 
lence and hatred with which it was plied during the 
ensuing election. There was at this time, for no 
very definite reason, a widespread popular uneasi- 
ness, and something approaching a general disgust 
with politicians. 

Among more considerate men on both sides, the 
breakdown was frankly spoken of as one of the great 
calamities in our political history. It was more 



THE FOURTH WARNING 



285 



than that. It was in reality one of the greatest which Part til 

have ever befallen Europe. Chapter 

vii. 



During the following July (1911), while in this 
country we were deeply engaged in the bitter climax 
of the constitutional struggle, there sounded a fourth 
strident warning from the gong of the German Chan- 
cellery. 

The Agadir incident is one of the strangest which 
have occurred in British history during recent years. 
Its full gravity was not realised outside a very nar- 
row circle at the time of its occurrence; and when 
subsequently it became more widely understood there 
was a curious conspiracy to hush it up — or, perhaps, 
not so much a conspiracy, as a general instinct of 
concealment — a spontaneous gesture of modesty — as 
if the British nation had been surprised bathing. 

At the beginning of July the German cruiser Pan- 
ther appeared at Agadir in Morocco. This visit was 
intended and understood as a direct challenge to 
France. Diplomacy was immediately in a stir. 

Three weeks later Mr. Lloyd George spoke at the 
Mansion House, making it clear that England would 
not tolerate this encroachment. Even amid the 
anger and excitement which attended the last stages 
of the Parliament Bill, this statement created a deep 
impression throughout the country, and a still 
deeper impression in other countries. 

Then the crisis appeared to fade away. Germany 
was supposed to have become amenable. We re- 
turned to our internecine avocations. The holiday 
season claimed its votaries, and a great railway 
strike upset many of their best-laid plans. The in- 
habitants of the United Kingdom are accustomed to 



A tragedy 
of errors. 



286 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 

Part hi. think only on certain topics during August and Sep- 

Chapteb tember, and it is hard to break them of their habits. 

VIL To reconsider a crisis which had arisen and passed 

a tragedy away some two and a half months earlier, was more 

than could be expected of us when we returned to 

work in the autumn. 

But Mr. Lloyd George's speech was capable of 
only one interpretation, — if Germany had persisted 
in her encroachment, this country would have gone 
to war in August or September 1911 in support of 
France. His words had no other meaning, and every 
highly placed soldier and sailor was fully aware of 
this fact, and made such preparations in his own 
sphere as the case required. But from what has 
transpired subsequently, it does not seem at all clear 
that more than two or three of the Cabinet in the 
least realised what was happening. Parliament did 
not understand the situation any more than the 
country did. 

Later on, when people had time to concentrate 
their minds on such matters, there was a thrill of 
post-dated anxiety — a perturbation and disap- 
proval; criticism upon various points; a trans- 
ference of Mr. McKenna from the Admiralty to the 
Home Office, and of Mr. Churchill from the Home 
Office to the Admiralty. Indignant anti-militarists, 
supporters for the most part of the Government, 
allowed themselves to be mysteriously reduced to 
silence. Business men, who had been shocked when 
they learned the truth, suffered themselves to be 
persuaded that even the truth must be taken with 
a pinch of salt. There was, in fact, a sort of gen- 
eral agreement that it was better to leave the sum- 
mer embers undisturbed, lest a greater connagra- 



THE FIFTH WARNING 287 

tion might ensue. The attitude of the orthodox Part in. 

politician was that of a nervous person who, hearing, Chapter 
as he imagines, a burglar in his bedroom, feels hap- vn - 

pier and safer when he shuts his eyes and pulls the a tragedy 
blankets over his head. 

A few months later, at the beginning of the fol- 
lowing year (1912), the fifth warning of the series 
was delivered. 

It differed from its predecessors inasmuch as it 
was addressed to the ears of the British Government 
alone. Neither the Opposition nor the country heard 
anything of it until more than two years later — until 
the battles of Alsace, of Charleroi, and of Mons had 
been lost — until the battle of the Marne had been won 
— until the British Army was moving north to take 
up a position in Flanders. Then we learned that, 
when Lord Haldane had visited Berlin in the month 
of February 1912, he had done so at the special re- 
quest of the Kaiser, in order to consider how Anglo- 
German misunderstandings might be removed. 

Lord Haldane would have acted more wisely had 
he stopped his journey en route, and never entered 
Berlin at all. For, two days before the date appoint- 
ed for his visit, proposals for large increases of the 
German Army and Navy were laid before the Reichs- 
tag. His mission was to abate competition in ar- 
maments, and here was an encouraging beginning! 
Was it contempt, or insolence, or a design to overawe 
the supposed timidity of the emissary; or was it 
merely a blundering effort to steal a march in the 
negotiations by facing the ambassador on his ar- 
rival with a fait accompli? Possibly it was a com- 
bination of all these; but at any rate it was ex- 



288 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 



Past III. 

Chapter 
VII. 

A tragedy 
of errors. 



ceedingly clumsy, and no less significant than 
clumsy. 

As to the mission — Germany was willing in a 
vague way to 'retard' — whatever that may mean 
— though not to abandon, or reduce, her naval pro- 
gramme, providing the British Government would 
agree to remain neutral in any war which Germany 
might choose to wage. France might be crushed 
and Belgium annexed ; but in either event England 
must stand aside and wait her turn. On no other 
terms would the Kaiser consent to a rapproche- 
ment with this country, or allow the blessed words 
'retardation of the naval programme ' to be uttered 
by official lips. 

An undertaking of this tenor went beyond those 
assurances of non-aggressive intent which Lord Hal- 
dane, on behalf of his own Government, was fully 
prepared to give. We would not be a party to any 
unprovoked attack on Germany — was not that suf- 
ficient? It was plainly insufficient. It was made 
clear that Germany desired a free hand to estab- 
lish herself in a position of supremacy astride of 
Europe. So Lord Haldane returned profitless from 
his wayfaring, and the British Government was at 
its wits ' end how to placate the implacable. 

The way they chose was well-doing, in which they 
wearied themselves perhaps overmuch, especially 
during the Balkan negotiations. For Germany did 
not want war at that time, for the reasons which 
have been given already. And so, rather surlily, and 
with the air of one who was humouring a crank — a 
pusillanimous people whose fixed idea was pacifism 
— she consented that we should put ourselves to 
vast trouble to keep the peace for her benefit. If 



of errors. 



THE HALDANE MISSION 289 

war had to come in the end, it had much better have part hi. 
come then — so far as we were concerned — seeing Chapter 
that the combined balance of naval and military VIL 
power was less unfavourable to the Triple Entente a tragedy 
at the beginning of 1913 than it was some fifteen 
months later. . . . This was all the notice we took 
of the fifth warning. We earned no gratitude by 
our activities, nor added in any way thereby to our 
own safety. 

The Haldane mission is a puzzle from first to last. 
The Kaiser had asked that he should be sent. . . . 
For what purpose? . . . Apparently in order to 
discuss the foreign policy of England and Germany. 
But surely the Kaiser should have been told that we 
kept an Ambassador at Berlin for this very purpose ; 
an able man, habituated to stand in the strong sun- 
light of the imperial presence without losing his 
head; but, above all, qualified to converse on such 
matters (seeing that they lay within his own prov- 
ince) far better than the most profound jurist in 
Christendom. Or if our Ambassador at Berlin could 
not say what was required, the German Ambassador 
in London might easily have paid a visit to Downing 
Street; or the Foreign Ministers of the two coun- 
tries might have arranged a meeting; or even the 
British Premier and the German Chancellor might 
have contrived to come together. Any of these ways 
would have been more natural, more proper, more 
likely (one would think) to lead to business, than the 
way which was followed. 

One guesses that the desire of the Kaiser that 
Lord Haldane should be sent, was met half-way by 
the desire of Lord Haldane to go forth ; that there 
was some temperamental affinity between these 



290 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 

PartIII. two pre-eminent characters — some attraction of 

Chapter opposites, like that of the python and the rabbit. 

VIL Whatever the reasons may have been for this 

a tragedy visit, the results of it were bad, and indeed dis- 

of errors 

astrous. To have accepted the invitation was to 
fall into a German trap ; a trap which had been so 
often set that one might have supposed it was 
familiar to every Foreign Office in Europe. Berlin 
has long delighted in these extra-official enterprises, 
undertaken behind the backs of accredited repre- 
sentatives. Confidences are exchanged ; explanations 
are offered 'in the frankest spirit' ; sometimes under- 
standings of a kind are arrived at. But so far as 
Germany is concerned, nothing of all this is binding, 
unless her subsequent interests make it desirable 
that it should be. The names of the irregular 
emissaries, German, British, and cosmopolitan, 
whom the Kaiser has sent to London and received 
at Berlin since the beginning of his reign, would 
fill a large and very interesting visitors ' book. One 
would have imagined that by the month of February 
1912 this favourite device had been found out and 
discredited even in Downing Street. 

Lord Haldane was perhaps even less well fitted 
for such an embassy by temperament and habit of 
mind, than he was by position and experience. 
Lawyer-statesmanship, of the modern democratic 
sort, is of all forms of human agency the one least 
likely to achieve anything at Potsdam. The British 
emissary was tireless, industrious, and equable. 
His colleagues, on the other hand, were overworked, 
indolent, or flustered. Ready on the shortest notice 
to mind everybody else's business, he was allowed 
to mind far too much of it ; and he appears to have 



THE GERMAN INTERPRETATION 291 

minded most of it rather ill than well. He was no Partiii. 
more suited to act for the Foreign Office than King Chapter 
Alfred was to watch the housewife 's cakes. VIL 

The man whose heart swells with pride in his own a tragedy 
ingenuity usually walks all his life in blinkers. It is 
not surprising that Lord Haldane 's visit to the 
Kaiser was a failure, that it awoke distrust at the 
time, or that it opened the way to endless misrepre- 
sentation in the future. What surprises is his stoi- 
cism ; that he should subsequently have shown so few 
signs of disappointment, distress, or mortification; 
that he should have continued up to the present mo- 
ment to hold himself out as an expert on German 
psychology ; x that he should be still upheld by his 
journalistic admirers, to such an extent that they 
even write pamphlets setting out to his credit ' what 
he did to thwart Germany. ' 2 

We have been told by Mr. Asquith, 3 what was 
thought by the British Government of the outcome 
of Lord Haldane's embassy. We have also been 
informed by Germany, what was thought of it by 
high officials at Berlin; what inferences they drew 
from these conversations, ; what hopes they founded 
upon them. We do not know, however, what was 
thought of the incident by the other two members 
of the Entente; how it impressed the statesmen of 
Paris and Petrograd; for they must have known 
of the occurrence — the English representative not 
being one whose comings and goings would easily 

1 Lord Haldane has explained German conduct in the present war by a 
sudden change of spirit, such as once befell a collie dog which owned 
him as master, and which after a blameless early career, was possessed 
by a fit of depravity in middle life and took to worrying sheep. Thus 
in a single metaphor he extenuates the German offence and excuses his 
own blindness ! 

2 "Lord Haldane: What he did to thwart Germany." Pamphlet 
published by the Daily Chronicle. 3 At Cardiff, October 2, 1914. 



292 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 

Pakt hi. escape notice. The British people were told nothing ; 

Chapter they knew nothing ; and therefore, naturally enough, 
vn - they thought nothing about the matter. 

a tragedy The British Cabinet — if Mr. Asquith's memory is 
to be relied on — saw through the devilish designs of 
Germany so soon as Lord Haldane, upon his return, 
unbosomed himself to the conclave in quaking whis- 
pers. "We know from the Prime Minister, that when 
he heard how the Kaiser demanded a free hand for 
European conquests, as the price of a friendly un- 
derstanding with England, the scales dropped from 
his eyes, and he realised at once that this merely 
meant the eating of us up later. But one cannot 
help wondering, since Mr. Asquith was apparently 
so clear-sighted about the whole matter, that he 
made no preparations whatsoever — military, finan- 
cial, industrial, or even naval (beyond the ordinary 
routine) — against an explosion which — the mood and 
intentions of Germany being what they were now 
recognised to be — might occur at any moment. 

As to what Germany thought of the incident we 
know of course only what the high personages at 
Berlin have been pleased to tell the world about 
their 'sincere impressions.' They have been very 
busy doing this — hand upon heart as their wont is — 
in America and elsewhere. According to their own 
account they gathered from Lord Haldane 's mission 
that the British Government and people were very 
much averse from being drawn into European con- 
flicts; that we now regretted having gone quite 
so far as we had done in the past, in the way of 
entanglements and understandings; that while we 
could not stand by, if any other country was being 
threatened directly on account of arrangements it 



COST OF AMATEUR DIPLOMACY 293 

had come to with England, England certainly was by Part hi. 
no means disposed to seek officiously for opportuni- Chapter 
ties of knight-errantry. In simple words the cases VIL 
of Tangier and Agadir were coloured by a special a tragedy 
obligation, and were to be distinguished clearly from 
anything in the nature of a general obligation or alli- 
ance with France and Russia. 

It is quite incredible that Lord Haldane ever said 
anything of this kind ; for he would have been four 
times over a traitor if he had — to France; to Bel- 
gium ; to his own country ; also to Germany whom he 
would thus have misled. It is also all but incredible 
that a single high official at Berlin ever understood 
him to have spoken in this sense. But this is what 
the high officials have assured their own country- 
men and the whole of the neutral world that they 
did understand; and they have called piteously 
on mankind to witness, how false the British Gov- 
ernment was to an honourable understanding, so 
soon as trouble arose in July last with regard to 
Servia. Such are some of the penalties we have 
paid for the luxury of indulging in amateur diplo- 
macy. 

The German bureaucracy, however, always presses 
things too far. It is not a little like Fag in The 
Rivals — "whenever it draws on its invention for a 
'good current lie, it always forges the endorsements 
' as well as the bill. " Asa proof that the relations of 
the two countries from this time forward were of the 
best, inferences have been drawn industriously by 
the high officials at Berlin as to the meaning and 
extent of Anglo-German co-operation during the 
Balkan wars ; as to agreements with regard to Africa 
already signed, but not published, in which Downing 



294 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 



VII. 

A tragedy 
of errors. 



Partite. Street had shown itself 'surprisingly accommodat- 
Chapter ing' ; as to other agreements with regard to the Bagh- 
dad Railway, the Mesopotamian oil-fields, the naviga- 
tion of the Tigris, and access through Basra to the 
Persian Gulf. These agreements, the earnest of a 
new entente between the Teuton nations — the United 
States subsequently to be welcomed in — are alleged 
to have been already concluded, signed and awaiting 
publication when war broke out. 1 Then trouble 
arises in Servia; a mere police business — nothing 
more — which might have been settled in a few days 
or at any rate weeks, if perfidious Albion had not 
seized the opportunity to work upon Muscovite sus- 
picions, in order to provoke a world-war for which 
she had been scheming all the time ! 

The sixth warning was the enormous German 
Army Bill and the accompanying war loan of 1913. 
By comparison, the five previous warnings were but 
ambiguous whispers. And yet this last reverberation 
had apparently no more effect upon the British 
Government than any of the rest. 

With all these numerous premonitions the puzzle 
is, how any government could have remained in 
doubt as to the will of Germany to wage war when- 

1 If this were really so, it is remarkable that Germany has not pub- 
lished these opiate documents, which lulled her vigilance and were the 
cause of her undoing. In the New York Evening Post (February 15, 
1915) there is a letter signed 'Historicus' in which the German version 
of the facts is not seriously questioned, although a wholly different 
inference is drawn : ' ' This extremely conciliatory attitude of England 
'is another proof of the pacific character of her foreign policy. But, 
' unfortunately, German political thought regards force as the sole con- 
' trolling factor in international relations, and cannot conceive of con- 
' cessions voluntarily made in answer to claims of a more or less equi- 
' table nature. To the German mind such actions are infallible indica- 
' tions of weakness and decadence. Apparently Grey 's attitude towards 
'German claims in Turkey and Africa was so interpreted, and the 
'conclusion was rashly reached that England could be ignored in the 
' impending world-war. ' ' 



of errors. 



THE SIXTH WABNING 295 

ever her power seemed adequate and the opportunity Partiii. 
favourable for winning it. The favourite plea that Chapter 
the hearts of Mr. Asquith and his colleagues were VIL 
stronger than their heads does not earn much respect, a tragedy 
Knowing what we do of them in domestic politics, 
this excuse would seem to put the quality of their 
heads unduly low. The true explanation of their 
omissions must be sought elsewhere than in their 
intellects and affections. 

It is important to remember that none of the 
considerations which have been set out in this chap- 
ter can possibly have been hidden from the Foreign 
Office, the War Office, the Admiralty, the Prime 
Minister, the Committee of Imperial Defence, or 
the inner or outer circles of the Cabinet. Important' 
papers upon matters of this kind go the round 
of the chief ministers. Unless British public 
offices have lately fallen into a state of more 
than Turkish indolence, of more than German 
miscalculation, it is inconceivable that the true 
features of the situation were not laid before minis- 
ters, dinned into ministers, proved and expounded to 
ministers, by faithful officials, alive to the dangers 
which were growing steadily but rapidly with each 
succeeding year. And although we may only surmise 
the vigilant activity of these subordinates, we do 
actually know, that Mr. Asquith 's Government was 
warned of them, time and again, by other persons 
unconcerned in party politics and well qualified to 
speak. 

But supposing that no one had told them, they 
had their own wits and senses, and these were surely 
enough. A body of men whose first duty is the 



296 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 

Paktiii. preservation of national security — who are trusted 
Chapter to attend to that task, paid for performing it, hon- 
VIL oured under the belief that they do attend to it and 
a tragedy perform it — cannot plead, in excuse for their failure, 
that no one had jogged their elbows, roused them 
from their slumbers or their diversions, and re- 
minded them of their duty. 

Mr. Asquith and his chief colleagues must have 
realised the interdependence of policy and arma- 
ments; and they must have known, from the year 
1906 onwards, that on the military side our arma- 
ments were utterly inadequate to maintain our pol- 
icy. They must have known that each year, force of 
circumstances was tending more and more to con- 
solidate the Triple Entente into an alliance, as the 
only means of maintaining the balance of power, 
which was a condition both of the freedom of Europe 
and of British security. They knew — there can be 
no doubt on this point — what an immense numerical 
superiority of armed forces Germany and Austria 
together could bring, first against France at the 
onset of war, and subsequently, at their leisure, 
against Russia during the grip of war. They 
knew that a British Expeditionary Army of 160,000 
men would not make good the difference — would 
come nowhere near making good the difference. 
They must have known that from the point of view 
of France and Belgium, the special danger of modern 
warfare was the crushing rapidity of its opening 
phase. They must have been kept fully informed 
of all the changes which were taking place in the 
military situation upon the continent to the detri- 
ment of the Triple Entente. They had watched the 
Balkan war and measured its effects. They knew 



INACTION OF THE GOVERNMENT 297 

the meanings of the critical dates — 1914-1916 — Partiii. 
better, we may be sure, than any section of their Chapter 
fellow-countrymen. And even although they might YIL 
choose to disregard, as mere jingoism, all the boasts a tragedy 

of errors. 

and denunciations of German journalists and pro- 
fessors, they must surely have remembered the 
events which preceded the conference at Algeciras, 
and those others which led up to the Defence Confer- 
ence of 1909. They can hardly have forgotten the 
anxieties which had burdened their hearts during 
the autumn of 1910. Agadir cannot have been for- 
gotten; the memory of Lord Haldane's rebuff was 
still green; and the spectre of the latest German 
Army Bill must have haunted them in their dreams. 

There is here no question of being wise after 
the event. The meaning of each of these things in 
turn was brought home to Mr. Asquith and his 
chief colleagues as it occurred — firstly, we may be 
sure, by their own intelligence — secondly, we may 
be equally sure, by the reports of their responsible 
subordinates — thirdly, by persons of knowledge and 
experience, who had no axe to grind or interest to 
serve. 

It is therefore absurd to suppose that ministers 
could have failed to realise the extent of the danger, 
or of our unpreparedness to meet it, unless they 
had purposely buried their heads in the sand. They 
knew that they had not a big enough army, and 
that this fact might ruin their whole policy. Why 
did they never say so? Why, when Lord Roberts 
said so, did they treat him with contumely, and 
make every effort to discredit him ? Why was noth- 
ing done by them during their whole period of office 
to increase the Army and thereby diminish the 



298 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 

Part hi. numerical superiority of their adversaries. On the 

Chapter contrary, they actually reduced the Army, assuring 

VIL the country that they had no use for so many trained 

a tragedy soldiers. Moreover, the timidity or secretiveness of 

the Government prevented England from having, 

what is worth several army corps, and what proved 

the salvation of France — a National Policy, fully 

agreed and appealing to the hearts and consciences 

of the whole people. 

The answers to these questions must be sought 
in another sphere. The political situation was one 
of great perplexity at home as well as abroad, and 
its inherent difficulties were immeasurably increased 
by the character and temperament of Mr. Asquith, 
by the nature no less of his talents than of his 
defects. The policy of wait-and-see is not neces- 
sarily despicable. There are periods in which it has 
been the surest wisdom and the truest courage ; but 
this was not one of those periods, nor was there 
safety in dealing either with Ireland or with Ger- 
many upon this principle. When a country is fully 
prepared it can afford to wait and see if there will 
be a war ; but not otherwise. 

Sir Edward Grey is a statesman whose integrity 
and disinterestedness have never been impugned by 
friend or foe; but from the very beginning of his 
tenure of office he has appeared to lack that supreme 
quality of belief in himself which stamps the greatest 
foreign ministers. He has seemed at times to hesi- 
tate, as if in doubt whether the dangers which he 
foresaw with his mind's eye were realities, or only 
nightmares produced by his own over-anxiety. We 
have a feeling also that in the conduct of his office 



of errors. 



SIR EDWARD GREY'S DIFFICULTIES 299 

he had played too lonely a part, and that such advice Part hi. 
and sympathy as he had received were for the most Chapter 
part of the wrong sort. What he needed in the way VI1 - 
of counsel and companionship was simplicity and a tragedy 
resolution. What he had to rely on was the very 
reverse of this. 

Lord Haldane, as we have learned recently, shared 
largely in the work of the Foreign Office; a man 
of prodigious industry, but over-ingenious, and of 
a self-complacency which too readily beguiled him 
into the belief that there was no opponent who could 
not be satisfied, no obstacle which could not be made 
to vanish — by argument. 

Moreover, Sir Edward Grey had to contend 
against enemies within his own household. In the 
Liberal party there was a tradition, which has never 
been entirely shaken off, that all increase of arma- 
ments is provocative, and that all foreign engage- 
ments are contrary to the public interest. After the 
Agadir crisis he was made the object of a special 
attack by a large and influential section of his own 
party and press, and was roundly declared to be no 
longer possible as Foreign Minister. 1 There can be 
no doubt that the attempt to force Sir Edward 
Grey's resignation in the winter 1911-1912 was fo- 
mented by German misrepresentation and intrigue, 
skilfully acting upon the peculiar susceptibilities of 
radical fanaticism. Nor is there any doubt that the 
attacks which were made upon the policy of Mr. 
Churchill, from the autumn of 1912 onwards, were 

1 ' ' The time has now come to state with a clearness which cannot be 
' mistaken that Sir Edward Grey as Foreign Secretary is impossible. ' ' — 
Daily News, January 10, 1912. The Daily News was not a lonely voice 
crying in the wilderness. Similar threats have been levelled against Mr. 
Churchill. 



of errors. 



300 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 

Part in. fostered by the same agency, using the same tools, 

Chapter and aiming at the same objects. 
VIL The orthodoxy of Mr. Churchill was suspect on 

a tragedy account of his Tory ancestry and recent conversion ; 
that of Sir Edward Grey on the ground that he was 
a country gentleman, bred in aristocratic traditions, 
trained in Foreign Affairs under the dangerous in- 
fluences of Lord Rosebery, and therefore incapable 
of understanding the democratic dogma that loving- 
kindness will conquer everything, including Prussian 
ambitions. 

Surely no very vivid imagination is needed to 
penetrate the mystery of Cabinet discussions on 
defence for several years before war broke out. Be- 
hind the Cabinet, as the Cabinet well knew, was a 
party, one half of which was honestly oblivious of all 
danger, while the other half feared the danger much 
less than it hated the only remedy. Clearly the bulk 
of the Cabinet was in cordial sympathy either with 
one or other of these two sections of their party. Sir 
Edward Grey accordingly had to defend his policy 
against an immense preponderance of ingrained 
scepticism, settled prejudices, and personal interests. 
And at the same time he seems to have been haunted 
by the doubt lest, after all, his fears were only night- 
mares. Mr. Churchill, there is no difficulty in seeing, 
must have fought very gallantly; but always, for 
the reason already given, with one hand tied behind 
his back. He had all his work cut out to maintain 
the Navy, which was under his charge, in a state of 
efficiency; and this upon the whole he succeeded in 
doing pretty efficiently. 1 

1 It has been stated on good authority, that Mr. McKenna upheld the 
national interests with equal firmness, and against equal, if not greater 
opposition, while he was at the Admiralty. 



EXCESSIVE TIMIDITY 301 

If we may argue back from public utterances to PartHI. 
Cabinet discussions, it would appear that the only Chapter 
assistance — if indeed it deserved such a name — VI1, 
which was forthcoming to these two, proceeded from a tragedy 
Mr. Asquith and Lord Haldane. The former was by 
temperament opposed to clear decisions and vigorous 
action. The latter — to whom the mind of Germany 
was as an open book — bemused himself, and seems 
to have succeeded in bemusing his colleagues to • 
almost as great an extent. 

In fancy, we can conjure up a scene which 
must have been enacted, and re-enacted, very often 
at Number 10 Downing Street in recent years. We 
can hear the warnings of the Foreign Minister, the 
urgent pleas of the First Lord of the Admiralty, the 
scepticism, indifference, or hostility expressed by the 
preponderant, though leaderless, majority in the 
Cabinet. Simple said, I see no danger; Sloth said, 
Yet a little more sleep; and Presumption said, Every 
Vat must stand upon his own bottom. . . . We can 
almost distinguish the tones of their Right Honour- 
able voices. 

The situation was governed by an excessive 
timidity — by fear of colleagues, of the caucus, of the 
party, and of public opinion — by fear also of Ger- 
many. Mr. Asquith, and the Cabinet of which he 
was the head, refused to look their policy between 
the eyes, and realise what it was, and what were its 
inevitable consequences. They would not admit that 
the Balance of Power was an English interest, or 
that they were in any way concerned in maintaining 
it. They would not admit that our Entente with 
France and Eussia was in fact an alliance. They 
thought they could send British officers to arrange 



302 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 



Paet III. 

Chapter 
VII. 

A tragedy 
of errors. 



plans of campaign with the French General Staff — 
could learn from this source all the secret hopes and 
anxieties of France — could also withdraw the greater 
part of their fleet from the Mediterranean, under 
arrangement for naval co-operation with our present 
ally 1 — all without committing this country to any 
form of understanding ! They boasted that they had 
no engagements with France, which puzzled the 
French and the Russians, and convinced nobody, 
save possibly themselves, and a section of their own 
followers. They had in fact bound the country to a 
course of action — in certain events which were not at 
all improbable — just as surely by drifting into a 
committal, as if they had signed and sealed a parch- 
ment. Yet they would not face the imperative condi- 
tion. They would not place their armaments on a 
footing to correspond with their policy. 

Much of this is now admitted more or less frankly, 
but justification is pleaded, in that it was essential to 
lead the country cautiously, and that the Government 
could do nothing unless it had the people behind it. 
In these savings there is a measure of truth. But as 
a matter of fact the country was not led at all. It was 
trapped. Never was there the slightest effort made 
by any member of the Government to educate the 
people with regard to the national dangers, responsi- 



1 A large section of the Liberal party watched with jealous anxiety 
our growing intimacy with France. In 1913, however, they discovered 
in it certain consolations in the withdrawal of our ships of war from 
the Mediterranean ; and they founded upon this a demand for the cur- 
tailing of our own naval estimates. France according to this arrange- 
ment was to look after British interests in the Mediterranean, Britain 
presumably was to defend French interests in the Bay of Biscay and 
the Channel. When, however, the war-cloud was banking up in July 
1914, these very people who had been most pleased with our withdrawal 
from the Mediterranean, were those who urged most strongly that we 
should now repudiate our liabilities under the arrangement. 



of errors. 



VALUE OF SELF-SACRIFICE 303 

bilities, and duties. When the crisis occurred the Part in. 
hand of the whole British Empire was forced. There Chapter 
was no other way ; but it was a bad way. And what VIL 
was infinitely worse, was the fact that, when war; a tragedy 
was declared — that war which had been discussed at 
so many Cabinet meetings since 1906 — military 
preparations were found to be utterly inadequate 
in numbers ; and in many things other than numbers. 
The politician is right in thinking that, as a rule, it 
is to his advantage if the people are behind him ; but 
there are times when we can imagine him praying 
that they may not be too close. 

We have been given to understand that it was 
impossible for the Government to acknowledge their 
policy frankly, to face the consequences, and to 
insist upon the necessary preparations in men and 
material being granted. It was impossible, because 
to have done so would have broken the Liberal 
party — that great instrument for good — in twain. 
The Cabinet would have fallen in ruin. The careers 
of its most distinguished members would have been 
cut short. Consider what sacrifices would have been 
contained in this catalogue of disasters. 

That is really what we are now beginning to 
consider, and are likely to consider more and more 
as time goes on. 

A great act of self-sacrifice — a man's, or a party's 
— may sometimes make heedless people realise the 
presence of danger when nothing else will. Suppose 
Mr. Asquith had said, ' ' I will only continue to hold 
'office on one condition," and had named the con- 
dition — 'that armaments should correspond to policy' 
■ — the only means of safety. He might thereupon have 
disappeared into the chasm; but like Curtius he 



304 THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY 



Part III. 

Chapter 

VII. 

A tragedy 
of errors. 



might have saved the City. It would have made 
a great impression, Mr. Asqnith falling from office 
for his principles. Those passages of Periclean 
grandeur, spoken after war broke out, about the 
crime of Germany against humanity — about sacrific- 
ing our own ease — about duty, honour, freedom, and 
the like — were wonderfully moving. Would there, 
however, have been occasion for them, if in the 
orator's own case, the sacrifice had been made before 
the event instead of after it, or if he had faithfully 
performed the simplest and chief of all the duties 
attaching to his great position! 

The present war, as many of us thought, and still 
think, was not inevitable. None have maintained 
this opinion in the past with greater vehemence than 
the Liberal party. But the conditions on which it 
could have been avoided were, that England should 
have been prepared, which she was not; and that 
she should have spoken her intentions clearly, which 
she did not. 

"When the war is ended, or when the tide of it has 
turned and begun to sweep eastward, there will be 
much going and coming of the older people, and of 
women, both young and old, between England and 
France. They have waited, and what is it that they 
will then be setting forth to see? . . . From Mons 
to the Marne, and back again to Ypres, heaps of 
earth, big and little, shapeless, nameless, numberless 
— the graves of men who did not hesitate to sacrifice 
either their careers or their lives when duty called 
them. Desolation is the heaviest sacrifice of all; 
and those who will, by and by, go on this pilgrim- 
age have suffered it, ungrudgingly and with pride, 
because their country needed it. If this war was 



of errors. 



THE PRICE PAID 305 

indeed inevitable there is no more to be said. But Partiii. 
what if it was not inevitable ? What if there would Chapter 
have been no war at all — or a less lingering and VIL 
murderous war — supposing that those, who from the a tragedy 
trust reposed in them by their fellow-countrymen 
should have been the first to sacrifice their careers 
to duty, had not chosen instead to sacrifice duty to 
their careers 1 It was no doubt a service to humanity 
to save the careers of politicians from extinction, 
to keep ministers in office from year to year, to 
preserve the Liberal party — that great instrument 
for good — unfractured. These benefits were worth 
a great price ; but were they worth quite so great a 
price as has been paid? 



PART IV 
DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 



Now I saw still in my Dream, that they went on until they were come 
to the place that Simple and Sloth and Presumption lay and slept in, 
when Christian went by on Pilgrimage. And behold they were hanged 
up in irons, a little way off on the other side. 

Then said Mercy to him that was their Guide and Conductor, What 
are those three men? and for what are they hanged there? 

Great-Heart : These three men were men of very bad qualities, they 
had no mind to be Pilgrims themselves, and whosoever they could they 
hindered. They were for sloth and folly themselves, and whoever they 
could persuade with, they made so too, and withal taught them to pre- 
sume that they should do well at last. They were asleep when Christian 
went by, and now you go by they are hanged. 

Mercy : But could they persuade any to be of their opinion ? 

Great-Heart: Yes, they turned several out of the way. There was 
Slow-pace, that they persuaded to do as they. They also prevailed with 
one Short-wind, with one No-heart, with one Linger-after-Lust, and 
with one Sleepy-head, and with a young woman her name was Dull, to 
turn out of the way and become as they. Besides they brought up an 
ill report of your Lord, persuading others that he was a Task-master. 
They also brought up an evil report of the good Land saying 'twas not 
half so good as some pretend it was. They also began to vilify his 
Servants, and to count the very best of them meddlesome troublesome 
busy-bodies. 

The Pilgrim's Progress. 



CHAPTER I 

THE BEITISH ARMY AND THE PEACE OF EUEOPE 

Many people who were not in the habit of concerning Part rv. 
themselves with party politics endeavoured, during Chapter 
the autumn of 1911, and from that time forward, _^_ 
to straighten out their ideas on the twin problems The British 

Army and 

of Foreign Policy and Defence. They were moved the peace 
thereto mainly by the Agadir incident. Moreover, 0l Europe - 
a year later, the Balkan war provided an object 
lesson in the success of sudden onset against an 
unprepared enemy. Gradually also, more and more 
attention was focussed upon the large annual in- 
creases in preparation of the warlike sort, which 
successive budgets, presented to the Reichstag, had 
been unable to hide away. In addition to these, came, 
early in 1913, the sensational expansion of the 
German military establishment and the French reply 
to it, which have already been considered. 

Private enquirers of course knew nothing of Lord 
Haldane's rebuff at Berlin in 1912, for that was a 
Government secret. Nor had they any means of 
understanding more than a portion of what was 
actually afoot on the Continent of Europe in the 
matter of armaments and military preparations. 
Their sole sources of information were official papers 
and public discussions. Many additional facts beyond 

309 



310 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 

Part iv. these are brought to the notice of governments 
Chapter through their secret intelligence departments. All 
L continental powers are more or less uncandid, both 
The British as regards the direction and the amount of their 
the peace expenditure on armaments. In the case of Germany 
oi Europe, concealment is practised on a greater scale and more 
methodically than with any other. Ministers obvi- 
ously knew a great deal more than the British public ; 
but what was known to the man-in-the-street was 
sufficiently disquieting, when he set himself to puzzle 
out its meanings. 

At this time (during 1912, and in the first half 
of 1913, until anxiety with regard to Ireland began 
to absorb public attention) there was a very widely- 
spread and rapidly-growing concern as to the se- 
curity of the country. For nearly seven years Lord 
Roberts, with quiet constancy, had been addressing 
thin and, for the most part, inanimate gatherings 
on the subject of National Service. Suddenly he 
found himself being listened to with attention and 
respect by crowded audiences. 

Lord Roberts had ceased to be Commander- 
in-Chief in 1904. After his retirement, and in the 
same year, he revisited the South African battle- 
fields. During this trip, very reluctantly — for he 
was no lover of change — he came to the conclusion 
that in existing circumstances 'national service * 
was a necessity. On his return to England he en- 
deavoured to persuade Mr. Balfour's Government 
to accept his views and give effect to them. Failing 
in this, he resigned his seat upon the Committee of 
Imperial Defence in 1905, in order that he might be 
able to advocate his opinion freely. He was then 
in his seventy-fourth year. It was not, however, 



NATIONAL ANXIETY 311 

until seven years later * that his words can be said Part iv. 
to have arrested general attention. Chapter 

The truth was that the nation was beginning to L 
be dissatisfied with what it had been told by party The British 
speakers and newspapers, on the one side and the thTpea^e 
other, regarding the state of the national defences. 0l Eur °P e - 
It had not even the consolation of feeling that what 
the one said might be set against the other, and 
truth arrived at by striking a balance between 
them. This method of the party system, which was 
supposed to have served fairly well in other matters, 
failed to reassure the nation with regard to its 
military preparations. The whole of this subject 
was highly complicated, lent itself readily to political 
mystery, and produced in existing circumstances the 
same apprehensions among ordinary men as those 
of a nervous pedestrian, lost in a fog by the wharf 
side, who finds himself beset by officious and quar- 
relsome touts, each claiming permission to set him 
on his way. 

The nation was disquieted because it knew that it 
had not been told the whole truth by either set of poli- 
ticians. It suspected the reason of this to be that 
neither set had ever taken pains to understand where 
the truth lay. It had a notion, moreover, that the 
few who really knew, were afraid — for party reasons 
— to speak out, to state their conclusions, and to 
propose the proper remedies, lest such a course 
might drive them from office, or prevent them from 
ever holding it. Beyond any doubt it was true that 
at this time many people were seriously disturbed 
by the unsatisfactory character of recent Parlia- 
mentary discussions, and earnestly desired to know 

October 1912. 



312 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 



Part IV. 

Chapter 

I. 

The British 
Army and 
the peace 
ol Europe. 



the real nature of the dangers to be apprehended, 
and the adequacy of our preparations for meeting 
them. 

There had always been a difficulty in keeping the 
Army question from being used as a weapon in party 
warfare. As to this — looking back over a long period 
of years — there was not much to choose between 
the Radicals, Liberals, or Whigs upon the one hand, 
and the Unionists, Conservatives, or Tories on the 
other. Military affairs are complicated and techni- 
cal; and the very fact that the line of country is 
so puzzling to the ordinary man had preserved it as 
the happy hunting-ground of the politician. When 
an opportunity presented itself of attacking the 
Government on its army policy, the opposition — 
whether in the reign of Queen Victoria or in that of 
Queen Anne — rarely flinched out of any regard for 
the national interest. And when Parliamentary con- 
siderations and ingrained prejudices made it seem 
a risky matter to undertake reforms which were 
important, or even essential, the Government of the 
day just as rarely showed any disposition to dis- 
charge this unpopular duty. 

While at times naval policy, and even foreign 
policy, had for years together been removed out of 
the region of purely party criticism, army policy had 
ever remained embarrassed by an evil tradition. 
From the time of John Churchill, Duke of Marl- 
borough, to the time of Field-Marshal Sir John 
French — from a date, that is, only a few years after 
our modern Parliamentary system was inaugurated 
by the 'Glorious Revolution,' down to the present 
day — the characteristic of almost every opposition 
with regard to this matter, had been factiousness, 



THE BLOOD TAXES 313' 

and that of almost every Government evasion. PartIV. 
Neither the one side nor the other had ever seemed Chapter 
able to approach this ill-fated topic with courage Im 
or sincerity, or to view it with steady constancy from The British 
the standpoint of the national interest. the peace 

For several years past the country had been of Europe - 
watching a conspicuous example of this ingrained 
habit of manoeuvring round the Army in order to 
obtain party advantage. From 1912 onwards, until 
more interesting perplexities provided a distraction, 
a great part of the Liberal press and party had been 
actively engaged in the attempt to fix the Unionist 
party with responsibility for the proposals of the 
National Service League. The Opposition, it is 
hardly necessary to record, were innocent of this 
charge — criminally innocent ; but it was nevertheless 
regarded as good party business to load them witji 
the odium of * conscription. ' The 'blood-taxes,' as 
it was pointed out by one particularly zealous jour- 
nal, would be no less useful than the 'food-taxes' 
as an 'election cry,' which at this time — more than 
ever before — appeared to have become the be-all 
and end-all of party activities. 

It was obvious to the meanest capacity that these 
industrious politicians were not nearly so much 
concerned with the demerits, real or supposed, of 
National Service, as with making their opponents 
as unpopular as possible. In such an atmosphere 
of prejudice it would have required great courage 
and determination in a statesman to seek out and 
proclaim the true way to security, were it national 
service or anything else which entailed a sacrifice. 

Was it wonderful that when people examined 
the signs of the times in the early part of 1913, 



314 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 

Part rv. they should have found themselves oppressed by 

Chapter feelings of doubt and insecurity? A huge German 

L military increase; a desperate French effort in 

The British reply; war loans (for they were nothing else) on a 

thTpeace vast scale in both countries — what was the mean- 

ot Europe. j n g f ft gfitf To w]iat ex t en t was British safety 

jeopardised thereby 1 ? 

To these questions there was no answer which 
carried authority; the official oracles were dumb. 
We are a democratic country, and yet none of our 
rulers had ever yet spoken plainly to us. None of 
the Secretaries for War, none of the Prime Ministers 
since the beginning of the century, had ever stated 
the issue with uncompromising simplicity, as the 
case required. None of them had ever taken the 
country into his confidence, either as to the extent 
of the danger or as to the nature of the remedy. It 
is necessary to assume — in the light of subsequent 
events — that these statesmen had in fact realised the 
danger, and were not ignorant of the preparations 
which were required to forestall it. Certainly it is 
hard to believe otherwise ; but at times, remembering 
their speeches and their acts, one is inclined to give 
them the benefit, if it be a benefit, of the doubt. 

The question at issue was in reality a graver mat- 
ter than the security of the United Kingdom or the 
British Empire. The outlook was wider even than 
this. The best guarantee for the preservation of 
the peace of Europe, and of the World, would have 
been a British army proportionate to our population 
and resources. There could be no doubt of this. 
For half a century or more we had, half unconsciously, 
bluffed Europe into the belief that we did in fact 
possess such an army; but gradually it had become 



BRITAIN AND EUROPEAN INTERESTS 315 

plain that this was not the case. Since the Agadir partIV. 
incident the real situation was apparent even to the Chapter 
man in the street — in Paris, Berlin, Brussels, the L 
Hague, Vienna, Rome, and Petrograd — in every The British 
capital, indeed, save perhaps in London alone. thTpeace 

If England had possessed such an army as would of Eur °P e - 
have enabled her to intervene with effect in European 
affairs, she would almost certainly never have been 
called upon to intervene. 1 Peace in that case would 
have preserved itself. For Europe knew — not from 
our professions, but from the obvious facts, which 
are a much better assurance — that our army would 
never be used except for one purpose only, to main- 
tain the balance of Power. She knew this to be our 
only serious concern; and, except for the single 
nation which, at any given time, might be aiming at 
predominance, it was also the most serious concern 
of the whole of Europe. She knew us to be dis- 
interested, in the diplomatic sense, with regard to all 
other European matters. She knew that there was 
nothing in Europe which we wished to acquire, and 
nothing — save in the extreme south-west, a rock 
called Gibraltar, and in the Mediterranean an island 
called Malta — which we held and were determined to 
maintain. In the chancelleries of Europe all this 
was clearly recognised. And more and more it was 

1 This view was held by no one more strongly than by Lord Boberts. 
During the last five-and-twenty years the writer has probably seen as 
much of soldiers as falls to the lot of most civilians, but nowhere, during 
that period, from the late senior Field-Marshal downwards, has he ever 
encountered that figment of the pacifist imagination of which we read 
so much during 1912-1914 — "a military clique which desires to create a 
'conscript army on the European model for purposes of aggression on 
' the continent of Europe. ' ' The one thought of all soldiers was adequate 
defence. Their one concern was how to prevent war. . . . M. Clemen- 
ceau once urged that Lord Eoberts should receive the Nobel Peace Prize 
for his advocacy of ' conscription ' in England. This proposal was made 
quite seriously. 



316 DEMOCEACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 

Part iv. coming to be recognised also by the organs of public 

Chapter opinion on the Continent, 
i. 

The British The population of France is roughly forty mil- 
thTpeace lions ; that of Germany, sixty-five millions; that of 
of Europe. ^ Q u n rted Kingdom, forty-five millions. As regards 
numbers of men trained to bear arms, France by 
1911 had already come to the end of her resources; 
Germany had still considerable means of expansion; 
Britain alone had not yet seriously attempted to 
put forth her strength. Had we done so in time 
the effect must have been final and decisive; there 
would then have been full security against disturb- 
ance of the peace of Europe by a deliberately 
calculated war. 

Europe's greatest need therefore was that Britain 
should possess an army formidable not only in 
valour, but also in numbers : her greatest peril lay 
in the fact that, as to the second of these require- 
ments, Britain was deficient. No power from the 
Atlantic seaboard to the Ural Mountains, save that 
one alone which contemplated the conquest and 
spoliation of its neighbours, would have been dis- 
quieted — or indeed anything else but reassured — 
had the British people decided to create such an 
army. For by reason of England's peculiar interests 
— or rather perhaps from her lack of all direct 
personal interests in European affairs, other than 
in peace and the balance of power — she was marked 
out as the natural mediator in Continental disputes. 
In these high perplexities, however, it is not the 
justice of the mediator which restrains aggression, 
so much as the fear inspired by his fleets and the 
strength of his battalions. 



CHAPTER n 

THE COMPOSITION OF THE BEITISH AKMY 

The doubt and anxiety of public opinion in 1912 partIV. 
were not allayed when the strength and composition Chapter 
of the British Army came to be considered. IL 

Leaving out of account those troops which were Thecom- 

-i t • • • t -i« i x-w •• position of 

recruited and maintained in India, the Dominions, the British 
and the Dependencies, the actual number of British Army " 
regulars employed in garrison duty abroad was in 
round figures 125,000 men. The number in the 
United Kingdom was approximately the same; but 
by no means the whole of these were fit to take the 
field. The total strength of the Regular Army in 
1912-1913 might therefore be taken at somewhere 
between 250,000 and 254,000 men, 1 of whom half 
were permanently out of this country, while from 
25,000 to 50,000 could not be reckoned on as avail- 
able in case of war, for the reason that they were 
either recent recruits or 'immatures.' 2 

1 These rough totals were approximately the same in the autumn of 
1912, and at the outbreak of war in July 1914. 

2 The exact number of men who could remain in the units when mo- 
bilised was difficult to assess, for the reason that it varied considerably 
according to the trooping season, which begins in August and ends in 
February. February was therefore the most unfavourable month for 
comparison, and it is probably not far from the truth to say that at that 
date 50,000 men out of our nominal home army were unavailable in case 
of war. Under the extreme stress of circumstances, it had recently been 
decided that boys of nineteen might serve in Europe in the event of war, 

317 



318 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 



Part IV. 

Chapter 

II. 

The com- 
position of 
the British 
Army. 



The reserves and additional troops which would 
be called out in the event of a serious war were so 
different in character that it was impossible simply 
to throw them into a single total, and draw conclusions 
therefrom according to the rules of arithmetic. For 
when people spoke of the Army Reserve, the Special 
Reserve, and the Territorial Army, they were talking 
of three things, the values of which were not at all 
comparable. The first were fully trained fighting 
soldiers ; the second were lads with a mere smatter- 
ing of their trade; while the third were little mor.e 
than an organised schedule of human material — ■ 
mainly excellent — which would become available for 
training only at the outbreak of war, and whose 
liability for service was limited to home defence. 
The sum-total of these reserves and additional troops 
was roughly 450,000 men; but this row of figures 
was entirely meaningless, or else misleading, until 
the significance of its various factors was grasped. 1 

The first of these categories, the Army Reserve, 
was the only one which could justly claim to rank 
as a true reserve — that is, as a fighting force, from 
the outbreak of war equal in calibre to the 

so that a good many ' immatures ' were now nominally ' mature. ' Only 
nominally, however, for even a war minister could not alter the course 
of nature by a stroke of the pen. 

1 Without wearying the reader too much with figures the German 
strength may be briefly indicated. That country has a population 
roughly half as large again as our own (65 millions against 45). The 
total of fully trained men whom the German Government could mobilise 
at the declaration of war was something over 4,500,000. Of these some 
2,400,000 composed the 'striking force'; the remaining 2,100,000 or 
thereabouts, the reserve for making good wastage of war. But in addi- 
tion, Germany had scheduled and inscribed in her Ersatz, or recruiting 
reserve, and in the Landsturm, fully 5,000,000 untrained and partially 
trained men, with ample equipment and military instructors for them 
all. A large proportion of these would be enrolled on mobilisation, and 
would undertake garrison and other duties, for which they would be 
fitted after a short period of service, thus freeing all fully trained men 
for service in the field. 



THE THREE RESERVES 319 

Continental troops against which it would be called paktIV. 
upon to take Ihe field. Chapteb 

The Army Reserve consisted of men who had IL 
served their full time in the Regular Army. They The com- 
were therefore thoroughly trained and disciplined, the' British 
needing only a few days — or at most weeks — to rub Army - 
the rust off them. 1 Nominally their numbers were 
137,000 2 men ; but as over 8000 of these were living 
out of the United Kingdom the net remainder had 
to be taken at something under 130,000. Moreover, 
as the Army Reserve depended automatically upon 
the strength of the Regular Army, and as the 
strength of this had recently been reduced, it seemed 
necessarily to follow that ultimately there would 
be a considerable diminution. 

The second category to which the name of a 
reserve was given was the Special Reserve. This, 
however, was no true reserve like the first, for it was 
wholly unfit to take the field upon the outbreak of 
hostilities. It was the modern substitute for the 
Militia, and was under obligation to serve abroad in 
time of war. The term of enlistment was six years, 
and the training nominally consisted of six months 
in the first year, and one month in camp in each of 
the succeeding years. But in practice these condi- 
tions had been greatly relaxed. It was believed that, 
upon the average, the term of training amounted to 
even less than the proposals of the National Service 

1 For purposes of immediate mobilisation, however, Continental re- 
servists are superior to our own, because in the British Army they lose 
touch with their regiments, and in case of war will in many cases be 
serving with officers and comrades whom they know nothing about; 
whereas in Germany (for example) they come up for periods of training 
with the regiments to which they belong. Also, at the outset, the pro- 
portion of reservists to serving soldiers will be much greater in our case. 

2 This was in 1912. Their numbers appear to have increased some- 
what. In July 1914 they were something over 146,000. 



320 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 



The com- 
position of 
the British 
Army. 



Part iv. League, 1 which had been criticised from the official 
Chapter standpoint — severely and not altogether unjustly — 
on the ground that they would not provide soldiers 
fit to be drafted immediately into the fighting line. 

Notwithstanding the inadequacy of its military 
education, this Special Reserve was relied upon in 
some measure for making up the numbers of our 
Expeditionary Force 2 at the commencement of war, 
and individuals from it, and even in some cases units, 
would therefore have been sent out to meet the 
conscript armies of the Continent, to which they were 
inferior, not only in length and thoroughness of 
training, but also in age. It was important also to 
bear in mind that they would be led by comparatively 
inexperienced and untrained officers. The strength 
of the Special Reserve was approximately 58,000 3 
men, or lads. Under the most favourable view it 
was a corps of apprentices whose previous service 
had been of a very meagre and desultory character. 
The third category was the Territorial Army, 
whose term of service was four years and whose 
military training, even nominally, only consisted of 
fifteen days in camp each year, twenty drills the 
first year, and ten drills each year after that. In 
reality this training had, on the average, consisted 
of very much less. This force was not liable for 
service abroad, but only for home defence. 

The minimum strength of the Territorial Army 

1 Viz. four months for infantry and six for cavalry. 

2 Twenty-seven battalions of the Special Reserve were scheduled to go 
out as complete units for duty on lines of communication, etc. The re- 
port on recruiting for 1912 says that the great majority of recruits for 
the Special Eeserve join between the ages of seventeen and nineteen. It 
is hardly necessary to point out the folly of putting boys of this age 
in a situation where they will be peculiarly liable to disease. Continen- 
tal nations employ their oldest classes of reserves for these duties. 

8 In July 1914 about 61,000. 



THEIR VALUES AND TRAINING 321 

was estimated beforehand by Lord Haldane at partIV. 
316,000 men; but these numbers bad never been Chapter 
reached. The approximate strength was only IL 
260,000 men, of whom only about half had qualified, The com- 
both by doing fifteen days in camp, and by passing an ^British 
elementary test in musketry. 1 These numbers had re- Armjr - 
cently shown a tendency to shrink rather than swell. 2 

The value of the Territorial Army, therefore, was 
that of excellent, though in certain cases immature, 
material, available for training upon the outbreak 
of war. But in spite of its high and patriotic spirit 
it was wholly unfit to take the field against trained 
troops until it had undergone the necessary training. 

In the event of war we could not safely reckon 
upon being able to withdraw our garrisons from 
abroad. 3 Consequently, in the first instance, and 
until the Special Reserve and the Territorial Army 
had been made efficient, all we could reasonably 
depend upon for serious military operations, either 
at home or abroad, were that part of the Regular 
Army which was in the United Kingdom, and the 
Army Reserve. 

In round figures therefore our soldiers imme- 
diately available for a European war {i.e. that por- 
tion of the Regular Army which was stationed at 
home and the Army Reserve) amounted on mobilisa- 
tion to something much under 250,000 men. Our 
apprentice troops (the Special Reserve), who were 
really considerably less than half-made, numbered 

1 I.e. in the autumn of 1912. They were, therefore, 56,000 short of 
Lord Haldane 's estimate. 

2 Latterly there was a slight improvement in recruiting. In July 
1914 the numbers (including permanent staff) were a little over 268,000 
— 48,000 short of Lord Haldane 's estimate. 

3 The fact that in certain cases we did so withdraw our garrisons in 
1914-1915 without disaster does not invalidate this calculation. 



322 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 



PartIV. something under 60,000 men. Our immade raw 
Chapter material (the Territorial Army), excellent in quality 

and immediately available for training, might be 

taken at 260,000 men. 



ii. 



The com- 
position of 
the British 
Army. 



3L 



The main consideration arising out of this analysis 
was of course the inadequacy of the British Army to 
make good the numerical deficiency of the Triple 
Entente in the Western theatre during the onset and 
the grip of war. Supposing England to be involved 
in a European war, which ran its course and was 
brought to a conclusion with the same swiftness 
which had characterised every other European war 
within the last half century, how were our half- 
made and our unmade troops to be rendered 
efficient in time to effect the result in any way 
whatsoever? 

There was yet another consideration of great 
gravity. If our full Expeditionary Force were sent 
abroad we should have to strain our resources to the 
utmost to bring it up to its full nominal strength and 
keep it there. The wastage of war would necessarily 
be very severe in the case of so small a force ; especi- 
ally heavy in the matter of officers. Consequently, 
from the moment when this force set sail, there would 
be a dearth of officers in the United Kingdom 
competent to train the Special Reserve, the Ter- 
ritorial Army, and the raw recruits. Every regular 
and reserve officer in the country would be required 
in order to mobilise the Expeditionary Force, and 
keep it up to its full strength during the first six 
months. As things then stood there was a certainty 
■ — in case of war — of a very serious shortage of 
officers of suitable experience and age to undertake 



SCARCITY OF OFFICERS 323 

the duties, which were required under our recently PartIV. 

devised military system. 1 Chapter 

Half -made soldiers and raw material alike would ]X 

therefore be left to the instruction of amateur or The com- 

on i ,,,.., , position of 

hastily improvised officers — zealous and intelligent the British 
men without a doubt ; but unqualified, owing to their Anny - 
own lack of experience, for training raw troops, so 
as to place them rapidly on an equality with the 
armies to which they would find themselves opposed. 
What the British system contemplated, was as if you 
were to send away the headmaster, and the assistant- 
masters, and the under-masters, leaving the school 
in charge of pupil-teachers. 

In no profession is the direct personal influence 
of teaching and command more essential than in 
the soldier 's. In none are good teachers and leaders 
more able to shorten and make smooth the road to 
confidence and efficiency. Seeing that we had chosen 
to depend so largely upon training our army after 
war began, it might have been supposed, that at least 
we should have taken care to provide ourselves with 
a sufficient number of officers and non-commissioned 
officers, under whose guidance the course of education 
would be made as thorough and as short as possible. 
This was not the case. Indeed the reverse was the 
case. Instead of possessing a large number of officers 
and non-commissioned officers, beyond those actually 
required at the outbreak of war for the purpose of 

1 The experience of the past few months makes this criticism appear 
absurd — in its understatement. But of course what was contemplated 
in 1912-13 was not anything upon the gigantic scale of our present 
'New Army'; but only (a) the Special Reserve, (&) the Territorial 
Army, possibly doubled in numbers during the first six months, and (c) 
fresh recruits for the Regular Army upon a very considerably enhanced 
scale. But even for these purposes which were foreseen, the provision 
of officers was quite inadequate; so inadequate indeed as to appear 
from the soldier 's point of view in the light of a parliamentary farce. 



324 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 



ii. 

The com- 
position of 
the British 
Army. 



PaetIV. starting with, repairing the wastage in the Expedi- 
Chapteb tionary Force, we were actually faced, as things then 
stood, with a serious initial shortage of the officers 
required for this one purpose alone. 

Lord Haldane in framing the army system which 
is associated with his name chose to place his trust 
in a small, highly-trained expeditionary force for 
immediate purposes, to be supplemented at a later 
date — if war were obliging enough to continue for so 
long — by a new army of which the Territorials 
formed the nucleus, and which would not begin its 
real training until after the outbreak of hostilities. 
Under the most favourable view this plan was a great 
gamble; for it assumed that in the war which was 
contemplated, the onset and the grip periods would 
be passed through without crushing disaster, and 
that England would, in due course, have an oppor- 
tunity of making her great strength felt in the drag. 
It will be said that Lord Haldane 's assumption has 
been justified by recent events, and in a sense this 
is true ; but by what merest hair-breadth escape, by 
what sacrifices on the part of our Allies, at what cost 
in British lives, with what reproach to our national 
credit, we have not yet had time fully to realise. 

But crediting Lord Haldane 's system, if we may, 
with an assumption which has been proved correct, 
we have reason to complain that he did not act boldly 
on this assumption and make his scheme, such as it 
was, complete and effective. For remember, it was 
contemplated that the great new army, which was 
to defend the existence of the British Empire in the 
final round of war, should be raised and trained upon 
the voluntary principle — upon a wave of patriotic 
enthusiasm — after war broke out. This new army 



WANT OF STORES AND PLANS 325 

would have to be organised, clothed, equipped, armed, Part iv. 
and supplied with ammunition. The 'voluntary Chapter 
principle' could not apply to matters of this kind. IL 
It might therefore have been expected that stores Thecom- 
would be accumulated, and plans worked out upon the' British 
the strictest business principles, with philosophic Anny - 
thoroughness, and in readiness for an emergency 
which might occur at any moment. 

Moral considerations which precluded 'conscrip- 
tion' did not, and could not, apply to inanimate 
material of war, or to plans and schedules of army 
corps and camps, or to a body of officers enlisted of 
their own free will. It may have been true that to 
impose compulsory training would have offended 
the consciences of free-born Britons; but it was 
manifestly absurd to pretend that the accumulation 
of adequate stores of artillery and small arms, of 
shells and cartridges, of clothing and equipment, 
could offend the most tender conscience — could 
offend anything indeed except the desire of the tax- 
payer to pay as few taxes as possible. 

If the British nation chose to bank on the assump- 
tion, that it would have the opportunity given it of 
'making good' during the drag of war, it should have 
been made to understand what this entailed in the 
matter of supplies; and most of all in reserve of 
officers. All existing forces should at least have been 
armed with the most modern weapons. There should 
have been arms and equipment ready for the recruits 
who would be required, and who were relied upon 
to respond to a national emergency. There should 
have been ample stores of every kind, including 
artillery, and artillery ammunition, for that 
Expeditionary Force upon which, during the first 



326 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 



Part IV. 

Chapter 

II. 

The com- 
position of 
the British 
Army. 



six months we had decided to risk our national 
safety. 

But, in fact, we were provided fully in none of 
these respects. And least of all were we provided in 
the matter of officers. There was no case of con- 
science at stake; but only the question of a vote in 
the House of Commons. We could have increased 
our establishment of officers by a vote; we could 
have laid in stores of ammunition, of clothing, of 
equipment by a vote. But the vote was not asked 
for — it might have been unpopular — and therefore 
Lord Haldane's scheme — in its inception a gamble 
of the most hazardous character — was reduced to a 
mere make-believe, for the reason that its originator 
lacked confidence to back his own 'fancy.' 



Looking back at the Agadir incident, it seemed 
plain enough, from a soldier's point of view, that 
the British Expeditionary Force was inadequate, in 
a purely military sense, to redress the adverse bal- 
ance against the French, and beat back a German 
invasion. The moral effect, however, of our as- 
sistance would undoubtedly have been very great, in 
encouraging France and Belgium by our comrade- 
ship in arms, and in discouraging Germany, by mak- 
ing clear to her the firmness of the Triple Entente. 

But by the summer of 1914 — three years later — 
this position had undergone a serious change. In 
a purely military sense, the value of such aid as it 
had been in our power to send three years earlier, 
was greatly diminished. The increase in the German 
striking force over that of France, which had taken 
effect since 1911, was considerably greater than the 
total numbers of the army which we held prepared 



COST OF FULL INSURANCE 327 

for foreign service. This was fully understood partIV. 
abroad; and the knowledge of it would obviously Chapter 
diminish the moral as well as the material effect of IL 
our co-operation. The com - 

In order that the combined forces of France and [^British 
England might have a reasonable chance of holding Army - 
their own 1 against Germany, until Russian pressure 
began to tell, the smallest army which we ought to 
have been able to put in the field, and maintain there 
for six months, was not less than twice that of the 
existing Expeditionary Force. From a soldier's 
point of view 320,000 men instead of 160,000 was the 
very minimum with which there might be a hope 
of withstanding the German onset ; and for the pur- 
pose of bringing victory within sight it would have 
been necessary to double the larger of these figures. 
In order to reach the end in view, Britain ought to 
have possessed a striking force at least half as large 
as that of France, in round figures between 600,000 
and 750,000 men. 

This was how the matter appeared in 1912, viewed 
from the standpoint of a soldier who found himself 
asked to provide a force sufficient, not for conquest — 
not for the purpose of changing the map of Europe 
to the advantage of the Triple Entente — but merely 
in order to safeguard the independence of Belgium 
and Holland, to prevent France from being crushed 
by Germany, 2 and to preserve the security of the 
British Empire. 

1 I.e. of holding the Germans at the French frontier and keeping 
them out of Belgium should they attempt to invade that country. 

2 At the time these totals were worked out the results appeared very 
startling to the lay mind. Eecent experience, however, has proved that 
the soldiers who worked them out were right when they described them 
as ' modest estimates. ' 



328 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 

part iv. The political question which presented itself to 

Chapter the minds of enquirers was this — If the British 

IL nation were told frankly the whole truth about the 

The com- Army, would it not conceivably decide that com- 

the* British plete insurance was a better bargain than half 

Army. measures I What force ought we to be prepared to 

send to France during the first fortnight of war in 

order to make it a moral certainty that Germany 

would under no circumstances venture to attack 

France? 

To questions of this sort it is obviously impossible 
to give certain and dogmatic answers. There are 
occasions when national feeling runs away with 
policy and overbears considerations of military 
prudence. The effects of sudden panic, of a sense of 
bitter injustice, of blind pride or overweening con- 
fidence, are incalculable upon any mathematical 
basis. But regarding the matter from the point of 
view of the Kaiser's general staff, whose opinion is 
usually assumed to be a determining factor in Ger- 
man enterprises, a British Expeditionary Force, 
amounting to something over 600,000 men, would 
have been sufficient to prevent the occurrence of a 
coolly calculated war. And in the event of war aris- 
ing out of some uncontrollable popular impulse, a 
British Army of this size would have been enough, 
used with promptitude and under good leadership, 
to secure the defeat of the aggressor. 

An Expeditionary Force of 320,000 men would 
mean fully trained reserves of something over 
210,000 in order to make good the wastage of war 
during a campaign of six months. Similarly an 
Expeditionary Force of 600,000 would mean reserves 
of 400,000. In the former case a total of 530,000 



position of 
the British 



LIMITS OF VOLUNTARY ENLISTMENT 329 

trained soldiers, and in the latter a total of 1,000,000, paetIV. 
would therefore have been required. 1 Chapter 

Even the smaller of these proposed increases IL 
in the Expeditionary Force would have meant The com 
doubling the number of trained soldiers in the British 
Army; the larger would have meant multiplying it Arxny ' 
by four. Under what system would it be possible 
to achieve these results if public opinion should 
decide that either of them was necessary to national 
security? The answer was as easy to give as the 
thing itself seemed hard to carry out. 

It had become clear a good deal earlier than the 
year 1914 that the limit of voluntary enlistment, 
under existing conditions, had already been reached 
for the Regular as well as the Territorial Army. If, 
therefore, greater numbers were required they could 
only be provided by some form of compulsory service. 
There was no getting away from this hard fact which 
lay at the very basis of the situation. 

If security were the object of British policy, the 
Expeditionary Force must be fully trained before 
war broke out. It would not serve the purpose for 
which it was intended, if any part of it, or of its 
reserves, needed to be taught their trade after war 
began. Thoroughness of training — which must under 
ordinary circumstances 2 be measured by length of 

1 In this calculation the wastage of war during the first six months 
has been taken at two-thirds. With the smaller force of 160,000 men, 
practically the whole army would be in the fighting line all the time, and 
the wastage consequently would be heavier. It could not wisely be 
assumed at less than three-fourths for the same period. 

2 Obviously the better and more experienced the officers, the higher the 
quality of the recruits, and the keener their spirit, the more quickly the 
desired result will be achieved. The last two have been very potent 
factors in the rapid education of our present ' New Army. ' In a time of 
abnormal patriotic impulse, the length of time required will be much 
shortened. Since August 1914 the lack of experienced officers has been 
the great difficulty. 



330 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 



PaktIV. 

Chapter 

II. 

The com- 
position of 
the British 
Army. 



training — appeared to be a factor of vital impor- 
tance. Given anything like equality in equipment, 
generalship, and position, men who had undergone 
a full two years' course — like the conscript armies 
of the Continent — ought to have no difficulty in de- 
feating a much larger force which had less discipline 
and experience. 

The lessons of the South African War were in 
many ways very useful ; but the praise lavishly, and 
justly, given to volunteer battalions by Lord Roberts 
and other distinguished commanders, needed to be 
studied in the light of the circumstances, and these 
were of a peculiar character. For one thing our 
antagonists, the Boers, were not trained troops, 
and moreover, their policy to a large extent was to 
weary us out, by declining decisive action and engag- 
ing us in tedious pursuits. Our volunteers, for the 
most part, were picked men. Although only half- 
trained — perhaps in the majority of cases wholly 
untrained — circumstances in this case permitted of 
their being given the time necessary for gaining 
experience in the field before being required to fight. 
This was an entirely different state of affairs from 
what might be looked for in a European war, in a 
densely peopled country, covered with a close net- 
work of roads and railways — a war in which great 
masses of highly disciplined soldiers would be hurled 
against one another systematically, upon a settled 
plan, until at last superiority at one point or another 
should succeed in breaking down resistance. The 
South African war and a European war were two 
things not in the least comparable. 

Before the nation could be expected to come to a 
final decision with regard to the insurance premium 



THE PEOPLE HAD A RIGHT TO KNOW 331 

which it was prepared to pay, it would require to be part iv. 

fully informed upon a variety of subordinate points Chapter 
of much importance. Cost was a matter which could IL 

not be put lightly on one side ; our peculiar obliga- The com- 

, • -■ , r? • ,-, position ol 

tions in regard to toreign garrisons was another; the British 
the nature of our industrial system was a third ; and Armjr - 
there were many besides. But the main and govern- 
ing consideration, if we wished to retain our inde- 
pendence as a nation, was — what provisions were 
adequate to security? The people wanted to know, 
and had a right to know, the facts. And in the end, 
with all due regard for our governors, and for the 
self-importance of political parties, it was not either 
for ministers or partisans to decide this question on 
behalf of the people; it was for the people, on full 
and honest information, to decide it for themselves. 



CHAPTER ni 



LOED ROBERTS S WARNINGS 



Part IV. 

Chapter 

III. 

Lord 

Roberts's 

warnings. 



Lord Roberts addressed many meetings in favour 
of National Service during the years which followed 
his return from South Africa in 1905 ; but the first 
of his speeches to arrest widespread popular atten- 
tion was delivered in the Free Trade Hall at Man- 
chester, on October 22, 1912. A popular audience 
filled the building to overflowing, listened with 
respect, and appeared to accept his conclusions with 
enthusiasm. His words carried far beyond the walls 
of the meeting-place, and caused something ap- 
proaching a sensation, or, as some thought, 
a scandal, in political circles. 

Of the commentators upon this speech the greater 
part were Liberals, and these condemned his utter- 
ances with unanimity in somewhat violent language. 
Official Unionism was dubious, uncomfortable, and 
disapproving : it remained for the most part dumb. 
A few voices were raised from this quarter in open 
reprobation; a few others proclaimed their inde- 
pendence of party discipline and hastened to approve 
his sentiments. 

There was no doubt of one thing — Lord Roberts's 
speech had at last aroused public interest. For 
the first time during the National Service agitation 

332 



NEED FOR NATIONAL SERVICE 333 

blood had been drawn. This was mainly due to PartIV. 
the object-lesson in the consequences of military Chapter 
unpreparedness, which the first Balkan War was ^_ 
iust then unfolding before the astonished eyes of ^> r ^ 

Roberts's 

Europe. In addition, those people, who for a year warnings. 
past had been puzzling their heads over the true 
meaning of the Agadir crisis, had become impressed 
with the urgent need for arriving at a clear decision 
with regard to the adequacy of our national 
defences. 

The speech was a lucid and forcible statement 
of the need for compulsory military training. It 
was interesting reading at the time it was delivered, 
and in some respects it is even more interesting to- 
day. It was compactly put together, not a thing of 
patches. A man who read any part of it would 
read it all. Yet in accordance with custom, contro- 
versy raged around three isolated passages. 

The first of these runs as follows : "In the year 
'1912, our German friends, I am well aware, do 
'not — at least in sensible circles — assert dogmatically 
'that a war with Great Britain will take place this 
'year or next; but in their heart of hearts they 
'know, every man of them, that — just as in 1866 
' and just as in 1870 — war will take place the instant 
'the German forces by land and sea are, by their 
' superiority at every point, as certain of victory as 
' anything in human calculation can be made certain. 
'Germany strikes when Germany's hour has struck. 
'That is the time-honoured policy of her Foreign 
'Office. That was the policy relentlessly pursued 
'by Bismarck and Moltke in 1866 and 1870. It 
'has been her policy decade by decade since that 
'date. It is her policy at the present hour." 



PabtIV. 

Chapter 

III. 

Lord 

Roberts's 

warnings. 



334 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 

The second passage followed upon the first: 
"It is an excellent policy. It is or should be the 
'policy of every nation prepared to play a great 
'part in history. Under that policy Germany has, 
'within the last ten years, sprung, as at a bound, 
'from one of the weakest of naval powers to the 
'greatest naval power, save one, upon this globe." 

The third passage came later: "Such, gentlemen, 
'is the origin, and such the considerations which 
'have fostered in me the growth of this conviction — 
'the conviction that in some form of National Service 
'is the only salvation of this Nation and this Empire. 
'The Territorial Force is now an acknowledged 
'failure — a failure in discipline, a failure in numbers, 
'a- failure in equipment, a failure in energy." 1 

The accuracy of the first and third of these state- 
ments now stands beyond need of proof. It was 
not truer that Germany would strike so soon as her 
rulers were of opinion that the propitious hour had 
struck, than it was that, when the British Govern- 
ment came to take stock of their resources at the 
outbreak of war, they would find the Territorial 
Army to be lacking in the numbers, equipment, train- 
ing, and discipline, which alone could have fitted it for 
its appointed task — the defence of our shores against 
invasion. Slowly, and under great difficulties, and 
amid the gravest anxieties these defects had subse- 
quently to be made good, hampering the while our 
military operations in the critical sphere. 

The second statement was of a different character, 
and taken by itself, without reference to the context, 
lent itself readily to misconception as well as mis- 

1 Manchester, October 22, 1912. Quoted from Lord Boberts's Mes- 
sage to the Nation (Murray), pp. 4-6 and p. 12. The date, however, is 
there given wrongly as October 25. 



POINTS OF CRITICISM 335 

construction. A certain number of critics, no doubt, Part iv. 
actually believed, a still larger number affected to Chapter 
believe, that Lord Roberts was here advocating the IIL 
creation of a British army, for the purpose of attack- Lord 
ing Germany, without a shred of justification, and at warnings. 
the first favourable moment. 

The whole tenor of this speech, however, from 
the first line to the last, made it abundantly clear 
that in Lord Roberts's opinion Britain could have 
neither motive nor object for attacking Germany; 
that the sole concern of England and of the British 
Empire with regard to Germany was, how we might 
defend our possessions and secure ourselves against 
her schemes of aggression. 

Lord Roberts, however, had in fact pronounced 
the intentions which he attributed to Germany to 
be 'an excellent policy,' and had thereby seemed 
to approve, and recommend for imitation, a system 
which was revolting to the conscience of a Christian 
community. 

The idea that Lord Roberts could have had any 
such thoughts in his mind seemed merely absurd to 
any one who knew him; nay, it must also have 
seemed inconceivable to any one who had taken 
the trouble to read the speech itself in an un- 
prejudiced mood. To an ordinary man of sense it 
did not need Lord Roberts's subsequent letter of 
explanation 1 to set his opinions in their true light. 
It was clear that his object, in this 'peccant 
passage,' had merely been to avoid a pharisaical 
condemnation of German methods and ambitions, 
and to treat that country as a worthy, as well as a 
formidable, antagonist. Being a soldier, however, — 

1 Manchester Guardian, November 5, 1912. 



336 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 



Part IV. 

Chapter 

III. 

Lord 

Roberts's 

warnings. 



not a practised platform orator, alive to the dangers 
of too generous concession — lie went too far. The 
words were unfortunately chosen, seeing that so 
many critics were on the watch, not to discover the 
true meaning of the speech, but to pounce on any 
slip which might be turned to the disadvantage of 
the speaker. 

At first there was an attempt on the part of cer- 
tain London 1 Liberal journals to boycott this speech. 
Very speedily, however, it seemed to dawn upon 
them that they had greater advantages to gain by 
denouncing it. A few days later, accordingly, the 
torrent of condemnation was running free. The 
ablest attack appeared in the Nation, 2 and as this 
pronouncement by the leading Radical weekly was 
quoted with approval by the greater part of the 
ministerial press throughout the country, it may 
fairly be taken as representing the general view 
of the party. 

The article was headed A Diabolical Speech, 
and its contents fulfilled the promise of the title. 
" There ought," said the writer, ''to be some means 
'of bringing to book a soldier, in the receipt of 
'money from the State, who speaks of a friendly 
'Power as Lord Roberts spoke of Germany." He 
was accused roundly of predicting and encourag- 
ing a vast and 'hideous conflict' between the two 
countries. Lord Roberts was a ' successful' 3 soldier ; 

1 This was not so, however, with the Liberal newspaper of greatest 
influence in the United Kingdom — the Manchester Guardian — which 
gave a full and prominent report of Lord Roberts's meeting. This 
journal is honourably free from any suspicion of using the suppression 
of news as a political weapon. 

'October 26, 1912. Like the Manchester Guardian, the Nation made 
no attempt to boycott the speech. 

3 ' Successful, ' not ' distinguished ' or ' able ' is the word. The amiable 
stress would appear to be on luck rather than merit. 



A EADICAL ATTACK 337 

but 'without training in statesmanship.' He 'had PabtIV. 
never shown any gift for it. ' His was ' an average Chapter 
Tory intellect.' He was a 'complete contrast' to IIL 
Wellington, who possessed two great qualities; for Lord 
"he set a high value on peace, and he knew how to warnings, 
'estimate and bow to the governing forces of 
'national policy. . . . Lord Roberts possesses 
'neither of these attributes. He is a mere jingo in 
'opinion and character, and he interprets the life 
' and interests of this nation and this Empire by the 
'crude lusts and fears which haunt the unimagina- 
'tive soldier's brain." 

We may pause at this breathing-place to take 
note of the healing influences of time. Radical 
journalists of 1832, and thereabouts, were wont to 
say very much the same hard things of the Duke 
of Wellington, as those of 1912 saw fit to apply to 
Earl Roberts. . . . We may also remark in passing, 
upon the errors to which even the most brilliant 
of contemporary judgments are liable. There has 
never been a man in our time who set a higher value 
on peace than Lord Roberts did. He realised, how- 
ever, not only the intrinsic value of peace, but its mar- 
ket cost. His real crime, in the eyes of pacifists, was 
that he stated publicly, as often as he had the chance, 
what price we must be prepared to pay, if we wanted 
peace and not war. It was in this sense, no doubt, 
that he did not know 'how to estimate and bow to the 
'governing forces of national policy.' His blunt 
warnings broke in rudely and crudely upon the com- 
fortable discourse of the three counsellors — Simple, 
Sloth, and Presumption, who, better than any others, 
were skilled in estimating the 'governing forces,' 
and the advantages to be gained by bowing to them. 



338 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 

Part rv. The writer in the Nation then proceeded to riddle 
Chapter Lord Roberts 's theories of defence. "He desires 
IIL 'us to remain a 'free nation' in the same breath 
Lord 'that he invites us to come under the yoke of con- 

wai4ngs. 'scription" — intolerable, indeed, that the citizens 
of a free nation should be ordered to fit themselves 
for defending their common freedom — "conscrip- 
tion, if you please, for the unheard-of purpose of 
'overseas service in India and elsewhere. ..." This 
invitation does not seem to be contained in this, or 
any other of Lord Roberts 's speeches ; but supposing 
it to have been given, it was not altogether 'unheard- 
of,' seeing that, under the law of conscription preva- 
lent (for example) in Germany, conscript soldiers can 
be sent to Palestine, or tropical Africa as lawfully 
as into Luxemburg, Poland, or France. According 
to the Nation, the true theory of defence was Sea 
Power ; but this, it appeared, could not be relied on 
for all time. . . . "While our naval monopoly — > 
'like our commercial monopoly — cannot exist for 
'ever, our sea power and our national security de- 
'pend on our ability to crush an enemy's fleet. . . . 
'We were never so amply insured — so over-insured 
' — against naval disaster as we are to-day." 

"Lord Roberts's proposition, therefore, " the writ- 
er continued, "is merely foolish; it is his way of 
'commending it, which is merely wicked. He speaks 
'of war as certain to take place 'the instant' the 
'German forces are assured of 'superiority at every 
'point,' and he discovers that the motto of German 
'foreign policy is that Germany strikes when Ger- 
many's hour has struck. Germany does not happen 
'to have struck anybody since 1870, and she struck 
'then to secure national unity, and to put an end to 



A LIBERAL ATTACK 339 

'the standing menace of French imperialism. Since PartIV. 
'then she has remained the most peaceful and the Chapter 
'most self-contained, though doubtless not the most IIL 
' sympathetic, member of the European family. . . . Lord 
1 Germany, the target of every cheap dealer in historic war^ga. 
4 slapdash, is in substance the Germany of 1870" 
(i.e. in extent of territory), "with a great industrial 
'dominion superadded by the force of science and 
'commercial enterprise. That is the story across 
'which Lord Roberts scrawls his ignorant libel. . . . 
' By direct implication he invites us to do to Germany 
'what he falsely asserts she is preparing to do to 
'us. These are the morals, fitter for a wolf -pack 
'than for a society of Christian men, commended 
'as 'excellent policy' to the British nation in the 
'presence of a Bishop of the Anglican Church.' ' 

This was very vigorous writing; nor was there 
the slightest reason to suspect its sincerity. In the 
nature of man there is a craving to believe ; and if 
a man happens to have his dwelling-place in a world 
of illusion and unreality, it is not wonderful that he 
should believe in phantoms. The credulity of the 
Nation might appear to many people to amount to 
fanaticism; but its views were fully shared, though 
less tersely stated, by the whole Liberal party, by 
the greater proportion of the British people, and 
not inconceivably by the bulk of the Unionist opposi- 
tion as well. The Government alone, who had 
learned the true facts from Lord Haldane eight 
months earlier, knew how near Lord Roberts 's warn- 
ings came to the mark. 

This article set the tone of criticism. The Man- 
chester Guardian protested against the "insinuation 
'that the German Government's views of interna- 



340 DEMOCEACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 



PaetIV. 

Chapter 

III. 

Lord 

Roberts's 

warnings. 



'tional policy are less scrupulous and more cynical 
'than those of other Governments." Germany has 
never been accused with justice "of breaking her 
'word, of disloyalty to her engagements, or of in- 
' sincerity. Prussia's character among nations is, in 
'fact, not very different from the character which 
'Lancashire men give to themselves as compared 
'with other Englishmen. It is blunt, straightfor- 
'ward, and unsentimental. . . ." How foolish, 
moreover, are our fears of Germany when we come 
to analyse them. "We have no territory that she 
' could take, except, in tropical Africa, which no sane 
'man would go to war about. Our self-governing 
'colonies could not in any case be held by force; 
'and Canada is protected in addition by the Monroe 
'doctrine. Egypt is not ours to cede. Malta could 
'not be had without war with Italy nor India without 
'war with Russia." 1 

This was a proud statement of the basis of British 
security, and one which must have warmed the 
hearts, and made the blood of Cromwell and Chatham 
tingle in the shades. Egypt, which we had rescued 
from a chaos of civil war, bankruptcy, and corruption, 
which during more than thirty years we had adminis- 
tered as just stewards for the benefit of her people, 
which we had saved from conquest and absorption 
by savage hordes — Egypt was not ours to cede. For 
the rest our dependencies were not worth taking 
from us, while our ' colonies ' could defend themselves. 
By the grace of Italy's protection we should be 
secured in the possession of Malta. India would 
be preserved to us by the goodwill of Russia, and 
Canada by the strong arm of the United States. . . . 

1 Manchester Guardian, October 28, 1912. 



A UNIONIST ATTACK 341 

Such at that time were the views of the Liberal PaetIV. 
journal foremost in character and ability. Chapter 

Somewhat later the Daily News took the field, IIL 
making up for lost time by an exuberance of mis- Lord 
construction. . . . "The whole movement as repre- warning. 
'sented by the National Service League is definitely 
'unmasked as an attempt to get up, not defence, but 
'an invasion of German territory. This discovery, 
'which for years has been suspected, is most valuable 
'as showing up the real object of the League, with its 
'glib talk about military calisthenics. Lord Roberts 
'may have been indiscreet, but at least he has made 
'it clear that what the League wants is war." 1 

On the same day, in order that the Liberals might 
not have a monopoly of reprobation, the Evening 
Standard, in an article entitled A Word with Lord 
Roberts, rated him soundly for having "made an 
' attack upon Germany and an attack upon the Terri- 
'torial Force. ..." "It is mere wanton mischief- 
' making for a man with Lord Roberts's unequalled 
'prestige to use words which must drive every 
'German who reads them to exasperation." And 
yet no signs whatsoever were forthcoming that so 
much as a single Teuton had been rendered des- 
perate, or had taken the words as in the least degree 
uncomplimentary. Up to the day of his death — 
and indeed after his death 2 — Lord Roberts was 
almost the only Englishman of his time of whom 
Germans spoke with consistent respect. . . . "Do 
'not," continues this lofty and sapient mentor, "Do 
'not let us talk as if the Kaiser could play the part 
'of a Genghis Khan or an Attila, ravening round 
'the world at the head of armed hordes to devour em- 

1 Daily News, October 30, 1912. 3 See Preface. 



342 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 



Part IV. 

Chapter 

III. 

Lord 

Roberts's 

warnings. 



' pires and kingdoms. ' ' 1 And yet how otherwise has 
the whole British Press been talking ever since the 
middle of August 1914? If during this period of 
nine months, the Evening Standard has kept all 
reference to Attila and his Huns out of its columns, 
its continence is unique. 

It would serve no useful purpose to set out further 
items of criticism and abuse from the leader and 
correspondence columns of newspapers, or from the 
speeches of shocked politicians. The Nation, the 
Manchester Guardian, and the Daily News are en- 
titled, between them, to speak for the Liberal party ; 
and if it cannot be said that the Evening Standard is 
quite similarly qualified in respect of the Unionists, 
there is still no doubt that the views which it ex- 
pressed with so much vigour, prescience, and felicity 
were held by many orthodox members of its party. 

Colonel Bromley-Davenport, for example, who 
had been Financial Secretary to the War Office in 
the late Unionist Government, spoke out strongly 
against Lord Roberts 's comments upon the efficiency 
of the Territorial Force. 'Compulsory service,' in 
his opinion, 'was not necessary. . . .' And then, 
with a burst of illuminating candour — "Which of 
'the great parties in the state would take up com- 
'pulsory service and fight a general election upon it? 
' The answer was that neither of the parties would ; 
'and to ask for compulsory military service was 
'like crying for the moon." 2 The power of any 
proposal for winning elections was to be the touch- 
stone of its truth. It would be impossible to state 
more concisely the attitude of the orthodox politi- 



1 Evening Standard, October 30, 1912. 

2 Morning Post, October 30, 1912. 



MINISTERIAL ATTACKS 343 

cian. Which party, indeed, we may well ask, would Part rv. 
have fought a general election on anything, however Chapter 
needful, unless it hoped to win on it? IIL 

The attitude of Ministers, however, with regard Lord 
to Lord Roberts's speech is much more worthy of warnings. 
remark than that of independent journalists and 
members of Parliament. For the Government knew 
several very important things which, at that time, 
were still hidden from the eyes of ordinary men. 

It was eight months since Lord Haldane had re- 
turned from Germany, concealing, under a smiling 
countenance and insouciant manner, a great burden of 
care at his heart. If on his return he spoke cheerily 
on public platforms about the kindness of his enter- 
tainment at Berlin, and of the greatness and good- 
ness of those with whom he had there walked and 
talked, this was merely in order that his fellow- 
countrymen might not be plunged in panic or de- 
spondency. He had learned the mind of Germany, 
and it was no light lesson. He had imparted his 
dreadful secret to his colleagues, and we have learned 
lately from Mr. Asquith himself what that secret 
was. . . . The rulers of Germany, 'to put it quite 
plainly,' had asked us for a free hand to overbear 
and dominate the European world, whenever they 
deemed the opportunity favourable. They had de- 
manded this of the astounded British emissary, "at 
'a time when Germany was enormously increasing 
'both her aggressive and defensive resources, and 
'especially upon the sea." To such a demand but 
one answer was possible, and that answer the British 
Government had promptly given — so we are led to 
infer — in clear and ringing tones of scorn. 1 

a Mr. Asquith at Cardiff, October 2, 1914. 



344 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 



Part IV. 

Chapter 

III. 

Lord 

Roberta's 

warnings. 



The Government knew for certain what nobody- 
else did. They knew what the aims of Germany 
were, and consequently they knew that Lord Roberts 
had spoken nothing but the truth. 

And yet, strange to relate, within a few days we 
find Mr. Runciman, a member of the Cabinet, admin- 
istering a severe castigation to Lord Roberts. The 
Manchester speech was "not only deplorable and 
'pernicious,' but likewise 'dangerous.' If it was 
resented in Germany, Mr. Runciman 'would like 
'Germany to know that it is resented no less in 
'England. ..." Lord Roberts had been a great 
organiser of the National Service League, the object 
of which was 'practically conscription'; but "he 
'knows little of England, and certainly little of the 
'North of England, if he imagines we are ever likely 
'to submit to conscription" — not even apparently 
(for there are no reservations) as an alternative to 
conquest; or as a security against murder, arson, 
and rape. . . . "War is only inevitable when states- 
'men cannot find a way round, or through, difficulties 
'that may arise; or are so wicked that they prefer 
'the hellish method of war to any other method of 
' solution ; or are so weak as to allow soldiers, arma- 
'ment makers, or scaremongers to direct their 
'policy." 1 Lord Roberts was not, of course, an 
armament maker, but he was a scaremonger and a 
soldier, and as such had no right to state his views 
as to how peace might be kept. 

When Sir Edward Grey was asked if any repre- 
sentation had been addressed by Germany to the 

1 Mr. Eunciman at Elland, Manchester Guardian, October 26, 1912. 
Sir Walter Eunciman, the father of this speaker, appears to be made of 
sterner stuff. After the Scarborough raid he denounced the Germans as 
' ' heinous polecats. ' ' 



warmng3. 



MR. ACLAND'S PERSISTENCY 345 

Foreign Office with reference to Lord Roberts's PartIV. 
utterances, he deprecated, with frigid discretion, the Chapter 
idea that either Government should make official IIL 
representation to the other about 'unwise or pro- Lord 
'vocative speeches.' 1 When Sir William Byles 
plied the Secretary of State for War, Colonel Seely, 
with questions as to the revocability of Lord Rob- 
erts 's pension, the answer was solemn and oracular, 
but no rebuke was administered to the interrogator. 2 

But perhaps the most puzzling thing of all, is the 
persistency with which Mr. Acland (Sir Edward 
Grey's Under-Secretary) pursued Lord Roberts for 
some three weeks after the rest were finished with 
him. It might have been expected that Mr. Acland 's 
chief, who knew 'the dreadful secret,' would have 
curbed his subordinate 's excess of zeal. 

Mr. Acland distorted the Manchester speech into 
an appeal to the British people to put themselves 
"in a position to strike at the Germans, and to 
' smash them in a time of profound peace, and without 
'cause." And this fanciful gloss he rightly de- 
nounces, in accents which remind us not a little of the 
Reverend Robert Spalding, as 'nothing less than a 
'wicked proposal.' 3 . . . For England to adopt com- 
pulsory military service would be "an utterly crimi- 
'nal and provocative proceeding against other coun- 
' tries of the world. ..." Here, indeed, is much food 
for wonder. What single country of the world would 
have regarded the adoption of national service by 
England as 'provocative'? What single country, ex- 
cept Germany, would even have objected to it? And 

1 Times, Parliamentary Keport, October 30, 1912. 

'Ibid. November 1, 1912. 

8 Mr. Acland at Taunton, the Times, November 5, 1912. 



346 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 

PartIV. what more right would Germany have had to object 

Chapter to our possessing a formidable army, than we had 
IIL right to object to her possessing a formidable 

Lord navy 1 

walSjs. When some days later Mr. Acland is reproached 
with having misrepresented Lord Roberts's original 
statement, he replies loftily that he "was justified 
'at the time in supposing that this was his real 
' meaning.' ' * One wonders why. Lord Roberts had 
said nothing which any careful reader of his whole 
speech — an Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, for 
example, quoting and speaking with a due sense of 
his great responsibilities — could conceivably have 
understood to bear this interpretation. 

A fortnight later Mr. Acland returns to the charge 
once more. "Lord Roberts," he says courteously, 
"has since explained that he did not mean what 
'his words seemed so plainly to mean" — that is, 
the smashing of Germany in time of profound peace 
and without any cause. . . . Danger to peace, the 
representative of the Foreign Office assures his audi- 
ence, "does not come from any action of His Maj- 
'esty's Government. It arises, if at all, from irre- 
sponsible utterances such as those which we heard 
' from Lord Roberts. I very much regret that harm 
'must have been done between the two countries by 
'Lord Roberts's speech." 2 

Although an under-secretary does not always en- 
joy the full confidence of his official superior, he 
would presumably obey orders — even an order to 
hold his tongue — if any were given. Consequently, 
although Lord Haldane's dreadful secret may have 

1 Letter in the Times, November 11, 1912. 

2 Mr. Acland at Bochdale, the Times, November 25, 1912. 



LORD ROBERTS WAS RIGHT 347 

been kept from Mr. Acland, as unfit for his innocent part iv. 
and youthful ears, it is surprising that he was never Chapter 
warned of the dangers of the path in which he was IIL 
so boldly treading. The discourtesies of youth to Lord 
age are not easily forgiven, especially when they are warni^s! 
founded upon misrepresentation, and when, as in this 
case, the older man was right and the younger wrong 
as to the facts. 

It will be said — it has indeed been already said — 
by way of excuse for the reticence of the Government 
with regard to the intentions, which German states- 
men revealed to Lord Haldane, at Berlin, in February 
1912 — that by keeping back from the country the 
knowledge which members of the Cabinet possessed, 
they thereby prevented an outbreak of passion and 
panic which might have precipitated war. This may 
be true or untrue ; it can neither be proved nor con- 
troverted; but at any rate it was not in accordance 
with the principle of trusting the people ; nor would 
it have prevented the Government and their support- 
ers — when war broke out — from making amends to 
Lord Roberts and others whom, on grounds of high 
policy, they had felt themselves obliged, in the past 
to rebuke unjustly and to discredit without warrant 
in the facts. This course was not impossible. Peel, 
a very proud man, made amends to Cobden, and his 
memory does not stand any the lower for it. 

With regard to those journalists and private poli- 
ticians whose mistakes were not altogether their own 
fault — being due in part at least, to the concealment 
of the true facts which the Government had practised 
— it would not have been in the least wounding to 
their honour to express regret, that they had been 
unwittingly the means of misleading the people, and 



348 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 



Part IV. 

Chapter 

III. 

Lord 

Roberts's 

warnings. 



traducing those who were endeavouring to lead it 
right. In their patriotic indignation some of these 
same journalists and politicians had overstepped 
the limits of what is justifiable in party polemics. 
They had attacked the teaching at the Military Col- 
leges, because it sought to face the European situa- 
tion frankly, and to work out in the lecture-room the 
strategical and tactical consequences which, in case 
of war, might be forced upon us by our relations 
with France and Russia. It would have done these 
high-minded journalists no harm in the eyes of their 
fellow-countrymen, had they acknowledged frankly 
that when in former days they had denounced the 
words of Lord Roberts as * wicked' and his inter- 
pretation of the situation as inspired by "the crude 
'lusts and fears which haunt the unimaginative sol- 
'dier 's brain" — when they had publicly denounced as 
'a Staff College Cabal' teachers who were only doing 
their duty — they had unwittingly been guilty of a 
cruel misjudgment. 

It is not a little remarkable that in 1912 — indeed 
from 1905 to 1914 — Lord Roberts, who, according 
to the Nation, possessed but ' an average Tory intel- 
lect,' should have trusted the people, while a demo- 
cratic Government could not bring itself to do so. 
The Cabinet, which knew the full measure of the 
danger, concealed it out of a mistaken notion of 
policy. Their henchmen on the platform and in the 
press did not know the full measure of the danger. 
They acted either from natural prejudice, or official 
inspiration — possibly from a mixture of both — when 
they made light of the danger and held up to scorn 
any one who called attention to it. The whole body 
of respectable, word-worshipping, well-to-do Liberals 



FAILURE TO MAKE AMENDS 349 

and Conservatives, whom nothing could stir out of PartIV. 
their indifference and scepticism, disapproved most Chapter 
strongly of having the word 'danger' so much as IIL 
mentioned in their presence. The country would Lord 
to-day forgive all of these their past errors more warning. 
easily if, when the crisis came, they had acted a 
manly part and had expressed regret. But never a 
word of the sort from any of these great public 
characters ! 



CHAPTER IV 



LOED KITCHENER S TASK 



Kitchener's 
task 



PartIv. Lord Roberts had been seeking for seven years to 
Chapter persuade the nation to realise that it was threatened 
IV - by a great danger ; that it was unprepared to encoun- 
Lord ter the danger; that by reason of this unprepared- 

ness, the danger was brought much nearer. Until Oc- 
tober 1912, however, he had failed signally in captur- 
ing the public ear. The people would not give him 
their attention either from favour or indignation. 
The cause of which he was the advocate appeared 
to have been caught in an academic backwater. 

But from that time forward, Lord Roberts had 
no reason to complain of popular neglect. Over- 
coming his natural disinclination to platform oratory 
and political agitation, sacrificing his leisure, putting 
a dangerous strain upon his physical strength, he 
continued his propaganda at a series of great meet- 
ings in the industrial centres. Everywhere he was 
listened to with respect, and apparently with a great 
measure of agreement. Only on one occasion was he 
treated with discourtesy, and that was by a civic dig- 
nitary and not by the audience. But he had now be- 
come an important figure in the political conflict, and 
he had to take the consequences, in a stream of abuse 
and misrepresentation from the party which dis- 

350 



TRIUMPH OF VOLUNTARY SYSTEM 351 

approved of his principles; while he received but PabtIV. 
little comfort from the other party, which lived in Chapter 
constant terror lest it might be thought to approve • 

of them. Lord Roberts's advocacy of national serv- Lord 
ice continued up to the autumn of 1913, when the task. 
gravity of the situation in Ireland made it impossible 
to focus public interest on any other subject. 

After the present war had run its course for a 
month or two, the minds of many people reverted 
to what Lord Roberts had been urging upon his 
fellow-countrymen for nine years past. His warn- 
ings had come true; that at any rate was beyond 
doubt. The intentions which he had attributed to 
Germany were clearly demonstrated, and likewise 
the vastness and efficiency of her military organisa- 
tion. The inadequacy of British preparations was 
made plain. They were inadequate in the sense that 
they had failed to deter the aggressor from a breach 
of the peace, and they had been equally inadequate 
for withstanding his onset. The deficiencies of the 
Territorial Army in numbers, discipline, training, 
and equipment had made it impossible to entrust it 
with the responsibility of Home Defence immediately 
upon the outbreak of war. As a consequence of 
this, the whole of the Regular Army could not be 
released for foreign service, although Sir John 
French's need of reinforcements was desperate. 
Notwithstanding, however, that Lord Roberts's 
warnings had come true, many people professed to 
discover in what had happened a full justification — 
some even went so far as to call it a 'triumph' — » 
for the voluntary system. 

Even after the first battle of Ypres, those who 
held such views had no difficulty in finding evidences 



352 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 

PartIV. of their truth on all hands. They found them in 
Chapter the conduct of our army in France, and in the courage 
IV - and devotion with which it had upheld the honour 
lotci of England against overwhelming odds. They found 

task. en ' it in the response to Lord Kitchener's call for volun- 
teers, and in the eagerness and spirit of the New 
Army. They found it in our command of the sea, 
in the spirit of the nation, and in what they read in 
their newspapers about the approval and admiration 
of the world. 

In the short dark days of December and January 
we were cheered by many bold bills and headlines 
announcing what purported to be victories ; and we 
were comforted through a sad Christmastide by 
panegyrics on British instinct, pluck, good-temper, 
energy, and genius for muddling through. Philo- 
sophic commentators pointed out that, just as Ger- 
many was becoming tired out and short of ammuni- 
tion, just as she was bringing up troops of worse and 
worse quality, we should be at our very best, wal- 
lowing in our resources of men and material of war. 
Six months, a year, eighteen months hence — for the 
estimates varied — Britain would be invincible. Eco- 
nomic commentators on the other hand impressed 
upon us how much better it was to pay through the 
nose now, than to have been bleeding ourselves white 
as the Germans, the French, and the Russians were 
supposed (though without much justification) to 
have been doing for a century. 

To clinch the triumph of the voluntary system — 
when the Hour came the Man came with it. 

Many of these things were truly alleged. Lord 
Kitchener at any rate was no mirage. The gallantry 
of our Army was no illusion; indeed, its heroism 



LORD KITCHENER'S APPOINTMENT 353 



Part IV. 

Chapter 
IV. 



was actually underrated, for the reason that the 
extent of its peril had never been fully grasped. 
Although British commerce had suffered severely 
from the efforts of a few bold raiders, the achieve- L° r <* 
ments of our Navy were such that they could quite task. 16 " 
fairly be described, as having secured command of 
the sea. 1 The German fleet was held pretty closely 
within its harbours. We had been able to move our 
troops and munitions of war wherever we pleased, 
and so far, without the loss of a ship, or even of a 
man. Submarine piracy — a policy of desperation — 
had not then begun. The quality of the New Army, 
the rapidity with which its recruits were being 
turned into soldiers, not only impressed the public, 
but took by complete surprise the severest of military 
critics. 

This is not the place for discussing how Lord 
Kitchener came to be appointed Secretary of State 
for War, or to attempt an estimate of his character 
and career. 2 He was no politician, but a soldier 

1 Partly by good fortune, but mainly owing to the admirable promp- 
titude and skill with which our naval resources were handled, the bulk of 
the German fleet was imprisoned from the outset. We did not experi- 
ence anything like the full effect of our unpreparedness. If Mr. Church- 
ill had not taken his decision on the day following the delivery of the 
Austrian ultimatum to Servia (July 24) by postponing the demobilisa- 
tion of the Fleet — to the great scandal of his own party, when the facts 
first became known — there would have been a very different tale to tell 
as regards the fate of the British merchant service on the high seas. 

2 Critics of the present Government, such as the editor of the Na- 
tional 'Review, have maintained that Lord Kitchener was forced upon an 
unwilling Cabinet by the pressure of public opinion, and that, although 
he was in England throughout the crisis, he was allowed to make all his 
preparations for returning to Egypt, and was only fetched back as he 
was on the point of stepping aboard the packet. During Sunday, Mon- 
day, and Tuesday (August 2, 3, and 4) London was buzzing with a 
strange rumour (which was fathered altogether falsely upon the French 
Ambassador) that France did not ask for or require our assistance on 
land, but only at sea. If this were so the absurdity of sending our Ex- 
peditionary Force would have been obvious. It is noteworthy that a 
usually well-inspired section of the Ministerial Press — even after they 
had reluctantly accepted war as inevitable — were still maintaining 



354 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 

PaetIV. and an administrator. He was in his sixty-fifth 
Chapter year, and since he had left the Royal Military Acad- 
Iv - emy in 1871, by far the greater part of his work had 
Lo^ been done abroad — in the Levant, Egypt, South 

task. ener 9 Africa, and India. 1 In no case had he ever failed at 
anything he had undertaken. The greater part of 
his work had been completely successful ; much of it 
had been brilliantly successful. He believed in him- 
self; the country believed in him; foreign nations 
believed in him. No appointment could have pro- 
duced a better effect upon the hearts of the British 
people and upon those of their Allies. The nation 
felt — if we may use so homely an image in this con- 
nection — that Lord Kitchener was holding its hand 
confidently and reassuringly in one of his, while with 
the other he had the whole race of politicians firmly 
by the scruff, and would see to it that there was no 
nonsense or trouble in that quarter. 

It is no exaggeration to say that from that time 
to this, 2 Lord Kitchener's presence in the Cabinet 
has counted for more with the country, than that 
of any other minister, or indeed than all other 

stoutly, even so late as Tuesday and Wednesday (4th and 5th), that 
the Expeditionary Force should not be allowed to cross the channel. 
Lord Kitchener was appointed on the Thursday, and the Expeditionary 
Force began to go abroad the following week. The chapter of English 
political history which begins with the presentation of the Austrian ulti- 
matum to Servia on the 23rd of July, and ends with the appointment of 
Lord Kitchener on the 6th of August, will no doubt prove to be one of 
the most interesting in our annals. Whether it will prove to be one of 
the most glorious or one of the most humiliating exhibitions of British 
statesmanship we cannot say until we possess fuller knowledge than we 
do at present of the attitude of ministers at the Cabinets of Friday, 
Saturday, and Sunday (July 31, August 1 and 2). 

Palestine, 1874-1878; Cyprus, 1878-1882; Egypt, 1882-1889; South 
Africa, 1899-1902; India, 1902-1909; Egypt, 1911-1914. Only during 
the years 1871-1874 and 1909-1911 does Lord Kitchener appear to have 
been freed from foreign service, and during a part of the latter interval 
he was travelling in China and Japan. 

2 End of May, 1915. 



HIS GRASP OF ESSENTIALS 355 

ministers put together. That in itself proves his PartIV. 
possession of very remarkable qualities; for nine Chapter 
such months of public anxiety and private sorrow, IV - 
as England has lately known, will disturb any repu- Lord 
tation which is not firmly founded upon merit. Dur- task. enerS 
ingthis time we have seen other reputations come and 
go; popularities made, and unmade, and remade. 
We have seen great figures all but vanish into the 
mist of neglect. But confidence in Lord Kitchener 
has remained constant through it all. Things may 
have gone wrong; the Government may have made 
mistakes ; even the War Office itself may have made 
mistakes ; yet the faith of the British people in the 
man of their choice has never been shaken for an 
instant. 

The highest of all Lord Kitchener's merits is, that 
being suddenly pitchforked into office by an emerg- 
ency, he nevertheless grasped at once the two or 
three main features of the situation, and turned the 
whole force of his character to dealing with them, 
letting the smaller matters meanwhile fall into line as 
best they might. He grasped the dominating factor 
— that it was essential to subordinate every military 
and political consideration to supporting France, 
whose fight for her own existence was equally a 
fight for the existence of the British Empire. He 
grasped the urgent need for the enrolment of many 
hundreds of thousands of men fit for making into 
soldiers, if we were to win this fight and not lose it. 
He grasped the need for turning these recruits into 
soldiers at a pace which hardly a single military ex- 
pert believed to be possible. He may, or may not, 
have fully grasped at the beginning, the difficulties 
— mainly owing to dearth of officers — with which he 



356 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 

PaktIV. was faced; but when he did grasp them, by some 
Chapter means or another, he succeeded in overcoming them. 
IV * It is dangerous to speak of current events in 

Lord confident superlatives; but one is tempted to do so 

task. eD ' with regard to the training of the New Army. Even 
the most friendly among expert critics believed that 
what Lord Kitchener had undertaken was a thing 
quite impossible to do in the prescribed time. Yet he 
has done it. And not only the friendly, but also the 
severest critics, have admitted that the New Army 
is already fit to face any continental army, and that, 
moreover, to all appearance, it is one of the finest 
armies in history. The sternest proof is yet to come ; 
but it is clear that something not far short of a mir- 
acle has been accomplished. 

If we search for an explanation of the miracle, 
we find it quite as much in Lord Kitchener's charac- 
ter as in his methods. Fortunately what was so pain- 
fully lacking in the political sphere was present in 
the military — Leadership. 

Despite the support which Lord Kitchener derived 
from the public confidence he laboured under several 
very serious disadvantages. A man cannot spend 
almost the whole of his working life out of England, 
and then return to it at the age of sixty-four, under- 
standing all the conditions as clearly as if he had 
never left it. Lord Kitchener was ignorant not only 
of English political conditions, but also of English 
industrial conditions, which in a struggle like the 
present are certainly quite as important as the other. 
He may well have consoled himself, however, with 
the reflection that, although he himself was lacking 
in knowledge, his colleagues were experts in both of 
these spheres. 



Chapter 
IV. 

Lord 
Kitchener's 



HIS DISADVANTAGES 357 

It was inevitable that Lord Kitchener must submit PaktIV - 
to the guidance of Ministers in the political sphere, 
providing they agreed with his main objects — the 
unflinching support of France, and the creation of 
the New Army. task 

In the industrial sphere, on the other hand, it 
was the business of Ministers, not merely to keep 
themselves in touch with Lord Kitchener's present 
and future needs, and to offer their advice and help 
for satisfying them, but also to insist upon his listen- 
ing to reason, if in his urgent need and unfamiliarity 
with the business world, he was seen to be running 
upon danger in any direction. 

It is impossible to resist the impression that, while 
his colleagues held Lord Kitchener very close by the 
head as to politics, and explained to him very clearly 
what they conceived the people would stand and 
would not stand, they did not show anything like the 
same vigilance or determination in keeping him well 
advised as to the means of procuring the material of 
war. 



CHAPTER V 



MATERIAL. OF WAR 



Part IV. 

Chapter 

V. 

Material 
of war. 



As regards the business world the position at this 
time * was a singularly difficult one. Within a few 
days of the outbreak of war, orders from all parts 
of the globe were forthcoming, on so vast a scale 
that the ordinary means of coping with them were 
wholly inadequate. It was not possible to walk out 
of the War Office and buy what was wanted in the 
shops. In a very brief period the whole industrial 
system of the United Kingdom was congested with 
orders. 

In Lord Kitchener's former experience of military 
and civil administration the difficulty had usually 
been to get the money he needed, in order to carry 
out his reforms and undertakings. But here was a 
case where he could have all the money he chose to 
ask for; it was the commodities themselves which 
could not be had either for money or love. 

When war broke out the industries of France and 
Belgium were paralysed — the former temporarily, 
the latter permanently. We could buy nothing in 
France ; France, on the other hand, was buying eag- 
erly in England. And so was Russia, not herself as 
yet a great industrial producer. And so were Bel- 
gium, Servia, Italy, Roumania, Greece, Japan — in- 

1 1 am specially referring to August-December 1914. 
358 



of war. 



ORGANISATION OF RESOURCES 359 

deed the whole world, more or less — belligerents and Part rv. 
neutrals alike — except the two Powers with which Chapter 
we were at war. All these competitors were in the v - 
field against the War Office, running up prices, and Material 
making the fortunes of enterprising middlemen, who 
flocked to the feast, like vultures from all corners of 
the sky. The industrial situation, therefore, needed 
the sternest regulation, and needed it at once. For 
it was essential to secure our own requirements, and 
to make certain that our Allies secured theirs, at a 
fair price and in advance of all other purchasers. 

Moreover, it was obviously necessary to look an 
immense way ahead, especially as regards munitions 
of war ; to aid with loans, and encourage with orders, 
firms able and willing to make what was required. 
It was essential that makers of arms and supplies 
should be stimulated to undertake vast increases of 
their staff and plant. Before the battle of the Marne 
was ended it was known, only too well, that every 
nation in Europe — with the single exception of 
Germany — had grossly underestimated the expendi- 
ture of artillery ammunition under conditions of 
modern warfare. It was of the most immediate 
urgency to concert with our Allies, and with our 
manufacturers, in order to set this trouble right. It 
was as necessary for the Allies to organise their 
resources as it was for them to organise their armies. 
The second, indeed, was impossible without the first, 
as Germany well knew, and in her own case had 
already practised. 

Finally, there was the problem — half industrial, 
half political — of labour; its hours, conditions, and 
remuneration. Without the utmost vigilance and 



360 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 

PabtIV. sympathy, without a constant inspiration of duty, 
Chapter without political leadership which appealed to the 
v - imagination and heart of the people, there were 
Material bound to be endless troubles and confusion; there 
of war. W ere bound to be disputes, quarrels, stoppages, and 
strikes. 

The prices of certain munitions and materials 
were almost anything the makers liked to name. 
Money was flying about, and everybody was aware 
of it. Human nature was sorely tempted. The 
future was anxious and uncertain. People dependent 
for a living on their own exertions, were beset with a 
dangerous inclination to hold out their pitchers, in 
the hopes of catching some portion of the golden 
shower while it lasted. The idea that workmen were, 
on the average, any greedier than their masters is 
only held by persons who have little knowledge of 
the facts. Cost of living had risen rapidly; this 
might have been foreseen from the beginning, as well 
as the dangers which it contained. 

In such circumstances as these the baser appetites 
of mankind are always apt to break loose and gain 
the upper hand, unless there is a firm leadership of 
the nation. That is where the statesman should 
come in, exercising a sagacious control upon the 
whole organisation of industry ; impressing on mas- 
ters the need for patience and sympathy; on their 
men the need for moderation; on all the need for 
sacrifices. 

During the months of February, March, and April 
1915 there was a loud outcry, led by a member of 
the Government, deploring the lack of munitions 
of war, and attributing the deficiency to a want 
of industry and energy on the part of a section 



MINISTERIAL INCONSISTENCIES 361 

of the working classes. Their frequent absten- PartIV. 
tions were condemned, and drunkenness was al- Chapter 
leged to have been, in many cases, a contributory Ym 

CaUSe. Material 

Then Mr. Asquith came forward and astonished 
the world by denying stoutly that there was, or ever 
had been, any deficiency in munitions of war. 1 He 
assured the country that so long ago as September 
he had "appointed a committee ... to survey the 
' situation. ' ' 2 He said nothing about irregularity of 
work, or about drunkenness as a cause of it. On 
the contrary, he produced the impression that the 
Army was as well provided as it could be, and that 
the behaviour of the whole world of industry had 

1 " I saw a statement the other day that the operations not only of 
'our Army but of our Allies were being crippled, or at any rate ham- 
' pered, by our failure to provide the necessary ammunition. There is 
'not a word of truth in that statement. I say there is not a word of 
' truth in that statement which is the more mischievous because if it were 
'believed, it is calculated to dishearten our troops, to discourage our 
' Allies, and to stimulate the hopes and activities of our enemies. Nor is 
1 there any more truth in the suggestion that the Government, of which I 
' am the head, have only recently become alive to the importance and the 
' urgency of these matters. On the contrary, in the earliest days of the 
'war, when some of our would-be instructors were thinking of quite 
' other things, they were already receiving our anxious attention, and as 
' far back, I think, as the month of September I appointed a Committee 
' of the Cabinet, presided over by Lord Kitchener, to survey the situa- 
' tion from this point of view — a Committee whose labours and inquiries 
' resulted in a very substantial enlargement both on the field and of ma- 
' chinery of supply. . . . 

"No, the urgency of the situation — and, as I shall show, the ur- 
1 gency is great — can be explained without any resort to recrimination or 
' to blame. It is due, in the main, to two very obvious causes. It is due, 
' first of all, to the unprecedented scale upon which ammunition on both 
' sides has been, and is being, expended. It not only goes far beyond all 
'previous experience, but it is greatly in advance of the forecasts of the 
'best experts." — Mr. Asquith at Newcastle, April 20, 1915. 

2 There has certainly been no lack of appointments either of commit- 
tees or individuals. So lately as the 7th of April the newspapers an- 
nounced a War Office Committee "to secure that the supply of muni- 
' tions of war shall be sufficient to meet all requirements. ' ' About a 
week later came the announcement of a still more august committee — 
' The Output Committee ' — with Mr. Lloyd-George as Chairman and Mr. 
Balfour as a member of it. If war could be won by appointing commit- 
tees and creating posts, victory ought long ago to have been secured. 



of war. 



362 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 

Part iv. been as impeccable as the foresight and energy of 

Chapter the Government. 
v - The country found it difficult to reconcile these 

Matoiir various statements one with another. It found it 
still more difficult to reconcile Mr. Asquith's assur- 
ances with what it had heard, not only from other 
Ministers, but from generals in their published 
communications. Private letters from the front for 
months past had told a very different story from 
that which was told, in soothing tones, to the 
Newcastle audience. These had laid stress upon the 
heavy price paid in casualties, and the heavy handi- 
cap imposed on military operations, owing to short- 
age of artillery ammunition. The appointment of 
the Committee alone was wholly credited; the rest 
of these assurances were disbelieved. 

Indeed it was impossible to doubt that there had 
been miscalculation and want of foresight in various 
directions ; and it would have been better to admit 
it frankly. The blame, however, did not rest upon 
Lord Kitchener's shoulders, but upon those of his 
colleagues. They understood the industrial condi- 
tions of the United Kingdom ; he did not and could 
not; and they must have been well aware of this 
fact. It was not Lord Kitchener's business, nor had 
he the time, to make himself familiar with those 
matters which are so well understood by the Board 
of Trade, the Local Government Board, and the 
Treasury. His business was to help France, to get 
recruits as best he could, to train them as soon as 
he could, and to send them out to beat the Germans.' 
It was the business of the Government — expert in 
British political and industrial conditions — to put 
him in the way of getting his recruits, and the equip- 



COMPLAINTS ABOUT MUNITIONS 363 



ment, supplies, and munitions of war which were PabtIV. 
necessary for making them effective. 1 



1 Since this chapter was printed (May 1915) public opinion has been 
somewhat distracted by a sensational wrangle as to whether or not the 
right kind of ammunition had been supplied. These are technical mat- 
ters upon which the ordinary man is no judge. The main point is that 
— certainly until quite recently — enough ammunition was not supplied ; 
nor anything like enough; and this was due to the failure to look far 
enough ahead in the early days of the war ; and to organise our indus- 
trial system to meet the inevitable requirements. 



Chapter 
V. 

Material 
of war. 



CHAPTER VI 



METHODS OF EECEUITING 



recruiting. 



PartIV. If Lord Kitchener is not to be held primarily 

Chapter responsible for the delay in providing war material, 

VI - just as little is he to be blamed for the methods of 

Methods of recruiting. For he had to take what the politicians 

told him. He had to accept their sagacious views 

of what the people would stand; of 'what they would 

never stand'; of what 'from the House of Commons' 

standpoint' was practicable or impracticable. 

Lord Kitchener wanted men. During August 
and September he wanted them at once — without a 
moment's delay. Obviously the right plan was to 
ask in a loud voice who would volunteer ; to take as 
many of these as it was possible to house, clothe, 
feed, and train ; then to sit down quietly and consider 
how many more were likely to be wanted, at what 
dates, and how best they could be got. But as re- 
gards the first quarter of a million or so, which 
there were means for training at once, there was 
only one way — to call loudly for volunteers. The 
case was one of desperate urgency, and as things 
then stood, it would have been the merest pedantry 
to delay matters until a system, for which not even 
a scheme or skeleton existed before the emergency 
arose, had been devised. The rough and ready 

364 



NEED FOR A SYSTEM 



365 



method of calling out loudly was open to many PartIV. 
objections on the score both of justice and efficiency, Chapter 
but the all-important thing was to save time. YI - 

Presumably, by and by, when the first rush was Methods <>* 
over, the Cabinet did sit down round a table to talk recruiting ' 
things over. We may surmise the character of the 
conversation which was then poured into Lord 
Kitchener's ears : — How England would never stand 
this or that ; how no f reeborn Englishman — especially 
north of the Humber and the Trent, 1 whence the 
Liberal party drew its chief support — would tolerate 
being tapped on the shoulder and told to his face 
by Government what his duty was ; how much less 
would he stand being coerced by Government into 
doing it; how he must be tapped on the shoulder 
and told by other people; how he must be coerced 
by other people; how pressure must be put on by 
private persons — employers by threats of dismissal 
— young females of good, bad, and indifferent char- 
acter by blandishments and disdain. The fear of 
starvation for the f reeborn Englishman and his fam- 
ily — at that time a real and present danger with many 
minds — or the shame of receiving a white feather, 
were the forces by which England and the Empire 
were to be saved at this time of trial. Moreover, 
would it not lead to every kind of evil if, at this junc- 
ture, the country were to become annoyed with the 
Government? Better surely that it should become 
annoyed with any one rather than the Government, 
whose patriotic duty, therefore, was to avoid un- 
popularity with more devoted vigilance than hereto- 
fore, if such a thing were possible. 

One can imagine Lord Kitchener — somewhat 

1 Cf. Mr. Kunciman, ante, p. 344. 



366 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 

paetTV. weary of discussions in this airy region, and sorely 
Chaptee perplexed by all these cobwebs of the party system — 
VI. insisting doggedly that his business was to make a 
Methods of New Army, and to come to the assistance of France, 
recruiting. .^hout a (J a y' s unnecessary delay. He must have 
the men; how was he to get the men? 

And one can imagine the response. ''Put your 
'trust in us, and we will get you the men. We 
'will go on shouting. "We will shout louder and 
'louder. We will paste up larger and larger pictures 
'on the hoardings. We will fill whole pages of 
'the newspapers with advertisements drawn up 
'by the 'livest publicity artists' of the day. We 
'will enlist the sympathies and support of the 
'press — for this is not an Oriental despotism, but 
'a free country, where the power of the press is 
'absolute. And if the sympathies of the press are 
'cool, or their support hangs back, we will threaten 
'them with the Press Bureau. We will tell the 
'country-gentlemen, and the men-of -business, that 
'is is their duty to put on the screw; and most of 
'these, being easily hypnotised by the word 'duty,' 
'will never dream of refusing. If their action is 
'resented, and they become disliked it will be 
'very regrettable; but taking a broad view, this 
'will not be injurious to the Liberal party in the 
'long run. 

"Leave this little matter, Lord Kitchener, to 
'experts. Lend your great name. Allow us to 
'show your effigies to the people. Consider what a 
'personal triumph for yourself if, at the end of this 
' great war, we can say on platforms that you and we 
'together have won it on the Voluntary System. 
'Trust in us and our methods. We will boom your 



THE ADVERTISEMENT CAMPAIGN 367 

'New Army, and we will see to it at the same time PaktTV. 
'that the Government does not become unpopular, Chapter 
'and also, if possible, that the Empire is saved." VL 

So they boomed the Voluntary System and the Methods of 
New Army in Periclean passages ; touched with awe 
the solemn chords ; shouted as if it had been Jericho. 

Two specimens, out of a large number of a 
similar sort — the joint handiwork apparently of the 
'publicity artists,' bettering the moving appeals of 
the late Mr. Barnum, and of the party managers, in- 
spired by the traditions of that incomparable ex- 
whip, Lord Murray of Elibank — are given below. 1 It 
is of course impossible to do justice here to the splen- 
dour of headlines and leaded capitals ; but the nature 
of the appeal will be gathered clearly enough. 
Briefly, the motive of it was to avoid direct compul- 
sion by Government — which would have fallen 
equally and fairly upon all — and to substitute for 
this, indirect compulsion and pressure by private 
individuals — which must of necessity operate un- 
equally, unfairly, and invidiously. To say that this 
sort of thing is not compulsion, is to say what is 
untrue. If, as appears to be the case, the voluntary 
system has broken down, and we are to have compul- 
sion, most honest men and women will prefer that the 
compulsion should be fair rather than unfair, direct 
rather than indirect, and that it should be exercised 
by those responsible for the government of the coun- 
try, rather than by private persons who cannot 
compel, but can only penalise. 

1 (A) Pour questions to the women of England. 

1. You have read what the Germans have done in Belgium. Have 
you thought what they would do if they invaded England? 

2. Do you realise that the safety of your Home and Children depends 
on our getting more men now? 



recruiting. 



368 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 

Part iv. By these means, during the past six months, a 

Chapter great army has been got together — an army great in 

VL numbers, 1 still greater in spirit ; probably one of the 

Methoda of noblest armies ever recruited in any cause. And 

Lord Kitchener has done his part by training this 

army with incomparable energy, and by infusing into 

officers and men alike his own indomitable resolution. 

The high quality of the New Army is due to the 

fact that the bulk of it consists of two kinds of men, 

who of all others are the best material for soldiers. 

It consists of men who love fighting for its own sake 

— a small class. It also consists of men who hate 

fighting, but whose sense of duty is their guiding 

principle — fortunately a very large class. It consists 

of many others as well, driven on by divers motives. 

3. Do you realise that the one word " Go " from you may send an- 
other man to fight for our King and Country ? 

4. When the War is over and your husband or your son is asked 
'What did you do in the great War?' — is he to hang his head because 
you would not let him go? 

Women of England do your duty! Send your men to-day to join 
our glorious Army. 

God Save the King. 
(B) Five questions to those who employ male servants. 

1. Have you a butler, groom, chauffeur, gardener, or gamekeeper 
serving you who, at this moment should be serving our King and Coun- 
try? 

2. Have you a man serving at your table who should be serving a 
gun? 

3. Have you a man digging your garden who should be digging 
trenches? 

4. Have you a man driving your car who should be driving a trans- 
port wagon? 

5. Have you a man preserving your game who should be helping to 
preserve your Country? 

A great responsibility rests on you. Will you sacrifice your personal 
convenience for your Country's need? 

Ask your men to enlist to-day. 

The address of the nearest Eecruiting Office can be obtained at any 
Post Office. n n „ 

God Save the King. 

1 How many we have not been told ; but that the numbers, whatever 
they may be, do not yet reach nearly what is still required we know 
from the frantic character of the most recent advertisements. 



ITS EFFECT ON PUBLIC OPINION 369 

But the spirit of the New Army — according to the Partiv. 
accounts of those who are in the best position to Chapter 
judge — is the spirit of the first two classes — of the v1, 
fighters and the sense-of-duty men. It is these who Methods of 

recruiting?. 

have leavened it throughout. 

This magnificent result — for it is magnificent, 
whatever may be thought of the methods which 
achieved it — has been claimed in many quarters — 
Liberal, Unionist, and non-party — as a triumph for 
the voluntary system. But if we proceed to question 
it, how voluntary was it really? Also how just? 
Did the New Army include all, or anything like all, 
those whose clear duty it was to join? And did it 
not include many people who ought never to have 
been asked to join, or even allowed to join, until 
others — whose ages, occupations, and responsibili- 
ties marked them out for the first levies — had all 
been called up ? 

There is also a further question — did the country, 
reading these various advertisements and placards — 
heroic, melodramatic, pathetic, and facetious — did 
the country form a true conception of the gravity of 
the position? Was it not in many cases confused 
and perplexed by the nature of the appeal? Did 
not many people conclude, that things could not 
really be so very serious, if those in authority re- 
sorted to such flamboyant and sensational methods — 
methods so conspicuously lacking in dignity, so 
inconsistent with all previous ideas of the majesty 
of Government in times of national peril? 

The method itself, no doubt, was only unfamiliar 
in so far as it used the King's name. It was familiar 
and common enough in other connections. But a 
method which might have been unexceptionable for 



370 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 

PabtIV. calling attention to the virtues of a shop, a soap, a 
Chapter circus, or a pill, seemed inappropriate in the case of 
VI - a great nation struggling at the crisis of its fate. 1 

Each of us must judge from his own experience 
of the effect produced. The writer has heard harsher 
things said of these appeals by the poor, than by the 
well-to-do. The simplest and least sophisticated 
minds are often the severest critics in matters of 
taste as well as morals. And this was a matter of 
both. Among townspeople as well as countryfolk 
there were many who — whether they believed or 
disbelieved in the urgent need, whether they re- 
sponded to the appeal or did not respond to it — 
regarded the whole of this 'publicity' campaign with 
distrust and dislike, as a thing which demoralised 
the country, which was revolting to its honour and 
conscience, and in which the King's name ought never 
to have been used. 2 

1 With apologies for the dialect, in which I am not an expert, I ven- 
ture to set out the gist of a reply given to a friend who set himself to 
find out why recruiting was going badly in a Devonshire village. . . . 
' ' We doant think nought, Zur, o ' them advertaizements and noospaper 
'talk about going soldgering. When Guv'ment needs soldgers really 
' sore, Guv 'ment '11 say so clear enough, like it does when it wants 
'taxes — 'Come 'long, Frank Halls, you're wanted.' . . . And when 
'Guv'ment taps Frank Halls on showlder, and sez this, I'll go right 
'enough; but I'll not stir foot till Guv'ment does; nor '11 any man of 
'sense this zide Exeter." 

2 The following letter which appeared in the Westminster Gazette 
(January 20, 1915), states the case so admirably that I have taken the 
liberty of quoting it in full : 

' ' Dear Sir — Every day you tell your readers that we are collecting 
' troops by means of voluntary enlistment, yet it is self-evident that our 
'recruiting campaign from the first has been a very noisy and a very 
'vulgar compulsion, which in a time of immense crisis has lowered the 
' dignity of our country and provoked much anxiety among our Allies. 
' Our national habit of doing the right thing in the wrong way has never 
'been exercised in a more slovenly and unjust manner. It is a crime 
'against morals not to use the equitable principles of national service 
'when our country is fighting for her life; and this obvious truth should 
'be recognised as a matter of course by every true democrat. A gen- 
' uinely democratic people, proud of their past history, and determined 
'to hold their own against Germany's blooddust, would have divided 
' her male population into classes, and would have summoned each class 



ON THE WORKING CLASSES 371 

On the part of the working-classes there were PartIV. 
other objections to the methods employed. They Chapter 
resented the hints and instructions which were so YI - 
obligingly given by the ' publicity artists' and the Methods of 
'party managers' to the well-to-do classes — to recruiing * 
employers of all sorts — as to how they should bring 
pressure to bear upon their dependents. And they 
resented — especially the older men and those with 
family responsibilities — the manner in which they 
were invited by means of circulars to signify their 
willingness to serve — as they imagined in the last 
dire necessity — and when they had agreed patrioti- 
cally to do so, found themselves shortly afterwards 
called upon to fulfil their contract. For they knew 

' to the colours at a given date. Those who were essential to the leading 
' trades of the country would have been exempted from war service in 
' the field, as they are in Germany ; the younger classes would have been 
' called up first, and no class would have been withdrawn from its civil 
' work until the military authorities were ready to train it. Instead of 
'this quiet and dignified justice, this admirable and quiet unity of a 
' free people inspired by a fine patriotism, we have dazed ourselves with 
' shrieking posters and a j ournalistic clamour against ' shirkers, ' and 
'loud abuse of professional footballers; and now an advertisement in 
' the newspapers assures the women of England that they must do what 
' the State declines to achieve, that they must send their men and boys 
'into the field since their country is fighting for her life. What cow- 
' ardice ! Why impose this voluntary duty on women when the State is 
' too ignoble to look upon her own duty in this matter as a moral obliga- 
'tion? 

' ' The one virtue of voluntary enlistment is that it should be volun- 
' tary — a free choice between a soldier 's life and a civilian 's life. To 
' use moral pressure, with the outcries of public indignation, in order to 
' drive civilians from their work into the army — what is this but a most 
'undignified compulsion? And it is also a compulsion that presses un- 
' equally upon the people, for its methods are without system. Many 
' families send their all into the fighting line ; many decline to be patri- 
'otic. A woman said to me yesterday: 'My husband has gone, and I 
'am left with his business. Why should he go? Other women in my 
'neighbourhood have their husbands still, and it's rubbish to say that 
' the country is in danger when the Government allows and encourages 
'this injustice in recruiting. If the country is in danger all the men 
' should fight — if their trade work is unnecessary to the armies. ' 

' ' This point of view is right; the wrong one is advocated by you and 
'by other Eadicals who dislike the justice of democratic equality. — 
'Yours truly, Walter Shaw Sparrow." 



172 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 



Part IV. 

Chapter 

VI. 

Methods of 
recruiting. 



that in the neighbouring village — or in the very next 
house — there were men much more eligible for mili- 
tary service in point of age and freedom from family 
responsibilities, who, not having either volunteered, 
or filled up the circular, were accordingly left un- 
disturbed to go about their daily business. 1 



The attitude of the country generally at the 
outbreak of war was admirable. It was what it 
should have been — as on a ship after a collision, 
where crew and passengers, all under self-command, 
and without panic, await orders patiently. So the 
country waited — waited for clear orders — waited to 
be told, in tones free from all ambiguity and hesita- 
tion, what they were to do as classes and as individ- 
uals. There was very little fuss or confusion. People 
were somewhat dazed for a short while by the finan- 
cial crisis ; but the worst of that was soon over. They 
then said to themselves, "Let us get on with our 
'ordinary work as hard as usual (or even harder), 
'until we receive orders from those responsible for 
'the ship's safety, telling us what we are to do." 

1 There have been bitter complaints of this artful way of getting re- 
cruits, as a boy 'sniggles' trout. The following letter to the Times 
(April 21, 1915) voices a very widely spread sense of injustice: 

' ' Sir — Will you give me the opportunity to ask a question, which I 
'think you will agree is important? When the Circular to Householders 
' was issued, many heads of families gave in their names on the assump- 
' tion that they would be called up on the last resort, and under circum- 
' stances in which no patriotic man could refuse his help. Married men 
'with large families are now being called up apparently without the 
'slightest regard to their home circumstances. Many of the best of 
'them are surprised and uneasy at leaving their families, but feel bound 
' in honour to keep their word, some even thinking they have no choice. 
' The separation allowances for these families will be an immense burden 
'on the State, and, if the breadwinner falls, a permanent burden. Is 
' the need for men still so serious and urgent as to justify this? If it is, 
' then I for one, who have up to now hoped that the war might be put 
' through without compulsion, feel that the time has come to ' fetch ' the 
'unmarried shirkers, and I believe there is a wide-spread and growing 
' feeling to that effect. — I am, Sir, etc., Charles G. E. Welby. ' ' 



BUSINESS AS USUAL 373 

There was a certain amount of sparring, then and Part rv. 

subsequently, between high-minded journalists, who Chapter 

were engaged in carrying on their own business as YI ' 

usual, and hard-headed traders and manufacturers Methods of 

recruiting, 

who desired to do likewise. The former were per- 
haps a trifle too self-righteous, while the latter took 
more credit than they deserved for patriotism, seeing 
that their chief merit was common sense. To have 
stopped the business of the country would have done 
nobody but the Germans any good, and would have 
added greatly to our national embarrassment. 

At times of national crisis, there will always 
be a tendency, among most men and women, to mis- 
givings, lest they may not be doing the full measure 
of their duty. Their consciences become morbidly 
active; it is inevitable that they should; indeed it 
would be regrettable if they did not. People are 
uncomfortable, unless they are doing something they 
have never done before, which they dislike doing, 
and which they do less well than their ordinary work. 
In many cases what they are inspired to do is less 
useful than would have been their ordinary work, 
well and thoughtfully done. At such times as these 
the Society for Setting Everybody Right always 
increases its activities, and enrols a large number of 
new members. But very soon, if there is leadership 
of the nation, things fall into their proper places and 
proportions. Neither business nor pleasure can be 
carried on as usual, and everybody knows it. There 
must be great changes ; but not merely for the sake 
of change. There must be great sacrifices in many 
cases ; and those who are doing well must give a help- 
ing hand to those others who are doing ill. But all — 
whether they are doing well or ill from the standpoint 



374 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 

Part rv. of their own private interests — must be prepared to 

Chapter do what the leader of the nation orders them to do. 

VL This was fully recognised in August, September, 

Methods of October, and November last. The country expected 

orders — clear and unmistakable orders — and it was 

prepared to obey whatever orders it received. 

But no orders came. Instead of orders there were 
appeals, warnings, suggestions, assurances. The 
panic-monger was let loose with his paint-box of 
horrors. The diffident parliamentarian fell to his 
usual methods of soothing, and coaxing, and shaming 
people into doing a very vague and much-qualified 
thing, which he termed their duty. But there was no 
clearness, no firmness. An ordinary man will realise 
his duty so soon as he receives a definite command, 
and not before. He received no such command ; he 
was lauded, lectured, and exhorted ; and then was left 
to decide upon his course of action by the light of his 
own reason and conscience. 1 

1 An example of the apparent inability of the Government to do any- 
thing thoroughly or courageously is found in a circular letter to shop- 
keepers and wholesale firms, which was lately sent out by the Home 
Secretary and the President of the Board of Trade. The object of this 
enquiry — undertaken at leisure, nine months after the outbreak of war 
— is to obtain information as to the number of men of military age, 
who are still employed in these particular trades, and as to the willing- 
ness of their employers to spare them if required, and to reinstate them 
at the end of the war, etc., etc. 

The timid futility of this attempt at organising the resources of the 
country is shown first by the fact that it left to the option of each em- 
ployer whether he will reply or not. Businesses which do not wish to 
have their employees taken away need not give an answer. It is com- 
pulsory for individuals to disclose all particulars of their income ; why, 
therefore, need Government shrink from making it compulsory upon 
firms to disclose all particulars of their staffs? . . . The second vice of 
this application is that the information asked for is quite inadequate 
for the object. Even if the enquiry were answered faithfully by every 
employer and householder in the country, it would not give the Govern- 
ment what they require for the purposes of organising industry or re- 
cruiting the army. ... In the third place, a certain group of trades is 
singled out at haphazard. If it is desired to organise the resources of 



AN ORGIE OF SENSATIONALISM 375 

He was not even given a plain statement of the PaetIV. 
true facts of the situation, and then left at peace to Chapter 
determine what he would do. He was disturbed in VL 
his meditations by shouting — more shouting — ever Methods of 
louder and louder shouting — through some thou- 
sands of megaphones. The nature of the appeal was 
emotional, confusing, frenzied, and at times degrad- 
ing. Naturally the results were in many directions 
most unsatisfactory, unbusinesslike, and disorderly. 
The drain of recruiting affected industries and in- 
dividuals not only unequally and unfairly, but in a 
way contrary to the public interest. If Government 
will not exercise guidance and control in unprece- 
dented circumstances, it is inevitable that the country 
must suffer. 

To judge from the placards and the posters, the 
pictures and the language, a casual stranger would 
not have judged that the British Empire stood at 
the crisis of its fate; but rather that some World's 
Fair was arriving shortly, and that these were the 
preliminary flourishes. Lord Kitchener cannot have 
enjoyed the pre-eminence which was allotted to him 
in our mural decorations, and which suggested that 
he was some kind of co-equal with the famous Bar- 
num or Lord George Sanger. Probably no one alive 
hated the whole of this orgie of vulgar sensational- 
ism, which the timidity of the politicians had forced 
upon the country, more than he did. 1 

the country what is needed is a general census of all males between 
16 and 60. 

One does not know whether to marvel most at the belated timorous- 
ness of this enquiry, or at the slatternly way in which it has been 
framed. 

1 One who is no longer alive — Queen Victoria — would possibly have 
hated it even more. Imagine her late Majesty 's feelings on seeing the 
walls of Windsor plastered with the legend — 'Be a sport: Join to-day' 
— and with other appeals of the same elevating character! . . . But 



376 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 



Part TV. 

Chapter 

VI. 

Methods of 
recruiting. 



Having stirred up good and true men to join the 
New Army, whether it was rightly their turn or not ; 
having got at others in whom the voluntary spirit 
burned less brightly, by urging their employers to 
dismiss them and their sweethearts to throw them 
over if they refused the call of duty, the 'publicity 
artists' and the 'party managers' between them 
undoubtedly collected for Lord Kitchener a very 
fine army, possibly the finest raw material for an 
army which has ever been got together. And Lord 
Kitchener, thereupon, set to work, and trained 
this army as no one but Lord Kitchener could have 
trained it. 

These results were a source of great pride and 
self-congratulation among the politicians. The 
voluntary principle — you see how it works ! What a 
triumph! What other nation could have done the 
same I 

Other nations certainly could not have done the 
same, for the reason that there are some things which 
one cannot do twice over, some things which one 
cannot give a second time — one's life for example, 
or the flower of the manhood of a nation to be made 
into soldiers. 

Other nations could not have done what we were 
doing, because they had done it already. They had 

perhaps the poster which is more remarkable than any other — consider- 
ing the source from which it springs — is one showing a garish but recog- 
nisable portrait of Lord Koberts, with the motto, 'He did his duty. 
' Will you do yours?' If the timidity of politicians is apparent in cer- 
tain directions, their courage is no less noteworthy in others. The cour- 
age of a Government (containing as it does Mr. Asquith, Lord Haldane, 
Mr. Eunciman, Sir John Simon, Mr. Harcourt, and Mr. Acland — not to 
mention others) which can issue such a poster must be of a very high 
order indeed. One wonders, however, if this placard would not be more 
convincing, and its effect even greater, were the motto amplified, so as 
to tell the whole story: "He did his duty; we denounced him for doing 
'it. We failed to do ours; will you, however, do yours?" 



recruiting. 



A FRENCH VIEW 377 

their men prepared when the need arose — which we Part iv. 
had not. Other nations were engaged in holding the Chapter 
common enemy at enormous sacrifices until we made VI - 
ourselves ready ; until we — triumphing in our Methods of 
voluntary system, covering ourselves in self-praise, 
and declaring to the world, through the mouths of 
Sir John Simon and other statesmen, that each of 
our men was worth at least three of their 'pressed 
men' or conscripts — until we came up leisurely with 
reinforcements — six, nine, or twelve months hence — 
supposing that by such time, there was anything 
still left to come up for. If the Germans were then 
in Paris, Bordeaux, Brest, and Marseilles, there 
would be — temporarily at least — a great saving of 
mortality among the British race. If, on the other 
hand, the Allies had already arrived at Berlin with- 
out us, what greater triumph for the voluntary prin- 
ciple could possibly be imagined? 

Putting these views and considerations — which 
have so much impressed us all in our own recent 
discussions — before a French officer, I found him 
obstinate in viewing the matter at a different angle. 
He was inclined to lay stress on the case of Northern 
France, and even more on that of Belgium, whose 
resistance to the German invasion we had wished for 
and encouraged, and who was engaged in fighting 
our battles quite as much as her own. The voluntary 
principle, in spite of its triumphs at home — which he 
was not concerned to dispute — had not, he thought, 
as yet been remarkably triumphant abroad ; and nine 
months had gone by since war began. 

He insisted, however, that for years before war 
was declared, our great British statesmen could not 
have been ignorant of the European situation, either 



Part IV. 

Chapter 
VI. 

Methods of 
recruiting. 



378 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 

in its political or its military aspects. Such ignorance 
was inconceivable. They must have suspected the 
intentions of Germany, and they must have known 
the numbers of her army. England had common 
interests with France. Common interests, if there 
be a loyal understanding, involve equal sacrifices — 
equality of sacrifice not merely when the push comes, 
but in advance of the crisis, in preparation for it — a 
much more difficult matter. Why then had not our 
Government told the British people long ago what 
sacrifice its safety, no less than its honour, required 
of it to give f 

I felt, after talking to my friend for some time, 
that although he rated our nation in some ways very 
highly indeed, although he was grateful for our 
assistance, hopeful of the future, confident that in 
Lord Kitchener we had found our man, nothing — 
nothing — not even selections from Mr. Spender's 
articles in the Westminster Gazette, or from Sir John 
Simon's speeches, or Sir John Brunner's assurances 
about the protection afforded by international law — 
could induce him to share our own enthusiasm for 
the voluntary system. . . . The triumph of the volun- 
tary system, he cried bitterly, is a German triumph: it 
is the ruin of Belgium and the devastation of France. 

And looking at the matter from a Frenchman's 
point of view, there is something to be said for his 
contention. 



Apart from any objections which may exist to 
British methods of recruiting since war broke out — 
to their injustice, want of dignity, and generally to 
their demoralising effect on public opinion — there 
are several still more urgent questions to be con- 



NEED FOR NATIONAL SERVICE 379 

sidered. Have those methods been adequate? And PartIV. 

if so, are they going to continue adequate to the end? Chapter 

Is there, in short, any practical need for conscription ? VL 

We do not answer these questions by insisting Methods of 

recruit intr* 

that, if there had been conscription in the past, we 
should have been in a much stronger position when 
war broke out ; or by proving to our own satisfaction, 
that if we had possessed a national army, war would 
never have occurred. Such considerations as these 
are by no means done with; they are indeed still 
very important; but they lie rather aside from the 
immediate question with which we are now faced, 
and which, for lack of any clear guidance from those 
in authority, many of us have been endeavouring of 
late to solve by the light of our own judgment. 

The answer which the facts supply does not seem 
to be in any doubt. We need conscription to bring 
this war to a victorious conclusion. We need con- 
scription no less in order that we may impose terms 
of lasting peace. Conscription is essential to the 
proper organisation not only of our manhood, but 
also of our national resources. 1 Judging by the 
increasing size, frequency, and shrillness of recent 
recruiting advertisements, conscription would seem 
to be equally essential in order to secure the number 
of recruits necessary for making good the wastage of 
war, even in the present preliminary stage of the war. 
And morally, conscription is essential in order that 
the whole nation may realise, before it is too late, the 
lif e-or-death nature of the present struggle ; in order 
also that other nations — our Allies as well as our 
enemies — may understand — what they certainly do 

1 This aspect is very cogently stated in Mr. Shaw Sparrow 'a letter to 
the Westminster Gazette quoted on pp. 370-371. 



380 DEMOCEACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 

Part iv, not understand at present — that our spirit is as firm 
Chapter and self-sacrificing as their own. 

VI. 

Methods of The voluntary system has broken down long ago. 

recruiting. j t b ro ke down on the day when the King of England 
declared war upon the Emperor of Germany. From 
that moment it was obvious that, in a prolonged war, 
the voluntary system could not be relied upon to 
give us, in an orderly and businesslike way, the 
numbers which we should certainly require. It was 
also obvious that it was just as inadequate for the 
purpose of introducing speed, order, and efficiency 
into the industrial world, as strength into our mili- 
tary affairs. 

So far, however, most of the accredited oracles of 
Government have either denounced national military 
service as un-English, and a sin against freedom ; or 
else they have evaded the issue, consoling their 
various audiences with the reflection, that it will be 
time enough to talk of compulsion, when it is clearly 
demonstrated that the voluntary system can no 
longer give us what we need. It seems improvident 
to wait until the need has been proved by the painful 
process of failure. The curses of many dead nations 
lie upon the procrastination of statesmen, who waited 
for breakdown to prove the necessity of sacrifice. 
Compulsion, like other great changes, cannot be 
systematised and put through in a day. It needs 
preparation. If the shoe begins to pinch severely 
in August, and we only then determine to adopt con- 
scription, what relief can we hope to experience be- 
fore the following midsummer ? And in what condi- 
tion of lameness may the British Empire be by then? 
"But what," it may be asked, "of all the official 



VALUE OF OFFICIAL ASSURANCES 381 

' and semi-official statements which have been uttered Pakt iv. 

'in a contrary sense? Surely the nation is bound Chaptek 

'to trust its own Government, even although no v 

'facts and figures are offered in support of their Methods of 

, ,, recruiting. 

assurances." 

Unfortunately it is impossible to place an implicit 
faith in official and semi-official statements, unless 
we have certain knowledge that they are confirmed 
by the facts. There has been an abundance of such 
statements in recent years — with regard to the 
innocence of Germany's intentions — with regard to 
the adequacy of our own preparations — while only 
a few weeks ago Mr. Asquith himself was assuring us 
that neither the operations of our own army, nor 
those of our Allies' armies, had ever been crippled, 
or even hampered, by any want of munitions. 

When, therefore, assurances flow from the same 
source — assurances that there is no need for com- 
pulsory military service — that the voluntary system 
has given, is giving, and will continue to give us all 
we require — we may be forgiven for expressing our 
incredulity. Such official and semi-official state- 
ments are not supported by any clear proofs. They 
are contradicted by much that we have heard from 
persons who are both honest, and in a position to 
know. They are discredited by our own eyes when 
we read the recruiting advertisements and posters. 
It seems safer, therefore, to dismiss these official and 
semi-official assurances, and trust for once to our 
instinct and the evidence of our own senses. It seems 
safer also not to wait for complete breakdown in war, 
or mortifying failure in negotiations for peace, in 
order to have the need for national service estab- 
lished beyond a doubt. 



CHAPTER VII 

PEEVEKSITIES OF THE ANTI-MILITAEIST SPIRIT 

PaetIV. If 'National Service, ' or 'Conscription,' has actually 
Chapter become necessary already, or may conceivably be- 
vn - come so before long, it seems worth while to glance 
Perver- at some of the considerations which have been urged 
the^tl m favour of this system in the past, and also to 
militarist examine some of the causes and conditions which 
have hitherto led public opinion in the United King- 
dom, as well as in several of the Dominions, to 
regard the principle of compulsion with hostility and 
distrust. 

Beyond the question, whether the system of re- 
cruiting, which has been employed during the present 
war, can correctly be described as 'voluntary,' there 
is the further question, whether the system, which is 
in use at ordinary times, and which produces some 
35,000 men per annum, can be so described. Lord 
Roberts always maintained that it could not, and that 
its true title was 'the Conscription of Hunger.' 

Any one who has watched the recruiting-sergeant 
at work, on a raw cold day of winter or early spring, 
will be inclined to agree with Lord Roberts. A fine, 
good-humoured, well-fed, well-set-up fellow, in a 
handsome uniform, with rows of medals which light 
up the mean and dingy street, lays himself alongside 

382 



spirit. 



NORMAL RECRUITING METHODS 383 

some half-starved poor devil, down in his luck, with Part iv. 
not a rag to his back that the north wind doesn't Chapter 
blow through. The appetites and vanities of the VIL 
latter are all of them morbidly alert — hunger, thirst, Pe y ver - 
the desire for warmth, and to cut a smart figure in SL^i- 
the world. The astute sergeant, though no professor ^}^ tist 
of psychology, understands the case thoroughly, as 
he marks down his man. He greets him heartily with 
a 'good day' that sends a glow through him, even 
before the drink at the Goat and Compasses, or Green 
Dragon has been tossed off, and the King's shilling 
accepted. 

Not that there is any need for pity or regret 
at the conclusion of such an episode as this; and 
assuredly it is no uncommon one. These young men 
with empty bellies, and no very obvious way of filling 
them, in nine cases out of ten enlistment saves them ; 
perhaps in more even than that. 

But talk about compulsion and the voluntary 
principle! What strikes the observer most about 
such a scene as this is certainly not anything which 
can be truly termed 'voluntary.' If one chooses to 
put things into ugly words — which is sometimes use- 
ful, in order to give a shock to good people who 
are tending towards self -righteousness in their wor- 
ship of phrases — this is the compulsion of hunger 
and misery. It might even be contended that it was 
not only compulsion, but a mean, sniggling kind of 
compulsion, taking advantage of a starving man. 1 

The law is very chary of enforcing promises made 
under duress. If a man dying of thirst signs his 
birthright away, or binds himself in service for a term 

1 Certain paragraphs of this chapter, in their original form, have 
been construed in some quarters as suggesting that 90 per cent or more 



384 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 



PaktIV. 

Chapter 

VII. 




of years, in exchange for a glass of water, the ink 
and paper have no validity. But the recruit is 
firmly bound. He has made a contract to give his 
labour, and to risk his life for a long period of years, 
at a wage which is certainly below the market rate ; 
and he is held to it. Things much more ' voluntary ' 
than this have been dubbed * slavery,' and denounced 
as 'tainted with servile conditions. ' And the loudest 
denunciators have been precisely those anti-militar- 
ists, who uphold our 'voluntary' system with the 
hottest fervour, while reprobating all forms of 'com- 
pulsion' with horror. 

"We have heard much caustic abuse of the National 
Service League. It has been accused of talking ' the 
cant of compulsion'; by which has been meant that 
certain of its members have put in the forefront of 
their argument the moral and physical advantages 

of the annual intake of recruits for the British Army have enlisted 
under pressure of hunger or want. Whether or not this was a reason- 
able construction to place upon certain sentences is a question which I 
am not concerned to discuss. It is, however, of some importance that 
the true intention should be put beyond the possibility of doubt. When 
I used the phrase 'nine out of ten . . . more even than that' I in- 
tended to refer, not to those who are induced to enlist by the pressure of 
want, but to those who, having enlisted under the pressure of want, are 
made men of by the profession of arms. I am of course well aware that 
among those who have enlisted as privates in the British Army there are 
very many (some of whom I have the honour to number among my 
friends) who have been led to do so by quite different motives — by the 
love of travel and adventure, and of the military career for its own sake. 
The point, however, of my argument was, and still remains, that noth- 
ing approaching 35,000 recruits could be got annually in normal times, 
except by a form of pressure which the most distinguished soldier of his 
day described as 'the Conscription of Hunger.' Mr. G. G. Coulton, 
writing in the Spectator (July 3, 1915), calls attention to a semi-official 
pronouncement which is of some interest: "In 1911 an official book 
against compulsory service was published by Sir Ian Hamilton, under 
the auspices of Lord Haldane, who specially based himself, in the first 
two pages of his preface, on Sir Ian's wide knowledge of British re- 
cruiting conditions. On p. 106 of that book Sir Ian says plainly: 'The 
majority of eighteen-to-nineteen-y ear-old recruits enlist because they 
have just ceased to be boys, and are unable to find regular employment 
as men. About four- fifths of them come to us because they cannot get 
a job at fifteen shillings a week. ' ' ' 



militarist 
spirit. 



MOEAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS 385 

which they imagine universal military training would part rv. 
confer upon the nation. Some may possibly have Chapter 
gone too far, and lost sight of the need of the nation, VIL 
in their enthusiasm for the improvement of the Perver- 
individual. But if occasionally their arguments the^anti- 
assume the form of cant, can their lapse be compared 
with the cant which tells the world smugly that the 
British Army is recruited strictly on the voluntary 
principle ? 

The 'economic argument,' as it is called, is 
another example. The country would be faced with 
ruin, we are told, if every able-bodied man had to 
give ' two of the best years of his life, ' 1 and a week 
or two out of each of the ensuing seven, to ' unpro- 
ductive' labour. Sums have been worked out to 
hundreds of millions sterling, with the object of 
showing that the national loss, during a single gen- 
eration, would make the national debt appear insig- 
nificant. How could Britain maintain her industrial 
pre-eminence weighted with such a handicap ? 

One answer is that Britain, buoyed up though 
she has been by her voluntary system, has not lately 
been outstripping those of her competitors who 
carried this very handicap which it is now proposed 
that she should carry; that she has not even been 
maintaining her relative position in the industrial 
world in comparison, for example, with Germany. 

But there is also another answer. If you take 
a youth at the plastic age when he has reached man- 
hood, feed him on wholesome food, subject him to 
vigorous and varied exercise, mainly in the open 
air, discipline him, train him to co-operation with 

1 This was the German period of training for infantry. The Na- 
tional Service League proposal was four months. 



386 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 



Perver- 
sities of 
the anti- 
militarist 
spirit. 



PartIV. his fellows, make him smart and swift in falling-to 
Chapter at whatever work comes under his hand, you are 
VIL thereby giving him precisely what, for his own sake 
and that of the country, is most needed at the present 
time. You are giving him the chance of developing 
his bodily strength under healthy conditions, and 
you are giving him a general education and moral 
training which, in the great majority of cases, will 
be of great value to him in all his after life. 

It is the regret of every one, who has studied our 
industrial system from within, that men wear out too 
soon. By the time a man reaches his fortieth year — 
often earlier — he is too apt, in many vocations, to 
be an old man ; and for that reason he is in danger 
of being shoved out of his place by a younger genera- 
tion. 

This premature and, for the most part, unneces- 
sary ageing is the real economic loss. If by taking 
two years out of a man's life as he enters manhood, if 
by improving his physique and helping him to form 
healthy habits, you can thereby add on ten or fifteen 
years to his industrial efficiency, you are not only 
contributing to his own happiness, but are also adding 
enormously to the wealth and prosperity of the 
country. Any one indeed, who chooses to work out 
sums upon this hypothesis, will hardly regard the 
national debt as a large enough unit for comparison. 

The kernel of this matter is, that men wear out in 
the working classes earlier than in others, mainly 
because they have no break, no rest, no change, 
from the day they leave school to take up a trade, 
till the day when they have to hand in their checks 
for good and all. It is not effort, but drudgery, which 
most quickly ages a man. It is the rut — straight, 



UNDER-RATING OF CONSCRIPT ARMIES 387 

dark, narrow, with no horizons, and no general view Pabt iv. 
of the outside world — which is the greatest of social Chapter 
dangers. More than anything else it tends to narrow- VIL 
ness of sympathy and bitterness of heart. p™- 

It would be cant to claim that universal military tLTanti- 
training will get rid of this secular evil; but to say ^^^ 
that it will help to diminish it is merely the truth. 
The real 'cant' is to talk about the economic loss 
under conscription ; for there would undoubtedly be 
an immense economic gain. 

But indeed the advocacy of the voluntary system 
is stuffed full of cant. . . . We are all proud of 
our army; and rightly so. But the opponents of 
universal military service carry their pride much 
further than the soldiers themselves. They con- 
trast our army, to its enormous advantage, with the 
conscript armies of the continent, which they regard 
as consisting of vastly inferior fighting men — of men, 
in a sense despicable, inasmuch as their meek spirits 
have submitted tamely to conscription. 

Colonel Seely, who, when he touches arithmetic 
soars at once into the region of poetry, has pro- 
nounced confidently that one of our voluntary sol- 
diers is worth ten men whom the law compels to 
serve. Sir John Simon was still of opinion — even 
after several months of war — that one of our volun- 
teers was worth at least three conscripts; and he 
was convinced that the Kaiser himself already knew 
it. What a splendid thing if Colonel Seely were 
right, or even if Sir John Simon were right ! 

But is either of them right 1 ? So far as our volun- 
tary army is superior — and it was undoubtedly 
superior in certain respects at the beginning of the 
war — it was surely not because it was a 'voluntary' 



388 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 

past iv. army; but because, on the average, it had undergone 
Chapter a longer and more thorough course of training than 
VIL the troops against which it was called upon to fight, 
pe™*- Fine as its spirit was, and high as were both its 
th e ie L°ti- courage and its intelligence, who has ever heard 
militarist a single soldier maintain that — measured through 

spirit- -it- 

and through — it was m those respects superior 
to the troops alongside which, or against which it 
fought I 

As the war has continued month after month, 
and men with only a few months ' training have been 
drafted across the Channel to supply the British 
wastage of war, even this initial superiority which 
came of longer and more thorough training has 
gradually been worn away. A time will come, no 
doubt — possibly it has already come — when Ger- 
many, having used up her trained soldiers of sound 
physique, has to fall back upon an inferior quality. 
But that is merely exhaustion. It does not prove the 
superiority of the voluntary system. It does not 
affect the comparison between men of equal stamina 
and spirit — one set of whom has been trained before- 
hand in arms — the other not put into training until 
war began. 

Possibly Colonel Seely spoke somewhat lightly 
and thoughtlessly in those serene days before the 
warcloud burst; but Sir John Simon spoke deliber- 
ately — his was the voice of the Cabinet, after months 
of grim warfare. To describe his utterances as cant 
doesnot seemunjust, thoughpossibly it is inadequate. 

We are proud of our army, not merely because of 
its fine qualities, but for the very fact that it is 
what we choose to call a ' voluntary' army. But 
what do they say of it in foreign countries'? What 



VII. 

Perver- 
sities of 



THE CANT OP MILITAEISM 389 

did the whole of Europe say of it during the South PartIV. 
African War? What are the Germans saying of it Chapter 
now? 

Naturally prejudice has led them to view the facts 
at a different angle. They have seldom referred to the anti- 
the 'voluntary' character of our army. That was ™ ir £ nst 
not the aspect which attracted their attention, so 
much as the other aspect, that our soldiers received 
pay, and therefore, according to German notions, 
'fought for hire.' At the time of the South African 
War all continental nations said of our army what 
the Germans still say — not that it was a 'voluntary' 
army, but that it was a 'mercenary' army; and this 
is a much less pleasant-sounding term. 1 

In this accusation we find the other kind of cant — 
the cant of militarism. For if ours is a mercenary 
army, so is their own, in so far as the officers and 
non-commissioned officers are concerned. But as a 
matter of fact no part, either of our army or the exist- 
ing German army, can with any truth be described 
as 'mercenaries'; for this is a term applicable only 
to armies — much more common in the past in 
Germany than anywhere else — who were hired out 
to fight abroad in quarrels which were not their own. 

But although this German accusation against the 
character of our troops is pure cant, it would not 
be wholly so were it levelled against the British 
people. Not our army, but we ourselves, are the 

1 The pay of the French private soldier is, I understand, about a sou 
— a halfpenny — a day. In his eyes the British soldier in the next 
trench, who receives from a shilling to eighteenpenee a day — and in the 
case of married men a separation allowance as well — must appear as a 
kind of millionaire. During the South African War the pay of certain 
volunteer regiments reached the figure of five shillings a day for privates. 
Men serving with our army as motor drivers — in comparative safety — < 
receive something like six shillings or seven and sixpence a day. 



militarist 
spirit. 



390 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 

PabtIV. true mercenaries, because we pay others to do for 
Chapter us what other nations do for themselves. In German 
VI1 - eyes — and perhaps in other eyes as well, which are 
perver- less willing to see our faults — this charge against the 
tLTLti- British people appears maintainable. It is incom- 
prehensible to other nations, why we should refuse 
to recognise that it is any part of our duty, as a peo- 
ple, to defend our country ; why we will not admit the 
obligation either to train ourselves to arms in time 
of peace, or to risk our lives in time of war ; why we 
hold obstinately to it that such things are no part of 
our duty as a people, but are only the duty of private 
individuals who love fighting, or who are endowed 
with more than the average sense of duty. 

"As for you, the great British People," writes 
Hexenkiichen contemptuously, ' ' you merely fold your 
'hands, and say self -righteously, that your duty be- 
'gins and ends with paying certain individuals to 
'fight for you — individuals whose personal interest 
'can be tempted with rewards; whose weakness of 
1 character can be influenced by taunts, and jeers, and 
'threats of dismissal ; or who happen to see their duty 
'in a different light from the great majority which 
'calls itself (and is par excellence) the British Peo- 
'ple. . . ." This may be a very prejudiced view of 
the matter, but it is the German view. What they 
really mean when they say that England is to be 
despised because she relies upon a mercenary army, 
is that England is to be despised because, being mer- 
cenary, she relies upon a professional army. The 
taunt, when we come to analyse it, is found to be lev- 
elled, not against the hired, but against the hirers ; 
and although we may be very indignant, it is not easy 
to disprove its justice. 



PAY OF THE BRITISH ARMY 



391 



The British nation, if not actually the richest, is 
at any rate one of the richest in the world. It has 
elected to depend for its safety upon an army which 
cannot with justice be called either i voluntary' or 
'mercenary/ but which it is fairly near the truth 
to describe as ' professional. ' The theory of our 
arrangement is that we must somehow, and at the 
cheapest rate, contrive to tempt enough men to be- 
come professional soldiers to ensure national safety. 
Accordingly we offer such inducements to take up 
the career of arms — instead of the trades of farm 
labourer, miner, carpenter, dock hand, shopkeeper, 
lawyer, physician, or stockbroker — as custom and 
the circumstances of the moment appear to require. 

In an emergency we offer high pay and generous 
separation allowances to the private soldier. In 
normal times we give him less than the market rate 
of wages. 

The pay of junior or subaltern officers is so meagre 
that it cannot, by any possibility, cover the expenses 
which Government insists upon their incurring. 
Captains, majors, and lieutenant-colonels are paid 
much less than the wages of foremen or sub-managers 
in any important industrial undertaking. Even for 
those who attain the most brilliant success in their 
careers, there are no prizes which will stand com- 
parison for a moment with a very moderate degree 
of prosperity in the world of trade or finance. They 
cannot even be compared with the prizes open to the 
bar or the medical profession. 

Hitherto we have obtained our officers largely 
owing to a firmly rooted tradition among the country 
gentlemen and the military families — neither as a 
rule rich men, or even very easy in their circum- 



PaetIV. 

Chapter 

VII. 

Perver- 
sities of 
the anti- 
militarist 
spirit. 



392 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 

Part rv. stances as things go nowadays — many of them very 
Chapter poor — a tradition so strong that it is not cant, but 
viI - plain truth, to call it sense of duty. There are other 
perver- motives, of course, which may lead a boy to choose 
the^anti- this profession — love of adventure, comparative 
militarist freedom from indoor life, pleasant comradeship, and 
in the case of the middle classes, recently risen to 
affluence, social aspirations. But even in the last 
there is far more good than harm; though in anti- 
militarist circles it is the unworthy aim which is 
usually dwelt upon with a sneering emphasis. For 
very often, when a man has risen from humble cir- 
cumstances to a fortune, he rejoices that his sons 
should serve the state, since it is in his power to 
make provision. The example of his neighbours, 
whose ancestors have been living on their acres since 
the days of the Plantagenets or the Tudors, is a noble 
example ; and he is wise to follow it. 

In the case of the rank and file of our army, a 
contract for a term of years (with obligations con- 
tinuing for a further term of years) is entered into, 
and signed, under the circumstances which have 
already been considered. We are faced here with 
a phenomenon which seems strange in an Age which 
has conceded the right to 'down tools,' even though 
by so doing a solemn engagement is broken — in an 
Age which has become very fastidious about hiring 
agreements of most kinds, very suspicious of any- 
thing suggestive of 'servile conditions ' or 'forced 
labour,' and which deprecates the idea of penalising 
breach of contract, on the part of a workman, even 
by process in the civil courts. 

As regards a private soldier in the British army, 
however, the Age apparently has no such com- 



THE ANTI-MILITABIST CONSCIENCE 393 

punctions. In a vast number of cases his contract PaetIV. 
has been made under pressure of hunger and want. Chapter 
Its obligations last for a long period of years. VIL 
The pay is below the ordinary market rates. Every- Perver- 
thing in fact, which, in equity, would favour a theHnu- 
revision, pleads in favour of the soldier who demands militarist 

' ■*• m spirit. 

to be released. But he is not released. It is not a 
case of suing him for damages in the civil courts, but 
of dealing with him under discipline and mutiny 
acts, the terms of which are simple and drastics — 
in peace time imprisonment, in war time death. 
"Without these means of enforcing the ' voluntary ' 
system the British people would not feel themselves 
safe. 

This phenomenon seems even stranger, when we 
remember that a large and influential part of the 
British people is not only very fastidious as to the 
terms of all other sorts of hiring agreements, as to 
rates of pay, and as to the conditions under which 
such contracts have been entered into — that it is not 
only most tender in dealing with the breach of such 
agreements — but that it also regards the object of 
the agreement for military service with particular 
suspicion. This section of the British people is anti- 
militarist on conscientious grounds. One would have 
thought, therefore, that it might have been more 
than usually careful to allow the man, who hires 
himself out for lethal purposes, to have the benefit of 
second thoughts ; or even of third, fourth, and fifth 
thoughts. For he, too, may develop a conscience 
when his belly is no longer empty. But no: to do 
this would endanger the 'voluntary' system. 

This anti-militarist section of the British people is 
composed of citizens who, if we are to believe their 



394 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 

paetiv. own professions, love peace more than other men 
Chapter love it, and hate violence as a deadly sin. They are 
VIL determined not to commit this deadly sin themselves ; 
perver- but being nnable to continue in pursuit of their 
the^nti- material and spiritual affairs, unless others will sin 
militarist j n their behalf, they reluctantly agree to hire, at as 
low a price as possible, a number of wild and dare- 
devil spirits, drawn from the upper and lower strata 
of society — both of whom they regard as approximat- 
ing to the reprobate type — to defend their property, 
to keep their lives safe, to enforce their Will as it 
is declared by ballot papers and House of Commons 
divisions, and to allow them to continue their careers 
of beneficent self-interest undisturbed. 

But for all that, we are puzzled by the rigour with 
which the contract for military service is enforced, 
even to the last ounce of the pound of flesh. Not a 
murmur of protest comes from this section of the 
British people, although it has professed to take the 
rights of the poorer classes as its special province. 
The explanation probably is that, like King Charles 
I., they have made a mental reservation, and are thus 
enabled to distinguish the case of the soldier from 
that of his brother who engages in a civil occupation. 
Roughly speaking, they choose to regard the 
civilian as virtuous, while the soldier, on the other 
hand, cannot in their opinion safely be presumed to 
be anything of the sort. Sometimes indeed — perhaps 
more often than not — he appears to them to be 
distinctly unvirtuous. The presumption is against 
him; for if he were really virtuous, how could he 
ever have agreed to become a soldier, even under 
pressure of want f For regulating the service of such 
men as these force is a regrettable, but necessary, 



ANTI-MILITAEIST CONFIDENCE 395 

instrument. The unvirtuous man has agreed to sin, Part rv. 

and the virtuous man acts justly in holding him to Chapter 
his bargain. If a soldier develops a conscience, and VIL 

insists on ' downing tools ' it is right to imprison him ; pe ™*- 

even in certain circumstances to put him against a the ie an«- 

wall and shoot him. militarist 

spirit. 

These ideas wear an odd appearance when we come 
to examine them closely, and yet not only did they 
exist, but they were actually very prevalent down 
to the outbreak of the present war. They seem to 
be somewhat prevalent, even now, in various quar- 
ters. But surely it is strange that virtuous citizens 
should need the protection of unvirtuous ones ; that 
they should underpay; that they should adopt the 
methods of 'forced labour' as a necessary part of 
the 'voluntary system'; that they should imprison 
and shoot men for breach of hiring agreements for 
long periods of years, entered into very often under 
pressure of circumstances. 

But there is a thing even stranger than any of 
these. Considering how jealous the great anti- 
militarist section of our fellow-countrymen is of any- 
thing which places the army in a position to encroach 
upon, or overawe, the civil power, it seems very 
remarkable that they should nevertheless have taken 
a large number of men — whose morals, in their view, 
were below rather than above the average — should 
have armed them with rifles and bayonets, and spent 
large sums of money in making them as efficient as 
possible for lethal purposes, while refusing firmly to 
arm themselves with anything but ballot-boxes, or to 
make themselves fit for any form of self-defence. 

It seems never to have crossed the minds of the 
anti-militarist section that those whom they thus 



396 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 



VII. 

Perver- 
sities of 
the anti- 
militarist 
spirit. 



PaetIV. regard — if not actually with moral reprehension, 
Chapter at any rate somewhat askance — might perhaps some 
day discover that there were advantages in being 
armed, and in having become lethally efficient ; that 
having studied the phenomena of strikes, and having 
there seen force of various kinds at work — hiring 
agreements broken, combinations to bring pressure 
on society successful, rather black things occasionally 
hushed up and forgiven — soldiers might draw their 
own conclusions. Having grown tired of pay lower 
than the market rate, still more tired of moral lec- 
tures about the wickedness of their particular trade, 
and of tiresome old-fashioned phrases about the sub- 
ordination of the military to the civil power — what if 
they, like other trades and classes, should begin to 
consider the propriety of putting pressure on society, 
since such pressure appears nowadays to be one of 
the recognised instruments for redress of wrongs? 
. . . Have not professional soldiers the power to put 
pressure on society in the twentieth century, just as 
they have done, again and again, in past times in 
other kingdoms and democracies, where personal 
freedom was so highly esteemed, that even the free- 
dom to abstain from defending your country was 
respected by public opinion and the laws of the land? 
But nonsense! In Germany, France, Russia, 
Austria, Italy, and other conscript countries armies 
are hundreds of times stronger than our own, while 
the soldiers in these cases are hardly paid enough to 
keep a smoker in pipe-tobacco. And yet they do 
not think of putting pressure on society, or of any- 
thing so horrible. This of course is true ; but then, 
in these instances, the Army is only Society itself 
passing, as it were, like a may-fly, through a certain 



the anti- 
militarist 
spirit. 



ARMIES AS LIBERATORS 397 

stage in its life-history. Army and Society in the partIV. 
conscript countries are one and the same. A man Chapter 
does not think of putting undue pressure upon him- VIL 
self. But in our case the Army and Society are Perver- 
not one and the same. Their relations are those of 
employer and employed, as they were in Rome long 
ago; and as between employer and employed, there 
are always apt to be questions of pay and position. 

It is useful in this connection to think a little 
of Rome with its 'voluntary' or 'mercenary' or 
'professional' army — an army underpaid at first; 
afterwards perhaps somewhat overpaid, when it 
occurred to its mind to put pressure on society. 

But Rome in the first century was a very different 
place from England in the twentieth. Very different 
indeed ! The art and rules of war were considerably 
less of an expert's business than they are to-day. 
Two thousand years ago — weapons being still some- 
what elementary — gunpowder not yet discovered — 
no railway trains and tubes, and outer and inner 
circles, which now are as necessary for feeding great 
cities as arteries and veins for keeping the human 
heart going — private citizens, moreover, being not 
altogether unused to acting with violence in self- 
defence — it might have taken, perhaps, 100,000 dis- 
ciplined and well-led professional soldiers a week or 
more to hold the six millions of Greater London by 
the throat. To-day 10,000 could do this with ease 
between breakfast and dinner-time. Certainly a con- 
siderable difference — but somehow not a difference 
which seems altogether reassuring. 

Since the days of Oliver Cromwell the confidence 
of the anti-militarists in the docility of the British 
Army has never experienced any serious shock. But 



398 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 

PartIV. yet, according to the theories of this particular 
Chapter school, why should our army alone, of all trades and 
VIL professions, be expected not to place its own class in- 
perver- terests before those of the country? 
the e Li°ti- When professional armies make their first entry 
militarist j n £ p rac tical politics it is almost always in the role 
of liberators and defenders of justice. An instance 
might easily occur if one or other set of politicians, 
in a fit of madness or presumption, were to ask, or 
order, the British Army to undertake certain opera- 
tions against a section of their fellow-countrymen, 
which the soldiers themselves judged to be contrary 
to justice and their own honour. 

Something of this kind very nearly came to pass 
in March 1914. The Curragh incident, as it was 
called, showed in a flash what a perilous gulf opens, 
when a professional army is mishandled. Politi- 
cians, who have come by degrees to regard the army 
— not as a national force, or microcosm of the people, 
but as an instrument which electoral success has 
placed temporarily in their hands, and which may 
therefore be used legitimately for forwarding their 
own party ends — have ever been liable to blunder in 
this direction. 

Whatever may have been the merits of the Cur- 
ragh case, the part which the British Army was asked 
and expected to play on that occasion, was one which 
no democratic Government would have dared to order 
a conscript army to undertake, until it had been 
ascertained, beyond any possibility of doubt, that 
the country as a whole believed extreme measures 
to be necessary for the national safety. 

If professional soldiers, however high and patri- 
otic their spirit, be treated as mercenaries — as if, in 



SERVICE AND SUFFRAGE 399 

their dealings with their fellow-countrymen, they had Part rv. 
neither souls nor consciences — it can be no matter for Chapter 
surprise if they should come by insensible degrees VIL 
to think and act as professional armies have so Perver - 
often acted in the past. . . . One set or other of LTanti- 
party politicians — the occurrence is quite as conceiv- ^^^ 
able in the case of a Unionist Government as in that 
of a Liberal — issues certain orders, which it would 
never dare to issue to a conscript army, and these 
orders, to its immense surprise, are not obeyed. 
Thereupon a Government, which only the day before 
seemed to be established securely on a House of 
Commons majority and the rock of tradition, is seen 
to be powerless. The army in its own eyes — possibly 
in that of public opinion also — has stood between the 
people and injustice. It has refused to be made the 
instrument for performing an act of tyranny and 
oppression. Possibly in sorrow and disgust it dis- 
solves itself and ceases to exist. Possibly, on the 
other hand, it glows with the approbation of its own 
conscience; begins to admire its own strength, and 
not improbably to wonder, if it might not be good for 
the country were soldiers to put forth their strong 
arm rather more often, in order to restrain the poli- 
ticians from following evil courses. This of course is 
the end of democracy and the beginning of militarism. 
An army which starts by playing the popular 
role of benefactor, or liberator, will end very speedily 
by becoming the instrument of a military despotism. 
We need look no farther back than Cromwell and 
his major-generals for an example. We have been 
in the habit of regarding such contingencies as remote 
and mediaeval ; none the less we had all but started 
on this fatal course in the spring and summer of last 



400 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 

PartIV. year. We were then saved, not by the wisdom of 
Chapter statesmen — for these only increased the danger by 
VIL the spectacle which they afforded of timidity, temper, 
perver- and equivocation — but solely by the present war 
the^ti- which, though it has brought us many horrors, has 
militarist averted, for a time at least, what is infinitely the 
worst of all. 

The conclusion is plain. A democracy which as- 
serts the right of manhood suffrage, while denying 
the duty of manhood service, is living in a fool's 
paradise. 

A democracy which does not fully identify itself 
with its army, which does not treat its army with 
honour and as an equal, but which treats it, on the 
contrary, as ill-bred and ill-tempered people treat 
their servants — with a mixture, that is, of fault- 
finding and condescension — is following a very peril- 
ous path. 

An army which does not receive the treatment it 
deserves, and which at the same time is ordered by 
the politicians to perform services which, upon 
occasions, it may hold to be inconsistent with its 
honour, is a danger to the state. 

A democracy which, having refused to train itself 
for its own defence, thinks nevertheless that it can 
safely raise the issue of 'the Army versus the Peo- 
ple/ is mad. 



CHAPTER VIII 



SOME HISTOKICAL KEFLECTIONS 



Peioe to the present war the chief bugbears PartIV. 
encountered by Lord Roberts, and indeed by all Chapter 
others whose aim it was to provide this country with VIIL 
an army numerically fit to support its policy, were Some . 
the objections, real or imaginary, of the British race reflections. 
to compulsory service, and more particularly to 
compulsory service in foreign lands. These preju- 
dices were true types of the bugbear ; for they were 
born out of opinion and not out of the facts. 

The smaller fry of politicians, whose fears — like 
those of the monkeys — are more easily excited by 
the front-row of things which are visible, than by 
the real dangers which lurk behind in the shadow, 
are always much more terrified of opinion than of 
the facts. This is precisely why most politicians 
remain all their lives more unfit than any other class 
of man for governing a country. Give one of these 
his choice — ask him whether he will prefer to support 
a cause where the facts are with him, but opinion is 
likely for many years to be running hard against him, 
or another cause where these conditions are reversed 
— of course he will never hesitate a moment about 
choosing the latter. And very probably his manner 

401 



402 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 

Pabt iv. of answering will indicate, that he thinks you insult 

Chapter his intelligence by asking such a question. 

vm - It is only the very rare type of big, patient poli- 

some tician, who realises that the facts cannot be changed 

reasons, by opinion, and that in the end opinion must be 

changed by the facts, if the two happen to be opposed. 

Such a one chooses accordingly, to follow the facts in 

spite of unpopularity. 

The little fellows, on the contrary, with their 
large ears glued anxiously to the ground, keep ever 
muttering to themselves, and chaunting in a sort of 
rhythmical chorus, the most despicable incantation 
in the whole political vocabulary: — "We who aspire 
4 to be leaders of the People must see to it that we 
'are never in advance of the People. . . . The People 
'will never stand this: the People will never stand 
'that. . . . Away with it therefore; and if possible 
'attach it like a mill-stone round the necks of our 
'enemies." 

Of course they are quite wrong. The People will 
stand anything which is necessary for the national 
welfare, if the matter is explained to them by a big 
enough man in accents of sincerity. 

A defensive force which will on no account cross 
the frontier is no defensive force at all. It is only 
a laughing-stock. 

A frontier is sometimes an arbitrary line drawn 
across meadow with plough; sometimes a river; 
sometimes a mountain range; sometimes, as with 
ourselves, it is a narrow strip of sea — a 'great 
ditch,' as Cromwell called it contemptuously. 

The awful significance, however, of the word 
'frontier' seems to deepen and darken as we pass 



THE HONOUR OF THE ARMY 403 

from the first example to the fourth. And there is paetIV. 
apparently something more in this feeling than the Chapter 
terrors of the channel crossing or of a foreign Ian- vnI - 
guage. Territorials may be taken to Ireland, which, some 
is a longer sea-journey than from Dover to Calais ; reSTns. 
but to be ' butchered abroad' — horrible! 

It is horrible enough to be butchered anywhere, 
but why more horrible in the valley of the Rhine 
than in that of the Thames? If national safety 
demands butchery, as it has often done in the past, 
surely the butchery of 50,000 brave men on the bor- 
ders of Luxemburg is a less evil than the butchery 
of twice that number in the vicinity of Norwich? 
And if we are to consider national comfort as well as 
safety, it is surely wise to follow the German example 
and fight in any man's country rather than in our 
own. The only question of real importance is 
this: — At what place will the sacrifice of life 
be most effective for the defence of the country? 
If we can answer that we shall know also where 
it will be lightest. 1 

The school of political thought which remained 
predominant throughout the great industrial epoch 
(1832-1886) bitterly resented the assumption, made 
by certain classes, that the profession of arms was 
more honourable in its nature, than commerce and 
other peaceful pursuits. The destruction of this sup- 
posed fallacy produced a great literature, and even 
a considerable amount of poetry. It was a frequent 
theme at the opening of literary institutes and tech- 
nical colleges, and also at festivals of chambers of 

1 Once more it is desirable to correct the erroneous impression that 
the conscript armies of continental powers are under no liability to 
serve outside their own territories or overseas. 



404 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 

Paktiv. commerce and municipalities. Professors of Polit- 

Chapter ical Economy expounded the true doctrine with great 

vnI - vehemence, and sermons were preached without num- 

some ber upon the well-worn text about the victories of 

historical 

reflections. peace. 

This reaction was salutary up to a point. It swept 
away a vast quantity of superannuated rubbish. In- 
ternational relations were at this time just as much 
cumbered with old meaningless phrases of a certain 
sort, in which vainglory was the chief ingredient, as 
they have recently been cumbered with others of a 
different sort in which indolence was the chief ingre- 
dient. Inefficiency, indifference, idleness, trifling, and 
extravagance were a standing charge against soldiers 
as a class ; and though they were never true charges 
against the class, they were true, for two generations 
following after Waterloo, against a large number of 
individuals. But this reaction, like most other reac- 
tions, swept away too much. 

A mercenary soldiery which looks to enrich itself 
D y P a y an d plunder is an ignoble institution. It has 
no right to give itself airs of honour, and must be 
judged like company promotion, trusts, or any of the 
many other predatory professions of modern times. 
It is also a national danger, inasmuch as its personal 
interest is to foment wars. The British Army has 
never been open to this charge in any period of its 
history. 

A profession in which it is only possible, by the 
most severe self-denial and economy, for an officer — 
even after he has arrived at success — to live on his 
pay, to marry, and to bring up a family, can hardly be 
ranked as a money-making career. Pecuniary mo- 
tives, indeed, were never the charge against ' the mili- 



THE PROFESSION OF ARMS 405 

tary' except among the stump-orator class. But pro- PaktIV. 
fessional indifference and inefficiency were, at that Chapter 
particular time, not only seriously alleged, but were vni - 
also not infrequently true. It was a good thing that some 
slackness should be swept away. That it has been reflections. 
swept away pretty thoroughly, every one who has 
known anything about the Army for a generation 
past, is well aware. 

But the much-resented claim to a superiority in 
the matter of honour is well founded, and no amount 
of philosophising or political-economising will ever 
shake it. Clearly it is more honourable for a man 
to risk his life, and what is infinitely more important 
— his reputation and his whole future career — in de- 
fence of his country, than it is merely to build up 
a competency or a fortune. The soldier's profession 
is beset by other and greater dangers than the physi- 
cal. Money-making pursuits are not only safer for 
the skin, but in them a blunder, or even a series of 
blunders, does not banish the hope of ultimate suc- 
cess. The man of business has chances of retrieving 
his position. Many bankrupts have died in affluence. 
In politics, a man with a plausible tongue and a cer- 
tain quality of courage, will usually succeed in elud- 
ing the consequences of his mistakes, by laying the 
blame on other people's shoulders. But the soldier is 
rarely given a second chance; and he may easily 
come down at the first chance, through sheer ill-luck, 
and not through any fault of his own. Such a pro- 
fession confers honour upon its members. 

Law, trade, and finance are not in themselves, as 
was at one time thought, dishonourable pursuits; 
but neither are they in themselves honourable. They 
are neither the one nor the other. It casts no slur 



406 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 



PaktIV. 

Chapter 
VIII. 

Some 

historical 

reflections. 



upon a man to be a lawyer, a tradesman, or a banker; 
but neither does it confer upon him any honour. 
But military service does confer an honour. The 
devotion, hardship, and danger of the soldier's life 
are not rewarded upon a commercial basis, or reck- 
oned in that currency. 

Some people are inclined to mock at the respect — 
exaggerated as they think — which is paid by con- 
script countries to their armies. For all its excesses 
and absurdities, this respect is founded upon a true 
principle — a truer principle of conduct than our own. 
In countries where most of the able-bodied men 
have given some years of their lives gratuitously to 
the service of their country, the fact is brought home 
to them, that such service is of a different character 
from the benefits which they subsequently confer 
upon the State by their industry and thrift, or by 
growing rich. 

From the national point of view, it is ennobling 
that at some period of their lives the great majority 
of citizens should have served the commonwealth 
disinterestedly. This after all is the only principle 
which will support a commonwealth. For a common- 
wealth will not stand against the shocks, which 
history teaches us to beware of, merely by dropping 
papers, marked with a cross, into a ballot-box once 
every five years, or even oftener. It will not stand 
merely by taking an intelligent interest in events, 
by attending meetings and reading the newspapers, 
and by indulging in outbursts of indignation or en- 
thusiasm. It will only stand by virtue of personal 
service, and by the readiness of the whole people, 
generation by generation, to give their lives and — 
what is much harder to face — the time and irksome 



A THEOEY OF BRITISH FREEDOM 407 

preparation which are necessary for making the sac- PartIV. 
rifice of their lives — should it be called, for — effective Chapter 
for its purpose. VIIL 

If the mass of the people, even when they have Some 
realised the need, will not accept the obligation of reflections. 
national service they must be prepared to see their 
institutions perish, to lose control of their own des- 
tinies, and to welcome another master than Democ- 
racy, who it may well be, will not put them to the 
trouble of dropping papers, marked with a cross, 
into ballot-boxes once in five years, or indeed at all. 
For a State may continue to exist even if deprived 
of ballot-boxes ; but it is doomed if its citizens will 
not in time prepare themselves to defend it with 
their lives. 

The memories of the press-gang and the militia 
ballot are dim. Both belong to a past which it is 
the custom to refer to with reprobation. Both were 
inconsistent with equal comradeship between 
classes ; with justice, dignity, honour, and the unity 
of the nation ; and on these grounds they are rightly 
condemned. 

But the press-gang and the militia ballot have 
been condemned, and are still condemned, upon other 
grounds which do not seem so firm. Both have been 
condemned as contravening that great and laudable 
principle of British freedom which lays it down that 
those who like fighting, or prefer it to other evils — 
like starvation and imprisonment — or who can be 
bribed, or in some other way persuaded to fight, 
should enjoy the monopoly of being 'butchered,' both 
abroad and at home. And it has been further main- 
tained by those who held these views, that people who 
do not like fighting, but choose rather to stay at home 



408 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 

Part iv. talking, criticising, enjoying fine thrills of patriot- 
Chapter ism, making money, and sleeping under cover, have 
VIIL some kind of divine right to go on enjoying that form 
some of existence undisturbed. Since the Wars of the 

refecuons. Roses the latter class has usually been in a great ma- 
jority in England. Even during the Cromwellian 
Civil War the number of men, capable of bearing 
arms, who actually bore them, was only a smallish 
fraction of the entire population. 

The moral ideals of any community, like other 
things, are apt to be settled by numbers. With the 
extension of popular government, and the increase 
of the electorate, this tendency will assert itself more 
and more. But providing the people are dealt with 
plainly and frankly, without flattery or deceit — like 
men and not as if they were greedy children — the 
moral sense of a democracy will probably be sounder 
and stronger than that of any other form of State. 

Even in England, however, there have been lapses, 
during which the people have not been so treated, 
and the popular spirit has sunk, owing to mean lead- 
ership, into degradation. During the whole of the 
industrial epoch the idea steadily gained in strength, 
that those whose battles were fought for them by 
others, approached more nearly to the type of the 
perfect citizen than those others who actually fought 
the battles; that the protected were worthier than 
the protectors. 

According to this view the true meaning of ' free- 
dom' was exemption from personal service. The 
whole duty of the virtuous citizen with regard to 
the defence of his country began and ended with 
paying a policeman. With the disappearance of im- 
minent and visible danger, the reprobate qualities 



NINETEENTH CENTURY NOTIONS 409 

of the soldier became speedily a pain and a scandal Part rv. 
to godly men. In time of peace he was apt to be Chapter 
sneered at and decried as an idler and a spendthrift, VIIL 
who would not stand well in a moral comparison with some 
those steady fellows, who had remained at home, regions. 
working hard at their vocations and investing their 
savings. 

The soldier, moreover, according to Political 
Economy, was occupied in a non-productive trade, 
and therefore it was contrary to the principles of 
that science to waste more money upon him than 
could be avoided. Also it was prudent not to show 
too much gratitude to those who had done the fight- 
ing, lest they should become presumptuous and for- 
midable. 

This conception of the relations between the army 
and the civilian population has been specially marked 
at several periods in our history — after the Crom- 
wellian wars; after the Marlborough wars; after 
1757; but during the half century which followed 
Waterloo it seemed to have established itself per- 
manently as an article of our political creed. 

After 1815 there was an utter weariness of fight- 
ing, following upon nearly a quarter of a century of 
war. The heroism of Wellington's armies was still 
tainted in the popular memory by the fact that the 
prisons had been opened to find him recruits. The in- 
dustrial expansion and prodigious growth of material 
wealth absorbed men's minds. Middle-class ideals, 
middle-class prosperity, middle-class irritation 
against a military caste which, in spite of its com- 
parative poverty, continued with some success to as- 
sert its social superiority, combined against the army 
in popular discussions. The honest belief that wars 



410 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 



Part IV. 

Chapter 

VIII. 

Some 

historical 

reflections. 



were an anachronism, and that the world was now 
launched upon an interminable era of peace, clothed 
the nakedness of class prejudice with some kind of 
philosophic raiment. Soldiers were no longer need- 
ed ; why then should they continue to claim the lion 's 
share of honourable recognition! 



Up to August 1914 the chief difficulties in the 
way of army reformers were how to overcome the 
firmly-rooted ideas that preparations for war upon a 
great scale were not really essential to security, and 
that, on those rare occasions when fighting might be 
necessary, it should not be undertaken by the most 
virtuous class of citizens, but by others whose lives 
had a lower value. If the citizen paid it was enough ; 
and he claimed the right to grumble even at paying. 
This was the old Liberal faith of the eighteen-fif ties, 
and it remained the faith of the straitest Radical 
sect, until German guns began to batter down the 
forts of Liege. 

But any one who remembers the state of public 
opinion between 1870 and 1890, or who has read the 
political memoirs of that time, will realise that a 
change has been, very slowly and gradually, stealing 
over public opinion ever since the end of that epoch. 
In those earlier times the only danger which disturbed 
our national equanimity, and that only very slightly, 
was the approach of Russia towards the north-west- 
ern frontier of India. The volunteer movement came 
to be regarded more and more by ordinary people 
in the light of a healthy and manly recreation, rather 
than as a duty. A lad would make his choice, very 
much as if volunteering were on a par with rowing, 
sailing, hunting, or polo. It is probably no exaggera- 



A CHANGE OF TONE 411 

tion to say that nine volunteers out of every ten, who Part iv. 
enrolled themselves between 1870 and 1890, never Chapter 
believed for a single moment that there was a chance vm - 
of the country having need of their services. Con- some 

, -i j • j i e j} j_ historical 

sequently, except m the case ot a tew extreme en- reflections. 
thusiasts, it never appeared that there was anything 
unpatriotic in not joining the volunteers. 

One has only to compare this with the attitude 
which has prevailed since the Territorial Army came 
into existence, to realise that there has been a stir- 
ring of the waters, and that in certain quarters a 
change had taken place in the national mood. With 
regard to the Territorials the attitude of those who 
joined, of those who did not join, of the politicians, 
of the press, of public opinion generally was marked- 
ly different from the old attitude. It was significant 
that a man who did not join was often disposed to 
excuse and to justify his abstention. The conditions 
of his calling, or competing duties made it impossible 
for him ; or the lowness of his health, or the highness 
of his principles in some way interfered. There was 
a tendency now to explain what previously would 
never have called for any explanation. 

The causes of this change are not less obvious 
than its symptoms. It is an interesting coincidence 
that Lord Kitchener had a good deal to do with it. 
The destruction of the bloodthirsty tyranny of the 
Khalifa (1898), and the rescue of a fertile province 
from waste, misery, and massacre, caused many 
people to look with less disapproving eyes than for- 
merly upon the profession of the soldier. The long 
anxieties of the South African War, and the levies 
of volunteers from all parts of the Empire, who 
went out to take a share in it, forced men to think 



412 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 



Part IV. 

Chapter 

VIII. 

Soma 

historical 

reflections. 



not only more kindly of soldiers, but also to think 
of war itself no longer as an illusion but as a 
reality. 1 

The events which happened during the last decade 
— the creation of the German Navy — the attempt 
and failure of the British Government to abate the 
rivalry in armaments — the naval panic and the 
hastily summoned Defence Conference in 1909 — the 
Russo-Japanese war — the Agadir crisis — the two 
Balkan wars — the military competition between Ger- 
many and France — all these combined to sharpen the 
consciousness of danger and to draw attention to 
the need for being prepared against it. 

These events, which crowded the beginning of the 
twentieth century, stirred and troubled public opin- 
ion in a manner which not only Mr. Cobden, who died 
in 1865, but almost equally Mr. Gladstone, who sur- 
vived him by more than thirty years, would have ut- 
terly refused to credit. Both these statesmen had 
been convinced that the world was moving steadily 
towards a settled peace, and that before another 
century had passed away — possibly even in a single 
generation — their dreams of general disarmament 
would be approaching fulfilment. 

And to a certain extent our own generation re- 
mains still affected by the same notions. Amid the 
thunders of more than a thousand miles of battle 
we still find ourselves clinging tenaciously to the 
belief, that the world has entered suddenly, and 

1 Influences of another kind altogether had much to do with the 
cleansing of public opinion — the writings of Henley, of Mahan, and of 
Mr. Eudyard Kipling. Though not so well known as the works of these, 
Henderson 's Life of Stonewall Jackson has nevertheless changed many 
courses of thought, and its indirect effect in removing false standards 
has been very great. I can never sufficiently acknowledge my personal 
debt to these four. 



NATUKE OF GERMAN ENMITY 413 

unexpectedly, upon an abnormal period which, from Part iv. 
its very nature, can only be of very brief duration. Chapter 
This comforting conviction does not appear to rest vni - 
upon solid grounds. In the light of history it would some 
not seem so certain that we have not passed out of reflections. 
an abnormal period into the normal — if lamentable 1 — 
condition when a nation, in order to maintain its 
independence, must be prepared at any moment to 
fight for its life. 

It would be profitless to pursue these speculations. 
It is enough for our own generation that we now 
find ourselves in a situation of the gravest danger ; 
and that it depends upon the efforts which we as a 
nation put forth, more than upon anything else, 
whether the danger will pass away or settle down 
and become chronic. 

Although we failed to perceive or acknowledge 
the danger until some nine months ago, it had been 
there for at least fifteen years, probably for twice 
that number. 

German antagonism to England has been com- 
pounded of envy of our possessions, contempt for 
our character, and hatred of our good fortune. What 
galled our rival more than anything else, was the 
fact that we enjoyed our prosperity, and held our 
vast Empire, upon too easy terms. The German 
people had made, and were continuing to make, 
sacrifices to maintain their position in the world, 
while the British people in their view were making 
none. And if we measure national sacrifices by 
personal service, and not merely in money payments, 
it is difficult to see what answer is to be given to 
this charge. 



historical 
reflections, 



414 DEMOCEACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 

PabtIV. It is clear that unless the result of this war be to 
Chapter crush Germany as completely as she herself hoped 
vnI - at the beginning of it, to crush France, our own 
some danger will remain, unless Germany's chief griev- 

ance against us is meanwhile removed. It is not a 
paradox, but merely a statement of plain fact, to say 
that Germany's chief grievance against ourselves 
was, that we were not prepared to withstand her 
attack. Her hatred, which has caused, and still 
causes us so much amazement, was founded upon 
the surest of foundations — a want of respect. The 
Germans despised a nation which refused to recog- 
nise that any obligation rested on its citizens, to fit 
themselves, by serious training, for defence of their 
inheritance. And they will continue to despise us 
when this war is over if we should still fail to recog- 
nise this obligation. Despising us, they will continue 
also to hate us ; the peace of the world will still be 
endangered ; and we shall not, after all our sacrifices, 
have reached the security at which we aimed. 

We may end this war without winning it, and at 
the same time without being defeated. And although 
it appears to be still believed by some persons that 
we can win, in some sort of fashion, without accept- 
ing the principle of national service, even those who 
entertain this dangerous confidence will hardly dare 
to deny that, after a war which ends without a 
crowning victory, we shall have to accept conscrip- 
tion at once upon the signature of peace. 

For it should be remembered that we have other 
things to take into account besides the mood of Ger- 
many. If we stave off defeat, only with the assist- 
ance of allies — all of whom have long ago adopted' 



HEART-SEARCHINGS 415 

universal military service in its most rigorous form PaetIV. 
• — we shall have to reckon with their appraisement of Chapteb 
the value of our assistance. If we are to judge by vrDL 
Germany's indomitable enterprise during the past s^ 
two generations, she is likely to recover from the ef- reLctim*. 
fects of this war at least as rapidly as ourselves. 
And when she has recovered, will she not hunger 
again for our possessions, as eagerly as before, if 
she sees them still inadequately guarded? And 
maybe, when that time comes, there may be some 
difficulty in finding allies. For a Power which de- 
clines to recognise the obligation of equal sacrifices, 
which refuses to make preparations in time of peace, 
and which accordingly, when war occurs, is ever found 
unready, is not the most eligible of comrades in 
arms. 

In a recent letter the Freiherr von Hexenkuchen 
refers, in his sour way, to some of the matters which 
have been discussed in this chapter. . . . "The 
'British people," he writes, "appear to be mightily 
1 exercised just now about their own and their neigh- 
bours ' consciences; about what they may or may 
'not do with decency; about whether or no football 
'matches are right; or race-meetings; or plays, 
'music-hall entertainments, concerts, the purchase 
' of new clothes, and the drinking of alcohol ; whether 
'indeed any form of enjoyment or cheerfulness ought 
'to be tolerated in present circumstances. 

"But although you vex yourselves over these and 
'other problems of a similar kind, you never seem 
'to vex yourselves about the abscess at the root of 
'the tooth. 

"The Holy Roman Empire, which was not holy, 



416 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 



nor Roman, nor yet an empire, reminds me not a 
little of your so-called voluntary military system, 
which is not voluntary, nor military, nor yet a 
system. It is only a chaos, a paradox, and a laugh- 
ing-stock to us Germans. 

"It is our army, and not yours, which really rests 
on a voluntary basis. Our whole people for a cen- 
tury past have voluntarily accepted the obligation 
of universal military service. Those amongst us 
who have raised objections to this system are but 
an inconsiderable fraction; negligible at any time, 
but in this or any other great crisis, not merely 
negligible, but altogether invisible and inaudible. 

"Our people desire their army to be as it is, 
otherwise it would not be as it is. No Kaiser, or 
Bureaucracy, or General Staff could impose such 
a system against the public will and conscience. 
Your people, on the other hand, have refused as 
a people to accept the military obligation. By vari- 
ous devices they endeavour to fix the burden on the 
shoulders of individuals. Is this the true meaning 
of the word 'voluntary' — to refuse? . . . Sir, I de- 
sire to be civil ; but was there ever a more conspicu- 
ous instance of cant in the whole history of the 
world, than your self-righteous boastings about 
your 'voluntary' military system? 

"You may wonder why I bracket these two things 

together — your soul-searchings about amusements 

of all kinds, and your nonsensical panegyrics on the 

'voluntary' principle. ... To my eyes they are 

very closely connected. 

"Cheerfulness is a duty in time of war. Every 
man or woman who smiles, and keeps a good heart, 
and goes about his or her day's work gaily, helps 



THE DUTY OF CHEERFULNESS 417 

by so much to sustain the national spirit. Not PabtIV. 
good, but harm, is done to the conduct of the war, Chapteb 
by moping and brooding over casualty lists, and VI11, 
by speculations as to disasters which have occurred, s° me 
or are thought to be imminent. But there is one reasons. 
essential preliminary to national cheerfulness — 
before a nation can be cheerful it must have a good 
conscience; and it cannot have a good conscience 
unless it has done its duty. 

"Your nation has a bad conscience. The reason 
is that, as a nation, it has not done its duty. This 
may be the fault of the leaders who have not dared 
to speak the word of command. But the fact re- 
mains, that you well know — or at any rate suspect 
in your hearts — that you have not done your whole 
duty. And consequently you cannot be really cheer- 
ful about anything. As you go about your daily 
work or recreations, you are all the while looking 
back over your shoulders with misgiving. As a 
nation you have not — even yet — dedicated your- 
selves to this war. When you have done so — if ever 
you do — your burden of gloom and mistrust will 
fall from your back, like that of Christian as he 
passed along the highway, which is fenced on either 
side with the Wall that is called Salvation." 

In the great American Civil War, the Southern 
States, which aimed at breaking away from the 
Union, adopted conscription within a year from the 
beginning. They were brave fighters ; but they were 
poor, and they were in a small minority. The North- 
ern States — confident in their numbers and wealth 
— relied at first upon the voluntary system. It gave 
them great and gallant armies; but these were not 



418 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 

PabtIV. enough; and as months went by President Lincoln 

Chapter realised that they were not enough. 
YI1J - Disregarding the entreaties of his friends, to be- 

some ware of asking of the people * what the people would 

reflection* never stand/ disregarding the clamours of his ene- 
mies about personal freedom, he insisted upon con- 
scription, believing that by these means alone the 
Union could be saved. And what was the result? 
A section of the press foamed with indignation. 
Mobs yelled, demonstrated, and in their illogical 
fury lynched negroes, seeing in these unfortunates 
the cause of all their troubles. But the mobs were 
not the American people. They were only a noisy 
and contemptible minority of the American people, 
whose importance as well as courage had been vastly 
over-rated. The quiet people were in deadly earnest, 
and they supported their President. 1 

But the task which Lincoln set himself was one 
of the hardest that a democratic statesman ever 
undertook. The demand which he determined to 
make, and did make, may well have tried his heart 
as he sat alone in the night watches. For compulsion 
was a violation of the habits and prejudices of the 
old American stock, while it was even more distasteful 
to new immigrants. It was contrary to the traditions 
and theories of the Republic, and, as many thought, 
to its fundamental principles. It was open to scornful 
attack on grounds of sentiment. Against a foe who 
were so weak, both in numbers and wealth, how hu- 
miliating to be driven to such desperate measures ! 
But most of all — outweighing all other considera- 
tions — this war of North and South was not only 
war, but civil war. Families and lifelong friendships 

*Cf. Bound Table, March 1915, 'The Polities of War.' 



LINCOLN AND CONSCRIPTION 419 

were divided. What compulsion meant, therefore, PartIY. 
in this case was, that brothers were to be forced to Chapter 
kill brothers, husbands were to be sent out to slay VI11 - 
the kinsmen of their wives, or — as they marched with some 
Sherman through Georgia — to set a light with their reflections. 
own hands to the old homesteads where they had 
been born. Between the warring States there were 
no differences of blood, tradition, or religion ; or of 
ideas of right and wrong; no hatred against a for- 
eign race; only an acute opposition of political 
ideals. Compulsion, therefore, was a great thing to 
ask of the American people. But the American peo- 
ple are a great people, and they understood. And 
Lincoln was a great man, — one of the greatest, nob- 
lest, and most human in the whole of history, — and 
he did not hesitate to ask, to insist, and to use force. 
What the end was does not need to be stated here; 
except merely this, that a lingering and bloody war 
was thereby greatly shortened, and that the Union 
was saved. 

The British Government and people are faced 
to-day with some, but not all — and not the greatest — 
of Lincoln's difficulties. Our traditions and theories 
are the same, to a large extent, as those which pre- 
vailed in America in 1863. But unlike the North we 
have had recent experience of war, and also of the 
sacrifices which war calls for from the civilian popu- 
lation. By so much the shock of compulsion would 
find us better prepared. 

But the other and much greater difficulties which 
beset Lincoln do not exist in the case of the British 
Government. We are not fighting against a foe 
inferior in numbers, but against one who up till now 
has been greatly superior in numbers — who has also 



420 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 

Part rv. been greatly superior in equipment, and preparation, 
Chapter and in deeply-laid plans. We are fighting against 
vn1, a foe who has invaded and encroached ; not against 
some on e who is standing on the defensive, demanding 

reflections, merely to be let go free. The family affections and 
friendships which would be outraged by conscription 
in this war against Germany are inconsiderable; 
mere dust in the balance. The present war is waged 
against a foreign nation; it is not civil war. It is 
waged against an enemy who plainly seeks, not his 
own freedom, but our destruction, and that of our 
Allies. It is waged against an enemy who by the 
treacherous thoroughness of his peace-time prepara- 
tions, appears to our eyes to have violated good faith 
as between nations, as in the conduct of the campaign 
he has disregarded the obligations of our common 
humanity. We may be wrong; we may take exag- 
gerated views owing to the bitterness of the strug- 
gle ; but such is our mind upon the matter. 

Lincoln's task would have been light had such 
been the mind of the Northern States half a century 
ago, and had he been faced with nothing more 
formidable than the conditions which prevail in Eng- 
land to-day. It does not need the courage of a Lin- 
coln to demand from our people a sacrifice, upon 
which the safety of the British Empire depends, 
even more certainly, than in 1863 did that of the 
American Union. 



CHAPTER IX 



THE CRUCIBLE OF WAR 



It in the foregoing pages the Liberal party has 
come in for the larger share of criticism, the reason 
is, that during the ten critical years, while dangers 
were drawing to a head, a Liberal Government 
chanced to be in power. That things would have 
been managed better and more courageously had 
the Unionists been in power may be doubted; and 
certainly it is no part of my present task to cham- 
pion any such theory. 

The special type of politician whose influence has 
wrought so much evil of late is no peculiar product 
of the Liberal party. He is the product of the party 
system in its corrupt decadence. You find him in 
the ranks of the Opposition as well as in those of 
the Ministerialists, just as you find good and true 
men in both. In this last lies our hope. In our 
present trouble good and true men have a chance 
of taking things into their own hands, which has 
been denied to them for many generations. 



PaetIV. 

Chapter 

IX. 

The 

crucible 
of war. 



This book has been written to establish the Need 
for National Service, in order that the British Em- 
pire may maintain itself securely in the present cir- 

421 



422 DEMOCEACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 

Part tv. cumstances of the world. If this contention be true 

Chapter jj. ^ g obvious that a corresponding Duty lies upon 
the whole nation to accept the burden of military 

cmcibie service. 

of war. Neither need nor duty has ever been made clear 

to the British people by their leaders. Owing to the 
abuses of the party system, increasing steadily over 
a considerable period of years, a certain type of 
politician has been evolved, and has risen into great 
prominence — a type which does not trust the people, 
but only fears them. In order to maintain them- 
selves and their parties in power, politicians of this 
type have darkened the eyes and drugged the spirit 
of the nation. 

It is no part of the plan of this volume to offer 
criticisms upon the naval and military aspects of 
the present war, or upon the wisdom or unwisdom 
of the operations which have been undertaken by 
land and sea. All that need be said in this connection 
may be put into a very few words. 

As we read and re-read British history we cannot 
but be impressed with the fact that our leading 
statesmen, misled by the very brilliancy of their 
intellectual endowments, have always been prone to 
two errors of policy, which the simpler mind of the 
soldier instinctively avoids. They have ever been 
too ready to conclude prematurely that a certain line 
of obstacles is so formidable that it cannot be forced ; 
and they have also ever been too ready to accept 
the notion, that there must surely be some ingenious 
far way round, by which they may succeed in cir- 
cumventing the infinite. 

The defect of brilliant brains is not necessarily a 



MAIN PRINCIPLE OF STRATEGY 423 

want of courage — daring there has usually been in paktIV. 
plenty — but they are apt to lack fortitude. They Chapter 
are apt to abandon the assault upon positions which IX - 
are not really invulnerable, and to go off, chasing The 
after attractive butterflies, until they fall into quag- ofwar. e 
mires. Dispersion of effort has always been the 
besetting sin of British statesmen and the curse of 
British policy. There is no clearer example of this 
than the case of William Pitt the Younger, who 
went on picking up sugar islands all over the world, 
when he ought to have been giving his whole strength 
to beating Napoleon. 

Very few obstacles are really insurmountable, and 
it is usually the shortest and the safest course to 
stick to what has been already begun. Especially 
is this the case when your resources in trained sol- 
diers and munitions of war are painfully restricted. 
At the one point, where you have decided to attack, 
the motto is push hard; and at all others, where 
you may be compelled to defend yourselves, the 
motto is hold fast. 

The peril of British war councils in the past has 
always been (and maybe still is) the tendency of 
ingenious argument to get the better of sound judg- 
ment. In the very opposite of this lies safety. We 
find the true type of high policy, as well as of suc- 
cessful campaigning, in the cool and patient inflexi- 
bility of Wellington, holding fast by one main idea, 
forcing his way over one obstacle after another 
which had been pronounced invincible — through 
walled cities ; into the deep valleys of the Pyrenees ;. 
across the Bidassoa — till from the crests of the 
Great Rhune and the Little his soldiers looked down 
at last upon the plains of France. 



424 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 

PabtIV. Our most urgent problem with regard to the 

Chapter present war, is how we may win it most thoroughly ; 

IX - but, in addition to this, there are two questions 

The which have recently engaged a good deal of public 

ofwL-. 6 attention. There is a Political question — what sort 

of European settlement is to take place after the 

war? And there is also a Criminal question — what 

sort of punishment shall be meted out, if crimes, 

contrary to the practice of war among civilised 

and humane states, have been committed by our 

antagonists ? 

I have not attempted to deal with either of these. 
They do not seem to be of extreme urgency; for 
unless, and until, we win the war it is somewhat idle 
to discuss the ultimate fate of Europe or the penalty 
of evil deeds. You cannot restore stolen property 
until you have recovered it, and you cannot punish 
a malefactor, nor is it very convenient even to try 
him, while he is still at large. If that be true, which 
was said of old by a great king — I do not make peace 
with barbarians but dictate the terms of their sur- 
render — we are still a long way from that. 

I have not occupied myself therefore with what 
are termed ' German atrocities.' So far as this mat- 
ter is concerned, I am satisfied to let it rest for the 
present upon the German statement of intentions be- 
fore war began, 1 and upon the proclamations which 

1 " A war conducted with energy cannot be directed merely against 
' the combatants of the enemy State and the positions they occupy, but 
'it will and must in like manner seek to destroy the total intellectual 
' and material resources of the latter. Humanitarian claims, such as the 
' protection of men and their goods, can only be taken into consideration 
'in so far as the nature and object of the war permit. 

' ' International Law is in no way opposed to the exploitation of the 
'crimes of third parties (assassination, incendiarism, robbery, and the 
'like) to the prejudice of the enemy. . . . The necessary aim of war 
' gives the belligerent the right and imposes on him the duty, according 



WHAT WE ARE FIGHTING ABOUT 425 

have been issued subsequently, with the object of PartIV. 

justifying their mode of operations by sea and land. Chapter 
The case against Germany on her own admission, is IX * 

quite strong enough without opening a further in- The 

quisition under this heading. 1 otwar. 

It is essential, however, to realise the falsities 
and perversities upon which the great fabric of 
German policy is founded; for otherwise we shall 
never understand either the nature of the enemy 
with whom we are at present engaged, or the full 
extent of the danger by which, not only we, but 
civilisation itself is now threatened. It is essential 
that the whole British race should understand the 
nature of the evils against which they are fighting — 
the ambitions of Germany — the ruthless despotism 
of the Prussian system — the new theories of right 
and wrong which have been evolved by thinkers 
who have been paid, promoted, and inspired by the 
State, in order to sanctify the imperial policy of 
spoliation. 

It is also essential for us to realise the nature of 
those things for which we are fighting — what we 
shall save and secure for our posterity in case of 
victory; what we stand to lose in event of defeat. 11 
The preservation or ruin of our inheritance, spiritual 
and material — the maintenance or overthrow of our 

' to circumstances, the duty not to let slip the important, it may be the 
' decisive advantages to be gained by such means. ' ' — The German War 
Book, issued by the Great General Staff. 

1 Clearly, however, when it comes to the discussion of terms of peace, 
not only the political question, but also the criminal question, will have 
to be remembered. Oddly enough the 'pacifist' section, which has al- 
ready been clamorous for putting forward peace proposals, seems very 
anxious that we should forget, or at any rate ignore, the criminal ques- 
tion — odd, because 'humanity' is the stuff they have set up their bills 
to trade in. 



426 DEMOCEACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 

Part iv. institutions, traditions, and ideas — the triumph of 

Chapter these, or the supplanting of them by a wholly differ- 

IX - ent order, which to our eyes wears the appearance 

The of a vast machine under the control of savages — 

o! wL-." are the main issues of the present war. And when 

now at last, we face them squarely, we begin to 

wonder, why of late years, we have been wont to 

treat problems of national defence and imperial 

security with so much levity and indifference. 

It is profitable to turn our eyes from the con- 
templation of German shortcomings inwards upon 
our own. If we have been guilty as a people during 
recent times of weakness, blindness, indolence, or 
cowardice, we should face these facts squarely, oth- 
erwise there is but a poor chance of arriving at 
better conditions. If we have refused to listen to 
unpleasant truths, and to exchange a drowsy and 
dangerous comfort against sacrifices which were 
necessary for security, it is foolish to lay the whole 
blame upon this or that public man, this or that 
government. For, after all, both public men and 
governments were our own creation ; we chose them 
because we liked them; because it gave us pleasure 
and consolation to listen to their sayings; because 
their doings and their non-doings, their un-doings 
and their mis-doings were regarded with approval 
or indifference by the great bulk of our people. 

It would be wise also to take to heart the lesson, 
plainly written across the record of the last nine 
months, that the present confusion of our political 
system is responsible, as much as anything — perhaps 
more than anything — for the depreciated currency 
of public character. The need is obvious for a Par- 
liament and a Government chosen by the Empire, 



CAUSES OF "WEAKNESS AND STRENGTH 427 

responsible to the Empire, and charged with the PartIV. 
security of the Empire, and with no other task. Chaptee 

IX. 

Why we are righting at all is one of our problems ; The 
why we are finding it so hard to win is another. In c^wL-. 8 
what does the main strength of our enemies consist? 
And in what does our own chief weakness consist? 

To say that our weakness is to be sought in our 
own vices, and the strength of our enemies in their 
virtues, is of course a commonplace. But one has 
only to open the average newspaper to realise the 
need for restating the obvious. For there the con 
trary doctrine is set forth daily and weekly with 
a lachrymose insistency — that our hands are weak- 
ened because we are so good ; that the Germans fight 
at an enormous advantage because they are so 
wicked and unscrupulous. 

But the things which we are finding hardest to 
overcome in our foes are not the immoral gibberings 
of professors, or the blundering cynicism of the Ger- 
man Foreign Office, or the methodical savagery of 
the General Staff, whether in Belgium or on the 
High Seas. These are sources of weakness and not 
of strength ; and even at the present stage it is clear 
that, although they have inflicted immeasurable suf- 
fering, they have done the German cause consider- 
ably more harm than good. 

Our real obstacles are the loyalty, the self-sacri- 
fice, and the endurance of the German people. 

The causes of British weakness are equally plain. 
Our indolence and factiousness; our foolish confi- 
dence in cleverness, manoeuvres, and debate for over- 
coming obstacles which lie altogether outside that 
region of human endeavour; our absorption as 



428 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 



The 

crucible 
of war. 



PaetIV. thrilled spectators in the technical game of British 
Chapter politics J — these vices and others of a similar char- 
Ix - acter, which, since the beginning of the war we have 
been straggling — like a man awakening from a night- 
mare — to shake off, are still our chief difficulties. It 
is a hard job to get rid of them, and we are not yet 
anything like halfway through with it. 

It must be clear to every detached observer, that 
the moral strength of England in the present strug- 
gle — like that of France — does not lie in Govern- 
ment or Opposition, but in the spirit of the people ; 
that this spirit has drawn but little support, in the 
case of either country, from the leadership and ex- 
ample of the politicians ; and that there is little cause 
in either case to bless or praise them for the fidelity 
of their previous stewardship. In the case of France 
this national spirit was aroused at the beginning; 
in our own case the process of awakening has pro- 
ceeded much more slowly. 

It is essential to put certain notions out of our 
heads and certain other notions into them. From 
the beginning of the war, a large part of the press — 
acting, we are entitled to suppose, in patriotic obedi- 
ence to the directions of the Press Bureau — has 
fostered ideas which do not correspond with the 
facts. Information has been doled out and presented 
in such a way as to destroy all sense of proportion 
in the public mind. 

It is not an uncommon belief, 2 for example, that 
we with our Allies — ever since the first onset, when, 

1 In reality, as regards party politics, we have been for years past 
very like those shouting, cigarette-smoking, Saturday crowds at foot- 
ball matches whom we have lately been engaged in reproving so virtu- 
ously. 

2 Certainly up to April 1915 it was not an uncommon belief. 



ILLUSIONS OF SUCCESS 



429 



IX. 

The 

crucible 
of war. 



being virtuously unprepared, we were pushed back partIV. 
some little distance — have been doing much better Chapteb 
than the Germans ; that for months past our adver- 
saries have been in a desperate plight — lacking am- 
munition, on the verge of bankruptcy and starvation, 
and thoroughly discouraged. 

There is also a tendency to assume — despite Lord 
Kitchener's grave and repeated warnings to the con- 
trary — that the war is drawing rapidly to a con- 
clusion, and that, even if we may have to submit to 
some interruption of our usual summer holidays, at 
any rate we shall eat our Christmas dinners in an 
atmosphere of peace and goodwill. 

The magnitude of the German victories, both in 
the East and West, during the earlier stages of the 
war, is not realised even now by the great majority 
of our fellow-countrymen; while the ruinous conse- 
quences of these victories to our Allies — the occupa- 
tion of Belgium, of a large part of northern France, 
and of Western Poland — is dwelt on far too lightly. 
Nor is it understood by one man in a hundred, that 
up to the end of last year, British troops were never 
holding more than thirty miles, out of that line of 
more than five hundred which winds, like a great 
snake, from Nieuport to the Swiss frontier. On the 
contrary, it is quite commonly believed that we have 
been doing our fair share of the fighting — or even 
more — by land as well as sea. 

A misleading emphasis of type and comment, to- 
gether with a dangerous selection of items of news, 
are responsible for these illusions; while the prev- 
alence of these illusions is largely responsible for 
many of our labour difficulties. 

Such dreams of inevitable and speedy victory 



430 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 

Part tv. are no doubt very soothing to indolent and timid 

Chapter minds, but they do not make for a vigorous and 

Jx - resolute spirit in the nation, upon which, more 

The than upon anything else, the winning of this war 

crucible , -. 

of war. depends. 

In some quarters there appears still to linger a 
ridiculous idea that we went into this war, out of 
pure chivalry, to defend Belgium. 1 We went into 
it to defend our own existence, and for no other 
reason. We made common cause with Allies who 
were menaced by the same danger as ourselves ; but' 
these, most fortunately, had made their preparations 
with greater foresight than we had done. The actual 
fighting has taken place, so far, in their territories 
and not in ours ; but the issue of this war is not one 
whit less a matter of life-or-death for us, than it is 
for them. 

Quite recently I have seen our present situation 
described glowingly and self-complacently as the 
1 triumph of the voluntary system.' I must be blind 
of both eyes, for I can perceive no 'triumph' and no 
* voluntary ' system. I have seen the territories of our 
Allies seized, wasted, and held fast by an undefeated 
enemy. I have seen our small army driven back; 
fighting with as much skill and bravery as ever in 
its history; suffering losses unparalleled in its 
history; holding its own in the end, but against 
what overwhelming numbers and by what sacri- 
fices ! The human triumph is apparent enough ; but 
not that of any system, voluntary or otherwise. 
Neither in this record of nine months' 'hard and 
hot fighting' on land, nor in the state of things 

'Mr. Lloyd George, Pearson's Magazine, March 1915. 



DEMOCRACY NOT INVINCIBLE 



431 



which now exists at the end of it all, is there a tri- 
umph for anything, or any one, save for a few 
thousands of brave men, who were left to hold fast 
as best they could against intolerable odds. 

Certain contemporary writers appear to claim 
more for that form of representative government, 
which we are in the habit of calling 'democracy,' 
than it is either safe to count on, or true to assert. 
In their eyes democracy seems to possess a superi- 
ority in all the higher virtuous qualities — ' freedom,' 
in particular — and also an inherent strength which 
— whatever may be the result of the present war — 
makes the final predominance of British institutions 
only a matter of time. 1 

I do not hold with either of these doctrines. Uni- 
versal superiority in virtue and strength is too wide 
a claim to put forward for any system of govern- 
ment. And 'freedom' is a very hard thing to define. 

It is not merely that the form of constitution, 
which we call ' democracy, ' is obviously not the best 
fitted for governing an uncivilised or half-civilised 
people. There are considerations which go much 
deeper than that — considerations of race, religion, 
temperament, and tradition. As it has been in the 
past, so conceivably it may be again in the future, 
that a people, which is in the highest degree civilised 
and humane, will seek to realise its ideals of freedom 
in some other sphere than the control of policy and 
legislation according to the electoral verdicts of its 

1 These views are very prevalent among Liberal writers, and they 
are clearly implied, if not quite so openly stated, in the expressions of 
Unionists. They seem also to be assumed as the basis of one of the 
ablest articles which has yet been written upon the causes of the present 
war — 'The Schism of Europe' (Bound Table, March 1915). 



Part TV. 

Chapter 

IX. 

The 

crucible 
of war. 



432 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 



Part IV. 

Chapter 

IX. 

The 

crucible 
of war. 



citizens. It is even possible that its national aspira- 
tions may regard some other end as a higher good 
even than freedom. We cannot speak with certainty 
as to the whole human race, but only with regard to 
ourselves and certain others, who have been bred 
in the same traditions. 

If a personal and autocratic government — the 
German for example — is able to arouse and maintain 
among its people a more ardent loyalty, a firmer 
confidence, a more constant spirit of self-sacrifice 
(in time of peace as well as war), I can see no good 
reason for the hope, that democracy, merely because, 
in our eyes, it approaches more nearly to the ideal 
of the Christian Commonwealth, will be able to 
maintain itself against the other. A highly central- 
ised system of government has great natural advan- 
tages both for attack and defence ; and if in addition 
it be supported by a more enduring fortitude, and a 
more self-denying devotion, on the part of the peo- 
ple, it seems almost incredible that, in the end, it 
will not prevail over other forms of government 
which have failed to enlist the same support. 

The strength of all forms of government alike, 
whether against foreign attack or internal disinte- 
gration, must depend in the long last upon the spirit 
of the people ; upon their determination to maintain 
their own institutions; upon their willingness to 
undertake beforehand, as well as during the excite- 
ment of war, those labours and sacrifices which are 
necessary for security. The spirit is everything. 
And in the end that spirit which is strongest is likely 
to become predominant, and to impose its own forms, 
systems, and ideas upon civilised and uncivilised 
nations alike. 



NEED OF LEADERSHIP 



433 



A considerable part of the world — though it may 
have adopted patterns of government which are 
either avowedly democratic or else are monarchies 
of the constitutional sort (in essence the same) — is 
by no means wedded to popular institutions ; has no 
deep-rooted traditions to give them support; could 
easily, therefore, and without much loss of self-re- 
spect, abandon them and submit to follow new fash- 
ions. But with the United Kingdom, the self-govern- 
ing Dominions, and the United States it is altogether 
different. 

To exchange voluntarily, merely because circum- 
stances rendered it expedient to do so, a system 
which is the only one consistent with our notions of 
freedom would be an apostasy. It would mean our 
immediate spiritual ruin, and for that reason also 
our ultimate material ruin. On the other hand, to 
continue to exist on sufferance, without a voice in 
the destinies of the world, would be an even deeper 
degradation. To be conquered outright, and absorbed, 
wouldbe an infinitely preferable fate to either of these. 



Part TV. 

Chapter 

IX. 

The 

crucible 
of war. 



The nations of the world have one need in common 
— Leadership. The spirit of the people can do much, 
but it cannot do everything. In the end that form 
of government is likely to prevail which produces the 
best and most constant supply of leaders. On its 
own theories, democracy of the modern type ought 
to out-distance all competitors; under this system 
capacity, probity, and vigour should rise most easily 
to the top. 

In practice, however, democracy has come under 
the thumb of the Party System, and the Party Sys- 
tem has reached a very high point of efficiency. It 



434 DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE 



PabtIV. 

Chapter 

IX. 

The 

crucible 
of war. 



has bettered the example of the hugest mammoth 
store in existence. It has elaborated machinery for 
crushing out independent opinion and for cramping 
the characters of public men. In commending its 
wares it has become as regardless of truth as a ven- 
dor of quack medicines. It pursues corruption as an 
end, and it freely uses corruption — both direct and in- 
direct — as the means by which it may attain its end. 
If the Party System continues to develop along its 
present lines, it may ultimately prove as fatal to the 
principle of democracy as the ivy which covers and 
strangles the elm-trees in our hedgerows. 

Leadership is our greatest present need, and it is 
there that the Party System has played us false. To 
manipulate its vast and intricate machinery there 
arose a great demand for expert mechanicians, and 
these have been evolved in a rich profusion. But in 
a crisis like the present, mechanicians will not serve 
our purpose. The real need is a Man, who by the 
example of his own courage, vigour, certainty, and 
stedfastness will draw out the highest qualities of 
the people; whose resolute sense of duty will brush 
opportunism aside; whose sympathy and truthful- 
ness will stir the heart and hold fast the conscience of 
the nation. Leadership of this sort we have lacked. 

The Newcastle speech with its soft words and 
soothing optimism was not leadership. It does not 
give confidence to a horse to know that he has a 
rider on his back who is afraid of him. 

It is idle at this stage to forecast the issue of the 
present war. Nevertheless we seem at last to have 
begun to understand that there is but a poor chance 
of winning it under rulers who are content to wait 
and see if by some miracle the war will win itself; 



NEED FOR FRANKNESS 



435 



or if by another miracle our resources of men and 
material will organise themselves. Since the battle 
of the Marne many sanguine expectations of a 
speedy and victorious peace have fallen to the 
ground. The constant burden of letters from sol- 
diers at the front is that the war — so far as England 
is concerned — is only just beginning. And yet, in 
spite of all these disappointments and warnings, the 
predominant opinion in official circles is still, appa- 
rently, as determined as ever to wait and see what 
the people will stand, although it is transparently 
clear what they ought to stand, and must stand, if 
they are to remain a people. 

We cannot forecast with certainty the issue of the 
present war, but hope nevertheless refuses to be 
bound. There is a false hope and a true one. There 
may be consolation for certain minds, but there is no 
safety for the nation, in the simple faith that democ- 
racy is in its nature invincible. Democracy is by no 
means invincible. On the contrary, it fights at a 
disadvantage, both by reason of its inferiority in 
central control, and because it shrinks from ruthless- 
ness. Nevertheless we may believe as firmly as those 
who hold this other opinion that in the end it will 
conquer. Before this can happen it must find a 
leader who is worthy of its trust. 



PartIV. 

Chapter 

IX. 

The 

crucible 
of war. 



Since August 1914 we have learned many things 
from experience which we previously refused to 
credit upon any human authority. We are not alto- 
gether done with the past; for it contains lessons 
and warnings — about men as well as things — which 
it would be wasteful to forget. But our main con- 
cern is with the present. And we are also treading 



436 DEMOCEACY AND NATIONAL SEEVICE 

PartIV. very close on the heels of the future, when — as we 

Chapter trust — the resistance of our enemies will be begin- 

IX ' ning to flag ; when the war will be drawing to an end ; 

The afterwards through anxious years (how many we 

crucible \ i ji -, -,-, -, 

of war. cannot guess) when the war has ended, and when the 
object of our policy will be to keep the peace which 
has been so dearly bought. 

Lord Eoberts was right in his forecast of the 
danger; nor was he less right in his perception of 
England's military weakness and general unpre- 
paredness for war. But was he also right as to the 
principle of the remedy which he proposed? And 
even if he were right as things stood when he uttered 
his warnings, is his former counsel still right in our 
present circumstances, and as we look forward into 
the future? Is it now necessary for us to accept 
in practice what has always been admitted in the 
vague region of theory — that an obligation lies upon 
every citizen, during the vigour of his age, to place 
his services, and if need be his life, at the disposal 
of that state under whose shelter he and all those 
who are most dear to him have lived ? 

There is always danger in treating a free people 
like children ; in humouring them, and coaxing them, 
and wheedling them with half-truths ; in asking for 
something less than is really needed, from fear 
that to ask for the whole would alarm them too 
much; with the foolish hope that when the first 
demand has been granted it will then be easy enough 
to make them understand how much more is still 
necessary to complete the fabric of security; that 
having deceived them once, it will be all the easier 
to deceive them again. 

As we look back over our country's history we 



THE PEOPLE WILL NOT FLINCH 437 

find that it was those men who told the people the partIV. 
whole truth — or what, at least, they themselves Chapter 
honestly believed to be the whole truth — who most IX - 
often succeeded in carrying their proposals through. The 
In these matters, which touch the very life and soul ZZli* 
of the nation, all artifice is out of place. The power 
of persuasion lies in the truthfulness of the advocate, 
no less than in the truth of his plea. If the would-be 
reformer is only half sincere, if from timidity or 
regard for popular opinion he chooses to tell but half 
his tale — selecting this, suppressing that, postponing 
the other to a more propitious season — he loses by 
his misplaced caution far more than half his 
strength. When there is a case to be laid before the 
British People it is folly to do it piecemeal, by astute 
stages of pleading, and with subtle reservations. If 
the whole case can be put unflinchingly it is not the 
People who will flinch. The issue may be left with 
safety to a tribunal which has never yet failed in 
its duty, when rulers have had the courage to say 
where its duty lay. 



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